Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1003 opinions found
In the Interest of J.C.B.G., et al., Children
COA04
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court treated the case as a pattern-of-endangerment case, relying on repeated unsafe home conditions, chronic supervision failures, exposure to domestic conflict and inappropriate adults, unsafe transportation practices including children riding unrestrained, failure to obtain proper medical care after injuries, and the severe burn injuries suffered by an infant while in Mother’s care. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the distinct analyses for environmental endangerment under subsection (D) and conduct-based endangerment under subsection (E), the court held the record showed both an endangering environment and a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children’s physical and emotional well-being. Because the best-interest finding also stood, the termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment findings are often won or lost through accumulation, not one dramatic event. In Texas family cases, a documented pattern of poor supervision, unsafe caretakers, transportation safety failures, minimization of injuries, and chronic instability can justify severe restrictions or termination even when the parent points to service compliance or some favorable facts."
Rains v. State
COA03
In Rains v. State, the Third Court of Appeals reviewed a conviction for repeated violation of a Chapter 85 protective order based on jail calls to the protected person. The court held the jury charge was erroneous under Harvey v. State because it failed to require the jury to find that the respondent had been served with the protective-order application and received notice of the protective-order hearing, and it also failed to define “in violation of a protective order” to include those notice elements. But because no objection was made at trial, the court applied Almanza’s egregious-harm standard and affirmed, concluding the omission did not cause egregious harm where the order recited that the respondent appeared in person and announced ready, the signed order was later served on him in jail, and the defense did not actually contest service of the application or notice of hearing at trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Protective-order enforcement starts with the family-court record. If a Chapter 85 order may later support criminal enforcement, lawyers should make sure the file clearly proves service of the application, notice of hearing, appearance or nonappearance, and service of the signed order. And if a criminal charge is later tried to a jury, counsel must object if the charge omits Harvey’s required notice-and-service elements, because without an objection appellate relief becomes much harder."
In the Interest of I.G., a Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights to I.G. after Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on both predicate grounds and best interest. The record described neglect concerns shortly after the child’s birth, validated methamphetamine use, unsafe home conditions, Mother’s incarceration, and her later conviction and 45-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, while the child was thriving in a grandparent placement. The court recited the governing rule that termination requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one ground under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1) plus best interest under § 161.001(b)(2), and that one supported predicate ground is enough to affirm if best interest is also supported. Although the excerpt does not include the court’s detailed merits analysis, it establishes that the trial court found grounds under § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P), and (Q), found termination in the child’s best interest, and the appellate court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination cases, the appeal usually turns on the record built long before trial: prove multiple predicate grounds, develop separate best-interest evidence, and document how substance abuse, unsafe conditions, incarceration, and the child’s progress in placement affect the analysis. For parents, a thin record on services, alternative care options, and best interest leaves little room for a successful sufficiency challenge on appeal."
Ex parte Warren McGee
COA01
In Ex parte Warren McGee, the First Court of Appeals addressed a habeas challenge to a criminal-contempt judgment after the underlying show-cause order broadly alleged that McGee had committed a crime or engaged in conduct leading to his arrest, but did not identify the specific offense or conduct. The court’s discussion emphasized that in criminal contempt proceedings, the show-cause order operates as the charging instrument and must give constitutionally adequate notice of the alleged offense under Ex parte Estevez and Jenkins v. State. The excerpted opinion notes that a show-cause order that fails to state an offense is void, and any contempt judgment based on it is likewise void. But because the supplied opinion text is truncated, the only clear case-specific disposition is that the court affirmed the habeas court’s denial of relief after considering whether the trial court had jurisdiction to later set aside the contempt judgment and dismiss the show-cause order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat every contempt show-cause order like a criminal charging instrument. In family-law enforcement and protective-order contempt practice, vague allegations can create a structural notice defect that may jeopardize the entire contempt proceeding, so plead the exact violated provision and the specific conduct with precision—and attack deficient notice early."
In the Interest of N.P.H. a/k/a N.H. and C.M.M. a/k/a C.M., Children
COA14
In In re N.P.H., Mother argued the termination decrees were void because trial allegedly did not commence before the dismissal deadline in Texas Family Code section 263.401. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected that record-based challenge, holding that because the trial on the merits began before the statutory deadline, the trial court retained jurisdiction and the decrees were not void. The court also reviewed the merits and held legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the best-interest findings, the findings that the Department made reasonable efforts but a continuing danger remained in the home, and the conservatorship rulings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Deadline-based jurisdiction attacks rise or fall on the trial record. If you want to preserve or defeat a section 263.401 challenge, make a clear record of the dismissal date, the trial setting, the parties’ announcements, and exactly when the merits trial begins; and never assume a procedural issue eliminates the need to build a strong evidentiary record on termination and conservatorship."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Sheetal Rane and Prasanth Marreddy
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court improperly included a Mumbai property in the marital estate and ordered it sold because the evidence showed Wife had gifted the property to her mother before the divorce. Under Texas Family Code section 7.001, a court may divide only property that is part of the marital estate, so once the property was transferred to a third party it was no longer divisible between the spouses. Because the erroneous inclusion of the Mumbai property affected the overall property division, the court reversed and remanded for a new division.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before asking a court to divide or sell an asset in divorce, prove the spouses actually owned it at the time of divorce. In foreign-property and informal-title cases especially, a completed pre-divorce transfer to a third party takes the asset outside the marital estate and can undo the entire property division on appeal."
Servello v. VillaSport LLC
COA14
In Servello v. VillaSport LLC, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered a temporary injunction entered in a business-disparagement and defamation suit ordering a former employee to remove a social-media video. Although the parties did not raise the issue, the court reviewed sua sponte whether the injunction complied with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. Rule 683 requires a temporary injunction order to set the cause for trial on the merits in the order itself. Because the injunction omitted a trial setting, the court held the order was void, reversed the temporary injunction, and remanded. The court also affirmed denial of the appellant’s TCPA motion to dismiss.
Litigation Takeaway
"When seeking or opposing temporary injunctive relief, do not treat Rule 683 as a technicality. The signed injunction order itself must include a merits trial setting, and appellate courts may reverse a temporary injunction for that omission even if no party raises it. In family-law cases, careful injunction drafting is as important as proving the injunction elements."
In the Interest of N.A.T., a Child
COA05
In *In re N.A.T.*, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a father could not use Texas Family Code § 161.005 to undo a prior adjudication of paternity because his mistaken-paternity petition was filed too late. Although he claimed he first learned in December 2023 that he was not the child’s biological father, the record showed he had suspected nonpaternity for years, requested court-ordered genetic testing in the 2009 divorce, and attempted at-home DNA testing in 2012. The court treated the date of awareness as a fact issue for the trial court and deferred to the trial court’s implied finding that Father was aware of facts indicating nonpaternity well more than two years before filing suit in June 2024. Because limitations barred the petition, Father failed to establish the meritorious prima facie case required by § 161.005(f), so the trial court was not required to order genetic testing. The court also held Father did not preserve his due-process complaint and affirmed the support-modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mistaken-paternity claims can be lost on limitations before any DNA test is ever ordered. If a parent suspected nonpaternity years earlier, prior requests for testing, prior statements, or prior conduct can defeat a later § 161.005 petition at the prima facie stage. For family-law litigators, this case highlights the importance of building or attacking the limitations record early and preserving any procedural or due-process complaints clearly on the record."
In the Interest of A.T., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, alleged paternal grandparents intervened seeking standing under former Texas Family Code sections 102.004(a)(2), 102.004(b), and 153.432. The court treated standing as a jurisdictional issue and applied the no-evidence framework for challenged jurisdictional facts. Although the parties disputed whether Brent Taylor was the child’s father, the court resolved the case on a narrower ground: the intervenors produced no evidence that they were Brent Taylor’s parents. Because every standing theory depended on proving that lineage link, pleadings and assumptions were not enough. The court held the Taylors failed to raise a fact issue on grandparent status, so dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper.
Litigation Takeaway
"If standing depends on a family relationship, prove every link in the chain with actual evidence. In grandparent-access and conservatorship cases, allegations, shared surnames, or indirect references will not substitute for proof of lineage, and a missing jurisdictional link can end the case before the court ever reaches best interest."
In the Interest of A.A., a Child
COA01
In *In re A.A.*, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a termination order based on endangerment grounds after the Department removed an infant following a domestic-violence incident and concerns about the mother’s mental-health stability. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient to support predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and also legally sufficient on best interest. But applying the clear-and-convincing factual-sufficiency standard, the court concluded the Department relied too heavily on the mother’s past conduct and not enough on the full record showing current improvement: completed services, resumed medication, negative drug tests, recent housing and employment stability, substantial visitation, and a bond with the child. Because that disputed evidence was too significant to permit a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Past endangerment and a strong foster placement do not automatically prove termination is in a child’s best interest. In close child-related cases, lawyers must build a record that addresses present circumstances—service completion, stability, compliance, bonding, and why those facts do or do not reduce risk—because factual-sufficiency review can undo a ruling that rests mainly on historical misconduct."