Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
787 opinions found
Michael Colbert v. State of Texas
COA12
In Colbert v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld an assault/family-violence conviction even though the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution. The defendant argued on appeal that trying the case the day after he elected to represent himself violated Article 1.051(e) and due process, but the court held that complaint was not preserved because he did not object, request a continuance, or otherwise raise the issue in the trial court; in fact, he stated he was ready to proceed. On the merits, the court applied the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, concluding that the complainant’s 911 statements, her similar statements to the responding officer, and the defendant’s own admission that he may have hit her with the television were sufficient to support the finding of bodily injury despite her later recantation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Recantation does not erase family-violence evidence, and preservation matters. In family-law cases, judges may credit contemporaneous 911 calls, officer testimony, and party admissions over a later walk-back, so lawyers should gather and present that evidence early. And if notice or due-process problems arise in a rushed hearing, counsel must object, request specific relief, and make a record immediately or the complaint may be lost on appeal."
In the Interest of D.J., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to D.J. As to Mother, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), a prior endangerment-based termination finding under subsection (M), and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on a pattern of evidence, including Mother’s prior endangerment termination history, the child’s positive drug test, Mother’s own positive hair-follicle test, missed testing, instability in housing and supervision, failure to know the child’s whereabouts, and inconsistent visitation. The court also rejected Mother’s argument that an earlier letter ruling controlled over the final judgment, reiterating that the signed order governs. As to Father, the court accepted appointed counsel’s Anders brief, conducted an independent review, found no nonfrivolous appellate issue, and affirmed termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family courts decide endangerment and best-interest disputes by looking at the whole pattern, not isolated recent improvements. Positive drug tests, missed tests, instability, prior CPS history, and inconsistent contact can combine to support severe relief, while informal letter rulings or oral pronouncements do not override the signed order."
Dillon v. Bamford
COA03
In Dillon v. Bamford, the Austin Court of Appeals largely affirmed the trial court’s refusal to modify conservatorship, holding the father did not prove a material and substantial change in circumstances that would justify giving him the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence or broader tie-breaking authority. The court emphasized the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, the conflicting evidence about parental conflict and safety concerns, and the guardian ad litem’s testimony that both parents were active, both homes were generally safe, and the children wanted the schedule to remain the same. But the court reversed the enforcement ruling on the parties’ agreed tax-dependency provision, concluding the trial court improperly rewrote the decree by shifting the father’s right to claim the children from 2019 to 2026 instead of enforcing the unambiguous odd-year allocation as written. The court affirmed the denial of enforcement as to tax year 2021 because the father failed to present sufficient proof of that alleged violation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Modification cases need concrete proof of a material change affecting the children, not just evidence of coparenting conflict or isolated parenting problems. And in enforcement proceedings, courts must enforce unambiguous decree language as written—especially tax-allocation provisions—but the movant still has to prove the violation with competent evidence year by year."
In re G.M.
COA02
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Section 156.102 is triggered by the date a modification petition is filed, not the date the hearing occurs. Father filed within one year of the prior order and sought to change the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence, so he was required to file a sufficient supporting affidavit. After the trial court found the affidavit insufficient, Section 156.102(c) required it to deny the requested relief and refuse to proceed. By nevertheless conducting an evidentiary hearing and entering temporary orders, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you seek to change primary residence within one year of the last order, the affidavit requirement is a hard gatekeeper. The key date is the filing date, and once a court finds the affidavit insufficient, it cannot simply go forward with a hearing anyway. For movants, draft a fact-specific affidavit that tracks the statute; for respondents, press for an early ruling and preserve error if the court proceeds despite an insufficiency finding."
Boswell v. State
COA02
In Boswell v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the State’s proof of an aggravated assault on a date different from the indictment’s “on or about” date did not make the evidence legally insufficient because, under Texas law, the State need only prove a date before indictment and within limitations unless time is a material element. The court rejected the defendant’s attempt to treat the date mismatch as a fatal variance or sufficiency defect. But the court agreed that double jeopardy barred punishing Boswell for both aggravated assault and continuous family violence when the aggravated assault was one of the predicate acts supporting the continuous-family-violence count. The court affirmed the aggravated-assault and assault/family-violence convictions, reversed the continuous-family-violence conviction, and rendered an acquittal on that count.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, a mismatch between a pleaded date and the proved date of a family-violence incident is usually better used as a credibility attack than as a dispositive legal argument. The bigger lesson is to carefully track how each abuse incident is being used across claims and requested relief so the same event is not carelessly double-counted as both a standalone act and part of a broader pattern."
In re O.L.M., a Child
COA01
In In re O.L.M., a Child, the mother tried to directly appeal temporary orders entered in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship. The First Court of Appeals treated the issue as purely jurisdictional and explained that Texas appellate courts may review interlocutory orders only when a statute expressly permits it. Relying on Texas Family Code section 105.001(e), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014, and prior cases, the court held that temporary SAPCR modification orders are not subject to interlocutory appeal. Because the mother used a notice of appeal instead of the proper potential vehicle of mandamus, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume an urgent temporary custody or SAPCR modification order can be appealed immediately. In Texas, temporary modification orders are generally not directly appealable, so lawyers should analyze appellate jurisdiction first, preserve a mandamus-ready record, and move quickly on mandamus if immediate review is truly necessary."
Vera v. State
COA03
In Vera v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed exclusion of a defense psychologist’s proposed testimony that stress-induced “fight-or-flight” physiology and alcohol effects reduced the defendant’s culpable mental state during a fatal bar fight. The court held the expert was qualified, but her opinions were too general and did not meaningfully connect the science to whether Vera intentionally or knowingly stabbed the victims; the testimony also risked confusing the jury by effectively smuggling voluntary-intoxication evidence in as a defense. The court further held that Vera was not entitled to a sudden-passion instruction because the escalating confrontation and intervening events did not amount to adequate cause that would render an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving family violence, child abuse, or coercive conduct, expert testimony about trauma, dysregulation, or “fight-or-flight” must be tightly tied to a specific legal issue and the party-specific facts. Generalized psychology that merely reframes intentional conduct as reactive can be excluded as unhelpful, confusing, or an improper excuse narrative."
Khandria v. Al-Muslim
COA14
In Khandria v. Al-Muslim, the father sought to modify a prior SAPCR/divorce decree that gave him no specific possession or access, arguing the original decree effectively gave the mother unchecked control and that circumstances had materially changed because she was now somewhat open to reunification. The Fourteenth Court first held that this argument was an improper collateral attack on the original decree: any defect in the decree was non-jurisdictional, making the decree at most voidable and subject to direct appeal, not later repair through modification. On the merits, the court held the evidence did not require findings of a material and substantial change or present best interest under Family Code section 156.101. The mother’s testimony showed only cautious, therapy-based openness while continuing to express concerns about the child’s loss of trust, and the father’s reluctance to commit to therapeutic recommendations undercut his request for immediate access. The court also affirmed denial of the father’s request to reduce child support because the record showed assets and earning capacity despite his claimed setbacks.
Litigation Takeaway
"A modification case is not a do-over for errors in the original decree. If the real complaint is that the prior order was legally defective, that issue usually must be raised by direct appeal. And in access-modification cases, vague evidence that a parent’s attitude has softened is not enough—lawyers need concrete proof of post-decree change and a child-centered reunification plan, especially when the relationship has been fractured for years."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Jesus Gregorio Lopez and Isela Flores Richardson
COA13
In this divorce appeal, the wife argued she lacked notice that a May 7 hearing would serve as the final trial and complained that the court ruled on disputed property issues without live testimony, based instead on attorney proffer and documents. The Thirteenth Court rejected those arguments because the record showed the case was orally set for trial on May 7, wife’s counsel acknowledged that understanding at the hearing, and the parties expressly agreed to proceed by proffer with documentary review. The court also found no reversible error regarding alleged post-hearing exhibits, a late-filed amended pleading, relief awarded in the decree, or findings and conclusions, and it affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you agree on the record to try a divorce case by proffer, stipulation, and documents, you usually cannot wait until the judge seems unconvinced and then demand a full evidentiary hearing. Family-law lawyers should clarify whether a setting is final, object clearly to any late amendments or procedure they oppose, and preserve the record before agreeing to an informal trial format."
In the Interest of C.F., a Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights, concluding legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that the parents used methamphetamine while caring for the infant, the child himself tested positive for methamphetamine, there were domestic-violence concerns, the home environment was unstable and unsafe, and the father later violated community supervision, was incarcerated, failed to complete services, and offered only a speculative post-release plan. Applying the Holley best-interest framework and sufficiency standards, the court held the trial court could reasonably infer ongoing danger and lack of stability from the father’s past and present conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts give heavy weight to concrete evidence of child endangerment—especially drug exposure, domestic violence, criminal instability, unsafe housing, and failure to complete services—and they may use past conduct to predict future risk. In any custody or termination case, promises of future improvement usually will not overcome a documented record of recent instability unless backed by credible, verifiable proof of rehabilitation, housing, employment, and safety."