Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Moreno Construction Co., Inc. v. Baker
COA04
After a jury found Moreno Construction liable for defective residential construction and awarded homeowner Robin Baker $110,000 in repair and consulting costs, the trial court reduced Baker’s supported attorney’s-fee request from $325,991.01 to $150,000. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the compensatory damages, holding that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the repair-related awards. Applying Texas’s lodestar framework, however, the court held that a trial court may reject excessive, duplicative, unsegregated, or inadequately documented fees but cannot select an unexplained amount untethered to evidence concerning reasonable hours and rates. Because the record did not provide a rational basis for the $150,000 award, the court reversed that portion of the judgment and remanded for an evidence-based fee determination rather than rendering the full amount requested.
Litigation Takeaway
"Build—and attack—attorney’s-fee claims line by line. A sustainable award should identify reasonable hours, rates, timekeepers, tasks, segregation decisions, and specific reductions; broad discretion does not permit an arbitrary round-number cut. When challenging fees, offer evidence supporting particular exclusions or an alternative lodestar calculation. Even if an unexplained reduction is reversed, the claimant may receive only a remand, not automatic recovery of the entire request."
Strong Builders, LLC v. CO3 Holdings, LLC
COA08
CO3 Holdings obtained a summary judgment against Strong Builders and related defendants, but its motion did not address every cause of action in CO3’s live pleading. Applying Texas finality rules, the Eighth Court of Appeals held that describing the judgment as “final,” stating that it “addresses all parties and claims,” and including a Mother Hubbard clause did not clearly and unequivocally dispose of the entire case. Because the record showed unresolved claims and the trial court never signed the requested severance order, the judgment remained interlocutory. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before appealing, confirm that the signed judgment actually disposes of every claim and party or contains unequivocal finality language. Do not rely on a “final” label or Mother Hubbard clause to resolve claims omitted from a summary-judgment motion; if claims remain, obtain a signed severance order, complete their disposition, or identify a valid basis for interlocutory review."
In re Vanessa Lynn Clark
COA04
In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, Vanessa Lynn Clark sought mandamus relief, while the real party in interest requested Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.11 sanctions based on an allegedly groundless petition, serial litigation, and Clark’s threatening and offensive communications. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that Clark failed to establish entitlement to mandamus relief and denied her petition. Although the court condemned her communications, it explained that Rule 52.11 sanctions must be tied directly to petition-related misconduct—principally the bad-faith filing of a clearly groundless mandamus petition—and that an unsuccessful petition is not necessarily sanctionable. Because the sanctions evidence focused largely on collateral communications rather than the petition’s legal or factual basis, the court denied sanctions and declined to impose filing restrictions, e-filing limitations, or a criminal referral, noting that trial-court remedies or Texas’s vexatious-litigant statutes might be better suited to that conduct. The court also denied Clark’s requests to disqualify opposing counsel, make a disciplinary referral, and strike the sanctions exhibits.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 52.11 sanctions request must focus on why the mandamus petition itself was clearly groundless and filed in bad faith; offensive communications, serial litigation, and other collateral misconduct are not enough without a direct connection to the petition. Lawyers should match each alleged abuse to the proper remedy and seek broad filing restrictions or vexatious-litigant relief through the procedure and forum authorized to grant it."
In the Interest of C. L. P., a Child
COA08
The Department sought termination of both parents’ rights, and an associate judge announced termination and later signed a written termination order. Father, however, timely requested de novo review by the referring court under Texas Family Code §§ 201.015 and 201.2041. The Eighth Court of Appeals held that Father’s request prevented the associate judge’s proposed order from becoming the referring court’s order by operation of law, even though Mother—the appellant—did not request review. Because the referring court had neither ratified the proposed order nor rendered a final judgment after de novo proceedings, the order remained interlocutory and was not appealable. The court also declined to abate because substantive issues remained for the referring court, rather than a merely formal or ministerial defect, and dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before appealing an associate judge’s ruling, review the entire docket for a timely de novo request by any party and confirm that the referring court has rendered a final judgment. Another party’s request can prevent finality for the case as a whole, and appellate abatement generally will not rescue a premature appeal when the referring court must still decide substantive issues."
In the Interest of J.Z.L.-H., aka J.L.-H., a Child
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights after concluding that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and the nonexclusive Holley factors, the court considered Mother’s repeated cocaine-positive tests, unresolved mental-health and medication-compliance issues, incomplete services, deficient supervision, domestic-violence concerns, and history involving six older children no longer in her care. Although Mother had stable housing, attended counseling, regularly participated in appropriate supervised visits, and completed some services, the trial court could find that these recent improvements did not establish sustained behavioral change. The child’s success and stability in a foster-to-adopt placement further supported termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts evaluate best interest through the parent’s long-term pattern of conduct, not service-plan attendance or recent progress alone. A parent seeking to avoid termination should connect completed services to objective, sustained change—such as verified sobriety, treatment and medication compliance, safe supervision, stable income, and a concrete parenting plan. Litigators should build a detailed timeline, corroborate explanations for noncompliance, address prior child-welfare history, and present comparative evidence about the child’s current placement and need for permanence."
Weisbard v. Sutton Health Care Center Ltd. Co.
COA05
After the trial court dismissed the case for want of prosecution, the appellant timely filed a motion to reinstate but failed to verify it as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(3). The Fifth Court of Appeals held that adding a verification after the rule’s thirty-day deadline did not cure the defect, extend the trial court’s plenary power, or trigger the ninety-day appellate deadline under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a)(3). Because the trial court’s later order denying reinstatement and purporting to dismiss with prejudice was signed after plenary power expired, it was void and did not restart the appellate timetable. The notice of appeal was therefore untimely, and the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A timely motion to reinstate must also be verified within Rule 165a(3)’s thirty-day period. In any family-law case dismissed for want of prosecution, file a fully compliant verified motion, calculate appellate deadlines from the original dismissal, and consider a protective notice of appeal rather than relying on a later reinstatement order."
Chavez v. State
COA14
Isaiah Chavez was convicted of murder after shooting Justin Davidson and claiming self-defense. Chavez sought to introduce a psychologist’s testimony about his general mental condition and childhood exposure to family violence to explain why he believed deadly force was immediately necessary. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.36(b) did not authorize the testimony because the statute concerns family violence committed by the deceased against the defendant, not unrelated childhood violence. The court further concluded that the testimony lacked the case-specific fit required by Texas Rule of Evidence 702 because the expert did not connect Chavez’s history to Davidson, the encounter in the truck, or Chavez’s perception of an immediate deadly threat. Finding the exclusion within the zone of reasonable disagreement, the court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert testimony about trauma or family violence must do more than establish a diagnosis, history, or general psychological principle. To satisfy Rule 702, counsel must create a reliable, case-specific analytical bridge between the expert’s opinions and the precise incident, conduct, risk, or statutory finding before the court. The report, examination, and offer of proof should expressly establish that nexus rather than relying on the expert’s credentials or asking the factfinder to infer it."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Claire Noel Callahan and Matthew John Lewis and in the Interest of A.C.C., a Child
COA06
In this divorce and SAPCR appeal, the mother challenged the trial court’s decision to change the parties’ infant child’s surname from Callahan to Lewis and its refusal to align the child’s possession schedule with that of an older half-sibling. Applying Texas Family Code § 45.004(a)(1), the Sixth Court of Appeals held that neither parent has a superior constitutional right to choose a child’s surname and that the controlling inquiry is the child’s best interest, evaluated through nonexclusive, fact-specific considerations rather than a mechanical factor count. The child’s young age, brief use of the Callahan surname, the mother’s unilateral naming decision and omission of the father from the birth paperwork, the father’s post-birth involvement, and conflicting testimony about any prior naming agreement provided sufficient evidence for the name change. The court also affirmed the possession schedule because sibling alignment, while relevant, did not control the broader best-interest analysis. It did not reach the father’s challenge to conditional appellate attorney’s fees because the triggering condition—an unsuccessful appeal by him—had not occurred.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child-name dispute must be proved through child-centered best-interest evidence, not parental tradition, preference, or claims of an exclusive constitutional naming right. Counsel should preserve communications and birth records, develop evidence of each parent’s involvement and the child’s family connections, and recognize that unilateral naming conduct may undermine credibility. Likewise, a request to coordinate half-siblings’ possession schedules requires concrete evidence of the benefit to the child; alignment is relevant but not automatically controlling."
Tran v. Overby
COA01
In Tran v. Overby, the First Court of Appeals held that a husband’s pleaded request in his answer for attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs incurred to prepare and defend a divorce was an independent claim for affirmative relief, not merely a defensive request. Because that fee claim was already pending when the wife nonsuited her divorce petition, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 did not extinguish it, and the trial court retained authority to decide and award fees under Family Code section 6.708. The court also rejected the wife’s jury-trial complaint, holding that although the reasonableness of fees can be a jury issue, her original jury demand in the divorce case did not survive the nonsuit and she failed to timely perfect a new jury demand by paying the Rule 216 jury fee for the remaining post-nonsuit fee dispute.
Litigation Takeaway
"A nonsuit does not necessarily end a divorce case if the other side has already pleaded attorney’s fees as affirmative relief. For respondents, plead fees clearly and request an actual judgment so the claim survives dismissal; for petitioners, do not assume you can avoid fee exposure by nonsuiting on the eve of trial. And if only fees remain after nonsuit, file a new jury demand and pay the jury fee again or you may lose any right to a jury on reasonableness."
In re L.B.
COA05
In a child-removal proceeding, the relator sought mandamus relief after the trial court allegedly refused to conduct an adversary hearing, reset it, and orally extended the children’s removal. The Fifth Court of Appeals explained that an oral ruling may be reviewed by mandamus only if the record establishes a clear, specific, and enforceable order. Because the relator provided neither a signed written order nor a properly authenticated reporter’s record documenting the trial court’s precise ruling, the court could not determine whether a reviewable order existed. It denied the mandamus petition without reaching the legality of the alleged rulings and denied the emergency motion for temporary relief as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Urgency does not excuse an inadequate mandamus record. Before seeking emergency appellate relief from an oral family-court ruling, counsel should obtain either a signed order or a properly authenticated reporter’s record showing that the ruling is definite, presently operative, and enforceable; counsel’s description, docket entries, emails, and unauthenticated transcripts are not substitutes."