Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
787 opinions found
In the Interest of I.P.P., a Child
COA05
In *In the Interest of I.P.P., a Child*, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed an order declaring a pro se mother a vexatious litigant in an ongoing SAPCR. After years of repeated filings—including modification, enforcement, TRO, reconsideration, and emergency requests—the father moved under Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to restrict her future pro se filings. The mother argued Chapter 11 should not apply within a single SAPCR, that her filings did not qualify as repeated relitigation, and that refusing to hear her emergency conservatorship-modification request violated due process and parental-rights protections. The court reviewed the ruling for abuse of discretion and held the order was independently supported by § 11.054(2), which permits vexatious-litigant findings based on repeated relitigation or attempted relitigation after adverse determinations. The court rejected any categorical exemption for SAPCR or “emergency” filings and found no reversible constitutional error on the briefing and record presented.
Litigation Takeaway
"Chapter 11 is available in family cases, including SAPCRs, to curb serial pro se filings that recycle issues already decided. If you want vexatious-litigant relief, build a chronology tying each new filing to prior final rulings and show why the new pleading has no reasonable chance of success. If you are filing a modification or emergency motion, make sure it rests on genuinely new facts—not just a new label for old complaints."
Newrez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing v. Kinney L. Barcuch
COA05
In a restricted appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a default judgment against Newrez LLC because the record showed the plaintiff failed to strictly comply with Texas service rules. The plaintiff served an unrelated individual and then an incorrect South Carolina entity rather than Newrez’s actual registered agent or another statutorily authorized person. The court rejected the appellee’s argument that the restricted appeal failed due to a supposedly incomplete clerk’s record, concluding the existing record sufficiently established nonparticipation and no timely post-judgment filings. Because defective service was apparent on the face of the record, the trial court never acquired personal jurisdiction, so the default judgment was void and had to be reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Default judgments are only as strong as the service record. In Texas, especially in default settings, courts require strict compliance with service rules, and serving the wrong agent, wrong entity, or wrong address can make the judgment void months later on restricted appeal. For family lawyers, this is a major warning in default divorces, modifications, enforcements, and cases involving LLCs or third-party entities tied to the marital estate: verify the exact legal identity and registered agent before prove-up, or risk losing the judgment entirely."
Hutton v. Alfrido
COA14
In Hutton v. Alfrido, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from a final protective order for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was filed too late. Although the appellant filed a timely post-judgment motion that functioned like a motion for new trial and extended the deadline to 90 days after the order was signed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a), the notice of appeal still had to be filed by February 3, 2026, or within the additional 15-day Verburgt grace period by February 18, 2026. Filing on February 27 was outside both deadlines. The court also rejected the appellant’s apparent attempt to rely on a later denial of a motion to set aside or reconsider the protective order, explaining that such a denial is not independently appealable and does not create a new appellate deadline. And because the record showed only a docket-sheet notation—not a signed order—there was no appealable later order in any event. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, calendar appellate deadlines from the original final order, not from a later ruling on a motion to reconsider or set aside. A post-judgment motion may extend the deadline, but it does not restart it indefinitely, and docket-sheet entries are not appealable orders. If there is any doubt, get a signed order, calculate the Rule 26.1 and Verburgt deadlines immediately, and file the notice of appeal early."
Griffith v. Barrett
COA14
In Griffith v. Barrett, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a temporary injunction was void because the order did not set the case for trial on the merits as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. The injunction stated only that it would remain in effect until final judgment or further order, which the court found was not a substitute for an affirmative merits trial setting. Applying the strict-compliance rule from InterFirst Bank and Qwest, the court treated the omission as a facial defect that rendered the injunction void, reversed the order, dissolved the injunction, and remanded without reaching other issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want temporary injunctive relief in a family-law-adjacent case, draft the order like a real Rule 683 injunction. An order that says it lasts until final judgment is not enough; the injunction itself must set the case for trial on the merits. For the responding party, this is a strong procedural attack point that can dissolve an overbroad injunction before litigating the underlying facts."
In re Malik Adonis Dartell Conyers
COA05
In this original proceeding arising from a child-return dispute, the relator asked the Dallas Court of Appeals to prohibit enforcement of a trial court’s return order and to stay related proceedings. The court did not reach the merits. Instead, it held the petition failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52 because it lacked the required certification and was supported largely by documents that were neither sworn nor certified, leaving an insufficient record for extraordinary relief. The court also denied the emergency motion as moot after denying the petition and struck the filings for including unredacted sensitive data in violation of Rule 9.9.
Litigation Takeaway
"Emergency appellate relief in family-law cases can be lost on procedure alone. If a writ petition is missing the Rule 52 certification, relies on unauthenticated attachments, or includes unredacted sensitive information, the court may deny or strike the filing without ever considering the underlying custody or child-return issue."
In re Brittany Hilbert
COA05
In this original proceeding arising from a conservatorship-related case, the relator asked the Dallas Court of Appeals to vacate a final order, attorney’s-fee award, and interim conservatorship or possession rulings based on parental-presumption and best-interest complaints. The court did not reach those merits because the mandamus filing was procedurally defective: the appendix and record were not supported by properly certified or sworn copies as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7, the challenged final order and relevant hearing transcript were missing, and the petition disclosed unredacted sensitive data in violation of Rule 9.9. Applying Walker v. Packer and Dallas mandamus-record precedent, the court held that the relator failed to provide a sufficient record to establish entitlement to mandamus relief and struck the filing for the confidentiality violation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus relief can be lost before the court ever considers the merits. In family-law emergency appellate practice, lawyers must file a complete, properly authenticated mandamus record, include the exact order and any necessary reporter’s record, and scrub all sensitive information under Rule 9.9. Even serious conservatorship complaints will fail if the filing is procedurally noncompliant."
Patrick Adam Ortiz v. The State of Texas
COA08
The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed Patrick Adam Ortiz’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child and two indecency-with-a-child counts. The defense argued the child complainant was not credible because she delayed reporting, previously did not disclose abuse to CPS, had some inconsistencies, and her mother allegedly wanted to use the allegations in a custody dispute. The court held those points went to weight and credibility for the jury, not legal sufficiency. Applying ordinary sufficiency and preservation rules, the court concluded the complainant’s detailed testimony alone was enough to prove repeated qualifying acts over the required period, and it rejected the remaining complaints about judicial comments, charge and indictment defects, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance, and double jeopardy.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, “this was raised for custody leverage” is not a silver bullet. Courts may still credit abuse allegations when the record shows repeated access, a detailed disclosure history, explainable delay, and contextual corroboration. Lawyers should build or attack these cases through chronology, access, prior statements, and corroborating circumstances—not motive rhetoric alone."
Ortiz v. Nelapatla
SCOTX
In Ortiz v. Nelapatla, the Texas Supreme Court decided whether a partial counteraffidavit under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001 defeats an entire medical-expense affidavit or only the portions actually challenged. Ortiz submitted affidavits from three medical providers to prove past medical expenses, but Nelapatla’s counteraffidavits disputed only specific portions of two providers’ bills. The trial court nevertheless excluded those two provider affidavits in full absent live expert testimony, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court analyzed the text of § 18.001, especially its allowance for controverting “all or part” of an affidavit, and held that the statute does not impose an all-or-nothing result. Unchallenged portions of a compliant medical-expense affidavit remain competent evidence of reasonableness and necessity and may go to the factfinder without live expert testimony. Because the lower courts excluded the affidavits too broadly, the Court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"A targeted challenge only creates a targeted evidentiary problem. If the other side’s § 18.001 counteraffidavit attacks only certain medical charges, the remaining unchallenged charges should still be admissible without live expert proof. In family-law cases involving uninsured medical expenses, therapy bills, counseling costs, or medical-needs evidence, lawyers should separate disputed from undisputed charges and press for admission of the uncontested portion."
In the Interest of N.H.S. and H.A.F., Children
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). Mother challenged only best interest on appeal, so the court focused on the Holley factors and section 263.307 considerations, relying on evidence of repeated abuse allegations, prior CPS “reason to believe” findings, the children’s fear of Mother, self-harm and trauma tied to that fear, unsafe and unsanitary home conditions, medication noncompliance, positive drug tests during the case, and the children’s improvement in foster care. Although Mother completed some services and her related criminal charge was dismissed after pretrial intervention, the court held that favorable evidence did not outweigh the broader pattern of danger, instability, and emotional harm, and it affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won on a layered record, not a single bad incident. Evidence of abuse history, child fear, trauma symptoms, mental-health noncompliance, unsafe home conditions, and the child’s improvement in a stable placement can collectively support strong best-interest findings, while partial rehabilitation or service completion may not overcome a record showing ongoing danger and instability."
Wallace v. Powell
COA05
In Wallace v. Powell, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a bill of review after Wallace tried to overturn an underlying summary judgment by attacking only the affidavit supporting the traditional summary-judgment ground. The court explained that a bill-of-review petitioner who participated in the underlying case must make a prima facie showing of a meritorious appellate ground likely to succeed on appeal. Because the underlying judgment rested on both traditional and no-evidence summary-judgment grounds, Wallace had to challenge both independent bases. His failure to address the no-evidence ground, identify evidence raising a fact issue, or explain why that ruling would have been reversible was fatal, so he could not establish the threshold meritorious-ground-of-appeal element.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you are using a bill of review to attack a final judgment, you must show a likely winning appellate issue against every independent ground supporting that judgment. In family cases, attacking only the weakest affidavit or one legal theory is not enough when the order could also stand on a separate no-evidence, standing, limitations, or other dispositive ground."