Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1003 opinions found
In the Interest of E.K.S., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, the mother challenged only the visitation language in a final order appointing DFPS permanent managing conservator and giving her supervised possession "at a date, time and location as arranged and agreed" with the Department. The court reviewed the order for abuse of discretion and focused on the child’s best interest, rejecting the argument that the Family Code always requires a fallback schedule with fixed dates and times. Because the record showed unresolved substance abuse, incomplete services, an eleven-month lapse in drug testing, inconsistent visitation, transportation problems, and an out-of-state placement requiring DFPS oversight, the court held the open-ended supervised-access provision was not arbitrary or unreasonable and affirmed the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"An "as arranged and agreed" visitation provision can survive appeal if the record shows why flexibility is necessary and tied to the child’s best interest. If you want to defend a non-specific supervised-access clause, build evidence of safety concerns, instability, logistics, and a reliable supervising conservator; if you want to attack one, preserve complaints that it is indefinite, unenforceable, or effectively delegates control over access without a workable minimum schedule."
In the Interest of T.W.B., a Child
COA05
In *In re T.W.B.*, a pro se father appealed a divorce and SAPCR decree challenging rulings on possession, child support, and property division. The Dallas Court of Appeals focused not on the underlying family-law complaints, but on whether the father’s brief complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. After finding that the first twenty record citations it checked were inaccurate, the court held it was not required to search fifteen volumes of appellate record to locate support for his factual assertions or claimed error. Applying settled law that pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules as represented parties, and noting that most issues were reviewed for abuse of discretion, the court concluded the father failed to demonstrate reversible error from the record and affirmed the trial court’s decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"On appeal, even potentially valid family-law complaints will fail if the brief does not accurately cite the record. Courts will not act as counsel, reconstruct arguments from a massive record, or relax briefing standards for pro se parties; if you cannot show the exact place where error was preserved and proved, affirmance is likely."
In Re Fort Bend Christian Academy
COA14
In *In re Fort Bend Christian Academy*, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that ecclesiastical abstention barred parents’ contract, promissory-estoppel, and DTPA claims against a private Christian school to the extent those claims required a court to interpret and evaluate the school’s internal policies on academic accommodations, bullying, harassment, and discipline. The court analyzed the dispute claim by claim, explaining that Texas courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction when resolving a claim would entangle the judiciary in a religious institution’s doctrine, mission, or internal governance. But the court distinguished concussion-related claims tied to TAPPS rules and concussion-management protocols, concluding those allegations could potentially be resolved through neutral principles of law because they involved external, secular safety standards rather than faith-based decision-making. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus in part, holding the protected internal-policy claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction while the neutral-principles concussion-related claims could proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family-law dispute touches a religious school, the key question is not the label on the claim but whether the court would have to second-guess the school’s faith-infused internal decisions. Claims based on internal discipline, accommodations, or student-governance policies may be jurisdictionally barred, while claims tied to objective outside standards or secular safety rules may still be litigated."
In the Interest of V.R.Z., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas appeal, the parties both sought divorce but disputed whether they had ever entered an informal marriage under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2). The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of marriage because the record showed a specific marriage date and anniversary, testimony that the parties referred to each other as husband and wife, cohabitation in Texas beginning in 2012, Facebook posts calling one party “my husband,” joint tax filings, and deed records identifying them as married. Applying the usual sufficiency standards and relying on the rule that an agreement to be married may be proved by circumstantial evidence, the court deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations and affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informal marriage cases are won or lost through a pattern of evidence, not a single statement. To prove marriage, build a cumulative record with anniversary evidence, cohabitation proof, tax returns, deeds, social media, and third-party testimony; to defeat it, you must explain away that documentary and public-facing pattern with a coherent alternative narrative, not just deny the marriage."
In re Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin, & Hubbard and Todd Crawford
COA01
In this mandamus proceeding, the First Court of Appeals reviewed sanctions imposed after out-of-state defense counsel accepted and used an opposing party’s sensitive personal records supplied by his former fiancé outside formal discovery. The trial court responded with sweeping relief, including disqualification, a large monetary sanction, revocation of pro hac vice status, disciplinary referrals, and a requirement that the attorneys disclose the sanctions order in any future Texas pro hac vice application for ten years. Applying TransAmerican’s just-sanctions framework, the court held that while trial courts have broad authority to punish serious litigation misconduct, non-monetary sanctions must be directly related to the misconduct and no more severe than necessary. The ten-year disclosure requirement failed that test because it operated as a reputational penalty affecting unrelated future cases rather than a case-specific remedy tied to the handling of the records. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus to vacate that disclosure requirement and denied relief on the remaining challenged rulings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Sensitive records obtained through spouses, ex-partners, or other third parties can expose counsel to disqualification and serious sanctions, but trial courts still cannot impose creative non-monetary sanctions that reach beyond the case and function as long-term professional punishment. In family-law litigation, use this case both to attack improper handling of private records and to challenge sanctions that are not tightly tethered to the actual misconduct."
In the Interest of M.M.S., a Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in M.M.S.’s best interest under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). Applying the clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards from In re J.F.C. and In re J.O.A. and the Holley factors, the court focused on Mother’s continued drug use, inconsistent mental-health treatment, unstable housing, poor visitation history, and prior neglect-related concerns involving siblings. The court also relied on evidence that M.M.S. had lived her entire life in a stable foster placement with her brother, was bonded there, and was thriving. Considering the full record and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the appellate court held a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are built through patterns, not isolated facts. A layered record showing substance abuse, untreated mental-health issues, unstable housing, missed visitation, and a child’s success in a stable placement will usually carry the day on appeal; on the defense side, rehabilitation must be documented with concrete proof of sobriety, treatment compliance, stability, and consistent parenting over time."
In the Interest of S.W.R. and H.G.R., Children
COA05
In this Dallas child-support modification case, the parents’ 2020 agreed divorce decree set support at an amount that differed from the Chapter 154 guidelines. Father sought modification in February 2023, arguing both that circumstances had materially and substantially changed and that the agreed amount did not substantially comply with the guidelines. Mother moved for summary judgment on the ground that no material and substantial change had occurred. The court held that because the original support order was an agreed order that deviated from the guidelines, Texas Family Code section 156.401(a-1) controlled and required proof of a material and substantial change in the circumstances of the child or a person affected by the order. Father could not rely on section 156.401(a)(2)’s 20%/$100 guideline-difference test because three years had not yet elapsed, and he conceded that point. Because Father did not respond to the summary-judgment motion with evidence creating a fact issue and did not effectively challenge the no-material-change ground on appeal, the court affirmed summary judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"If an agreed child-support order departs from guideline support, a parent seeking modification before three years have passed must prove a material and substantial change in circumstances. A simple argument that the agreed amount is above or below the guidelines is not enough, and failing to directly attack a no-change summary-judgment ground can end the case on appeal."
David Rojas Sanchez v. The State of Texas
COA05
In David Rojas Sanchez v. The State of Texas, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Sanchez waived his complaint about the admission of Article 38.37 extraneous-offense testimony because he did not preserve error. Although defense counsel objected at the pretrial hearing when the witness could not identify Sanchez in the courtroom, the trial judge responded that she would 'wait and see,' which the appellate court treated as a deferral rather than an express or implicit ruling. Counsel did not press for a definitive ruling, did not object to the court’s failure to rule, and did not renew the objection when the testimony came in before the jury. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and preservation authorities including Dobbs and Darty, the court held that an objection alone is not enough without an adverse ruling or an objection to the refusal to rule. Because no preserved ruling existed, the court did not reach the merits of the Article 38.37 challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the court says 'wait and see,' you do not yet have a ruling. In family-law trials and hearings, lawyers must press objections to a clear ruling, renew them when the evidence is offered, and object on the record if the court refuses or fails to rule. Otherwise, even strong evidentiary complaints may be lost on appeal."
Thompson v. State
COA05
In Thompson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a police officer’s testimony that she found the complainant credible required reversal of an assault-family-violence conviction. The court assumed, without deciding, that admitting the credibility-vouching testimony was error, then applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b)’s nonconstitutional harmless-error standard. Looking at the full record, the court emphasized that the testimony was brief, not repeated, and not featured in closing argument, while other evidence independently supported the verdict, including visible injuries, expert strangulation testimony, and jail-call evidence suggesting an admission. The court held that any error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Improper credibility-vouching is not automatic reversible error. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, the appellate fight will usually turn on harm: whether the opinion testimony was emphasized, whether the case lacked corroboration, and whether the challenged statement likely affected the outcome. Build your record with objective evidence, and if you are preserving error, also preserve prejudice."
In the Interest of J.D.H., a Child
SCOTX
In this parental-rights termination case, the mother’s notice of appeal was filed after the 20-day deadline for accelerated appeals because counsel apparently believed a motion for new trial extended the deadline. The Texas Supreme Court agreed the notice was untimely under Rule 26.1(b) and existing precedent, but held that termination cases are different from ordinary civil cases because the statutory right to counsel includes effective assistance, including counsel’s duty to timely perfect an appeal. Applying Strickland principles and drawing on criminal lost-appeal cases, the Court held that a parent may seek an out-of-time appeal when ineffective assistance caused the missed deadline. Rather than automatically accepting the late notice or dismissing outright, the proper remedy is to reverse the dismissal and remand so the court of appeals can abate the case for an evidentiary hearing in the trial court on deficient performance and prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination cases, a missed accelerated appellate deadline is not always the end of the case if counsel’s ineffective assistance caused it. Lawyers must separately calendar the 20-day notice-of-appeal deadline and should seek abatement and remand for a Strickland hearing—not equitable forgiveness of the deadline—when a lost appeal stems from attorney error."