Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1216 opinions found
In the Interest of J.M.M., S.A.M., and N.R.M., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father argued the trial court lost jurisdiction because it signed the final order after the 90-day deadline in Texas Family Code section 263.4011. The Fourth Court of Appeals agreed the statutory deadline was missed, but held the deadline is mandatory rather than jurisdictional, relying on its prior decision in In re T.D. Because the father did not preserve the complaint in the trial court through a timely objection, motion, or request, the issue was waived. The court therefore affirmed the order terminating Father’s rights and appointing Mother sole managing conservator, while also noting the evidentiary record against Father was unusually sparse.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a missed statutory deadline will void a family-law order on appeal. If a deadline violation is not jurisdictional, you must preserve it in the trial court with a timely objection, motion, or request—and in split-setting cases, track the deadline from the first day trial begins because recesses do not stop the clock."
In re Phillip James Emerson, Jr.
COA06
In this original proceeding, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that once a Rule 18a motion to recuse is filed, the trial judge may not take further substantive action until the judge either recuses or refers the motion to the regional presiding judge. Here, the relator filed a habeas application and a motion to disqualify or recuse on the same day, but the county judge later denied habeas relief before entering a recusal or referral order. Relying on Rule 18a(f)(1) and prior cases holding that orders signed during that freeze period are void, the court concluded the habeas-denial order was signed without authority. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the void order, while denying all other requested relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Timing matters. In Texas, a filed Rule 18a recusal motion immediately freezes the judge’s power to sign substantive orders until the judge either recuses or refers the motion. Family-law lawyers should audit the docket before any ruling on temporary orders, enforcement, possession, support, or property issues, because an order signed during that freeze period may be void and subject to mandamus."
Seavey v. State
COA14
In Seavey v. State, the defendant argued his Confrontation Clause rights were violated when a substitute medical examiner testified about cause and manner of death using an autopsy file prepared by a different examiner who did not appear at trial. On remand after Smith v. Arizona, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the State had introduced the absent examiner’s testimonial statements for their truth or instead presented an expert who independently reviewed the autopsy report, photographs, radiology, and toxicology and formed his own opinion. The court held the testimony was permissible because the substitute examiner offered an independent causation opinion rather than merely relaying the original examiner’s conclusions, so overruling the confrontation objection was not an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"When using a substitute expert, build the record that the witness personally reviewed the underlying materials, applied independent professional judgment, and is offering the witness’s own opinion—not acting as a conduit for an absent professional’s conclusions. In family-law cases, that distinction can determine whether expert testimony survives objection."
Sprung v. Velazquez
COA03
In Sprung v. Velazquez, a husband in a divorce case argued that language in his counter-petition objecting to an associate judge 'hearing a trial on the merits or presiding at a jury trial' counted as a written jury demand. The Austin Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that Rule 216 requires an explicit written jury demand filed timely before trial, and that a reference to a jury trial in an objection to an associate judge is not enough. The court also held that the husband’s oral jury request, made only after the bench trial had begun and after the wife rested, was plainly untimely and could be denied without abusing discretion because granting it would disrupt the docket. The court further affirmed denial of his oral, unverified motion for continuance under Rules 251 and 252.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a jury in a Texas family-law case, file a clear written jury demand early and pay the fee—do not assume other pleadings preserve that right. An objection to an associate judge is not a jury demand, and trial-day oral requests for a jury or continuance are usually too late."
In the Matter of A.F. and I.M.A.F. v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this juvenile-delinquency appeal, the juveniles argued the State’s petitions should have been dismissed because only their mother was served even though the father’s name and address were allegedly known. The Fourteenth Court treated the issue as one of statutory construction and focused on the text of Texas Family Code §§ 53.04 and 53.06. It held that the statute’s singular, disjunctive wording—“parent, guardian, or custodian”—does not require service on both parents absent express language such as “both” or “all.” The court also held that § 53.04(d)(4) was not triggered because one parent was known, located in Texas, and served. The denial of the motions to dismiss was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Service and notice fights rise or fall on the exact statutory text. If the Family Code uses singular and disjunctive language, a court may reject arguments that notice had to be given to every known parent or conservator unless the statute expressly says so. For family-law litigators, this case is a reminder to ground dismissal and due-process arguments in specific notice language, and to distinguish between complete failure of notice and partial-service complaints."
In the Matter of A.F. and I.M.A.F. v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this juvenile-delinquency appeal, the juveniles argued the State’s petitions should have been dismissed because, although the mother was served, the father was not, even though his identity and address were allegedly known. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals treated the issue as one of statutory construction and focused on the text of Texas Family Code § 53.04(d)(3), which refers to “the parent, guardian, or custodian” in the singular and disjunctive. Rejecting the argument that plural words like “names” and “residence addresses” required service on both parents, the court held it would not read “both” or “all” into the statute when the Legislature did not include that language. The court also held § 53.04(d)(4) did not impose any additional service duty because that subsection applies only when the relevant adult is out of state, cannot be found in Texas, or has an unknown residence. Because service on one parent satisfied the statute, the trial court properly denied the motions to dismiss and the judgments were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Notice fights in Texas family-law-related cases turn on the exact statutory text, not broad fairness arguments. If a statute uses singular or disjunctive wording like “the parent, guardian, or custodian,” courts may treat service on one qualifying adult as enough unless the Legislature expressly requires notice to both or all interested parties."
In the Interest of A.S.E. a/k/a A.E., a Child
COA01
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E). The court reviewed the father’s conduct over time—not as isolated incidents—and focused on the child’s positive drug test at birth, the father’s repeated positive drug tests, numerous missed tests treated as positive, failed treatment efforts, failure to complete services, criminal charges and convictions, incarceration, domestic violence, and repeated violations of the Department’s safety plan. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and settled law that subsection (E) is proved through a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient. The court also upheld best interest, concluding that the father’s late improvement did not outweigh the child’s need for permanence and the stability of the relative placement that wished to adopt.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on patterns, not excuses. Repeated drug use, missed tests, failed services, criminal trouble, and violations of safety measures can add up to a compelling course-of-conduct record, and late progress may not undo years of instability. In private custody cases, the same pattern evidence can justify restrictions, supervised possession, or limits on decision-making."
In re Enriqueta Medina
COA14
In a divorce case, the trial court signed a final default divorce decree on September 30, 2024. The husband later claimed he never received notice of the decree and filed a motion for new trial months after the court’s plenary power expired. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(d), the trial court lost plenary power thirty days after signing the decree because no timely post-judgment motion extended that deadline. The court further explained that the clerk’s failure to send default-judgment notice under Rule 239a does not indefinitely extend the trial court’s power; any relief based on lack of notice must fit within the limited Rule 306a framework. Because the new-trial order was signed long after plenary power expired, it was void, and mandamus was the proper remedy to require the trial court to vacate it.
Litigation Takeaway
"Jurisdictional deadlines control, even when a party says they never got notice of a default decree. In family-law cases, lawyers must immediately analyze Rule 329b and Rule 306a deadlines after judgment; once plenary power expires, the trial court cannot grant an out-of-time new trial, and the available remedies shift to restricted appeal, bill of review, or mandamus against any void order."
Robert Anthony Rios v. The State of Texas
COA14
In *Robert Anthony Rios v. The State of Texas*, the defendant tried to elicit testimony from the complainant’s mother that the child later said, “Mommy, I’m sorry. I lied.” The State objected on hearsay grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection while expressly giving defense counsel the chance to explain any non-hearsay purpose or exception. Counsel did not identify any admissibility theory, instead rephrased the question, drew another hearsay objection, and then moved on. On appeal, Rios argued the testimony was admissible as impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, a statement against interest, under optional completeness, and under confrontation principles. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held those arguments were not preserved because none was presented to the trial court as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court also rejected the related ineffective-assistance claim on the direct-appeal record. The holding is that when a hearsay objection is sustained, the proponent must timely state the specific basis for admission or the complaint is forfeited on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other side says “hearsay,” do not assume the judge will fill in the rule for you. In any Texas family case, you must immediately state the exact admissibility theory—non-hearsay purpose, specific exception, impeachment, completeness, or constitutional ground—or you will likely lose the issue on appeal."
In the Matter of C.B.
COA14
In In the Matter of C.B., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a juvenile court retained authority under Texas Family Code section 54.11 to conduct a determinate-sentence transfer hearing and transfer C.B. to TDCJ, even though he was already confined in TDCJ on an adult robbery conviction and had never been physically admitted to TJJD. The court focused on the statutory prerequisites rather than physical placement, reasoning that C.B. remained subject to an uncompleted juvenile determinate sentence that had been committed to TJJD, and TJJD properly made the referral required for the transfer hearing. The court rejected arguments that adult custody divested the juvenile court of power, found sufficient evidence to support transfer based on the underlying offense, later adult conviction, TJJD recommendation, and inability to complete the sentence in the juvenile system before age nineteen, and held that no reversible due-process error was shown from C.B.’s Zoom appearance because no objection was preserved. The court also found no reversible error in the deadly-weapon finding in the transfer order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not confuse a party’s physical custody status with a court’s continuing statutory authority. In overlapping Family Code and criminal matters, the key questions are whether the governing statute still authorizes action and whether the required procedural triggers have occurred. Also, preserve procedural objections—especially to remote appearances—because unpreserved complaints are unlikely to succeed on appeal."