Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1216 opinions found
In re M.M.
COA02
In this original proceeding arising from post-divorce enforcement litigation, the mother obtained a contempt order against the father for violating possession, medical, and property-division provisions of the divorce decree. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held the order was void because the criminal-contempt portion contained inconsistent confinement terms, and the civil-contempt portion merely declared the father in civil contempt without imposing a coercive sanction or stating how he could purge the contempt. Applying settled Texas contempt law, the court emphasized that civil contempt must be coercive and must tell the contemnor exactly what act will secure compliance or release. Because the order lacked those essential features, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a Texas family-law contempt order to survive review, drafting matters as much as proof. A valid civil-contempt order must do more than list violations—it must specify the coercive sanction and the exact purge condition within the contemnor’s power. If the order blurs civil and criminal contempt, or leaves the respondent guessing how to comply, it is vulnerable to mandamus as void."
Romero v. State
COA14
In Romero v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove continuous sexual abuse of a child under Penal Code section 21.02 when the child could not give exact dates for each incident. The court applied the standard legal-sufficiency framework and held that exact dates were not required so long as a rational factfinder could infer that at least two acts of sexual abuse occurred over 30 or more days. The child’s testimony that the abuse happened about every other weekend, together with her description of three memorable incidents occurring more than a month apart, was enough to satisfy the statute’s duration element. The court also reaffirmed that a child complainant’s testimony alone can support the conviction and affirmed Romero’s conviction and sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
"When exact dates are unavailable, lawyers can still prove repeated child abuse by building a pattern-based record anchored to routines, recurring opportunities, and a few memorable incidents separated in time. In family-law cases, that approach can support findings about endangerment, possession restrictions, supervised access, and best interest without requiring false calendar precision."
In the Interest of A.W., a Child
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating that, after reviewing the record, no nonfrivolous issue could be raised. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals independently reviewed the clerk’s and reporter’s records under Anders and In re K.M., including the trial court’s findings under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (Q) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). Given the record of drug use during pregnancy, the child’s positive test at birth, incarceration, noncompliance, instability, and the absence of any pro se response, the court found no arguable ground for appeal and affirmed the termination order. The court separately denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding under In re P.M. that a no-merit appeal alone is not good cause for withdrawal and that appointed counsel’s duties continue through Texas Supreme Court proceedings unless relieved on some independent basis.
Litigation Takeaway
"An Anders affirmance in a termination case does not end appointed counsel’s job. For family-law litigators, the case highlights two practical lessons: build and preserve appellate issues at trial because a bad record is hard to overcome on accelerated review, and if appointed on appeal, comply fully with Anders procedures while expecting to remain counsel through possible Texas Supreme Court review unless the court grants withdrawal for a reason beyond frivolousness."
In the Interest of V.C., a Child
COA13
In this private termination-and-adoption appeal, the court reversed a trial court order terminating the mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(C) and (F). The father and stepmother relied mainly on the mother’s incarceration, nonpayment of child support, and absence from the child’s life. The court strictly scrutinized the evidence under the clear-and-convincing standard and held it was insufficient on both predicate grounds. As to subsection (C), the evidence showed the child was adequately supported in the father’s home, so the record did not establish that the mother voluntarily left the child without adequate support. As to subsection (F), the petitioners proved nonpayment but did not prove the mother had the ability to pay during the relevant statutory period, especially while incarcerated and in a halfway house. The mother’s post-release efforts to contact the child, along with evidence that the father controlled or blocked access, also undermined any abandonment theory. The court reversed and rendered judgment without reaching best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination cases rise or fall on exact statutory proof, not sympathy or bad optics. Incarceration, missed support, and a weak relationship with the child do not by themselves prove abandonment or failure to support under § 161.001(b)(1)(C) or (F). Petitioners must prove each element—especially adequate-support facts under subsection (C) and actual ability to pay during the statutory window under subsection (F). For respondents, evidence of attempted contact, blocked access, and inability to pay can be decisive."
J.L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In J.L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Third Court of Appeals upheld an order denying the father both managing and possessory conservatorship of his infant child. The record showed repeated domestic violence between the parents, the father’s methamphetamine use, the child’s positive methamphetamine hair test, untreated mental-health issues, threats to the caregiver, and the father’s failure to complete key court-ordered services. Applying Family Code sections 153.002 and 153.191 under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held that the usual presumption favoring appointment of a non-managing parent as possessory conservator was rebutted because appointment was not in the child’s best interest and the father’s possession or access would endanger the child’s physical or emotional welfare. The court also rejected the father’s complaint about discretionary visitation because he was not entitled to possessory-conservator status in the first place.
Litigation Takeaway
"The Section 153.191 possessory-conservator presumption is real, but it can be overcome with a strong danger record. Repeated family violence, substance abuse, direct child drug exposure, untreated mental-health instability, threats, and failure to complete services can justify denying a parent any conservatorship role at all—not just restricting visitation."
In the Interest of D.C.C. and R.C.C., Children
COA05
In this Dallas appeal, Father argued the final divorce decree improperly departed from the parties’ binding mediated settlement agreement by imposing monthly child support when the MSA only required the parents to split daycare costs. The court acknowledged that qualifying MSAs under Texas Family Code sections 6.602 and 153.0071 are binding and that courts generally may not render judgments that vary from them, but it held that ordinary error-preservation rules still apply. Because Father did not clearly object when the trial court announced it would include standard child-support language, did not seek enforcement of the MSA as written, and did not file a post-judgment motion complaining that the decree varied from the MSA, he failed to preserve the complaint. The court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"A binding MSA is only as good as the record you make to enforce it. If a trial court signals that a decree will add or alter terms from the MSA, counsel must object clearly, request a conforming decree, and, if necessary, file a motion to modify or for new trial—or the complaint may be waived on appeal."
Ardon v. State
COA02
In Ardon v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that even if the trial court erred by designating a forensic interviewer as the child’s Article 38.072 outcry witness and by excluding or redacting sexual-history evidence under Rules 107 and 412, those errors were harmless. The court focused on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), reasoning that the complainant herself testified to the same core abuse allegations at trial, making the interviewer’s testimony cumulative, and that the excluded sexual-knowledge evidence would not have materially advanced the defense beyond evidence the jury already heard. Because the complained-of rulings did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, the convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Preserving evidentiary error is not enough—on appeal, the real fight is often harm. If substantially the same evidence comes in through other witnesses, or excluded evidence adds little to the theory already presented, reversal is unlikely. In family-law cases involving child statements, forensic interviews, and sexual-knowledge evidence, build the record to show why the disputed evidence is uniquely important rather than merely cumulative."
In re The State of Texas, ex rel. Jennifer A. Tharp
COA03
In this original mandamus proceeding, the State challenged a trial court’s refusal to include an affirmative family-violence finding in a criminal judgment and its refusal to impose the mandatory $100 family-violence fine after placing the defendant on community supervision for assault causing bodily injury, family violence. The Austin Court of Appeals analyzed Code of Criminal Procedure articles 42.013 and 42A.504(b), emphasizing that both statutes use mandatory language: once the court determines a Title 5 offense involved family violence as defined by Family Code section 71.004, it must enter the finding in the judgment and must impose the fine if community supervision is granted. The court rejected the trial court’s attempt to hold those consequences in abeyance as a probation incentive, concluding the duties were ministerial rather than discretionary. Because the State lacked an adequate appellate remedy, mandamus was proper, and the court conditionally granted relief compelling entry of both the family-violence finding and the fine.
Litigation Takeaway
"A family-violence finding is not a negotiable probation detail. Once a criminal court determines family violence occurred in a qualifying Title 5 case, the finding must be entered immediately, and family-law litigators should expect that judgment to become a powerful exhibit in custody, possession, protective-order, and divorce-related disputes."
Olivares v. Sanchez
COA08
In Olivares v. Sanchez, the appellant tried to appeal a July 1, 2025 final judgment by filing a notice of appeal on November 10, 2025, after the trial court denied her timely motion for new trial on October 9, 2025. The court explained that a timely motion for new trial extends the deadline to file a notice of appeal to 90 days after the final judgment is signed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a)(1), making the deadline September 29, 2025. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the later order denying new trial created a separate 30-day deadline, because an order denying a motion for new trial is not independently appealable. Since the notice of appeal was filed after the extended deadline measured from the final judgment, and outside the Rule 26.3 grace period calculated from that same date, the court held it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, the appellate clock runs from the signed final judgment or final appealable order—not from the order denying a motion for new trial. A timely new-trial motion can extend the notice-of-appeal deadline to 90 days, but it does not restart the clock. Calendar the final-order date, the Rule 26.1 extended deadline, and the Rule 26.3 grace period immediately, or the appeal may be lost entirely."
Rodriguez v. State
COA03
In Rodriguez v. State, the defendant was convicted of violating a protective order, and the trial court enhanced his punishment under Texas Penal Code section 12.42 based on two prior felony convictions. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodriguez was the same person convicted in the prior cases. The court explained that similar identifiers and investigative testimony, without a reliable evidentiary link such as fingerprints, certified penitentiary records, stipulations, or other competent identity evidence, were legally insufficient to support the habitual-offender findings. The court left the underlying conviction intact, reversed the punishment portion of the judgment, and remanded for a new punishment hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"If prior convictions matter, do not assume identity from a shared name or partial identifiers. In family-law cases involving protective orders, conservatorship, possession restrictions, or family-violence allegations, lawyers should be prepared to prove that the opposing party is the person actually convicted through certified records and a clean identity link—or attack that link if the proof is weak."