Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of A.G.J., a Child
COA04
In In re A.G.J., the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights because he challenged only the subsection (E) endangerment finding and best interest, while leaving subsection (N) constructive abandonment and subsection (P) confinement/criminal-conduct findings unchallenged. Applying In re A.V., the court held those unchallenged predicate grounds were binding on appeal and independently supported termination. The court still reviewed subsection (E) under In re N.G. because endangerment findings carry collateral consequences in future cases, and it concluded the evidence was legally and factually sufficient based on the father’s homelessness, refusal of shelter, failure to complete services, incarceration, lack of a post-release plan, and failure to obtain timely medical care for the child. The termination order was therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In a termination appeal, challenge every predicate ground that supports the judgment. Even if the court must review a challenged (D) or (E) finding under In re N.G., any unchallenged independent ground can still make reversal impossible."
In re Bagley
COA12
In In re Bagley, the husband sought mandamus relief from a post-decree order requiring him to sign a special warranty deed transferring real property awarded in the divorce. While that enforcement fight was pending, the court of appeals had already reversed and remanded the underlying community-property division in the divorce decree because valuation errors affected the overall just-and-right division. The Tyler Court held that, under Texas law, reversal of a defective property division nullifies the entire division and leaves the case as though the judgment had never been rendered. Because the deed requirement and the later order compelling execution of the deed depended entirely on the reversed property division, the enforcement order was itself a nullity. The court therefore denied mandamus without reaching the relator’s jurisdictional complaints.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce property division is reversed on appeal, every enforcement mechanism tied to that division may collapse with it. Family-law litigators should immediately reassess deeds, transfer orders, equalization enforcement, and similar post-decree relief after a merits reversal, because an order that once looked enforceable may no longer have any legal effect."
In re United Services Automobile Association
COA04
In a dissenting mandamus opinion, the Fourth Court of Appeals concluded a trial court abused its discretion by refusing to set aside a no-answer default judgment against USAA after sworn evidence showed the petition was internally misrouted through its registered-agent portal during employee coverage for a vacationing worker. Applying Craddock, the dissent reasoned the routing failure negated intentional or consciously indifferent conduct, USAA also established a meritorious defense and lack of prejudice to the plaintiffs, and under Dolgencorp the trial court had no discretion to leave the default in place once all three elements were met. The dissent further concluded mandamus was appropriate because forcing the parties to proceed through a damages phase before correcting the default would leave no adequate appellate remedy and create unnecessary litigation.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a no-answer default results from an internal service-routing mistake, detailed sworn proof can satisfy Craddock and support immediate mandamus relief if the trial court still refuses to reopen the case—especially where damages or other prove-up proceedings remain and waiting for appeal would waste time and expense."
In re April Renee McDowell
COA08
In this mandamus proceeding, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that a trial court’s second ex parte TRO restricting a mother’s possession and access to her child was void because it did not include a date-certain expiration and instead purported to remain in effect until further order or until it expired by operation of law. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 680 strictly, the court explained that ex parte TROs must expire by their own terms within no more than 14 days, with only one like-period extension absent consent. Because the mother expressly refused to consent to any extension, the later TRO also operated as an impermissible additional extension of the earlier TRO. The court granted mandamus in part, vacating only the void TRO portion while leaving intact the notice and setting for the temporary-injunction hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"In emergency family-law cases, ex parte TROs must be drafted with exact Rule 680 compliance: include a specific expiration date, do not use open-ended “until further order” language, and do not treat a hearing reset as consent to extend restraints. If a court rolls one TRO into another without a valid expiration date or express consent, the restrained party has a strong mandamus challenge even though the temporary-injunction hearing may still go forward."
Gnadt v. Moody National Bank
COA14
In Gnadt v. Moody National Bank, the dispute arose after the estate of a deceased wife claimed rights in assets remaining in her late husband’s estate, then later argued it should have received notice when the husband’s executor sought resignation and discharge. The court analyzed Estates Code sections 361.003 and 22.018 and adopted the narrower view that notice is required only for someone who presently has a property right in or claim against the estate, not someone who merely once held a qualifying status such as spouse or devisee. Because the parties’ settlement agreement broadly resolved their community-versus-separate-property dispute and released future claims, the court held the wife’s estate no longer remained an interested person entitled to citation. The probate court therefore did not err by refusing to set aside the discharge order for lack of notice.
Litigation Takeaway
"In post-death marital property disputes, a broad settlement release can do more than end the merits fight—it can also eliminate future probate notice and participation rights. Family lawyers should expressly preserve any desired notice rights or interested-person status when settling estate-related property claims."
Haskett v. Pitchford
COA01
In Haskett v. Pitchford, the First Court of Appeals affirmed sanctions and a turnover order arising from post-judgment litigation over excess proceeds from a tax sale. The appellant argued he received too little notice of the sanctions hearing, but the court held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(b) generally requires only three days’ notice and, more importantly, any complaint about inadequate notice was waived because he did not object or seek relief in the trial court as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court also rejected his other sanctions complaints because they were unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or unsupported by the record, and it upheld the turnover order because the related judgment had not been superseded.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a sanctions hearing is set on short notice, do not save the complaint for appeal. Object immediately, request a continuance if needed, explain the prejudice on the record, and obtain a ruling. In family-law cases, courts will apply ordinary preservation rules strictly in sanctions and post-judgment enforcement proceedings."
Williamson Music 1st, LLC v. EQYInvest Owner II, Ltd, LLP
COA06
In a commercial lease dispute, the Texarkana Court of Appeals upheld the landlord’s damages award but reversed the attorney’s-fees award. The court held that although the tenant failed to prove its mitigation defense strongly enough to defeat the breach-of-lease judgment, the landlord’s fee evidence was legally insufficient because it did not adequately segregate recoverable fees from unrecoverable fees. Relying on Texas fee-segregation law, including Tony Gullo Motors, the court explained that conclusory testimony, block billing, and a single undifferentiated fee request will not support an award unless the services are truly inextricably intertwined. The result was affirmance of the merits judgment and reversal of the fee award.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want attorney’s fees in a Texas family case, do not offer only a global number. When a case includes mixed claims or mixed relief, you must segregate fee-authorized work from non-compensable work—or specifically prove why the work was inseparable. For challengers, this case is strong authority for objecting to block-billed, conclusory, and non-segregated fee proof in divorce, SAPCR, modification, and enforcement proceedings."
Atudonyang v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
COA05
In Atudonyang v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., Wells Fargo sued on a credit-card account, and the defendant tried to challenge service by filing pleadings labeled as special appearances and motions to quash. The Dallas Court of Appeals focused on the substance of those filings rather than their titles. Because the defendant’s arguments attacked only the manner and alleged defects of service—not whether he was amenable to personal jurisdiction in Texas under Rule 120a—the court held the purported special appearances were not true special appearances. Instead, they operated as general appearances. The court further held that the defendant’s later filings, including a counterclaim and other requests for affirmative relief, independently constituted general appearances that waived any complaint about citation or defective service. The trial court’s denial of the special appearance and motion to quash was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use a special appearance to complain about defective service. In Texas family law cases, a true Rule 120a special appearance is only for challenging personal jurisdiction; service defects belong in a motion to quash. If a party files the wrong threshold pleading—or seeks affirmative relief before the jurisdictional sequence is protected—they may make a general appearance and waive service objections entirely."
In the Interest of B.B., a Child
COA06
In *In the Interest of B.B.*, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed a modification order appointing Mother sole managing conservator after nonparent conservators repeatedly violated court orders. The dispute centered on whether circumstances had materially and substantially changed under Texas Family Code § 156.101(a)(1)(A) and whether giving Mother primary conservatorship was in the child’s best interest. The court relied on evidence that the Broomfields moved the child outside the geographic restriction, denied Mother court-ordered access, filed collateral litigation in another county, and were held in contempt for thirty-six violations. The court also considered Mother’s evidence of rehabilitation, including sobriety, steady employment, church involvement, and a stable plan for the child, along with amicus testimony supporting reunification. Applying deferential abuse-of-discretion review and the fit-parent principles recognized in *In re C.J.C.*, the court held the trial court had sufficient evidence to find both material change and best interest, and it affirmed the modification. The court also rejected the venue complaint because a prior mandamus proceeding had already determined that transfer based on the child’s residence in Smith County was improper since that residence resulted from unjustifiable conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody modification cases involving nonparents, enforcement problems can become the strongest merits evidence. A parent who shows present stability and rehabilitation can regain managing conservatorship, especially when the nonparent conservators undermine the child’s relationship with the parent through relocation violations, denied access, contemptuous conduct, or manipulative litigation tactics."
In the Interest of E.T. and J.T., Children
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to prove endangerment and best interest under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b). The court looked at Mother’s conduct as a continuing pattern—not a single lapse—including repeated methamphetamine use, refusals and no-shows for drug testing, abandonment of two very young children unattended in unsafe conditions, instability in housing and employment, and reliance on a third party for day-to-day care. Applying the endangerment standards and the Holley best-interest factors, the court concluded Mother’s short periods of compliance and some negative tests did not outweigh the longer record of instability, while the children’s bond with their stable caregiver and need for permanence supported termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Temporary compliance will not erase a documented pattern of drug use, refused testing, abandonment, and instability. In Texas family cases, courts focus on durable parenting behavior and who is actually providing safe, consistent care—not last-minute improvement or partial service-plan completion."