Weekly Digest
June 20 – June 26, 2026
39 opinions this week
In the Interest of J.Z.A., a Child
SCOTX
In In re J.Z.A., the Supreme Court of Texas held that former Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O) allowed termination only for violating a court order that specifically stated the actions required for reunification. The Department relied on service-plan language requiring Mother to “follow through with all recommendations” from providers and to “actively participate” and “utilize learned skills” during visits. The Court concluded those directives were too vague and open-ended to satisfy the statute, especially where the later recommendation to take antipsychotic medication was never incorporated into an amended court order. Because the evidence showed, at most, noncompliance with generalized expectations rather than a specific court-ordered act, the Court reversed and vacated the termination.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a party’s rights depend on compliance with an order, the order must say exactly what must be done. Vague directives like “follow recommendations” or “actively participate” are poor enforcement language and may not support termination, sanctions, or other serious consequences without specific, court-ordered terms.”
Gray v. Beck
COA03
In Gray v. Beck, an heirship dispute turned on whether Jane Gray was Robert Beck’s informal spouse under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2). Gray offered evidence that they lived together in Texas and may have privately considered themselves married, but Matthew Beck moved for no-evidence summary judgment arguing there was insufficient proof of the required elements. The Third Court of Appeals held that an informal-marriage claim requires legally sufficient evidence of agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others in Texas as married. The court concluded the record lacked more than a scintilla of evidence on the key holding-out element, and it also rejected Gray’s notice complaint because the amended summary-judgment motion merely clarified existing grounds rather than adding new ones. The court affirmed summary judgment and the heirship judgment declaring Robert unmarried at death.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your case depends on proving an informal marriage, evidence of living together and a private commitment is not enough. You need concrete proof that the couple publicly represented themselves in Texas as married—through witnesses, documents, or consistent public conduct—or the claim may be defeated on no-evidence summary judgment.”
In the Interest of H.J.L. a/k/a H.J.H., a Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights after evidence showed he repeatedly sexually abused his child over several years. The court focused on Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), holding that the multi-year abuse constituted a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the child’s physical and emotional well-being. The court relied on the child’s outcry, therapist testimony about grooming, coercion, escalation, and trauma, and evidence of PTSD, depression, self-harm, and a suicide attempt. The same evidence, along with the child’s wish for no contact, progress in foster care, lack of safe family placement, and the ad litem’s recommendation, also supported the best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2).
Litigation Takeaway
“Sexual abuse evidence is powerful endangerment evidence in Texas family cases, not just CPS cases. When the record shows a sustained pattern of abuse, grooming, coercion, and resulting trauma, courts will support strong protective rulings—including termination, no-contact orders, supervised access, and sole conservatorship—even without a criminal conviction. Build the record through outcry, therapist, placement, and trauma evidence; noncooperation by the accused parent can further strengthen the endangerment and best-interest case.”
Nicholas Field v. Brandi Pinsker
COA03
In Field v. Pinsker, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed a modification order requiring above-guideline support for an adult disabled child under Texas Family Code § 154.306. The dispute centered on whether post-majority support for Eric, a severely autistic young adult with significant behavioral and functional limitations, could exceed ordinary guideline child support. The court analyzed the statute through an abuse-of-discretion lens and held that § 154.306 allows trial courts to consider the child’s proven disability-related needs, including constant one-on-one supervision, structured care, caregiver scarcity, and safety-related expenses, rather than limiting support to guideline amounts. Because the evidence showed Eric was incapable of self-support, required substantial ongoing care, and Field had the ability to pay more, the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering above-guideline support.
Litigation Takeaway
“Section 154.306 cases turn on detailed proof of functional incapacity and real-world care costs, not diagnosis alone. If you want above-guideline adult disabled child support, build a concrete record showing supervision needs, safety risks, caregiver costs, and the obligor’s ability to pay; if you oppose it, attack the specificity, necessity, and reasonableness of those claimed expenses rather than relying on a simple guideline-cap argument.”
In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt
COA05
In re Schmidt held that stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are civil protective-order judgments and are final and appealable when they dispose of all parties and issues in the application. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed Chapter 7B’s incorporation of Title 4 Family Code procedures, relied on Texas authority treating these proceedings as civil, and applied ordinary mandamus principles requiring no adequate appellate remedy. Because the relators could have challenged the orders by direct appeal, and because a missed appellate deadline does not make mandamus available absent true voidness, the court denied mandamus relief and denied the requested stays as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat every completed protective-order case—including a Chapter 7B stalking order—as a stand-alone final judgment. Calendar appellate deadlines immediately, build and preserve the record at the hearing, and do not assume mandamus can rescue a missed appeal unless the order is truly void.”
In re Coby Todd Bausch
COA08
In re Coby Todd Bausch arose from a trust-administration dispute after a trial court entered an order clarifying a successor trustee’s powers to wind up a family trust under Texas Property Code § 115.001. The relator sought mandamus, arguing the order was void because it was entered without notice and a hearing and because it impermissibly expanded the trustee’s authority beyond the trust instrument. The El Paso Court of Appeals denied relief, focusing on the threshold mandamus requirement that the relator show no adequate appellate remedy. The court explained that even if the relator disputed the merits of the trustee-powers order, those complaints were the kind ordinarily reviewed on direct appeal, and the relator never developed any argument showing why appeal after final judgment would be inadequate. The court also rejected the due-process theory as a basis for extraordinary relief because the trial court later held a reconsideration hearing, considered the parties’ positions, and reaffirmed its ruling. The petition for writ of mandamus and motion to stay were denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is not a shortcut for challenging an aggressive interlocutory order. Even if a trial court acts without an initial hearing or grants broad fiduciary powers, the petition will likely fail unless you specifically show why a normal appeal cannot fix the harm. Preserve error, build a record, seek reconsideration, and separately prove irreparable harm before choosing mandamus.”
Crane v. Crane
SCOTX
In Crane v. Crane, the Texas Supreme Court held that a no-evidence summary-judgment motion under Rule 166a is sufficiently specific when it identifies the factual predicates of the pleaded claims in enough detail to put the nonmovant on notice of what evidence is required. Sasha Crane sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging Robert Crane’s fence interfered with her easement and blocked access to her property. Robert moved for no-evidence summary judgment, asserting there was no evidence Sasha owned an easement crossing his property or that his fence crossed any such easement. The Court looked to the actual claims pleaded and concluded that fence interference was the sole factual basis for both the declaratory and injunctive claims, so the motion adequately challenged the essential elements even without using the precise phrase “interference with an easement.” Because Sasha produced evidence aimed mainly at proving the easement still existed, but no evidence that the fence actually crossed or interfered with the easement, the Court held take-nothing summary judgment was proper and reinstated the trial court’s judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law property and injunction disputes, courts will focus on the specific factual event that gives the claim life. A no-evidence motion does not need magic words if it clearly targets that operative fact. If you plead lockout, blocked access, gate changes, or interference with awarded property, you must have summary-judgment evidence proving the actual interference—not just the underlying right.”
Moore v. State
COA05
In Moore v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old murder defendant for adult prosecution under Texas Family Code § 54.02. Moore argued the transfer was unsupported because the investigation was not “full,” given that some forensic and electronic-device testing was still pending, and because the evidence did not sufficiently show he could not be rehabilitated in the juvenile system. The court rejected those arguments, explaining that a § 54.02 transfer hearing is not a trial on the merits and does not require every investigative thread to be finished so long as the juvenile court had a sufficiently developed record to assess probable cause and community welfare. Because the juvenile court ordered and reviewed a diagnostic study, social evaluation, psychological material, and a full investigation, and because the record supported findings of probable cause, violent and willful conduct, use of a deadly weapon, and serious doubt about rehabilitation through juvenile services, the appellate court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient and that the transfer order was not an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a statute requires the trial court to consider specific factors and court-ordered evaluations, appellate courts usually focus on whether the existing record gave the judge a legally sufficient basis to make the required findings—not on whether every possible piece of evidence had been gathered. To challenge a discretionary ruling successfully, tie any missing evidence to a specific statutory finding and show why the current record cannot support that finding.”
Arthur v. Williams
COA06
In Arthur v. Williams, the defendant tried to use a Rule 120a special appearance to argue that substituted service was defective because the process server allegedly failed to comply with the trial court’s substituted-service order and Rules 106 and 107. The Texarkana Court of Appeals focused on the substance of the complaint and held that these arguments challenged only the manner of service, not whether the defendant was amenable to Texas process. Relying on Kawasaki Steel and GFTA Trendanalysen, the court explained that service defects must be raised by motion to quash, not by special appearance, and that using a special appearance for that purpose constitutes a general appearance. The court therefore affirmed the denial of the special appearance.
Litigation Takeaway
“Use the right procedural tool. In Texas family cases, a special appearance is for true personal-jurisdiction or non-amenability challenges, not complaints that substituted service was carried out incorrectly. If the issue is noncompliance with a substituted-service order or Rules 106 and 107, raise it by motion to quash or risk turning the filing into a general appearance.”
In the Interest of S.H., A.H., and A.H., Children
COA06
In In re S.H., the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed a parental-rights termination judgment after the mother argued only that the trial court should have continued trial because she was allegedly still institutionalized and discovery was incomplete. The court focused on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251, which requires a continuance request to be in writing and supported by affidavit unless the parties consent or the law provides otherwise. Although the mother had filed an earlier unverified motion that supported a prior reset, the request tied to the actual trial setting was only oral. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the court held the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the continuance because the request did not comply with Rule 251. The court also found no showing of prejudice from the mother’s absence because the record did not establish the materiality of her testimony or likely effect on the outcome, rejected the vague discovery complaint because the record did not identify missing discovery or resulting harm, and held any due-process complaint was not preserved because it was not raised in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a continuance issue to survive appeal in Texas family court, build a Rule 251 record: file a written, verified motion for the specific setting, support it with sworn facts, explain exactly why the missing witness or discovery matters, and request alternatives like remote appearance if needed. Equity alone will not preserve error.”
In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt
COA05
In this original proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are final, appealable orders when they dispose of all parties and all issues in the protective-order case. The relators tried to attack the orders by mandamus, but the court applied ordinary mandamus principles, relied on Cooke’s finality analysis for protective orders, and extended that reasoning to Chapter 7B proceedings because they are civil in nature and procedurally governed through Title 4 of the Family Code. Because the relators had an adequate remedy by direct appeal, and did not show the orders were void, mandamus was unavailable even though they missed the appellate deadline. The court denied mandamus relief and denied the requested stays as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat every final protective order—including Chapter 7B stalking orders—as immediately appealable. In family-law cases, do not assume mandamus can rescue a missed appeal; unless the order is truly void, direct appeal is the required path.”
Austin Paris v. Alexandra Paris
COA02
In Paris v. Paris, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree appointing the mother sole managing conservator and heavily restricting the father’s possession and access after evidence showed a history or pattern of family violence against the mother and alcohol or substance abuse. The father argued Section 153.004 should not apply because the violence was not directed at the children, but the court rejected that argument, explaining the statute protects both children and other victims of family violence and permits restrictions when credible evidence shows danger. Relying on the prior protective-order findings, the trial record, and the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support electronic-only contact, delayed in-person visitation, step-up conditions, reunification therapy, and testing requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
“Family-violence findings against the other parent—not just against the children—can justify sole managing conservatorship and major possession restrictions under Family Code § 153.004. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to build a detailed safety record and propose specific protective terms, because tailored restrictions tied to protective-order findings are hard to overturn on appeal.”
John Martin Charles Bailey v. The State of Texas
COA10
In Bailey, the appellant challenged a revocation order based on an alleged due-process problem tied to testimony about one contested violation, but he did not challenge his pleas of true to five other alleged violations. The court applied the rule that any single independent ground can support revocation and that a plea of true alone is sufficient. Because Bailey’s admitted violations were independent of the complained-of testimony and unaffected by the alleged error, the court held the revocation order had to be affirmed. The court also noted that once supervision is revoked, the trial court may impose the original suspended sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a trial court’s ruling rests on multiple independent grounds, an appeal that attacks only one ground may fail even if that complaint has merit. In family law cases involving enforcement, modification, protective orders, or overlapping findings, lawyers must preserve error and challenge every independent basis that could support the order.”
Roland Joseph Seymour v. Sharee Walker
COA14
In Seymour v. Walker, the father appealed the denial of his Chapter 157 enforcement motion seeking contempt, make-up possession, sanctions, and fees for alleged violations of a possession order. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction over the contempt portion because contempt rulings are not reviewable by direct appeal. It further held that the request for additional possession under Family Code section 157.168 became moot when the child turned eighteen during the appeal, leaving no live controversy over possession or access. The court also rejected the argument that a fee request under section 157.167 preserved jurisdiction, explaining that the statute mandates fees only after a finding of noncompliance, which Seymour never obtained before mootness attached. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a possession-enforcement case is approaching a child’s eighteenth birthday, move fast: make-up possession claims can become moot on appeal once the child turns eighteen. And a bare request for fees under Family Code section 157.167 will not keep the case alive unless the movant already obtained a finding of noncompliance. Also, denial of contempt relief generally cannot be challenged by direct appeal.”
Tia Mashawn Palm Clark v. Quincy Deaz Clark
COA14
In Clark v. Clark, the wife tried to avoid enforcement of a divorce mediated settlement agreement by filing a last-minute motion to set it aside based on duress and coercion. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the issue was not preserved for appeal because the record did not show the motion was presented to the trial court, heard, or ruled on before the final judgment was signed, as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court also explained that, even if preservation were assumed, the trial court could still enforce the MSA because the wife’s declaration did not establish key duress elements such as lack of present means of protection or that her free agency was overcome. The judgment enforcing the MSA was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to challenge an MSA in Texas family court, filing a motion is not enough. You must promptly serve it, set it for hearing, make sure it is actually presented to the judge, and obtain a ruling or a refusal to rule. Without a clear record, an appellate court will likely treat duress, coercion, or fraud complaints as waived.”
Jean Michel Szabuniewicz, Individually and in His Capacity as Former Trustee of the Oak Lawn Investment Trust; Oak Lawn General, Inc.; Oak Lawn Holdings I, L.P.; Texas Urban Properties, Ltd.; Texas Urban GP, Inc.; Oak Lawn Medical Properties, L.P.; Willow Park Construction, Inc.; and Guaranty Finance Company v. Todd May, in His Capacity as Trustee of the Beverly Trust
COA02
In this restricted appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed a no-answer default judgment because the face of the record showed multiple service defects under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 99 and 107. The plaintiff obtained default relief against an individual and several entities, but the returns of service were never separately filed with the clerk before judgment and appeared only as attachments to the default motion. The court also found strict-compliance problems because the petition, citations, and returns did not match as to the registered agent, the person actually served, and the service addresses. Applying the rule that no presumptions favor valid service in a restricted appeal and that actual notice does not cure defective service, the court held the record did not affirmatively establish proper service. The default judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you plan to take a default judgment, build the service record for appellate review. In Texas family cases, even small mismatches in names, capacities, agents, or addresses—or a return that is not actually filed with the clerk—can undo a default on restricted appeal, regardless of actual notice.”
In the Matter of J.J.
COA02
In *In the Matter of J.J.*, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order modifying disposition and committing J.J. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department after J.J. stipulated to multiple probation violations, including a new law violation for unlawfully carrying a handgun, alcohol possession, handgun possession, and gang association. The court analyzed Texas Family Code Section 54.05 under the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard and held that the stipulations alone supported modification. It further concluded that the juvenile court reasonably relied on J.J.’s escalating gun-related conduct, substance-use concerns, detention infractions, inconsistent parental follow-through, and the failure of prior community-based interventions in deciding that TJJD commitment was more appropriate than continued probation or an undeveloped relative placement.
Litigation Takeaway
“Trial courts get broad discretion when the record shows escalating dangerous behavior and failed lesser interventions. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a cumulative record on supervision failures, safety risks, prior services, and the weakness or strength of any proposed relative placement, because appellate courts will usually defer to a well-supported restrictive ruling.”
In re Guardianship of Stewart
COA10
In In re Guardianship of Stewart, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a guardianship order appointing Father as permanent guardian of the parties’ adult son was void because the proposed ward was never personally served with Father’s guardianship application as required by Texas Estates Code § 1051.103(a)(1). Although the son was later personally served with Mother’s separate competing application and an attorney ad litem answered and appeared, the court treated the problem as a complete lack of service—not a mere technical defect. Relying on the Estates Code and In re Guardianship of Fairley, the court explained that personal service must correspond to the specific pleading on which the court grants relief, and neither actual notice nor ad litem participation can waive or cure the absence of service on the proposed ward. Because Father’s application was never personally served on the proposed ward, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction to appoint Father, so the appellate court vacated the order and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a statute makes personal service jurisdictional, each pleading seeking affirmative relief must stand on its own. Service of one party’s petition does not authorize judgment on another party’s competing petition, and actual notice, attorney participation, or ad litem involvement will not save an order entered on an unserved pleading.”
Ruben Gonzalez v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Ruben Gonzalez v. The State of Texas, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed Gonzalez’s injury-to-a-child conviction under a party-liability theory. The State did not need direct proof that Gonzalez personally inflicted every injury; instead, the court held circumstantial evidence was enough to show he intended to promote or assist the offense. The evidence showed Gonzalez lived in the home, exercised disciplinary authority over the child, used harsh punishment including food restriction, was aware of the child’s obvious physical decline, and failed to obtain medical care. Applying Texas Penal Code sections 7.01 and 7.02, the court concluded a rational jury could infer culpable participation from his authority in the household, proximity to the child, awareness of the worsening condition, omission in the face of obvious need, and minimizing statements after the fact. The court also rejected his Confrontation Clause complaint and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law cases, Gonzalez is a strong crossover authority for the idea that a live-in nonparent can be treated as a de facto caregiver based on actual household power, not formal legal status. If a parent’s partner or other resident adult disciplines the child, controls food, observes injuries or decline, and does nothing, that evidence can support endangerment, restrictions, supervised possession, or no-contact provisions even without formal caregiving records.”
In the Interest of B.H. and L.H.
COA09
In this Beaumont divorce appeal, the wife challenged a final decree requiring sale of the marital residence and setting guideline child support. The court held the property complaint was not preserved because the decree tracked the parties’ mediated agreement, the trial court found the division just and right, and the wife made no objection or developed any record of coercion, fraud, or misrepresentation at the prove-up or in a post-judgment motion. The child-support complaint likewise failed because the trial court based support on testimony and admitted financial information about the husband’s self-employment income, disallowed some claimed deductions, and the wife did not object or offer contrary evidence in the trial court. The court also refused to consider documents attached only to the appellate brief because matters outside the appellate record are not evidence. The decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to challenge a mediated divorce decree or a child-support calculation, do it in the trial court and make a record. Silence at prove-up, especially when the decree follows a mediated agreement, usually waives appellate complaints, and you cannot fix a bad record by attaching new documents to an appellate brief.”
In re Ganga Thapa
COA03
In In re Ganga Thapa, the Third Court of Appeals held that a grandmother had standing under Texas Family Code section 102.004(a)(2) to seek managing conservatorship because the Department, which had been appointed managing conservator after termination of the parents’ rights, expressly consented to her suit. The trial court had sua sponte found she lacked standing and struck her intervention in the pending SAPCR. The appellate court treated the issue as a pure standing question, applied the rule that an intervenor in a SAPCR generally needs only the same standing required to file the claim as an original suit, and concluded that Thapa’s original-suit standing carried over to intervention. Because the trial court’s contrary legal conclusion was an abuse of discretion and denial of intervention in a SAPCR lacks an adequate appellate remedy, the court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its standing ruling and order striking the intervention.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a grandparent’s standing depends on Family Code section 102.004(a)(2), get the managing conservator’s consent clearly into the record—preferably in a filed written consent tied expressly to the statute. Once that statutory gateway is satisfied, a trial court cannot deny intervention based on generalized discretion; the fight shifts from standing to the merits.”
In the Interest of N.P., a Child
COA12
In In re N.P., the Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court analyzed whether the child’s environment and the father’s course of conduct endangered the child, focusing on the mother’s methamphetamine use during pregnancy, the newborn’s positive drug test, the parents’ homelessness, the father’s repeated domestic violence against the mother during pregnancy, and his resulting incarceration. The court held this evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show both endangering conditions or surroundings under subsection (D) and a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious endangering course of conduct under subsection (E), so it affirmed the termination judgment without reaching subsection (P).
Litigation Takeaway
“Prenatal violence, drug exposure at birth, homelessness, and criminal instability can combine to prove endangerment under both Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a unified safety narrative tying domestic violence, substance abuse, and instability directly to risk to the child.”
In the Interest of K.D.S., a Child
COA05
In In re K.D.S., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a father’s SAPCR modification suit, a $5,000 attorney’s-fee award, and an order requiring him to post a $5,000 bond before filing future modification pleadings in the case. The father tried to use the modification proceeding to collaterally attack the underlying 2021 SAPCR order based on alleged service defects and other jurisdictional theories, but the court held those complaints were waived by his prior appearance and answer and could not support a collateral attack on a non-void final order. The court also held that any complaint about the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law was waived because none were requested. Most significantly, the court approved the prefiling bond as a sanctions measure for repeated frivolous filings, discovery abuse, failure to appear, and refusal to litigate within the rules, explaining that such relief may be imposed without a formal vexatious-litigant finding when supported by the record and tailored to secure costs and attorney’s fees. The father’s due-process, equal-protection, and access-to-courts objections were not preserved, so the sanctions and dismissal were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas family courts can use their sanctions power—not just the vexatious-litigant statute—to require a bond before future SAPCR modification filings when a party shows a pattern of frivolous pleadings, discovery abuse, and rule-defying conduct. For practitioners, the key is to build a detailed record, tie the bond to anticipated costs and fees, and preserve any constitutional objections with specificity in the trial court.”
Jackson v. Slack
COA12
In Jackson v. Slack, the Tyler Court of Appeals reversed a no-answer default judgment because substituted service did not strictly comply with the Rule 106(b) order authorizing it. The trial court’s order allowed service only at Jackson’s specified apartment unit by either leaving the papers with someone over sixteen at that unit or posting them on that unit’s front door. But the return showed service was made instead on a leasing-office employee in the complex office. Applying Texas’s strict-compliance rules for default judgments, the court held that substituted service must match the order exactly, that actual notice cannot cure defective service, and that the deviation deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction. The default judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“In any Texas family-law default, substitute service is only as good as the Rule 106 order. If the order authorizes service at a specific residence, unit, or by a specific method, the return must show exact compliance. Service on apartment staff, relatives, office personnel, or other practical substitutes will not support a default unless the order expressly allows it.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Zachary Rogers and Janeth Rogers and in the Interest of N.R. and J.R., Children
COA05
In Rogers, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree after the husband tried to challenge child-support and medical-support provisions he had signed and approved as to both form and substance. The court held that, under the consent-judgment and invited-error doctrines, a party who agrees to the substance of a decree generally cannot later complain on appeal about those same provisions absent fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation. The court also rejected the husband’s recusal complaint because the judge he sought to recuse was not the judge who presided over trial or signed the decree, and he showed no harmful error. The judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not sign a divorce decree 'approved as to form and substance' if you intend to appeal any substantive ruling. If child support, medical support, offsets, or other decree terms remain disputed, preserve the issue on the record, reserve objections clearly, and avoid consent language that will waive appellate review.”
In the Interest of P.H.S. and E.K.S., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally insufficient to support endangerment findings against Father under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The Department proved serious concerns in Mother’s home, including unsanitary conditions, domestic violence concerns, a violated safety plan involving Mother’s paramour, and an unexplained injury to one child, but the court emphasized that subsections (D) and (E) require parent-specific proof. Applying the clear-and-convincing and legal-sufficiency standards, the court concluded the record did not show Father knowingly placed the children in endangering conditions, knowingly allowed them to remain there, personally engaged in a course of endangering conduct, or knowingly placed them with someone who did. The court therefore reversed and rendered the (D) and (E) findings as to Father, while affirming the termination order on other grounds.
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment findings cannot rest on guilt by association. If you want a Family Code 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) finding against a particular parent, you need evidence tying that parent to knowledge, control, placement, permission, or a conscious course of dangerous conduct—not just proof that the child was in a bad situation with someone else.”
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez
COA04
In Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, the trial court ordered the father to pay $1,417.23 in monthly child support even though the decree referenced lower guideline amounts and stated only that he was underemployed and that above-guideline support was in the children’s best interest. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that because the award varied from the guideline calculation, Texas Family Code § 154.130 required written findings stating the parties’ net resources, the percentage applied, whether guideline support would be unjust or inappropriate, and the specific reasons for the variance. The appellate court concluded the decree’s conclusory recitals were insufficient because they left the father and the court to guess whether the trial court had imputed income, varied upward from a guideline figure, or both. The omission was harmful and reversible, so the court abated the appeal and remanded for entry of the required findings.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a Texas court orders child support above or below the guideline amount, the decree must do more than say 'underemployed' and 'best interest.' Lawyers should make sure the order spells out the guideline calculation, net resources, percentage used, and the specific reasons guideline support would be unjust or inappropriate, or an otherwise defensible support award may be sent back on appeal.”
Michael Ray Guajardo v. The State of Texas
COA09
In Michael Ray Guajardo v. The State of Texas, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that Article 38.37 allows the State to admit prior sexual acts against children even when the defendant committed those acts as a juvenile, so long as the statute’s notice and relevance requirements are met. The defendant argued the statute should be limited to adult conduct and that Rule 403 required exclusion because the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. The court rejected both arguments, reasoning that the statute contains no adulthood limitation and courts may not add one. It further held the extraneous-act evidence was highly probative of sexual interest in children, state of mind, and the propensity inference Article 38.37 expressly permits in child-sex-offense cases, and that this probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In child-related litigation, historical sexual misconduct involving children is not automatically irrelevant or inadmissible just because it occurred when the accused was a juvenile. For family-law cases involving conservatorship, possession, protective orders, or modification, Guajardo is a strong analogy for arguing that older or juvenile-age conduct can still be powerful evidence of present child-safety risk—while opponents should focus on relevance, reliability, remoteness, and Rule 403 fairness rather than a categorical age-based objection.”
In re Arturo Perez and Texas Materials Group, Inc.
COA04
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial after a defense take-nothing verdict based on two unsupported reasons: a conclusory factual-sufficiency finding and alleged "empty chair" gamesmanship involving an undesignated traffic flagger. Applying In re Toyota Motor Sales and related mandamus precedent, the court explained that a new-trial order must give legally proper, specific reasons that are actually supported by the record. The court found the trial judge improperly treated a stipulation about right of way as if it proved negligence and proximate cause, and also relied on misconduct findings that were unpreserved and contradicted by the record. Because the verdict winners had no adequate appellate remedy if forced to retry the case, mandamus issued to vacate the new-trial order.
Litigation Takeaway
“A trial court cannot order a do-over based on vague claims that a verdict was against the evidence or that one side engaged in "gamesmanship" unless those reasons are preserved, legally valid, and tied to actual record support. For family-law litigants, this is a strong mandamus blueprint for attacking unsupported new-trial, temporary, or post-judgment rulings that rely on broad fairness or best-interest language without specific evidence and preserved error.”
Dr. Wesley G.C. Athey v. Diana Athey
COA04
In Athey v. Athey, the husband appealed a divorce decree awarding the wife a $25,000 judgment for missing separate-property jewelry, arguing due process, insufficient evidence of value, and harm from the trial court’s failure to file findings. The Fourth Court held the due-process complaint was not preserved because the appellate constitutional theory was not specifically raised in the trial court. On valuation, the court agreed the evidence was factually insufficient to support the specific $25,000 figure because the record lacked competent evidence of actual value, such as appraisals, market estimates, metal weight, or gemstone quality. But the court still affirmed because property division is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and a valuation error alone is not reversible unless the appellant also shows the error made the overall division manifestly unjust and unfair. Because the husband did not analyze the full estate or explain how the alleged error skewed the overall division, he failed to show reversible error. The court also held the missing findings and conclusions were harmless because he could still present his appellate issues.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you challenge a Texas divorce property division on appeal, it is not enough to prove the trial court used the wrong value for one asset. You must also show how that mistake changed the overall estate division enough to make it manifestly unjust and unfair. Preserve constitutional complaints precisely, build real valuation evidence at trial, and on appeal recalculate the entire division—not just the disputed item.”
In Re Fort Bend Christian Academy
COA14
In *In re Fort Bend Christian Academy*, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that ecclesiastical abstention barred parents’ contract, promissory-estoppel, and DTPA claims against a private Christian school to the extent those claims required a court to interpret and evaluate the school’s internal policies on academic accommodations, bullying, harassment, and discipline. The court analyzed the dispute claim by claim, explaining that Texas courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction when resolving a claim would entangle the judiciary in a religious institution’s doctrine, mission, or internal governance. But the court distinguished concussion-related claims tied to TAPPS rules and concussion-management protocols, concluding those allegations could potentially be resolved through neutral principles of law because they involved external, secular safety standards rather than faith-based decision-making. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus in part, holding the protected internal-policy claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction while the neutral-principles concussion-related claims could proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a family-law dispute touches a religious school, the key question is not the label on the claim but whether the court would have to second-guess the school’s faith-infused internal decisions. Claims based on internal discipline, accommodations, or student-governance policies may be jurisdictionally barred, while claims tied to objective outside standards or secular safety rules may still be litigated.”
In the Interest of T.W.B., a Child
COA05
In *In re T.W.B.*, a pro se father appealed a divorce and SAPCR decree challenging rulings on possession, child support, and property division. The Dallas Court of Appeals focused not on the underlying family-law complaints, but on whether the father’s brief complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. After finding that the first twenty record citations it checked were inaccurate, the court held it was not required to search fifteen volumes of appellate record to locate support for his factual assertions or claimed error. Applying settled law that pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules as represented parties, and noting that most issues were reviewed for abuse of discretion, the court concluded the father failed to demonstrate reversible error from the record and affirmed the trial court’s decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“On appeal, even potentially valid family-law complaints will fail if the brief does not accurately cite the record. Courts will not act as counsel, reconstruct arguments from a massive record, or relax briefing standards for pro se parties; if you cannot show the exact place where error was preserved and proved, affirmance is likely.”
In re Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin, & Hubbard and Todd Crawford
COA01
In this mandamus proceeding, the First Court of Appeals reviewed sanctions imposed after out-of-state defense counsel accepted and used an opposing party’s sensitive personal records supplied by his former fiancé outside formal discovery. The trial court responded with sweeping relief, including disqualification, a large monetary sanction, revocation of pro hac vice status, disciplinary referrals, and a requirement that the attorneys disclose the sanctions order in any future Texas pro hac vice application for ten years. Applying TransAmerican’s just-sanctions framework, the court held that while trial courts have broad authority to punish serious litigation misconduct, non-monetary sanctions must be directly related to the misconduct and no more severe than necessary. The ten-year disclosure requirement failed that test because it operated as a reputational penalty affecting unrelated future cases rather than a case-specific remedy tied to the handling of the records. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus to vacate that disclosure requirement and denied relief on the remaining challenged rulings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Sensitive records obtained through spouses, ex-partners, or other third parties can expose counsel to disqualification and serious sanctions, but trial courts still cannot impose creative non-monetary sanctions that reach beyond the case and function as long-term professional punishment. In family-law litigation, use this case both to attack improper handling of private records and to challenge sanctions that are not tightly tethered to the actual misconduct.”
In the Interest of V.R.Z., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas appeal, the parties both sought divorce but disputed whether they had ever entered an informal marriage under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2). The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of marriage because the record showed a specific marriage date and anniversary, testimony that the parties referred to each other as husband and wife, cohabitation in Texas beginning in 2012, Facebook posts calling one party “my husband,” joint tax filings, and deed records identifying them as married. Applying the usual sufficiency standards and relying on the rule that an agreement to be married may be proved by circumstantial evidence, the court deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations and affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“Informal marriage cases are won or lost through a pattern of evidence, not a single statement. To prove marriage, build a cumulative record with anniversary evidence, cohabitation proof, tax returns, deeds, social media, and third-party testimony; to defeat it, you must explain away that documentary and public-facing pattern with a coherent alternative narrative, not just deny the marriage.”
In the Interest of E.K.S., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, the mother challenged only the visitation language in a final order appointing DFPS permanent managing conservator and giving her supervised possession "at a date, time and location as arranged and agreed" with the Department. The court reviewed the order for abuse of discretion and focused on the child’s best interest, rejecting the argument that the Family Code always requires a fallback schedule with fixed dates and times. Because the record showed unresolved substance abuse, incomplete services, an eleven-month lapse in drug testing, inconsistent visitation, transportation problems, and an out-of-state placement requiring DFPS oversight, the court held the open-ended supervised-access provision was not arbitrary or unreasonable and affirmed the order.
Litigation Takeaway
“An "as arranged and agreed" visitation provision can survive appeal if the record shows why flexibility is necessary and tied to the child’s best interest. If you want to defend a non-specific supervised-access clause, build evidence of safety concerns, instability, logistics, and a reliable supervising conservator; if you want to attack one, preserve complaints that it is indefinite, unenforceable, or effectively delegates control over access without a workable minimum schedule.”
In the Interest of M.M.S., a Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in M.M.S.’s best interest under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). Applying the clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards from In re J.F.C. and In re J.O.A. and the Holley factors, the court focused on Mother’s continued drug use, inconsistent mental-health treatment, unstable housing, poor visitation history, and prior neglect-related concerns involving siblings. The court also relied on evidence that M.M.S. had lived her entire life in a stable foster placement with her brother, was bonded there, and was thriving. Considering the full record and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the appellate court held a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest cases are built through patterns, not isolated facts. A layered record showing substance abuse, untreated mental-health issues, unstable housing, missed visitation, and a child’s success in a stable placement will usually carry the day on appeal; on the defense side, rehabilitation must be documented with concrete proof of sobriety, treatment compliance, stability, and consistent parenting over time.”
In the Interest of S.W.R. and H.G.R., Children
COA05
In this Dallas child-support modification case, the parents’ 2020 agreed divorce decree set support at an amount that differed from the Chapter 154 guidelines. Father sought modification in February 2023, arguing both that circumstances had materially and substantially changed and that the agreed amount did not substantially comply with the guidelines. Mother moved for summary judgment on the ground that no material and substantial change had occurred. The court held that because the original support order was an agreed order that deviated from the guidelines, Texas Family Code section 156.401(a-1) controlled and required proof of a material and substantial change in the circumstances of the child or a person affected by the order. Father could not rely on section 156.401(a)(2)’s 20%/$100 guideline-difference test because three years had not yet elapsed, and he conceded that point. Because Father did not respond to the summary-judgment motion with evidence creating a fact issue and did not effectively challenge the no-material-change ground on appeal, the court affirmed summary judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“If an agreed child-support order departs from guideline support, a parent seeking modification before three years have passed must prove a material and substantial change in circumstances. A simple argument that the agreed amount is above or below the guidelines is not enough, and failing to directly attack a no-change summary-judgment ground can end the case on appeal.”
David Rojas Sanchez v. The State of Texas
COA05
In David Rojas Sanchez v. The State of Texas, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Sanchez waived his complaint about the admission of Article 38.37 extraneous-offense testimony because he did not preserve error. Although defense counsel objected at the pretrial hearing when the witness could not identify Sanchez in the courtroom, the trial judge responded that she would 'wait and see,' which the appellate court treated as a deferral rather than an express or implicit ruling. Counsel did not press for a definitive ruling, did not object to the court’s failure to rule, and did not renew the objection when the testimony came in before the jury. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and preservation authorities including Dobbs and Darty, the court held that an objection alone is not enough without an adverse ruling or an objection to the refusal to rule. Because no preserved ruling existed, the court did not reach the merits of the Article 38.37 challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
“When the court says 'wait and see,' you do not yet have a ruling. In family-law trials and hearings, lawyers must press objections to a clear ruling, renew them when the evidence is offered, and object on the record if the court refuses or fails to rule. Otherwise, even strong evidentiary complaints may be lost on appeal.”
Thompson v. State
COA05
In Thompson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a police officer’s testimony that she found the complainant credible required reversal of an assault-family-violence conviction. The court assumed, without deciding, that admitting the credibility-vouching testimony was error, then applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b)’s nonconstitutional harmless-error standard. Looking at the full record, the court emphasized that the testimony was brief, not repeated, and not featured in closing argument, while other evidence independently supported the verdict, including visible injuries, expert strangulation testimony, and jail-call evidence suggesting an admission. The court held that any error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Improper credibility-vouching is not automatic reversible error. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, the appellate fight will usually turn on harm: whether the opinion testimony was emphasized, whether the case lacked corroboration, and whether the challenged statement likely affected the outcome. Build your record with objective evidence, and if you are preserving error, also preserve prejudice.”