Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1643 opinions found
In the Interest of M.L.D., a Child
COA06
The parents of M.L.D. challenged a final order appointing them and two nonparents as joint managing conservators while giving the nonparents the exclusive right to determine the child’s residence. The Sixth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 153.131(a), reinforced by the constitutional fit-parent presumption, required proof that appointing the parents would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development—not merely evidence that the nonparents were more involved or might provide a preferable home. Disputed or isolated evidence involving a sunburn, vehicle safety, discipline, haircuts, dance, daycare, and possession exchanges did not establish the necessary nexus between the parents’ appointment and probable significant harm. The court therefore found the evidence legally and factually insufficient, vacated the final conservatorship order, left the temporary order in place, and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"A nonparent cannot overcome the parental presumption with comparative best-interest evidence, greater resources, a close bond, or disagreements over ordinary parenting choices. To obtain managing conservatorship over a parent’s objection, the nonparent must present specific, admissible evidence connecting parental acts or omissions to probable significant physical or emotional harm under § 153.131(a). Parent-side counsel should force the court to separate standing and best interest from significant impairment, request detailed findings, and preserve sufficiency and constitutional challenges."
Romero v. Romero
COA05
In a restricted appeal from a default divorce decree, Husband challenged the award of the marital home to Wife as a disproportionate division of property, contending that the home was his separate property. The Fifth Court of Appeals concluded that Husband satisfied the jurisdictional requirements for a restricted appeal, but it could consider only materials that were before the trial court when judgment was rendered. Because Husband’s separate-property documents were filed after rendition, they were not part of the face of the record and could not establish reversible error. The existing record included the deed and evidence of Husband’s cruelty, family-violence convictions, lengthy incarceration, and a protective order, and it did not affirmatively show either an abuse of discretion in the property division or lack of notice. The court affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"A restricted appeal cannot be used to supplement an undeveloped trial record with postjudgment evidence. Parties asserting separate property must offer and obtain admission of deeds, tracing records, and other proof before rendition. Appellate counsel must identify affirmative error from the record as it existed when judgment was rendered; silence, ambiguity, or later-filed documents will not establish mischaracterization, insufficient notice, or an abuse of discretion."
Fariborz Hadjebian v. Sandra Dunning
COA05
After a jury found Sandra Dunning negligent in causing a multi-vehicle accident but awarded Fariborz Hadjebian no damages, Hadjebian argued that the trial court’s compressed schedule prevented him from presenting medical testimony and that the zero-damages findings were factually insufficient. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the scheduling complaint was not preserved because counsel neither timely objected when the limitation affected the presentation of evidence nor made an offer of proof identifying the doctor’s anticipated testimony and its relevance; raising the issue for the first time in a motion for new trial was too late under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court also concluded that the jury could find negligence but no compensable damages given the disputed causation evidence, including Hadjebian’s preexisting back problems and another accident. It affirmed the take-nothing judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a trial-time limit threatens material evidence, object immediately, identify the affected witness or exhibit, explain its relevance, request specific relief, obtain a ruling, and make an offer of proof before resting. A motion for new trial ordinarily cannot cure a silent trial record, and without a proffer an appellate court cannot assess exclusion or harm."
Pahuja v. Colors of Brazil, LLC
COA07
After a two-week bench trial, the appellants timely requested findings of fact and conclusions of law and filed a notice of past-due findings, but the trial judge resigned without issuing them. Because the case involved disputed matters and potentially multiple grounds for the judgment, the Seventh Court of Appeals concluded that the record did not affirmatively show the omission was harmless. The court held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18 authorized the successor judge to issue the missing findings and conclusions, and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.4 required abatement and remand to correct the omission rather than reversal for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"After a family-law bench trial, timely request findings and file a Rule 297 notice if they become past due—even if the trial judge leaves office. When missing findings prevent meaningful appellate review, explain the disputed issues and alternative grounds for the judgment; if a successor judge can supply the findings under Rule 18, the usual remedy is abatement for correction, not an automatic new trial."
McClure v. State
COA05
In this criminal appeal, James Hunter McClure challenged his sexual-assault conviction, arguing in part that the prosecution was time-barred and that testimony concerning two similar alleged sexual assaults was inadmissible. The Fifth Court of Appeals held that the DNA-based exception to the limitations period applied because biological evidence collected during the investigation produced an unknown male profile that did not match the complainant or another readily ascertainable person. It further held that defense cross-examination suggesting an innocent or consensual explanation for McClure’s DNA opened the door to the other complainants’ testimony as rebuttal evidence. Given the material similarities among the incidents, the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rules 404(b) and 403. The court affirmed the conviction but remanded for recalculation of mandatory jail-time credit and correction of the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Cross-examination can change the evidentiary landscape. When counsel suggests consent, accident, fabrication, mistake, or another innocent explanation, the court may admit otherwise excluded similar-incident evidence to rebut that theory. Before advancing an alternative explanation—especially after a conditional pretrial ruling—family-law litigators should identify what prior acts, communications, records, or third-party testimony the questioning may make admissible, preserve relevance and Rule 403 objections, and request a limiting instruction when appropriate."
Joseph Thompson and Thompson Custom Properties, LLC v. High Equity Investments, LLC
COA03
Thompson prevailed on one breach-of-contract claim—the only claim authorizing attorney’s fees—and sought $327,617.30 after making his own entry-specific reductions for nonrecoverable work. High Equity countered with counsel’s testimony that the recoverable claim was factually distinct and substantially less demanding than the other disputes, identified billing entries that remained unsegregated, and opined that only 20% of the total fees was attributable to the recoverable claim. Applying Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa and Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, the Third Court of Appeals held that segregation may be proved through a reasoned percentage allocation and that a trial court need not accept the fee applicant’s more granular methodology. Because the billing records established the services, hours, personnel, and rates, while the opposing testimony supported the 20% allocation, the court upheld the $115,299.41 fee award.
Litigation Takeaway
"Attorney-fee segregation is a contested evidentiary issue, not a calculation controlled by the fee applicant. A party challenging fees should offer a qualified witness who reviews the invoices, identifies work attributable to nonrecoverable claims, compares the claims’ relative complexity and demands, gives concrete examples, and proposes a reasoned alternative percentage. Conversely, a fee applicant should connect every category of work to a legal basis for recovery and explain—not merely assert—why common work is intertwined or why the chosen allocation is reasonable."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Hatif Bin Basharat and Maham Tariq and in the Interest of F.H.M., I.H.M., and A.H.M., Children
COA05
In a Texas divorce involving three children, the father argued that Texas had to decide custody because it was the children’s UCCJEA home state and he satisfied Texas residency requirements. The mother sought dismissal in favor of Ontario, citing alleged domestic violence and prior Canadian child-protection involvement, her expiring visitor status and inability to work in Texas, limited finances and housing, family support in Canada, and the location of relevant witnesses and records. The Fifth Court of Appeals explained that home-state jurisdiction under Texas Family Code § 152.201 gives a court authority to decide custody but does not require it to exercise that authority. Applying the inconvenient-forum factors in § 152.207 and reviewing for abuse of discretion, the court held that the developed evidentiary record supported Ontario as the more appropriate forum. It also concluded that the father’s Texas residency did not mandate a Texas custody proceeding and that the Hague Convention’s habitual-residence analysis did not control because no Hague return proceeding was involved. The court affirmed the dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Home-state status is not the end of a UCCJEA forum dispute. A party seeking to keep or move a custody case must build an admissible, factor-by-factor record under Texas Family Code § 152.207, particularly concerning family violence, immigration and work authorization, finances, housing, support networks, and the location of witnesses and records. Counsel should also distinguish custody jurisdiction from divorce jurisdiction and specify whether Texas should dismiss or stay only the custody claims while retaining other issues."
E. L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
The Texas Third Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of a mother’s parental rights after the Department presented evidence of recurring marijuana, methamphetamine, and cocaine use; threats and aggression toward a caseworker; refusal to continue safety measures; and persistent instability affecting the children. Analyzing the evidence cumulatively, the court held that it was legally and factually sufficient to establish both that the mother knowingly allowed the children to remain in endangering conditions under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and that she engaged in a voluntary, continuing course of endangering conduct under § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Although the mother met some of the children’s needs and maintained a bond with them, the children’s need for permanence, their behavioral and emotional difficulties, and their improvement in a stable placement also supported the finding that termination was in their best interests.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment should be proved or defended through a complete chronology rather than by treating each event in isolation. Repeated drug use, threats, resistance to safety plans, and resulting instability can collectively establish both an endangering environment and an endangering course of conduct—even when the parent meets some immediate needs and the children remain bonded to the parent. Counsel should separately develop the elements of subsections (D) and (E), connect drug use and volatility to parenting risk, preserve communications and placement evidence, and directly address favorable evidence."
Sanjay Khanduja, Independent Administrator with Will Annexed to the Estate of Dr. R.K. Dhingra v. Malachite Venture Corp.
COA01
The Estate sued Malachite and others over title to real property, alleging that a deed in Malachite’s chain of title contained a forged signature. After Malachite moved for summary judgment—but before the trial court rendered judgment—the Estate filed a notice nonsuiting all of its claims against Malachite. Applying Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 162 and 163, the First Court of Appeals concluded that the party-specific nonsuit was timely, became effective immediately upon filing without a court order, and caused no legally cognizable prejudice shown by the record. Because the nonsuit extinguished the Estate’s claims against Malachite, the trial court could not later adjudicate their merits by summary judgment. Malachite’s independent counterclaims and cross-claims remained pending to the extent they sought affirmative relief. The appellate court reversed the challenged judgment and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"A party may nonsuit all of its claims against one litigant in a multiparty case before judgment is rendered, even when a summary-judgment motion is pending. The nonsuit takes effect upon filing and prevents a later merits ruling on those claims, but it does not extinguish another party’s independent counterclaims, cross-claims, sanctions requests, attorney’s-fee claims, or costs. Family-law counsel should file before rendition, identify exactly which claims and parties are being dismissed, and audit the pleadings for relief that survives."
In the Interest of J.R.M., a Child
COA13
After a SAPCR modification case was dismissed for want of prosecution, newly retained counsel filed a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(3) motion to reinstate supported by his own affidavit. Although counsel stated that the motion’s allegations were within his personal knowledge, the record showed that he entered the case only after dismissal and had not personally participated in the earlier prosecution, mediation, or docket activity. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the conclusory affidavit did not properly verify the motion because counsel lacked personal knowledge of the material historical facts. As a result, the motion neither triggered Rule 165a’s mandatory-hearing requirement nor extended the appellate deadline under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a). Because the notice of appeal was filed seventy-nine days after the dismissal order, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 165a motion to reinstate must be verified by someone with actual personal knowledge of the relevant prosecution history; new counsel cannot establish personal knowledge merely by reviewing the file or reciting affidavit language. Use the client, former counsel, or multiple competent affiants as necessary, and independently calendar the ordinary thirty-day appellate deadline. If the verification’s validity is uncertain, file a protective notice of appeal rather than assume the motion extended the timetable."