Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1643 opinions found
In the Interest of S.L.B., M.S.B., and M.A.B., Jr., Children
COA04
The Department sought termination of an alleged father’s parental rights after allegations of domestic violence and substance abuse. For the youngest child, the trial court relied on Texas Family Code § 161.002(b)(1) because the father, despite being served, did not file an admission of paternity or a counterclaim to adjudicate parentage. On appeal, he challenged only the sufficiency of the best-interest evidence. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that § 161.002(b)(1) provides an independent basis for termination that does not require a best-interest finding under § 161.001. Because the father did not challenge the failure-to-legitimate ground, the court treated that independently dispositive ground as valid and affirmed termination, notwithstanding his trial testimony admitting paternity.
Litigation Takeaway
"An alleged father should formally assert parentage immediately through a written admission of paternity or a Chapter 160 counterclaim; participation in the case or an oral admission at trial may not protect his rights. On appeal, counsel must challenge every independent ground supporting termination because attacking only best interest will not reach an unchallenged § 161.002(b)(1) finding."
Maya Saeidi Tanha v. Abbas Saeidi Tanha
COA12
In this Texas divorce appeal, the wife challenged the characterization of part of the marital residence as the husband’s separate property, contending that the down-payment funds were community-business proceeds or a loan rather than gifts. Applying Texas Family Code § 3.003’s community-property presumption and clear-and-convincing-evidence standard, the court held that the husband’s testimony, bank records, check, gift documentation, and donor testimony adequately traced funds gifted solely to him into the home’s acquisition. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations and implying findings supporting the judgment because no findings of fact and conclusions of law were requested, the court affirmed the decree and the husband’s separate-property interest in the residence.
Litigation Takeaway
"A spouse can preserve a separate-property interest in a home purchased during marriage—even when gifted funds pass through a joint account—if the funds remain clearly traceable from the donor to the closing. Parties should assemble a complete transaction timeline, corroborate donative intent with donor testimony and contemporaneous records, address any alleged loan or repayment, and request findings of fact and conclusions of law after a contested bench trial to protect appellate rights."
Torres v. Lummus
COA01
Coltin Lummus sought pre-suit depositions and documents under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 to identify and investigate unknown persons or entities he alleged had assisted Skye Torres in obtaining an abortion, with the stated intent to pursue claims under the Texas Heartbeat Act and Wrongful Death statute. The First Court of Appeals explained that when Rule 202 discovery is sought for use in an anticipated action, the petitioner must first establish that the trial court would have personal jurisdiction over the anticipated defendants; proper venue and jurisdiction over the proposed deponents are not substitutes for that showing. Because Lummus had neither identified the anticipated defendants nor established their jurisdictional contacts with Texas, Rule 202 could not be used to discover the facts needed to create jurisdiction. The court reversed the discovery order and rendered judgment denying the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 202 is not a tool for discovering whether Texas courts have jurisdiction over unknown or nonresident prospective defendants. Before obtaining pre-suit discovery for an anticipated action, a petitioner must identify a valid basis for personal jurisdiction over each anticipated defendant and support it with jurisdictional facts. Family-law counsel should distinguish the discovery target from the prospective defendant and, when an underlying divorce, SAPCR, enforcement, or related action is already ripe, consider filing suit and using ordinary discovery instead."
Najar v. State
COA02
After Miguel Enrique Najar invoked Texas Rule of Evidence 614 at his community-supervision revocation hearing, a State’s community-supervision officer remained in the courtroom and heard part of the testimony before being removed. The trial court nevertheless allowed the officer to testify, subject to Najar identifying any testimony tainted by the violation. The Second Court of Appeals held that violating the sequestration rule does not automatically require exclusion or reversal; the complaining party must show that the witness’s exposure materially influenced the testimony and caused prejudice. Because the officer primarily testified from supervision records about independent administrative violations, offered no substantive account of the child’s injuries, and was not shown to have tailored his testimony, the court affirmed the judgment adjudicating guilt and revoking community supervision.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 614 sequestration violation, standing alone, is not enough to exclude a witness or obtain reversal. Family-law counsel should promptly object, determine exactly what testimony the witness heard, reurge the objection when the witness is called, identify specific testimony showing tailoring or corroboration, and connect that testimony to a material finding and probable harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.1."
In Re David Turner
COA14
David Turner sought mandamus relief after the regional presiding judge denied his motion to recuse the trial judge. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals concluded that the trial judge satisfied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(f)(1) by declining to recuse voluntarily and timely referring the motion to the regional presiding judge. Because Turner’s allegations were based primarily on judicial rulings and case-related actions, they did not establish an abuse of discretion under Rule 18a(a)(3). The court also held that Rule 18a(j)(1)(A), which permits review of a recusal denial after final judgment, provided an adequate appellate remedy. It therefore denied the petition for writ of mandamus and the request for temporary relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus may compel a trial judge to perform Rule 18a’s mandatory recuse-or-refer duty, but it ordinarily cannot provide immediate review once the judge properly refers the motion and the assigned judge denies it. Adverse rulings alone do not establish judicial bias; counsel should support recusal with specific evidence independent of the judge’s decisions and preserve any denial for appeal after final judgment."
Cerda v. State
COA10
In a credibility-driven prosecution for continuous sexual abuse of a child, Gerardo Cerda challenged testimony that he had similarly abused another young step-granddaughter and also contested two court-cost assessments. Applying Texas Rule of Evidence 403 and the Gigliobianco factors, the Tenth Court of Appeals held that the testimony’s substantial probative value—based on the State’s need for firsthand corroborative evidence and the incidents’ similarities in relationship, age, access, setting, timing, and method—was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court affirmed Cerda’s conviction and life sentence but modified the judgment to delete two costs not expressly authorized by law.
Litigation Takeaway
"Similar-act sexual-abuse evidence can survive Rule 403 when credibility is central, the incidents share concrete similarities, and the proponent demonstrates a genuine evidentiary need. In family cases, however, counsel must establish an independent civil basis for admission—such as Texas Family Code § 153.004 or Texas Rule of Evidence 415—because Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37 does not apply. Counsel should also audit every cost or fee in a judgment and identify specific legal authority for each assessment."
In the Interest of J.R.P., Jr. and J.P.M.P., Children
COA14
The Department sought termination of Mother’s parental rights after an infant sibling died from traumatic injuries while in Father’s care. Despite Father’s history of domestic violence and restrictions barring contact, Mother had repeatedly left the children with him and later violated Department safety measures. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that this evidence, together with Mother’s continuing lack of protective capacity, was legally and factually sufficient to establish endangerment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and to support the best-interest finding, notwithstanding her participation in services and bond with the children. The court also rejected Mother’s ICWA challenge because the record contained no information indicating that either child was a tribal member or was eligible for membership and the biological child of a tribal member; therefore, the court had no statutory “reason to know” that the children were Indian children, and ICWA’s heightened notice and inquiry procedures were not triggered. The termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Generalized Native American ancestry does not, by itself, trigger ICWA; counsel must create a record connecting the child to a federally recognized tribe through membership or eligibility plus a biological parent’s membership. The case also shows that completing services will not defeat termination when a parent’s conduct still demonstrates an inability to protect children from domestic violence, unsafe caregivers, or violations of safety plans and court orders."
In the Interest of V.J.-A. II, a Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights after she challenged only the best-interest finding. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard, the Holley best-interest considerations, and legal- and factual-sufficiency review, the court considered the child’s extremely high methamphetamine exposure, Mother’s continued positive drug tests and repeated testing refusals, unstable housing, resistance to home inspections, prior child-welfare history, and failure to establish a safe, drug-free home. It also weighed the child’s improved behavior, academic success, treatment, and potential long-term foster placement. Mother’s explanations and partial service-plan compliance did not outweigh the evidence of continuing danger, so the court held the best-interest finding legally and factually sufficient.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and custody litigation, a documented pattern of positive, missed, or refused drug tests—especially when coupled with unstable housing and a child’s direct drug exposure—can outweigh claimed sobriety and partial completion of services. Counsel should build or rebut a dated, objective record showing testing compliance, lasting behavioral change, a verified safe home, and the conduct’s concrete effect on the child. On appeal, every independently material termination finding should be challenged because unchallenged endangerment findings may also reinforce the best-interest determination."
In the Interest of L.M.C., a Child
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the termination of Father’s parental rights to L.M.C. under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O) and the trial court’s best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). Although Father presented certificates and evidence of improved housing, employment, and insurance, the record showed that he completed only nine of twenty-one requested drug tests, tested positive for methamphetamine six times, repeatedly refused or failed to test, continued using drugs after treatment, and completed only a fraction of the required substance-abuse program. Applying the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard and deferring to the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts, the appellate court held that legally and factually sufficient evidence established material noncompliance with the court-ordered service plan. Father’s unresolved substance abuse, incomplete treatment, inconsistent visitation, history of violence, and limited bond with the child also supported the finding that termination was in L.M.C.’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"A completion certificate does not prove meaningful compliance when provider records, drug tests, or the parent’s own admissions show otherwise. Parents facing compliance-based orders should document obstacles as they arise, request alternatives promptly, complete every material treatment component, and build a consistent record of sobriety and safe visitation. Counsel on either side should present a dated, requirement-by-requirement record connecting compliance or noncompliance to the child’s safety and best interest."
In re Jessica Coronado
COA11
In a divorce and SAPCR, the trial court twice appointed Jessica and Hiram Coronado temporary joint managing conservators despite evidence that Hiram had physically abused Jessica’s older children. In an earlier mandamus proceeding, the Eleventh Court of Appeals had determined that credible evidence of physical abuse triggered Texas Family Code § 153.004(b), which prohibits joint managing conservatorship. After the trial court vacated its first order, conducted a new hearing, and again appointed the parents joint managing conservators, the appellate court held that its prior abuse determination remained controlling under the law-of-the-case doctrine. Because the trial court had no discretion to disregard either the mandatory statute or the prior appellate ruling, and temporary SAPCR orders are generally not appealable, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief as to joint managing conservatorship but denied relief on the separately challenged possession and geographic-restriction issues.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat Texas Family Code § 153.004(b) as a mandatory threshold issue: credible evidence of qualifying abuse eliminates the trial court’s discretion to appoint joint managing conservators, even when the abuse involved another child in the household. A trial court also cannot evade a prior mandamus ruling by vacating its order and rehearing the same issue without materially changed facts or law. Because temporary SAPCR orders generally cannot be appealed, counsel should build a mandamus-ready record and separately prove any requested restrictions on possession, access, or geography."