Opinion Library

Evidence

Chappell v. State

COA01

In Chappell v. State, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a life-sentence conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child after rejecting claims of ineffective assistance and evidentiary error. The case centered on a child’s disclosure of sexual abuse to her mother, followed by testimony from the mother, stepfather, and the child about the disclosure, surrounding circumstances, and the child’s later behavioral changes. The court applied the usual Strickland framework to the ineffective-assistance claim and held the record did not overcome the presumption that counsel acted reasonably or show prejudice. On the evidentiary issues, the court emphasized preservation principles, concluding there was no preserved, harmful error in admitting the challenged disclosure-related testimony. The opinion’s practical significance is its reminder that when child outcry and related statements are involved, appellate success depends on specific, timely objections and a clear record identifying the hearsay theory and purpose of the evidence.

Litigation Takeaway

"In abuse-driven custody, SAPCR, protective-order, and termination litigation, the fight is usually won or lost through precise evidentiary objections and a clean appellate record. Don’t rely on broad hearsay complaints—identify each statement, each hearsay layer, and the exact basis for admissibility or exclusion, because preservation failures can sink both trial objections and later appellate attacks."

In the Interest of A.M., a Child

COA06

The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to A.M. after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support Father’s predicate grounds under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (N) and the best-interest findings as to both parents. The court analyzed Father’s repeated incarcerations, criminal conduct, long-term absence, and inability to provide a stable home holistically rather than in isolation, holding that this pattern constituted endangering conduct and constructive abandonment. It also held that A.M.’s history of instability, trauma, failed placements, both parents’ continued incarceration, and evidence that she was moving toward acceptance of adoption supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in her best interest.

Litigation Takeaway

"In termination and other family-law cases, incarceration rarely stands alone—the winning record ties repeated criminal conduct and absence to a larger pattern of instability, lack of caregiving, and the child’s need for permanence. Trial lawyers should build a child-specific chronology showing how parental unavailability affected this child, because appellate courts will review endangerment holistically and defer heavily to credibility-based best-interest findings."

In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B.

COA10

The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights after an independent Anders review found no nonfrivolous appellate issues. The court nevertheless specifically analyzed Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) under In re N.G., relying on evidence of severe abuse in the home, the father’s failure to accept responsibility, unresolved safety concerns despite service completion, and the absence of any therapeutic support for reunification. The court also held that appointed counsel in a parental-rights appeal may not withdraw merely because an Anders brief was filed; under In re P.M., counsel must show independent good cause to withdraw.

Litigation Takeaway

"In Texas termination appeals, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) will get specific appellate review even in an Anders case, so trial counsel must build a record on abuse, exposure, accountability, and actual remediation—not just service completion. Appointed appellate counsel should also expect to remain on the case through any petition-for-review stage unless they can show good cause beyond filing an Anders brief."

In the Interest of D.J., a Child

COA02

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to D.J. As to Mother, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), a prior endangerment-based termination finding under subsection (M), and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on a pattern of evidence, including Mother’s prior endangerment termination history, the child’s positive drug test, Mother’s own positive hair-follicle test, missed testing, instability in housing and supervision, failure to know the child’s whereabouts, and inconsistent visitation. The court also rejected Mother’s argument that an earlier letter ruling controlled over the final judgment, reiterating that the signed order governs. As to Father, the court accepted appointed counsel’s Anders brief, conducted an independent review, found no nonfrivolous appellate issue, and affirmed termination.

Litigation Takeaway

"Family courts decide endangerment and best-interest disputes by looking at the whole pattern, not isolated recent improvements. Positive drug tests, missed tests, instability, prior CPS history, and inconsistent contact can combine to support severe relief, while informal letter rulings or oral pronouncements do not override the signed order."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Michael Colbert v. State of Texas

COA12

In Colbert v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld an assault/family-violence conviction even though the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution. The defendant argued on appeal that trying the case the day after he elected to represent himself violated Article 1.051(e) and due process, but the court held that complaint was not preserved because he did not object, request a continuance, or otherwise raise the issue in the trial court; in fact, he stated he was ready to proceed. On the merits, the court applied the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, concluding that the complainant’s 911 statements, her similar statements to the responding officer, and the defendant’s own admission that he may have hit her with the television were sufficient to support the finding of bodily injury despite her later recantation.

Litigation Takeaway

"Recantation does not erase family-violence evidence, and preservation matters. In family-law cases, judges may credit contemporaneous 911 calls, officer testimony, and party admissions over a later walk-back, so lawyers should gather and present that evidence early. And if notice or due-process problems arise in a rushed hearing, counsel must object, request specific relief, and make a record immediately or the complaint may be lost on appeal."

In the Interest of C.F., a Child

COA11

The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights, concluding legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that the parents used methamphetamine while caring for the infant, the child himself tested positive for methamphetamine, there were domestic-violence concerns, the home environment was unstable and unsafe, and the father later violated community supervision, was incarcerated, failed to complete services, and offered only a speculative post-release plan. Applying the Holley best-interest framework and sufficiency standards, the court held the trial court could reasonably infer ongoing danger and lack of stability from the father’s past and present conduct.

Litigation Takeaway

"Courts give heavy weight to concrete evidence of child endangerment—especially drug exposure, domestic violence, criminal instability, unsafe housing, and failure to complete services—and they may use past conduct to predict future risk. In any custody or termination case, promises of future improvement usually will not overcome a documented record of recent instability unless backed by credible, verifiable proof of rehabilitation, housing, employment, and safety."

Family Violence & Protective Orders

Boswell v. State

COA02

In Boswell v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the State’s proof of an aggravated assault on a date different from the indictment’s “on or about” date did not make the evidence legally insufficient because, under Texas law, the State need only prove a date before indictment and within limitations unless time is a material element. The court rejected the defendant’s attempt to treat the date mismatch as a fatal variance or sufficiency defect. But the court agreed that double jeopardy barred punishing Boswell for both aggravated assault and continuous family violence when the aggravated assault was one of the predicate acts supporting the continuous-family-violence count. The court affirmed the aggravated-assault and assault/family-violence convictions, reversed the continuous-family-violence conviction, and rendered an acquittal on that count.

Litigation Takeaway

"For family-law litigators, a mismatch between a pleaded date and the proved date of a family-violence incident is usually better used as a credibility attack than as a dispositive legal argument. The bigger lesson is to carefully track how each abuse incident is being used across claims and requested relief so the same event is not carelessly double-counted as both a standalone act and part of a broader pattern."

Child Support

Nunez v. Nichols

COA03

In Nunez v. Nichols, the Austin Court of Appeals considered whether sufficient evidence supported an order requiring a father to pay ongoing and retroactive support for his adult disabled daughter under Texas Family Code section 154.302, plus health-insurance and unreimbursed medical-expense obligations. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because it showed the daughter’s serious physical and psychiatric conditions began before age eighteen, continued into adulthood, and left her requiring substantial care and personal supervision while not capable of self-support. The father’s evidence of limited independence, including travel and a restricted driver’s license, went to weight rather than negating the statutory elements, and his expert did not provide a vocational basis to establish employability. The court therefore affirmed the support and medical-support portions of the order, but reversed and remanded the $25,468.46 attorney’s-fee award because the record lacked the detailed proof of hours, rates, and value of services required to support that amount.

Litigation Takeaway

"For adult disabled-child support cases, courts want functional proof, not just diagnoses: build a timeline showing pre-majority onset, current inability to be self-supporting, and the need for substantial day-to-day supervision. For opponents, isolated signs of independence are usually not enough without developed evidence of actual self-sufficiency. And regardless of who wins on the merits, an attorney’s-fee award can still be undone on appeal if counsel does not present disciplined lodestar-style proof."

Appeal and Mandamus

In re Tracy Hoots

COA12

In In re Tracy Hoots, a pro se relator sought mandamus relief in a family-law dispute, alleging her children were removed without lawful process and that the trial judge had a conflict of interest. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the petition failed to comply with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7: it included no certified or sworn copy of any challenged order, no adequate mandamus record, and identified no specific trial-court ruling or refusal to act that could be reviewed. Applying the rule that mandamus requires a sufficient record showing a clear abuse of discretion, and that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as lawyers, the court held the relator failed to establish entitlement to extraordinary relief and denied the petition.

Litigation Takeaway

"Mandamus is won or lost on the record. In family-law cases, even serious complaints about child removal, due process, or judicial bias will fail unless the petition identifies a specific reviewable trial-court action and includes a Rule 52 appendix and mandamus record with certified or sworn materials supporting every factual assertion."

Appeal and Mandamus

In re G.M.

COA02

In this mandamus proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Section 156.102 is triggered by the date a modification petition is filed, not the date the hearing occurs. Father filed within one year of the prior order and sought to change the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence, so he was required to file a sufficient supporting affidavit. After the trial court found the affidavit insufficient, Section 156.102(c) required it to deny the requested relief and refuse to proceed. By nevertheless conducting an evidentiary hearing and entering temporary orders, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you seek to change primary residence within one year of the last order, the affidavit requirement is a hard gatekeeper. The key date is the filing date, and once a court finds the affidavit insufficient, it cannot simply go forward with a hearing anyway. For movants, draft a fact-specific affidavit that tracks the statute; for respondents, press for an early ruling and preserve error if the court proceeds despite an insufficiency finding."