Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
787 opinions found
Dillon Austin Venson v. The State of Texas
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly designated a forensic interviewer as the Article 38.072 outcry witness even though the child first told her mother that the defendant had 'messed with' her and put his hands down her pants. The court explained that the outcry witness is not automatically the first adult who hears any allegation of abuse, but the first adult who receives a statement that describes the alleged offense in a discernible way. Because the mother described the initial conversation as brief and lacking detail, while the later CAC interview provided specific facts about the sexual touching, the trial court acted within its discretion in selecting the forensic interviewer. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to support the indecency-with-a-child conviction and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-abuse-related family litigation, do not assume the first adult listener controls the evidentiary story. Courts will focus on the first sufficiently descriptive disclosure, not merely the first mention of abuse. For practitioners, the key is to build a precise disclosure timeline, compare the exact content of each statement, and frame arguments around specificity rather than chronology."
In the Interest of Z.D., a Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. The court first analyzed whether counsel complied with Anders, In re Schulman, and Kelly by thoroughly reviewing the record, serving the mother with the brief and motion to withdraw, and advising her of her right to review the record and file a pro se response. After conducting its own independent review, the court found no arguable ground for reversal, including no viable challenge to the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), where the record showed a pattern of drug abuse creating substantial risk of harm to the child and impairing the mother’s ability to parent. The court also held that counsel’s motion to withdraw was premature because appointed counsel in termination appeals generally must continue representation through exhaustion of further appellate remedies under Family Code section 107.016(2) and In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination cases, Anders review will not save a weak record challenge where the evidence clearly ties a parent’s substance abuse to danger, instability, and inability to safely parent. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to build a record that specifically connects conduct to child endangerment and best interest; for appointed appellate counsel, the lesson is to strictly follow Anders procedures and expect representation to continue beyond the court of appeals unless properly relieved."
The Bryant Law Firm and Deborah E. Bryant v. Robert Walker
SCOTX
In a fee-dispute case with family-law implications, the Texas Supreme Court held that a client’s claims against his former lawyer were barred by accord and satisfaction under Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 3.311. After the client demanded a refund and complained that the lawyer’s alleged mishandling of his child-support-termination matter caused additional losses, the lawyer sent a $3,300 refund check and a release. The check conspicuously stated that cashing it would be a full and final settlement and release of all claims. The Court concluded the statutory elements were satisfied because the refund was tendered in good faith, there was a bona fide dispute over the amount and scope of the client’s claims, and the client deposited the check with actual knowledge of the settlement condition. The client’s attempt to cross out the release language and refusal to sign a separate release did not matter because negotiating the check itself completed the accord and satisfaction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat any check marked as full settlement like a binding settlement offer, not routine payment. In family-law disputes over fees, reimbursements, equalization payments, or support-related expenses, depositing a conspicuously conditioned check can wipe out larger claims—even if you write "under protest," strike the language, or decline to sign a separate release."
Fair v. Powell
COA03
In Fair v. Powell, the Austin Court of Appeals rejected a claimed implied easement by necessity across neighboring property in a family land dispute. Fair argued her guesthouse and event-center tract needed access over the Powells’ driveway, but the court focused on Texas’s strict-necessity standard and the time-of-severance requirement. Relying on deed history, recorded instruments, and affidavit testimony showing Fair’s property already had access to Keeneland Drive by a road on her own land, the court held the tract was not landlocked. Because an easement by necessity cannot arise from convenience, lower cost, or longstanding permissive family use, and because alternate access existed, no implied easement by necessity was established.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your client claims a right to keep using a family roadway, driveway, or gate after divorce, partition, or sale, historical practice alone is not enough. Courts will demand objective proof—deeds, surveys, severance history, and actual access to a public road—and any alternate route, even if unpaved or less desirable, can defeat an implied-easement-by-necessity claim."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Sini Ann Mathews and Wesley Mon Mathews
COA13
In this divorce case, the appellant tried to use a restricted appeal to challenge the final divorce decree after already filing a timely motion for new trial. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a restricted appeal is available only if the appellant did not timely file any post-judgment motion, and that requirement is jurisdictional under the appellate rules and Ex parte E.H. Because the motion for new trial was filed within thirty days of the decree, the appellant could not satisfy a required element of restricted appeal. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction and held that later efforts to obtain the appellate record could not cure the defect.
Litigation Takeaway
"Choose your post-judgment remedy carefully. In Texas family cases, a timely motion for new trial and a restricted appeal are not interchangeable fallback options—filing the motion for new trial destroys restricted-appeal jurisdiction."
In the Interest of K.M.N., P.N. III, E.J.N., I.A.N., B.L.N., C.A.N., S.V.N., L.F.N., and S.N., Children
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. The court relied on extensive evidence of danger and instability, including Mother’s cocaine use at the birth of the youngest child, unsafe and unsanitary housing, educational neglect, parentification of older siblings, Father’s sexual-abuse conviction and history of physical abuse, and Mother’s prolonged failure to protect the children despite knowing of Father’s violence and alleged killing of one child. Applying the Family Code best-interest framework and Holley factors, the court held the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief that termination was in the children’s best interest, and it separately affirmed Father’s termination after independent Anders review revealed no non-frivolous appellate issue.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, failure to protect can be just as powerful as direct abuse. A parent who continues to align with a known abuser, minimizes danger, or cannot show a real safety plan risks losing conservatorship or parental rights even if that parent was not the primary perpetrator."
Bouvier v. Thompson
COA02
In Bouvier v. Thompson, the plaintiff sued family members in 2024 claiming they concealed inheritance information, committed fraud, breached fiduciary duties, and conspired to deprive her of assets she said she should have inherited. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment because the defendant used the plaintiff’s own prior filings to show she knew the key facts no later than 2014: she believed Ezelle was her biological mother, believed an inheritance was owed to her, and believed family members were concealing it. Applying Texas’s four-year limitations periods for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and the derivative limitations rule for conspiracy, the court held the claims accrued by 2014 and were therefore time-barred when filed in 2024. The court also emphasized that arguments about delayed discovery or concealment do not defeat summary judgment without competent evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"Labels do not save stale claims. If a client’s earlier pleadings, letters, or filings show they already knew the essential facts, Texas limitations likely starts running then—even if they later say they lacked full proof. In family-related property, probate-overlap, and fraud cases, lawyers should audit prior statements carefully, plead only recognized causes of action, and support any tolling theory with actual summary-judgment evidence."
Juan Morales a/k/a Juan Manuel Morales v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Juan Morales a/k/a Juan Manuel Morales v. The State of Texas, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the defendant’s fourth and fifth motions for continuance in a retrial for continuous sexual abuse of a child. The defense argued it needed more time because its proposed expert was unavailable, first citing medical issues and later scheduling conflicts. The court applied Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 29.03, 29.06, 29.07, and 29.08 and held that the trial court acted within its discretion because the continuance motions did not meet the strict statutory requirements for an absent-witness continuance. The fourth motion lacked required specifics about diligence, the expected testimony, and other mandatory elements, and the fifth motion was unverified, which preserved nothing for appellate review. The court also noted the case had already been continued multiple times and the record did not show the expert was medically unavailable on the actual trial date. The conviction was therefore affirmed on the continuance issue.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a continuance because an expert cannot appear, do not rely on general fairness arguments. File a sworn motion, show specific diligence, explain exactly why the expert matters, prove the absence was not self-created, and give the court a concrete timeline for availability. In family cases, Morales is a strong tool for defeating vague last-minute reset requests and a warning that repeated continuances seriously weaken any appellate complaint."
Spragins v. Lunn 34 Cattle
COA02
In Spragins v. Lunn 34 Cattle, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals looked past the trial court’s label of a “restraining order” and held that the order was actually a temporary injunction because it was entered after a contested evidentiary hearing and remained in effect “until further order” during the pendency of the case. Applying Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 683 and 684, the court held the order was void because it did not affirmatively set the case for trial on the merits and did not fix a bond. The court rejected the idea that an “until further order” clause could satisfy Rule 683 and dissolved the injunction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, the label on an order does not control—its function does. If an order entered after notice and hearing operates like a temporary injunction, it must strictly comply with Rules 683 and 684 by including a merits trial setting and a bond amount. Otherwise, the order may be void and vulnerable to immediate interlocutory attack."
In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child
COA13
In *In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child*, the mother challenged only one part of the termination judgment: whether the trial court used the correct version of Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O). The suit was filed in 2023, but the Legislature amended § 161.001 effective September 1, 2025, repealing the old service-plan ground in subsection (O) and renumbering the substance-abuse ground into subsection (O). The Thirteenth Court focused on the amendment’s express transition clause, which made the new law apply to SAPCRs pending in the trial court on the effective date. Because this case was still pending on September 1, 2025 and was tried afterward, the amended statute controlled. The court held the trial court correctly applied amended subsection (O) and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family case stays pending across a legislative change, do not assume the filing date controls. Always check the session law’s effective-date and transition provisions, because amended Family Code sections can apply to pending SAPCRs and change pleadings, proof, jury charge, judgment language, and appellate strategy."