Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1643 opinions found
Rubio v. State
COA13
In this criminal appeal with direct relevance to Texas family-law expert practice, Rubio challenged a forensic scientist’s qualifications under Texas Rule of Evidence 702 and conducted voir dire, but the trial court never expressly or implicitly ruled on the objection. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, the court held that an objection and supporting examination do not preserve error without an adverse ruling or an objection to the trial court’s refusal to rule. The court also rejected Rubio’s remaining evidentiary and cumulative-harm arguments because some complaints were unpreserved and none established reversible error, and it affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Making a Rule 702 objection and conducting extensive voir dire are not enough to preserve an expert challenge for appeal. Counsel must obtain an express or implicit ruling on each asserted ground—or object on the record if the trial court refuses to rule—and should follow up on any objection the court carries or takes under advisement."
In the Interest of J.K., a Child
COA02
After Mother filed a bill of review more than a year after a default judgment terminated her parental rights, Father invoked Texas Family Code § 161.211(a), which generally bars direct or collateral attacks on qualifying termination orders after six months. The trial court treated the deadline as jurisdictional and dismissed the case on a plea to the jurisdiction. The Second Court of Appeals held that the statute restricts the availability of relief but does not clearly withdraw the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. It therefore reversed and remanded without deciding whether the statutory bar, Mother’s due-process allegations, or the bill-of-review requirements ultimately entitled either party to judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"A mandatory deadline is not necessarily jurisdictional. Counsel defending a termination order should assert § 161.211(a) as a statutory bar through an appropriate merits-based procedure—not solely through a plea to the jurisdiction—and preserve alternative defenses. A petitioner who defeats a jurisdictional dismissal still must overcome the six-month bar and prove every requirement for bill-of-review relief."
Hernandez v. State
COA11
Christian Emmanuel Hernandez appealed his assault-family-violence conviction, arguing that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.14 required the trial court to add his requested instruction directing the jury to acquit if it had a reasonable doubt. Reviewing the charge as a whole, the Eleventh Court of Appeals concluded that the existing application paragraph already correctly placed the burden of proof on the State and expressly required a not-guilty verdict if the State failed to prove any element beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Hernandez’s proposed language was virtually identical to—and adequately covered by—the charge given, refusing it was neither error nor harmful. The court overruled the issue and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A party is not entitled to a duplicative jury instruction merely because it restates or emphasizes a correctly submitted legal principle. To preserve a meaningful charge complaint, counsel should identify a substantive omission, tie the requested language to controlling and current authority, explain why the existing charge is inadequate, and show how the omission could affect the verdict. In family-violence matters overlapping with criminal proceedings, counsel should also review the actual criminal charge and verdict before assessing the conviction’s effect on custody, possession, protective orders, or related family-law issues."
In Re Frontier Custom Builders, Inc.
COA09
Frontier Custom Builders sought mandamus relief after the trial court barred it from further questioning a material witness based on alleged witness influence. Although the trial court stated that death-penalty sanctions were unwarranted, the Ninth Court of Appeals examined the order’s practical effect and concluded that it was case-determinative because it prevented Frontier from developing material liability evidence. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.2 and TransAmerican, the court held that the record did not show that lesser sanctions had been tested, meaningfully considered, or found ineffective. Because the restriction was more severe than necessary and could not be adequately remedied on appeal, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts evaluate sanctions by their practical effect, not their label. Before a family court excludes evidence or testimony in a way that effectively decides custody, property, enforcement, or another disputed issue, it must connect the remedy to the misconduct and create a record showing why lesser sanctions would not work. Counsel facing such an order should propose narrower alternatives, preserve the excluded proof, request findings, and promptly consider mandamus relief."
Prosperity Bank v. Steed
COA02
During Christina and Robert Steed’s divorce, the trial court appointed a receiver—without notifying Prosperity Bank—to control and sell real property owned by the spouses’ LLC and pledged as collateral for a $1 million loan. The Second Court of Appeals held that the real estate was “fixed and immovable property” under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 695 and that the bank, as a deed-of-trust lienholder, was an adverse party entitled to at least three days’ pre-appointment notice. Neither the divorce court’s authority under Texas Family Code § 6.502(a)(5) nor its equitable receivership power displaced Rule 695, and the bank’s later participation did not cure the notice violation. The court reversed the order denying the bank’s motion to dissolve and rendered an order dissolving the receivership.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before seeking a receiver over real estate in a divorce, identify and give Rule 695 notice to every lender, lienholder, and other adverse claimant. Urgency, alter-ego allegations, and the court’s Family Code authority do not excuse pre-appointment notice, and a later hearing will not cure the defect. Counsel should consider a temporary restraining order or another less drastic remedy while notice is provided; an improperly appointed receiver is subject to dissolution and interlocutory appeal."
Stone v. Stone
COA03
After an earlier appeal invalidated an indefinite “as agreed” possession provision, the trial court entered a specific possession schedule for a mother living in Portugal and appointed a friend of the court under Texas Family Code § 107.021 to draft an order reflecting the court’s announced ruling. The mother argued that the appointment improperly delegated judicial authority, denied due process, exceeded the appellate mandate, and resulted in overly restrictive possession terms. The Third Court of Appeals concluded that the friend’s role was ministerial because the judge decided the substantive terms, allowed the parties to review and object to the proposed order, ruled on those objections, and independently signed the final order. The court also held that the definite schedule complied with the mandate, makeup possession was not required, and longer possession periods coordinated with school breaks were reasonable given the children’s schooling in Texas and the mother’s residence abroad. The court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court may appoint a friend of the court to reduce an announced custody ruling to writing, but the judge must retain all substantive decision-making authority. Counsel should obtain a detailed ruling on the record, compare the proposed order provision by provision with that ruling, make specific objections before entry, and ensure that possession terms are definite, enforceable, and supported by the family’s practical circumstances."
In the Interest of J.R.M., a Child
COA13
After a SAPCR modification case was dismissed for want of prosecution, newly retained counsel filed a Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(3) motion to reinstate supported by his own affidavit. Although counsel stated that the motion’s allegations were within his personal knowledge, the record showed that he entered the case only after dismissal and had not personally participated in the earlier prosecution, mediation, or docket activity. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that the conclusory affidavit did not properly verify the motion because counsel lacked personal knowledge of the material historical facts. As a result, the motion neither triggered Rule 165a’s mandatory-hearing requirement nor extended the appellate deadline under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a). Because the notice of appeal was filed seventy-nine days after the dismissal order, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 165a motion to reinstate must be verified by someone with actual personal knowledge of the relevant prosecution history; new counsel cannot establish personal knowledge merely by reviewing the file or reciting affidavit language. Use the client, former counsel, or multiple competent affiants as necessary, and independently calendar the ordinary thirty-day appellate deadline. If the verification’s validity is uncertain, file a protective notice of appeal rather than assume the motion extended the timetable."
Soria v. State
COA11
Juan Soria III appealed his family-violence assault conviction after the complainant, his former wife, remained in the courtroom following her initial testimony, heard other witnesses testify, and was later recalled by the defense. The Eleventh Court of Appeals explained that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.03 and Texas Rule of Evidence 614(d) do not automatically require exclusion of a victim-witness. The party seeking exclusion must make a timely, specific request and show that hearing other testimony would materially affect the victim’s testimony. Because Soria neither requested her exclusion at the appropriate time nor made the required evidentiary showing—and because her later testimony did not concern the assault details addressed by the intervening witnesses—the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court found no demonstrated harm and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Invoking “the rule” alone may not exclude a victim-witness. Counsel must timely request that witness’s exclusion, establish on the record how exposure to other testimony could materially influence later testimony, obtain a ruling, and connect any claimed violation to specific changes in the witness’s account. In related divorce, custody, or protective-order litigation, precise transcript comparisons are far more persuasive than generalized claims of coaching or influence."
Julian Castillo Huerta v. The State of Texas
COA12
A child told her mother that Huerta caused a hickey but did not disclose the alleged sexual contact until a later Children’s Advocacy Center interview. Huerta argued that the mother or grandmother, rather than the CAC interviewer, was the proper outcry witness under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072. Applying the rule that the outcry witness is the first adult to receive a discernible statement describing the offense—not merely a general suggestion of abuse—the Twelfth Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its discretion in designating the CAC interviewer. The earlier communications lacked sufficient detail, the grandmother’s information was secondhand, and any error was harmless because the child testified without objection to the same material facts.
Litigation Takeaway
"In cases involving a child’s abuse disclosure, build a precise chronology of what the child said, to whom, and when. The first adult to hear a general concern is not necessarily the first witness to receive a legally significant description of abuse. Counsel should establish the exact content of each disclosure, distinguish direct statements from secondhand reports, identify the governing hearsay rule, and preserve error by objecting to materially similar evidence when it is offered."
In the Interest of A.S., B.S., and E.S., Children
COA05
In this divorce and conservatorship dispute, Father challenged the trial court’s failure to rule again on his motion for new trial, its statement that plenary power had expired, and its exclusion of his untimely disclosed witnesses and exhibits under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the new-trial motion was automatically overruled 75 days after the final decree because no signed written order had determined it. Although the trial court apparently miscalculated when its plenary power expired, it had no duty to rule again on the already-denied motion, and Father did not show that the error was harmful. The court also upheld the evidentiary rulings because Father failed to establish good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice and did not provide a complete reporter’s record. The court affirmed the final divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Calendar post-judgment deadlines from the date the judgment is signed: a motion for new trial is automatically denied on day 75 unless the court signs a written order, even though plenary power may continue for another 30 days. A hearing, docket entry, or informal communication is not a substitute for a signed order. Family-law litigants must also timely disclose evidence and witnesses, build a record supporting any Rule 193.6 exception, and provide a complete appellate record to obtain meaningful review."