In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt

In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt, 05-26-00492-CV, June 26, 2026.

On appeal from 397th Judicial District Court, Grayson County, Texas

Synopsis

A stalking protective order issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is a final, appealable order if it disposes of all parties and all issues in the protective-order proceeding. Because that direct appellate remedy exists, mandamus is unavailable absent a true voidness problem, and a party cannot revive a missed appeal deadline by recasting the challenge as an original proceeding.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters to Texas family-law litigators because protective orders routinely intersect with divorce, SAPCR, modification, and enforcement litigation. The Dallas Court of Appeals confirmed that even when the protective order arises under Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure rather than directly under Title 4 of the Family Code, the proceeding remains civil in nature and follows Title 4 finality principles. Strategically, that means counsel handling parallel divorce or custody cases must treat a stalking protective order as a stand-alone final judgment for appellate purposes: docket the deadline immediately, evaluate appellate issues promptly, and do not assume the order can later be attacked by mandamus if no notice of appeal was filed.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The relators, Kurtis Schmidt and Ashley Lynn Schmidt, filed pro se petitions for writ of mandamus challenging protective orders entered against them by the trial court in Grayson County. They also sought emergency stays of those protective orders. The opinion does not elaborate on the underlying allegations in detail, because the dispositive issue was procedural rather than factual: whether the challenged stalking protective orders were the type of final orders that had to be attacked by direct appeal rather than by mandamus.

The court identified the orders as stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. That mattered because Chapter 7B proceedings are authorized through the Code of Criminal Procedure, but they are civil protective-order proceedings that borrow heavily from Title 4 of the Family Code in their application, issuance, and enforcement. The appellate court therefore focused on finality doctrine and the adequacy of an appellate remedy, not on the evidentiary merits of the stalking findings.

Issues Decided

• Whether a stalking protective order issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is a final, appealable order when it disposes of all parties and all issues in the underlying application.
• Whether mandamus relief is unavailable where the complained-of protective order could have been challenged through a direct appeal.
• Whether a relator may obtain mandamus relief merely because the relator did not timely pursue the available appeal.
• Whether the relators demonstrated the kind of void order that would excuse the need to show an inadequate appellate remedy.

Rules Applied

The court relied on familiar mandamus standards and then tied those standards to protective-order finality doctrine.

• Mandamus ordinarily requires a showing of both a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).
• If the challenged order is void, a relator need not show the absence of an adequate appellate remedy. In re Saving Grace #2, LLC, No. 05-23-00745-CV, 2023 WL 6783511, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 13, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
• A protective order is final and appealable if it disposes of all parties and all issues in the underlying protective-order proceeding. Cooke v. Cooke, 65 S.W.3d 785, 788–89 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.).
• Mandamus cannot be used to challenge an order that can be, or could have been, challenged by direct appeal. In re Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 613–14 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding).
• Mandamus remains unavailable even where the party failed to timely exercise the appellate remedy. In re Parnell, 283 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, orig. proceeding).

The court also relied on the statutory structure of Chapter 7B and recent authority confirming the civil character of those proceedings:

• Chapter 7B applications for stalking protective orders are made in the same manner as Title 4 Family Code applications. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 7B.051.
• Chapter 7B protective orders are issued in the manner provided by Title 4 of the Family Code. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 7B.052.
• Title 4 enforcement procedures apply to Chapter 7B protective orders to the fullest extent practicable. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 7B.053.
• Chapter 7B protective-order proceedings are civil matters. Goldstein v. Sabatino, 690 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tex. 2024).
• The Fourteenth Court has likewise recognized the Title 4 procedural overlay for stalking protective orders. Garza v. Renteria, 726 S.W.3d 894, 897 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.).

Application

The court’s analysis was straightforward but important. It began with the ordinary rule that mandamus requires both abuse of discretion and the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal. That framed the inquiry around finality. If the protective orders were final judgments in their own proceedings, then the relators had an adequate legal remedy through a direct appeal, and mandamus was improper.

The relators were attacking stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B, not family-violence protective orders under Chapter 85 of the Family Code. The court therefore had to bridge that statutory distinction. It did so by explaining that the finality analysis from Cooke applies equally here because Chapter 7B proceedings are civil in nature and expressly incorporate Title 4 procedures for application, issuance, and enforcement. In other words, although Chapter 7B appears in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the operative procedural framework is functionally the same as Family Code protective-order litigation for purposes of finality.

Once the court concluded that Chapter 7B stalking protective orders are final and appealable when they dispose of all parties and all issues, the mandamus petitions largely failed on arrival. The court reiterated the settled rule that mandamus is not a substitute for appeal. It further emphasized that this remains true even if the relator allowed the appellate deadline to expire. A lost appeal is not the same thing as no adequate appeal. The only potential escape hatch would have been a showing that the orders were void, but the court concluded the relators had not established entitlement to relief on that basis either.

Holding

The court held that stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are final, appealable orders when they dispose of all parties and all issues in the underlying protective-order application. In reaching that conclusion, the court treated Chapter 7B proceedings as civil matters governed, for these purposes, by the finality principles applicable to Title 4 Family Code protective orders.

The court also held that mandamus relief was unavailable because the relators had an adequate appellate remedy by direct appeal. That rule applied even if the relators failed to timely pursue the appeal. Because the relators did not demonstrate entitlement to the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, the court denied both petitions and denied the related stay motions as moot.

Practical Application

For family-law practitioners, the immediate lesson is procedural discipline. Protective orders often arise in the middle of a divorce, a custody fight, or a post-judgment enforcement dispute, and counsel may be tempted to treat them as ancillary skirmishes rather than as separately appealable judgments. In re Schmidt confirms that this is a dangerous assumption. If the order fully disposes of the protective-order application, the appellate clock is running regardless of what else is pending between the parties.

The case is especially important in matters involving stalking allegations between spouses, former spouses, dating partners, or co-parents. Because Chapter 7B stalking protective orders are civil and follow Title 4 mechanisms, appellate strategy should mirror Family Code protective-order practice. Trial counsel should ensure the record is fully developed at the protective-order hearing, preserve objections with appellate framing in mind, and immediately assess whether the order contains reversible defects, overbroad relief, duration problems, due-process issues, or evidentiary insufficiencies.

This opinion also affects coordination between trial and appellate teams. In many family-law cases, the same factual nucleus supports multiple proceedings: a protective-order case, a pending divorce, temporary orders, a SAPCR, and possibly a modification or enforcement action. In re Schmidt teaches that the existence of those parallel matters does not postpone or dilute the finality of the protective order itself. If the protective-order case is complete, the safest assumption is that the order must be appealed now.

Practitioners should also be careful in advising clients about post-order options. Clients who miss the appeal deadline may ask whether mandamus can “fix it.” In most cases, the answer will be no. Unless the order is truly void, mandamus will not rescue a party from a forfeited appellate remedy. That makes deadline control, notice review, and immediate appellate triage critical in every protective-order matter.

Checklists

Protective-Order Finality Review

• Determine whether the order disposes of all parties in the protective-order proceeding.
• Determine whether the order resolves all issues raised in the underlying application.
• Do not assume a Chapter 7B stalking order is somehow nonfinal because it arises under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
• Treat the signed protective order as a stand-alone final judgment unless a clear basis exists to conclude otherwise.
• Calendar post-judgment and appellate deadlines the day the order is signed.

Immediate Appellate Triage After a Protective Order

• Obtain the signed order immediately and confirm the signing date.
• Review the order for overbreadth, duration, prohibited-contact terms, firearm findings, residence exclusions, and other collateral consequences.
• Evaluate whether the court had subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction.
• Assess preservation of error from the hearing record.
• Order the reporter’s record without delay.
• File the notice of appeal within the applicable deadline.
• Consider supersedeas, stay options, and practical compliance advice while appellate review is pending.

Mandamus Screening in Protective-Order Cases

• Ask first whether a direct appeal is or was available.
• If appeal was available, do not assume mandamus can substitute for a missed deadline.
• Evaluate whether the complained-of defect is merely reversible error or rises to true voidness.
• Reserve mandamus arguments for exceptional circumstances, not ordinary complaints about sufficiency, procedure, or trial-court rulings.
• Explain to the client that “I did not appeal” does not equal “I had no adequate appellate remedy.”

Trial-Level Preservation in Divorce or Custody Cases with Parallel Protective Orders

• Build a complete evidentiary record at the protective-order hearing.
• Make clear, specific objections tied to due process, statutory compliance, evidentiary admissibility, and scope of relief.
• Request findings or clarifications where appropriate.
• Distinguish the protective-order proceeding from the divorce or SAPCR for purposes of finality and appellate deadlines.
• Coordinate the protective-order strategy with the broader custody and property narrative, but do not let the larger case obscure the protective order’s independent appealability.

Client Counseling to Avoid the Relators’ Problem

• Tell the client immediately whether the order is likely final and appealable.
• Provide a written explanation of the appellate deadline.
• Advise that mandamus is extraordinary and generally unavailable when appeal existed.
• Document the recommendation regarding appeal.
• If the client declines an appeal, confirm that decision in writing.
• Reassess promptly whether any true voidness issue exists before considering extraordinary relief.

Citation

In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt, Nos. 05-26-00492-CV & 05-26-00557-CV, memorandum opinion (Tex. App.—Dallas June 26, 2026, orig. proceeding).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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