Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
787 opinions found
Wallace v. Powell
COA05
In Wallace v. Powell, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a bill of review after Wallace tried to overturn an underlying summary judgment by attacking only the affidavit supporting the traditional summary-judgment ground. The court explained that a bill-of-review petitioner who participated in the underlying case must make a prima facie showing of a meritorious appellate ground likely to succeed on appeal. Because the underlying judgment rested on both traditional and no-evidence summary-judgment grounds, Wallace had to challenge both independent bases. His failure to address the no-evidence ground, identify evidence raising a fact issue, or explain why that ruling would have been reversible was fatal, so he could not establish the threshold meritorious-ground-of-appeal element.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you are using a bill of review to attack a final judgment, you must show a likely winning appellate issue against every independent ground supporting that judgment. In family cases, attacking only the weakest affidavit or one legal theory is not enough when the order could also stand on a separate no-evidence, standing, limitations, or other dispositive ground."
Lartigue v. Farias
COA01
In Lartigue v. Farias, the First Court of Appeals held that a civil stalking claim under Chapter 85 was not subject to dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The dispute arose after Lartigue, in the context of separate unauthorized-practice litigation, sent repeated emails and placed repeated calls to attorney Farias that included abusive language, threats, and statements implying an in-person confrontation. Lartigue argued the communications were protected because they related to pending litigation and thus involved free speech and petitioning. The court rejected that framing and focused on the gravamen of the live claim: threatening, harassing, repeated conduct that allegedly caused fear and disrupted Farias’s work. Because the stalking claim was based on alleged intimidation rather than protected speech or petitioning activity, the TCPA did not apply at step one, so the court affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss without reaching prima facie proof or defenses.
Litigation Takeaway
"Not every communication connected to a lawsuit is TCPA-protected. When the real target of the claim is repeated threats, harassment, stalking, or intimidation, courts may stop the TCPA analysis at step one. In family-law cases, that makes pleading and framing critical: emphasize the coercive conduct, unwanted contacts, escalation, and safety impact—not just the fact that the parties were already in litigation."
In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B.
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed a Brazos County order terminating a father’s parental rights after appointed counsel filed an Anders brief. The court independently reviewed the full record, including the father’s pro se response, and held the appeal was wholly frivolous. In addressing the required endangerment grounds under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the court relied on severe evidence that father physically abused another child in the home, that the children at issue were exposed to that dangerous environment, that father minimized the abuse as discipline, failed to accept responsibility, failed to show meaningful therapeutic progress, and had no recommendation for reunification despite technical service completion. The court also held that appointed counsel in a termination appeal may not withdraw solely because counsel filed an Anders brief; absent additional good cause, counsel must continue representation through any petition-for-review stage.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and other child-safety cases, courts focus on actual danger and whether the parent truly changed—not just whether services were completed. Abuse of one child, denial or minimization, and failure to benefit from therapy can support findings that other children remain at risk. For appointed appellate counsel, an Anders brief does not automatically end the representation."
In the Interest of C.F., a Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights, concluding legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that the parents used methamphetamine while caring for the infant, the child himself tested positive for methamphetamine, there were domestic-violence concerns, the home environment was unstable and unsafe, and the father later violated community supervision, was incarcerated, failed to complete services, and offered only a speculative post-release plan. Applying the Holley best-interest framework and sufficiency standards, the court held the trial court could reasonably infer ongoing danger and lack of stability from the father’s past and present conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts give heavy weight to concrete evidence of child endangerment—especially drug exposure, domestic violence, criminal instability, unsafe housing, and failure to complete services—and they may use past conduct to predict future risk. In any custody or termination case, promises of future improvement usually will not overcome a documented record of recent instability unless backed by credible, verifiable proof of rehabilitation, housing, employment, and safety."
Khandria v. Al-Muslim
COA14
In Khandria v. Al-Muslim, the father sought to modify a prior SAPCR/divorce decree that gave him no specific possession or access, arguing the original decree effectively gave the mother unchecked control and that circumstances had materially changed because she was now somewhat open to reunification. The Fourteenth Court first held that this argument was an improper collateral attack on the original decree: any defect in the decree was non-jurisdictional, making the decree at most voidable and subject to direct appeal, not later repair through modification. On the merits, the court held the evidence did not require findings of a material and substantial change or present best interest under Family Code section 156.101. The mother’s testimony showed only cautious, therapy-based openness while continuing to express concerns about the child’s loss of trust, and the father’s reluctance to commit to therapeutic recommendations undercut his request for immediate access. The court also affirmed denial of the father’s request to reduce child support because the record showed assets and earning capacity despite his claimed setbacks.
Litigation Takeaway
"A modification case is not a do-over for errors in the original decree. If the real complaint is that the prior order was legally defective, that issue usually must be raised by direct appeal. And in access-modification cases, vague evidence that a parent’s attitude has softened is not enough—lawyers need concrete proof of post-decree change and a child-centered reunification plan, especially when the relationship has been fractured for years."
In re Anabel Lopez Perez
COA03
In In re Anabel Lopez Perez, the relator sought mandamus relief in the Third Court of Appeals to force an Austin County Court at Law judge to execute or clarify a QDRO arising from a divorce. The court did not reach the merits of the QDRO dispute. Instead, it analyzed Texas Government Code sections 22.221 and 22.201(d) and held that its ordinary mandamus power extends only to trial judges within its appellate district, and Austin County is not in the Third Court’s district. The relator also failed to show that mandamus was necessary to protect or enforce the Third Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The petition was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing mandamus in any post-divorce property case, especially a QDRO or decree-clarification dispute, confirm that the respondent judge sits within the appellate court’s territorial district. A strong merits argument cannot overcome filing in the wrong court, and family-law subject matter does not create mandamus jurisdiction."
Boswell v. State
COA02
In Boswell v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the State’s proof of an aggravated assault on a date different from the indictment’s “on or about” date did not make the evidence legally insufficient because, under Texas law, the State need only prove a date before indictment and within limitations unless time is a material element. The court rejected the defendant’s attempt to treat the date mismatch as a fatal variance or sufficiency defect. But the court agreed that double jeopardy barred punishing Boswell for both aggravated assault and continuous family violence when the aggravated assault was one of the predicate acts supporting the continuous-family-violence count. The court affirmed the aggravated-assault and assault/family-violence convictions, reversed the continuous-family-violence conviction, and rendered an acquittal on that count.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, a mismatch between a pleaded date and the proved date of a family-violence incident is usually better used as a credibility attack than as a dispositive legal argument. The bigger lesson is to carefully track how each abuse incident is being used across claims and requested relief so the same event is not carelessly double-counted as both a standalone act and part of a broader pattern."
Michael Colbert v. State of Texas
COA12
In Colbert v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld an assault/family-violence conviction even though the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution. The defendant argued on appeal that trying the case the day after he elected to represent himself violated Article 1.051(e) and due process, but the court held that complaint was not preserved because he did not object, request a continuance, or otherwise raise the issue in the trial court; in fact, he stated he was ready to proceed. On the merits, the court applied the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, concluding that the complainant’s 911 statements, her similar statements to the responding officer, and the defendant’s own admission that he may have hit her with the television were sufficient to support the finding of bodily injury despite her later recantation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Recantation does not erase family-violence evidence, and preservation matters. In family-law cases, judges may credit contemporaneous 911 calls, officer testimony, and party admissions over a later walk-back, so lawyers should gather and present that evidence early. And if notice or due-process problems arise in a rushed hearing, counsel must object, request specific relief, and make a record immediately or the complaint may be lost on appeal."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Jesus Gregorio Lopez and Isela Flores Richardson
COA13
In this divorce appeal, the wife argued she lacked notice that a May 7 hearing would serve as the final trial and complained that the court ruled on disputed property issues without live testimony, based instead on attorney proffer and documents. The Thirteenth Court rejected those arguments because the record showed the case was orally set for trial on May 7, wife’s counsel acknowledged that understanding at the hearing, and the parties expressly agreed to proceed by proffer with documentary review. The court also found no reversible error regarding alleged post-hearing exhibits, a late-filed amended pleading, relief awarded in the decree, or findings and conclusions, and it affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you agree on the record to try a divorce case by proffer, stipulation, and documents, you usually cannot wait until the judge seems unconvinced and then demand a full evidentiary hearing. Family-law lawyers should clarify whether a setting is final, object clearly to any late amendments or procedure they oppose, and preserve the record before agreeing to an informal trial format."
In re G.M.
COA02
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Section 156.102 is triggered by the date a modification petition is filed, not the date the hearing occurs. Father filed within one year of the prior order and sought to change the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence, so he was required to file a sufficient supporting affidavit. After the trial court found the affidavit insufficient, Section 156.102(c) required it to deny the requested relief and refuse to proceed. By nevertheless conducting an evidentiary hearing and entering temporary orders, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you seek to change primary residence within one year of the last order, the affidavit requirement is a hard gatekeeper. The key date is the filing date, and once a court finds the affidavit insufficient, it cannot simply go forward with a hearing anyway. For movants, draft a fact-specific affidavit that tracks the statute; for respondents, press for an early ruling and preserve error if the court proceeds despite an insufficiency finding."