Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1643 opinions found
In the Interest of L.S., a Child
COA14
Foster parents sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights and adopt the child after caring for him continuously for approximately six months. Mother challenged their standing for the first time on appeal, arguing that they did not qualify under Texas Family Code § 102.003 and had not filed the nonparent affidavit required by § 102.0031. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that standing in a SAPCR implicates subject-matter jurisdiction and therefore may be challenged for the first time on appeal, but concluded that the foster parents independently established standing under § 102.005. Their continuous possession, day-to-day care, and parental functions satisfied the statute’s actual-possession-and-control requirement; formal legal authority was unnecessary. Because § 102.005 is a distinct standing provision for adoption or termination joined with adoption, the § 102.0031 affidavit requirement did not apply. The court affirmed the termination judgment without deciding whether the foster parents also had standing under § 102.003.
Litigation Takeaway
"Match the asserted standing statute to the relief requested. A petitioner seeking termination joined with adoption may independently establish standing under Texas Family Code § 102.005 without satisfying § 102.003 or its § 102.0031 affidavit requirement. Petitioners should plead and prove each statutory element—including possession dates, caregiving responsibilities, and substantial past contact—because standing can be challenged for the first time on appeal. Respondents must attack every independently sufficient standing ground rather than focusing only on § 102.003."
North American Polypropylene ULC v. The Williams Companies, Inc.
COA14
North American Polypropylene ULC and related plaintiffs pursued fraud and negligent-misrepresentation claims in Texas after an Alberta court rejected NAPP’s related contract claim. The defendants obtained summary judgment on res judicata and collateral-estoppel grounds, but the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a foreign-country ruling can have preclusive effect only if it is final under the law of the issuing country. Applying Texas Rule of Evidence 203 to determine Canadian law, the court concluded that the Alberta judgment was not final. Because the defendants therefore failed to conclusively establish their preclusion defenses, the court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"A party relying on a foreign judgment must prove through a proper Rule 203 record that the judgment is final under the issuing country’s law; its title or resemblance to a Texas judgment is not enough. In international family-law disputes, attorneys should separately analyze authentication, recognition or enforcement, foreign-law finality, and the elements of res judicata or collateral estoppel."
In re James Haecker
COA03
James Haecker sought mandamus relief from a sua sponte show-cause order and sanctions hearing, but the judge who issued the order was later recused and replaced. Applying In re Blevins and related mandamus precedent, the Third Court of Appeals concluded that mandamus could not issue against the successor judge solely for an act of the recused predecessor. Rather than deny the petition, the court abated the proceeding so the successor judge could independently decide—using additional evidence if necessary—whether to leave the challenged order in effect, modify it, or set it aside.
Litigation Takeaway
"A judge’s recusal can reset mandamus review. When the challenged order was entered by the former judge, promptly ask the successor judge to reconsider it and obtain an express written ruling before pursuing mandamus relief. Preserve the reassignment documents, reconsideration evidence, hearing record, and new order because the successor judge’s decision may moot, narrow, or redefine the appellate dispute."
Peacock v. Samples
COA14
In this Texas divorce appeal, Joshua Peacock argued that a rental house acquired during the marriage was his separate property because his father had purchased it for him as a gift. Applying Texas Family Code § 3.003, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the house was presumed community property and that Peacock failed to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Title had passed directly from a third-party seller to Peacock, his father never held title, and Peacock offered no deed, closing documents, payment records, gift letter, or donor testimony establishing the source of funds and donative intent. The trial court was entitled to disbelieve Peacock’s unsupported testimony and consider his inconsistent proposal to divide the sale proceeds with his spouse. The court also rejected his challenges concerning the valuation and treatment of the parties’ used-car dealership and affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"A spouse claiming that real estate acquired during marriage was a parent-funded gift must prove the transaction at inception of title with clear, consistent, and preferably documentary evidence tracing the purchase funds and establishing donative intent. Sole title and unsupported testimony may not overcome the community-property presumption. Counsel should also maintain consistent characterization positions throughout pleadings, inventories, proposed divisions, and trial, and should request findings of fact and conclusions of law after a bench trial."
In the Interest of R.C.L. and J.J.L., Children
COA04
The Department sought termination of Father’s parental rights after evidence showed recurring domestic violence in the home, cocaine use, criminal conduct, and serious untreated medical and dental needs affecting his two daughters. Although Father completed counseling, parenting classes, domestic-violence programs, and a recent inpatient rehabilitation program, the Fourth Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court could weigh his continued violence, drug use, volatile relationship, and history of relapse more heavily than his service-completion certificates. It held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported endangerment under Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), continuing danger under section 161.001(f), and the children’s best interest, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying an extension of the statutory dismissal deadline. The termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Completing court-ordered services does not establish rehabilitation when dangerous behavior continues. In termination and custody litigation, counsel should build a chronological record connecting domestic violence, substance abuse, criminal conduct, and neglected health needs to the children’s risk, while a defending parent must demonstrate early, sustained, and objectively verified behavioral change—not merely recent treatment or program certificates."
Anderson v. Sakiewicz
COA04
In a dispute over property held by the Barbara Tolbert Revocable Trust, the trial court entered a midcase order that purported to “permanently” enjoin Jensen Chelsea Anderson from exercising authority over or interfering with trust property. Because the underlying claims remained unresolved, the Fourth Court of Appeals examined the order’s character and function—not its label—and classified it as a temporary injunction subject to Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 683 and 684. The order was void because it neither set the case for trial on the merits nor fixed the applicants’ security. The court reversed the order, dissolved the injunction, and remanded without addressing the merits of the parties’ trust and property claims.
Litigation Takeaway
"Calling a midcase restraint “permanent” does not make it so. If an order functions as a temporary injunction, it must satisfy the mandatory procedural requirements governing temporary injunctions, including a merits-trial setting under Rule 683 and security under Rule 684. Family-law counsel should also determine whether a restraint is a Family Code temporary order or a Rules-based injunction because that classification controls both the order’s required contents and the available route for appellate review."
Sanchez v. Reyes
COA03
In an appeal from a suit to modify the parent-child relationship, Andrea Marie Sanchez challenged an order requiring her to pay court costs and an appeal bond after the trial court sustained Joel A. Reyes’s contest to her statement of inability to afford costs. The Third Court of Appeals held that, under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f) and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 20.1, an appellant who files an inability-to-pay statement cannot be required to pay appellate costs unless the trial court enters a compliant order containing the required findings and notice of appellate-review rights. Because the order did not satisfy Rule 145(f), the court abated the appeal, remanded for a new indigency determination, ordered supplemental records, and tolled appellate deadlines during the abatement without reaching the merits of the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"A court cannot require a family-law appellant to pay appellate costs based on a procedurally deficient indigency order—even if the appellant missed the contest hearing. Counsel should treat Rule 145 proceedings as evidentiary matters, ensure the client appears with proof of present financial circumstances, and verify that any order contains detailed findings and the required appellate-rights notice. If it does not, promptly seek abatement, remand, and tolling before record-preparation or briefing deadlines are jeopardized."
In Re Secure Collateral Management, LLC
COA14
After dash-camera footage from a vehicle repossession was automatically deleted, the trial court found that Secure Collateral Management had spoliated evidence and struck six affirmative defenses. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that spoliation required proof that Secure Collateral reasonably anticipated litigation while the footage remained available and possessed or controlled the recording. Although Secure Collateral’s contract with the repossession company permitted requests for certain operational information, the record did not show that Secure Collateral learned of the injury-producing incident before the footage was deleted; the contractual relationship alone did not establish a preservation duty as to the specific video. Because the predicate spoliation finding was unsupported and striking the defenses materially impaired Secure Collateral’s case, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Missing, relevant evidence does not automatically justify spoliation sanctions. The movant must prove when litigation became reasonably foreseeable, that the evidence still existed then, and that the opposing party possessed it or had a legal right to obtain and preserve it. General contractual access to information is not necessarily control over a particular record, and case-killing sanctions imposed without proof of a preservation duty may warrant mandamus relief."
In the Interest of C.M., M.M., F.M., and G.M., Children
COA14
The Department sought termination of Father’s parental rights based on a years-long pattern of methamphetamine and marijuana use, repeated positive and missed drug tests, relapse after inpatient treatment, and failure to complete recommended services. Applying Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered Father’s conduct as a continuing course of endangerment rather than isolated incidents. It concluded that endangerment did not require proof that Father used drugs in the children’s presence or physically injured them because his ongoing drug use created risks of impaired caregiving, instability, criminal consequences, and unavailability. The court held the evidence legally and factually sufficient and affirmed the termination judgment and the Department’s appointment as managing conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a drug-endangerment termination case, build a chronological record showing the parent’s admissions, positive and missed tests, treatment attempts, relapses, incomplete services, and continued use after learning parental rights were at risk. A completed treatment program or occasional negative test will carry little weight without objective proof of sustained sobriety, follow-up care, stable housing, and a realistic caregiving plan; the Department need not prove drug use in the child’s presence or an actual physical injury."
Ex parte C.C., a Child
COA06
After C.C. filed a juvenile habeas application alleging illegal confinement and ineffective assistance of counsel, the juvenile court denied the application in a one-sentence order without a hearing, findings, or explanation. The Sixth Court of Appeals distinguished C.C.’s right to seek habeas relief from his right to appeal the particular ruling. Examining the order and the entire record under Texas habeas precedent, the court found no indication that the juvenile court had adjudicated the substantive claims rather than merely declined to issue the writ or proceed further. Because only a merits-based habeas ruling is appealable and C.C. did not request that the attempted appeal be treated as a mandamus petition, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A summary order stating only that habeas relief is “denied” may not support an appeal. Counsel should create a record showing that the trial court considered and decided the substantive habeas claims, seek a clear merits-based order, and determine before filing whether appeal, mandamus, or an original habeas proceeding is the proper vehicle. If mandamus may be required, expressly request alternative mandamus treatment rather than assuming the appellate court will convert the case on its own."