Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1643 opinions found
In the Interest of A.R. and K.G., Children
COA06
The Department sought to terminate Father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), alleging that his drug use, domestic violence, criminal history, and instability endangered A.R.’s conditions or surroundings, and under § 161.001(b)(1)(N) for constructive abandonment. The Sixth Court of Appeals concluded that the Department’s witnesses offered largely generalized concerns and allegations, without clear and convincing evidence identifying a dangerous environment in which Father knowingly placed or allowed A.R. to remain. Under In re N.G., the court reviewed the challenged ground (D) finding despite the unchallenged ground (N) finding because a ground (D) finding can carry consequences in later termination proceedings. The court modified the judgment to delete the unsupported ground (D) finding but otherwise affirmed termination based on the unchallenged constructive-abandonment and best-interest findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination evidence must be tied to the precise statutory ground: allegations of drugs, family violence, criminal conduct, or instability do not establish ground (D) without proof of a specific endangering environment, the child’s exposure to it, and the parent’s knowledge. Appellate counsel should challenge unsupported ground (D) and (E) findings even when another ground independently supports termination, because deleting those findings can protect the parent in future cases involving other children."
In the Interest of J.B.L., a Child
COA04
The Department sought to terminate Mother’s parental rights based in part on alleged endangerment arising from drug use. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that clear and convincing evidence did not support Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E) because the Department did not connect Mother’s historical or post-removal drug use to a conscious course of conduct that endangered J.B.L. during pregnancy or while the child was in her care. Although due process required review and deletion of the challenged subsection (E) finding because of its potential future consequences under subsection (M), the court affirmed termination as modified based on the unchallenged subsection (N) and (O) grounds and the supported best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Evidence of drug use does not automatically prove subsection (E) endangerment. Counsel must establish when the conduct occurred, how it impaired parenting or exposed the child to danger, and that it formed a conscious course of conduct. Parent-side appellate counsel should separately challenge unsupported subsection (D) or (E) findings even when another ground supports termination, because deleting those findings may prevent their use in a later case involving another child."
Julian Castillo Huerta v. The State of Texas
COA12
A child told her mother that Huerta caused a hickey but did not disclose the alleged sexual contact until a later Children’s Advocacy Center interview. Huerta argued that the mother or grandmother, rather than the CAC interviewer, was the proper outcry witness under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072. Applying the rule that the outcry witness is the first adult to receive a discernible statement describing the offense—not merely a general suggestion of abuse—the Twelfth Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its discretion in designating the CAC interviewer. The earlier communications lacked sufficient detail, the grandmother’s information was secondhand, and any error was harmless because the child testified without objection to the same material facts.
Litigation Takeaway
"In cases involving a child’s abuse disclosure, build a precise chronology of what the child said, to whom, and when. The first adult to hear a general concern is not necessarily the first witness to receive a legally significant description of abuse. Counsel should establish the exact content of each disclosure, distinguish direct statements from secondhand reports, identify the governing hearsay rule, and preserve error by objecting to materially similar evidence when it is offered."
Theriot v. Scallion
COA14
After a default order increased Ashton Aaron Theriot’s child-support obligation and confirmed a medical-support arrearage, Theriot sought a bill of review, claiming lack of service and jurisdictional defects. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals explained that although complete nonservice relieves a bill-of-review plaintiff from proving a meritorious defense and opposing-party misconduct, the plaintiff must still prove that service did not occur. Because the record contained a facially valid citation signed by the district clerk and bearing the court’s seal, Theriot’s uncorroborated assertions and mistaken contention that a judge had to sign the citation did not overcome the presumption of valid service. The court also declined to consider challenges to the underlying support order because the bill of review had not been granted and rejected Theriot’s jurisdictional arguments. It affirmed the order denying the bill of review.
Litigation Takeaway
"A party seeking to set aside a default family-law judgment based on nonservice needs admissible, independent evidence that service never occurred; allegations, technical objections, and the party’s uncorroborated testimony generally will not defeat a facially valid return. Counsel defending the judgment should preserve the citation, return, and supporting delivery records, while counsel challenging it should obtain corroborating witnesses, address records, delivery evidence, or other proof of actual nonservice. Errors in the underlying order cannot be litigated unless the bill of review is first granted."
In the Interest of L.Z.R., a Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(f)(1) that, despite the Department’s reasonable reunification efforts, a continuing danger prevented Mother from safely regaining custody of her child. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and heightened sufficiency review applicable to parental-termination cases, the court evaluated Mother’s circumstances at the time of trial rather than her promises of future improvement. Her unsuitable housing, lack of dependable income, unresolved substance abuse, missed and positive drug tests, criminal exposure, history of instability, and credibility problems collectively permitted a firm belief or conviction that the danger remained. The court affirmed the continuing-danger and best-interest findings, termination of Mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and the Department’s appointment as sole managing conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a Department-filed termination case, § 161.001(f)(1) is an independent proof-and-drafting requirement: counsel must present clear and convincing evidence of reasonable reunification efforts and continuing danger, and the order must state specific findings in a separate section. Promises of future housing, sobriety, employment, or criminal compliance generally will not overcome objective evidence that those risks remain unresolved at trial. A parent seeking more time should offer a concrete, corroborated transition plan because the request may otherwise reinforce that immediate return is unsafe."
Ex parte Otha Gary Washington
COA14
Washington sought habeas relief after a Texas trial court denied him bail under article I, section 11d(b) of the Texas Constitution on a charge that he shot his girlfriend with a firearm. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the Fourteenth Court held that section 11d(b) establishes alternative grounds for detention, so the State did not need to prove a risk of willful nonappearance if clear and convincing evidence showed that bail could not reasonably ensure safety. The alleged firearm assault, the complainant’s contemporaneous fear of retaliation and death, and Washington’s two prior aggravated-assault convictions—including a firearm assault against a family member—supported the safety finding. The court therefore affirmed the denial of habeas relief despite the absence of flight-risk evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"A criminal bail-denial ruling is not a final finding that family violence occurred, but the evidence underlying it can be highly consequential in protective-order, conservatorship, and possession litigation. Counsel should obtain and independently present admissible evidence such as victim statements, firearm evidence, medical and police records, and prior similar convictions, while carefully distinguishing the burdens and issues in criminal and family court and coordinating around bond conditions, no-contact orders, and Fifth Amendment concerns."
Sajida Corporation, Shareef Enterprises Inc., and Imaad Thouseef v. Seawall Investors, LLC as Assignee of Omair Bashir, and JB Rental Properties, LLC
COA14
A failed package sale of two convenience-store properties led the purchasers to assert contract, tort, declaratory, and equitable claims against the sellers. After the trial court awarded substantive relief and attorney’s fees to the purchasers, the sellers appealed. Applying Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, the Fourteenth Court held that overlapping facts do not excuse a fee claimant from segregating fees incurred solely on recoverable claims from those incurred solely on nonrecoverable claims; only discrete legal services that advance both types of claims may remain unsegregated. Because the purchasers’ evidence neither adequately segregated the fees nor established that all claimed services satisfied that exception, the court reversed the attorney’s-fee award and remanded for redetermination, while affirming the remainder of the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case combines claims with different attorney’s-fee rules, begin segregating fees when the claims are pleaded—not when preparing the fee affidavit. Use task-specific billing and fee testimony to identify work performed solely for recoverable claims, exclude work performed solely for nonrecoverable claims, and explain which discrete services actually advanced both. Shared facts, witnesses, or documents alone do not make all fees recoverable."
In the Interest of L.M., a Child
COA05
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services filed suit to terminate Mother’s parental rights and was appointed L.M.’s temporary managing conservator. Under Texas Family Code § 263.401(a), the trial court’s jurisdiction expired on March 23, 2026, because trial had not commenced and no qualifying extension had been granted by the statutory deadline. The Fifth Court of Appeals held that the extension order signed the following day was void and could not revive jurisdiction; neither the parties’ participation nor a later nunc pro tunc order cured the defect. The court vacated the termination order and dismissed both the underlying suit and the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat the § 263.401 dismissal date as a jurisdictional deadline, not a flexible scheduling date. In a DFPS termination case, counsel must ensure that trial actually commences or that the court grants a statutorily compliant extension before jurisdiction expires. A late extension, party agreement, participation, or nunc pro tunc order cannot revive the case, and appellate counsel should independently verify the deadline even when no party objected below."
Team DGR, LLC v. Kang
COA06
After Young Mo Kang filed a personal-injury suit outside the facial two-year limitations period, Team DGR, LLC sought traditional summary judgment, arguing that limitations barred the claim despite Kang’s assertion that accident-related cognitive impairment tolled limitations under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 16.001. Applying Draughon v. Johnson and Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc., the court held that a traditional summary-judgment movant must conclusively negate a properly raised tolling doctrine and that the relevant inquiry is whether the claimant could understand, participate in, and control the litigation—not merely whether the claimant retained counsel or performed ordinary activities. Because Kang’s medical evidence raised a genuine fact issue regarding his litigation capacity, Team DGR failed to establish its limitations defense as a matter of law, and the trial court properly denied summary judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"A party seeking traditional summary judgment on limitations must conclusively negate any properly raised unsound-mind tolling claim. Retaining counsel, filing claims, driving, or handling routine tasks may show functionality, but those facts do not conclusively prove that a person could understand and direct litigation when competent medical evidence indicates cognitive impairment. Family-law counsel should evaluate litigation-specific capacity and choose carefully between traditional and no-evidence summary-judgment procedures."
In Re W. Murray Thompson Construction Co., Inc.
COA13
After a construction-accident jury returned findings that supported a take-nothing judgment for the general contractor, the trial court granted the plaintiffs a new trial based on contractual-control and evidentiary-insufficiency grounds. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 and the standards established by In re Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas and In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., the court of appeals held that a new-trial order setting aside a jury verdict must state specific, legally appropriate reasons that are supported by the record. Because the trial court’s stated grounds did not survive merits-based review, and an appeal after retrial would not adequately protect the contractor’s original verdict and judgment, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief and directed the trial court to vacate the new-trial order and reinstate the take-nothing judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court cannot set aside a jury verdict merely by issuing a detailed new-trial order; every stated reason must be legally valid and supported by the trial record. In divorce and SAPCR jury cases, counsel should identify whether each challenged finding is binding or advisory, obtain a signed order specifying each new-trial ground, and promptly consider mandamus when unsupported grounds deprive a client of a favorable verdict and judgment."