Opinion Library

Moore v. State

COA05

In Moore v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old murder defendant for adult prosecution under Texas Family Code § 54.02. Moore argued the transfer was unsupported because the investigation was not “full,” given that some forensic and electronic-device testing was still pending, and because the evidence did not sufficiently show he could not be rehabilitated in the juvenile system. The court rejected those arguments, explaining that a § 54.02 transfer hearing is not a trial on the merits and does not require every investigative thread to be finished so long as the juvenile court had a sufficiently developed record to assess probable cause and community welfare. Because the juvenile court ordered and reviewed a diagnostic study, social evaluation, psychological material, and a full investigation, and because the record supported findings of probable cause, violent and willful conduct, use of a deadly weapon, and serious doubt about rehabilitation through juvenile services, the appellate court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient and that the transfer order was not an abuse of discretion.

Litigation Takeaway

"When a statute requires the trial court to consider specific factors and court-ordered evaluations, appellate courts usually focus on whether the existing record gave the judge a legally sufficient basis to make the required findings—not on whether every possible piece of evidence had been gathered. To challenge a discretionary ruling successfully, tie any missing evidence to a specific statutory finding and show why the current record cannot support that finding."

Termination of Parental Rights

In the Interest of S.H., A.H., and A.H., Children

COA06

In In re S.H., the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed a parental-rights termination judgment after the mother argued only that the trial court should have continued trial because she was allegedly still institutionalized and discovery was incomplete. The court focused on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 251, which requires a continuance request to be in writing and supported by affidavit unless the parties consent or the law provides otherwise. Although the mother had filed an earlier unverified motion that supported a prior reset, the request tied to the actual trial setting was only oral. Applying abuse-of-discretion review, the court held the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the continuance because the request did not comply with Rule 251. The court also found no showing of prejudice from the mother’s absence because the record did not establish the materiality of her testimony or likely effect on the outcome, rejected the vague discovery complaint because the record did not identify missing discovery or resulting harm, and held any due-process complaint was not preserved because it was not raised in the trial court.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you want a continuance issue to survive appeal in Texas family court, build a Rule 251 record: file a written, verified motion for the specific setting, support it with sworn facts, explain exactly why the missing witness or discovery matters, and request alternatives like remote appearance if needed. Equity alone will not preserve error."

Modifying Child Support

Nicholas Field v. Brandi Pinsker

COA03

In Field v. Pinsker, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed a modification order requiring above-guideline support for an adult disabled child under Texas Family Code § 154.306. The dispute centered on whether post-majority support for Eric, a severely autistic young adult with significant behavioral and functional limitations, could exceed ordinary guideline child support. The court analyzed the statute through an abuse-of-discretion lens and held that § 154.306 allows trial courts to consider the child’s proven disability-related needs, including constant one-on-one supervision, structured care, caregiver scarcity, and safety-related expenses, rather than limiting support to guideline amounts. Because the evidence showed Eric was incapable of self-support, required substantial ongoing care, and Field had the ability to pay more, the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering above-guideline support.

Litigation Takeaway

"Section 154.306 cases turn on detailed proof of functional incapacity and real-world care costs, not diagnosis alone. If you want above-guideline adult disabled child support, build a concrete record showing supervision needs, safety risks, caregiver costs, and the obligor’s ability to pay; if you oppose it, attack the specificity, necessity, and reasonableness of those claimed expenses rather than relying on a simple guideline-cap argument."

Property Division

Crane v. Crane

SCOTX

In Crane v. Crane, the Texas Supreme Court held that a no-evidence summary-judgment motion under Rule 166a is sufficiently specific when it identifies the factual predicates of the pleaded claims in enough detail to put the nonmovant on notice of what evidence is required. Sasha Crane sought declaratory and injunctive relief alleging Robert Crane’s fence interfered with her easement and blocked access to her property. Robert moved for no-evidence summary judgment, asserting there was no evidence Sasha owned an easement crossing his property or that his fence crossed any such easement. The Court looked to the actual claims pleaded and concluded that fence interference was the sole factual basis for both the declaratory and injunctive claims, so the motion adequately challenged the essential elements even without using the precise phrase “interference with an easement.” Because Sasha produced evidence aimed mainly at proving the easement still existed, but no evidence that the fence actually crossed or interfered with the easement, the Court held take-nothing summary judgment was proper and reinstated the trial court’s judgment.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law property and injunction disputes, courts will focus on the specific factual event that gives the claim life. A no-evidence motion does not need magic words if it clearly targets that operative fact. If you plead lockout, blocked access, gate changes, or interference with awarded property, you must have summary-judgment evidence proving the actual interference—not just the underlying right."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt

COA05

In re Schmidt held that stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are civil protective-order judgments and are final and appealable when they dispose of all parties and issues in the application. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed Chapter 7B’s incorporation of Title 4 Family Code procedures, relied on Texas authority treating these proceedings as civil, and applied ordinary mandamus principles requiring no adequate appellate remedy. Because the relators could have challenged the orders by direct appeal, and because a missed appellate deadline does not make mandamus available absent true voidness, the court denied mandamus relief and denied the requested stays as moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"Treat every completed protective-order case—including a Chapter 7B stalking order—as a stand-alone final judgment. Calendar appellate deadlines immediately, build and preserve the record at the hearing, and do not assume mandamus can rescue a missed appeal unless the order is truly void."

Arthur v. Williams

COA06

In Arthur v. Williams, the defendant tried to use a Rule 120a special appearance to argue that substituted service was defective because the process server allegedly failed to comply with the trial court’s substituted-service order and Rules 106 and 107. The Texarkana Court of Appeals focused on the substance of the complaint and held that these arguments challenged only the manner of service, not whether the defendant was amenable to Texas process. Relying on Kawasaki Steel and GFTA Trendanalysen, the court explained that service defects must be raised by motion to quash, not by special appearance, and that using a special appearance for that purpose constitutes a general appearance. The court therefore affirmed the denial of the special appearance.

Litigation Takeaway

"Use the right procedural tool. In Texas family cases, a special appearance is for true personal-jurisdiction or non-amenability challenges, not complaints that substituted service was carried out incorrectly. If the issue is noncompliance with a substituted-service order or Rules 106 and 107, raise it by motion to quash or risk turning the filing into a general appearance."

Termination of Parental Rights

In the Interest of H.J.L. a/k/a H.J.H., a Child

COA07

The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights after evidence showed he repeatedly sexually abused his child over several years. The court focused on Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), holding that the multi-year abuse constituted a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the child’s physical and emotional well-being. The court relied on the child’s outcry, therapist testimony about grooming, coercion, escalation, and trauma, and evidence of PTSD, depression, self-harm, and a suicide attempt. The same evidence, along with the child’s wish for no contact, progress in foster care, lack of safe family placement, and the ad litem’s recommendation, also supported the best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2).

Litigation Takeaway

"Sexual abuse evidence is powerful endangerment evidence in Texas family cases, not just CPS cases. When the record shows a sustained pattern of abuse, grooming, coercion, and resulting trauma, courts will support strong protective rulings—including termination, no-contact orders, supervised access, and sole conservatorship—even without a criminal conviction. Build the record through outcry, therapist, placement, and trauma evidence; noncooperation by the accused parent can further strengthen the endangerment and best-interest case."

Divorce

Gray v. Beck

COA03

In Gray v. Beck, an heirship dispute turned on whether Jane Gray was Robert Beck’s informal spouse under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2). Gray offered evidence that they lived together in Texas and may have privately considered themselves married, but Matthew Beck moved for no-evidence summary judgment arguing there was insufficient proof of the required elements. The Third Court of Appeals held that an informal-marriage claim requires legally sufficient evidence of agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others in Texas as married. The court concluded the record lacked more than a scintilla of evidence on the key holding-out element, and it also rejected Gray’s notice complaint because the amended summary-judgment motion merely clarified existing grounds rather than adding new ones. The court affirmed summary judgment and the heirship judgment declaring Robert unmarried at death.

Litigation Takeaway

"If your case depends on proving an informal marriage, evidence of living together and a private commitment is not enough. You need concrete proof that the couple publicly represented themselves in Texas as married—through witnesses, documents, or consistent public conduct—or the claim may be defeated on no-evidence summary judgment."

In re Coby Todd Bausch

COA08

In re Coby Todd Bausch arose from a trust-administration dispute after a trial court entered an order clarifying a successor trustee’s powers to wind up a family trust under Texas Property Code § 115.001. The relator sought mandamus, arguing the order was void because it was entered without notice and a hearing and because it impermissibly expanded the trustee’s authority beyond the trust instrument. The El Paso Court of Appeals denied relief, focusing on the threshold mandamus requirement that the relator show no adequate appellate remedy. The court explained that even if the relator disputed the merits of the trustee-powers order, those complaints were the kind ordinarily reviewed on direct appeal, and the relator never developed any argument showing why appeal after final judgment would be inadequate. The court also rejected the due-process theory as a basis for extraordinary relief because the trial court later held a reconsideration hearing, considered the parties’ positions, and reaffirmed its ruling. The petition for writ of mandamus and motion to stay were denied.

Litigation Takeaway

"Mandamus is not a shortcut for challenging an aggressive interlocutory order. Even if a trial court acts without an initial hearing or grants broad fiduciary powers, the petition will likely fail unless you specifically show why a normal appeal cannot fix the harm. Preserve error, build a record, seek reconsideration, and separately prove irreparable harm before choosing mandamus."

In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt

COA05

In this original proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are final, appealable orders when they dispose of all parties and all issues in the protective-order case. The relators tried to attack the orders by mandamus, but the court applied ordinary mandamus principles, relied on Cooke’s finality analysis for protective orders, and extended that reasoning to Chapter 7B proceedings because they are civil in nature and procedurally governed through Title 4 of the Family Code. Because the relators had an adequate remedy by direct appeal, and did not show the orders were void, mandamus was unavailable even though they missed the appellate deadline. The court denied mandamus relief and denied the requested stays as moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"Treat every final protective order—including Chapter 7B stalking orders—as immediately appealable. In family-law cases, do not assume mandamus can rescue a missed appeal; unless the order is truly void, direct appeal is the required path."