Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1003 opinions found
In the Interest of N.P., a Child
COA12
In In re N.P., the Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court analyzed whether the child’s environment and the father’s course of conduct endangered the child, focusing on the mother’s methamphetamine use during pregnancy, the newborn’s positive drug test, the parents’ homelessness, the father’s repeated domestic violence against the mother during pregnancy, and his resulting incarceration. The court held this evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show both endangering conditions or surroundings under subsection (D) and a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious endangering course of conduct under subsection (E), so it affirmed the termination judgment without reaching subsection (P).
Litigation Takeaway
"Prenatal violence, drug exposure at birth, homelessness, and criminal instability can combine to prove endangerment under both Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a unified safety narrative tying domestic violence, substance abuse, and instability directly to risk to the child."
In re Ganga Thapa
COA03
In In re Ganga Thapa, the Third Court of Appeals held that a grandmother had standing under Texas Family Code section 102.004(a)(2) to seek managing conservatorship because the Department, which had been appointed managing conservator after termination of the parents’ rights, expressly consented to her suit. The trial court had sua sponte found she lacked standing and struck her intervention in the pending SAPCR. The appellate court treated the issue as a pure standing question, applied the rule that an intervenor in a SAPCR generally needs only the same standing required to file the claim as an original suit, and concluded that Thapa’s original-suit standing carried over to intervention. Because the trial court’s contrary legal conclusion was an abuse of discretion and denial of intervention in a SAPCR lacks an adequate appellate remedy, the court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its standing ruling and order striking the intervention.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a grandparent’s standing depends on Family Code section 102.004(a)(2), get the managing conservator’s consent clearly into the record—preferably in a filed written consent tied expressly to the statute. Once that statutory gateway is satisfied, a trial court cannot deny intervention based on generalized discretion; the fight shifts from standing to the merits."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Zachary Rogers and Janeth Rogers and in the Interest of N.R. and J.R., Children
COA05
In Rogers, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce decree after the husband tried to challenge child-support and medical-support provisions he had signed and approved as to both form and substance. The court held that, under the consent-judgment and invited-error doctrines, a party who agrees to the substance of a decree generally cannot later complain on appeal about those same provisions absent fraud, collusion, or misrepresentation. The court also rejected the husband’s recusal complaint because the judge he sought to recuse was not the judge who presided over trial or signed the decree, and he showed no harmful error. The judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not sign a divorce decree 'approved as to form and substance' if you intend to appeal any substantive ruling. If child support, medical support, offsets, or other decree terms remain disputed, preserve the issue on the record, reserve objections clearly, and avoid consent language that will waive appellate review."
Michael Ray Guajardo v. The State of Texas
COA09
In Michael Ray Guajardo v. The State of Texas, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that Article 38.37 allows the State to admit prior sexual acts against children even when the defendant committed those acts as a juvenile, so long as the statute’s notice and relevance requirements are met. The defendant argued the statute should be limited to adult conduct and that Rule 403 required exclusion because the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. The court rejected both arguments, reasoning that the statute contains no adulthood limitation and courts may not add one. It further held the extraneous-act evidence was highly probative of sexual interest in children, state of mind, and the propensity inference Article 38.37 expressly permits in child-sex-offense cases, and that this probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-related litigation, historical sexual misconduct involving children is not automatically irrelevant or inadmissible just because it occurred when the accused was a juvenile. For family-law cases involving conservatorship, possession, protective orders, or modification, Guajardo is a strong analogy for arguing that older or juvenile-age conduct can still be powerful evidence of present child-safety risk—while opponents should focus on relevance, reliability, remoteness, and Rule 403 fairness rather than a categorical age-based objection."
In re Arturo Perez and Texas Materials Group, Inc.
COA04
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial after a defense take-nothing verdict based on two unsupported reasons: a conclusory factual-sufficiency finding and alleged "empty chair" gamesmanship involving an undesignated traffic flagger. Applying In re Toyota Motor Sales and related mandamus precedent, the court explained that a new-trial order must give legally proper, specific reasons that are actually supported by the record. The court found the trial judge improperly treated a stipulation about right of way as if it proved negligence and proximate cause, and also relied on misconduct findings that were unpreserved and contradicted by the record. Because the verdict winners had no adequate appellate remedy if forced to retry the case, mandamus issued to vacate the new-trial order.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court cannot order a do-over based on vague claims that a verdict was against the evidence or that one side engaged in "gamesmanship" unless those reasons are preserved, legally valid, and tied to actual record support. For family-law litigants, this is a strong mandamus blueprint for attacking unsupported new-trial, temporary, or post-judgment rulings that rely on broad fairness or best-interest language without specific evidence and preserved error."
In the Interest of K.D.S., a Child
COA05
In In re K.D.S., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a father’s SAPCR modification suit, a $5,000 attorney’s-fee award, and an order requiring him to post a $5,000 bond before filing future modification pleadings in the case. The father tried to use the modification proceeding to collaterally attack the underlying 2021 SAPCR order based on alleged service defects and other jurisdictional theories, but the court held those complaints were waived by his prior appearance and answer and could not support a collateral attack on a non-void final order. The court also held that any complaint about the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law was waived because none were requested. Most significantly, the court approved the prefiling bond as a sanctions measure for repeated frivolous filings, discovery abuse, failure to appear, and refusal to litigate within the rules, explaining that such relief may be imposed without a formal vexatious-litigant finding when supported by the record and tailored to secure costs and attorney’s fees. The father’s due-process, equal-protection, and access-to-courts objections were not preserved, so the sanctions and dismissal were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas family courts can use their sanctions power—not just the vexatious-litigant statute—to require a bond before future SAPCR modification filings when a party shows a pattern of frivolous pleadings, discovery abuse, and rule-defying conduct. For practitioners, the key is to build a detailed record, tie the bond to anticipated costs and fees, and preserve any constitutional objections with specificity in the trial court."
Dr. Wesley G.C. Athey v. Diana Athey
COA04
In Athey v. Athey, the husband appealed a divorce decree awarding the wife a $25,000 judgment for missing separate-property jewelry, arguing due process, insufficient evidence of value, and harm from the trial court’s failure to file findings. The Fourth Court held the due-process complaint was not preserved because the appellate constitutional theory was not specifically raised in the trial court. On valuation, the court agreed the evidence was factually insufficient to support the specific $25,000 figure because the record lacked competent evidence of actual value, such as appraisals, market estimates, metal weight, or gemstone quality. But the court still affirmed because property division is reviewed for abuse of discretion, and a valuation error alone is not reversible unless the appellant also shows the error made the overall division manifestly unjust and unfair. Because the husband did not analyze the full estate or explain how the alleged error skewed the overall division, he failed to show reversible error. The court also held the missing findings and conclusions were harmless because he could still present his appellate issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you challenge a Texas divorce property division on appeal, it is not enough to prove the trial court used the wrong value for one asset. You must also show how that mistake changed the overall estate division enough to make it manifestly unjust and unfair. Preserve constitutional complaints precisely, build real valuation evidence at trial, and on appeal recalculate the entire division—not just the disputed item."
In the Interest of P.H.S. and E.K.S., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally insufficient to support endangerment findings against Father under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The Department proved serious concerns in Mother’s home, including unsanitary conditions, domestic violence concerns, a violated safety plan involving Mother’s paramour, and an unexplained injury to one child, but the court emphasized that subsections (D) and (E) require parent-specific proof. Applying the clear-and-convincing and legal-sufficiency standards, the court concluded the record did not show Father knowingly placed the children in endangering conditions, knowingly allowed them to remain there, personally engaged in a course of endangering conduct, or knowingly placed them with someone who did. The court therefore reversed and rendered the (D) and (E) findings as to Father, while affirming the termination order on other grounds.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment findings cannot rest on guilt by association. If you want a Family Code 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) finding against a particular parent, you need evidence tying that parent to knowledge, control, placement, permission, or a conscious course of dangerous conduct—not just proof that the child was in a bad situation with someone else."
Gutierrez v. Gutierrez
COA04
In Gutierrez v. Gutierrez, the trial court ordered the father to pay $1,417.23 in monthly child support even though the decree referenced lower guideline amounts and stated only that he was underemployed and that above-guideline support was in the children’s best interest. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that because the award varied from the guideline calculation, Texas Family Code § 154.130 required written findings stating the parties’ net resources, the percentage applied, whether guideline support would be unjust or inappropriate, and the specific reasons for the variance. The appellate court concluded the decree’s conclusory recitals were insufficient because they left the father and the court to guess whether the trial court had imputed income, varied upward from a guideline figure, or both. The omission was harmful and reversible, so the court abated the appeal and remanded for entry of the required findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a Texas court orders child support above or below the guideline amount, the decree must do more than say 'underemployed' and 'best interest.' Lawyers should make sure the order spells out the guideline calculation, net resources, percentage used, and the specific reasons guideline support would be unjust or inappropriate, or an otherwise defensible support award may be sent back on appeal."
Jackson v. Slack
COA12
In Jackson v. Slack, the Tyler Court of Appeals reversed a no-answer default judgment because substituted service did not strictly comply with the Rule 106(b) order authorizing it. The trial court’s order allowed service only at Jackson’s specified apartment unit by either leaving the papers with someone over sixteen at that unit or posting them on that unit’s front door. But the return showed service was made instead on a leasing-office employee in the complex office. Applying Texas’s strict-compliance rules for default judgments, the court held that substituted service must match the order exactly, that actual notice cannot cure defective service, and that the deviation deprived the trial court of personal jurisdiction. The default judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any Texas family-law default, substitute service is only as good as the Rule 106 order. If the order authorizes service at a specific residence, unit, or by a specific method, the return must show exact compliance. Service on apartment staff, relatives, office personnel, or other practical substitutes will not support a default unless the order expressly allows it."