Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1216 opinions found
In the Interest of S.M.T. and S.J.T., Children
COA14
In this post-divorce SAPCR modification case, the father tried to undo an in-court Rule 11 settlement after the trial court accepted the agreement and stated the orders were effective that day. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused on the key procedural question: whether consent still existed at rendition. Applying Texas Rule 11 principles and S&A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal, the court held that consent may be withdrawn only before rendition, not after. Because the settlement terms were recited in open court, father personally agreed to them, and the trial court rendered judgment before father attempted to back away, his later refusal to sign and later objections did not prevent entry of a conforming written order. The appellate court also rejected father's complaint that the written order improperly changed the children's primary residence, concluding the record supported the trial court's view that the rendered agreement imposed a Clear Creek ISD-based framework rather than designating father's address as the primary residence.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you settle a family-law case on the record, the moment that matters is rendition, not the later signature. Once the court accepts the Rule 11 agreement and renders it effective, buyer's remorse usually cannot undo the deal; from then on, the real fight is whether the written order truly conforms to what was recited in court."
Driver v. State
COA14
In Driver v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Evidence 608(b) barred the defense from cross-examining a child complainant about a prior childhood false statement to a counselor, even after the complainant’s aunt testified that the child had a truthful reputation. The court analyzed the proposed impeachment as classic specific-instance evidence offered only to show the complainant had lied before and therefore might be lying again, which Rule 608(b) prohibits. The court further concluded that exclusion of the evidence did not violate the defendant’s confrontation rights or right to present a defense because the prior falsehood was not tied to bias, motive, interest, coercion, or correction of a materially false impression. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases, you generally cannot impeach a witness with an unrelated prior lie just to argue they are a dishonest person. If you want the evidence admitted, you need a non-character theory—such as bias, motive, interest, coercion, or a misleading impression—and you must clearly build and preserve that theory on the record."
In the Interest of H.F., a Child
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals independently reviewed the entire record, counsel’s brief, and Mother’s pro se response, which raised fairness concerns, recent sobriety efforts, and explanations for missed services and drug tests. The court held those arguments did not reveal an arguable appellate issue, especially where they relied on matters outside the trial record or were contradicted by evidence showing repeated positive drug tests, missed tests, homelessness, unemployment, and noncompliance with services. The court affirmed the termination order under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (b)(2), and denied counsel’s motion to withdraw because under In re P.M., a belief that the appeal is frivolous is not by itself good cause to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appeals are won on preserved error and the trial record, not on post-judgment explanations or extra-record documents. In termination and other family-law cases, lawyers must build the evidentiary record before judgment and, for appointed appellate counsel, remember that Anders affirmance does not automatically end representation."
Chelby Thrasher v. Jessica Thrasher
COA11
In this divorce appeal, Chelby Thrasher challenged the denial of reimbursement, the characterization of certain assets as Jessica Thrasher’s separate property, the overall just-and-right property division, and an attorney’s-fees award. The court held that reimbursement was waived because Chelby did not plead it as an affirmative claim and, without the reporter’s record, the court could not determine whether the issue was tried by consent or otherwise preserved. As to property characterization, property division, and attorney’s fees, the court explained that each complaint depended on the evidence presented at the final hearing. Because Chelby failed to provide the reporter’s record required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6, the appellate court was required to presume the omitted evidence supported the divorce decree and therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge a divorce decree on appeal, you must bring a complete reporter’s record for any issue that depends on trial evidence. Also, reimbursement must be affirmatively pleaded or clearly tried by consent; otherwise the claim is likely waived."
Eric Hines v. Tiffany Shavonne Stevenson Hines
COA09
In Hines v. Hines, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed a divorce case’s dismissal for want of prosecution after neither party nor counsel appeared at a required pretrial conference, even though the parties had previously signed a mediated settlement agreement. The court held the trial judge acted within its discretion because the case was no longer truly uncontested once the wife filed a motion to set aside the MSA, and the appellate record did not include key materials—such as the scheduling order, alleged emails excusing attendance, a proposed decree, or a reporter’s record from the dismissal setting—needed to show the dismissal was improper. The court also upheld denial of reinstatement, finding the record did not negate conscious indifference where counsel knew about the setting, the risk of dismissal, and the pending MSA challenge. Finally, the court rejected the husband’s argument that Family Code section 6.602 required entry of judgment on the MSA, explaining that without a complete record he could not show the statute compelled rendition instead of dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A signed MSA does not end the court’s power to manage its docket or protect a case from dismissal. If there is any dispute about the MSA or decree language, treat the case as contested, appear at required settings unless formally excused, and build a full record showing the court was asked to render judgment on the MSA. Section 6.602 is powerful, but it will not save a case on appeal if counsel misses settings or fails to preserve the documents and hearing record needed to prove error."
Gregory Jack v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Jack v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed adjudication and revocation of deferred-adjudication community supervision because the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Gregory Jack failed to report as directed. Although Jack argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove a separate alleged new-law violation involving discharge of a firearm, the court applied settled revocation law holding that one proven supervision violation is enough to sustain revocation. The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, noted the supervision officer’s testimony that Jack had notice and failed to appear, and emphasized that Jack neither challenged that finding on appeal nor developed any due-diligence defense. Because the unchallenged reporting violation independently supported the judgment, the court affirmed without needing to resolve the attacked new-offense ground.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a trial court’s order rests on multiple independent grounds, an appeal can fail unless every ground is challenged. For family-law litigators, even a so-called “technical” violation—like failing to report, attend, exchange, notify, or complete services—can independently carry the ruling if it is pleaded, proved, and left unanswered."
In the Interest of B.L.H., M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., D.R.D.S., Children
COA10
In In re B.L.H., the Waco Court of Appeals held that a mother whose parental rights were terminated could not appeal only the order appointing DFPS as managing conservator while leaving the termination judgment unchallenged. Mother argued DFPS failed to overcome the parental presumption under Texas Family Code section 153.131(a), but the court explained that once termination stands, section 161.206(b) divests the parent of all legal rights and duties, including the ability to invoke rights available only to a legal parent. Relying on In re J.D.G., the court treated DFPS’s conservatorship appointment as a consequence of the unchallenged termination rather than a separate issue Mother had standing to contest. The court therefore rejected her appeal on standing grounds without reaching the sufficiency of the conservatorship evidence. The court also affirmed Father’s termination under Anders review and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a parent wants to challenge DFPS conservatorship on appeal, counsel usually must also challenge the termination ruling that extinguishes parental status. Once termination is left intact, the parent generally loses standing to rely on the parental presumption or attack conservatorship as if still a legal parent."
Richard Pasillas v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Pasillas v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether admitting muted body-camera footage showing a non-testifying complainant crying, gesturing, and displaying injuries violated the Confrontation Clause. Rather than deciding that constitutional question, the court assumed error and analyzed harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) and the Langham factors. The court held any assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the video was cumulative of other evidence admitted without objection, including officer observations, photographs of injuries, EMT testimony recounting the complainant’s description of the assault, and Pasillas’s separate admission establishing the second predicate assault. The conviction for continuous violence against the family was therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A good evidentiary objection may not win on appeal if the same fact came in elsewhere without objection. In family-violence-related litigation, lawyers must preserve error across every parallel evidence source, while proponents should build redundancy so the judgment can survive harmless-error review even if one item is later excluded."
Suarez v. State
COA13
In Suarez v. State, the defendant challenged whether a prior deferred-adjudication disposition for continuous violence against the family could satisfy the prior-conviction element needed to elevate a new family-violence assault to a felony under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(A). The court applied the legal-sufficiency standard and focused on the statute’s text, especially § 22.01(f)(1), which expressly defines “previously convicted” to include a guilty or nolo contendere plea that resulted in deferred adjudication, whether or not sentence was ever later imposed. Because the State introduced certified records showing Suarez’s guilty plea and deferred adjudication for a qualifying family-violence offense, the court held the evidence was legally sufficient and that no later adjudication of guilt was required during guilt-innocence. The court also modified the judgment to reflect the jury’s repeat-offender enhancement finding that had been omitted from the written judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not make blanket arguments that deferred adjudication is “not a conviction.” In Texas family-law and family-violence litigation, the controlling statute may give a deferred-adjudication plea real legal effect. Read the exact statutory definition, and use certified plea papers and orders—not summaries—to prove or challenge the prior proceeding."
In re Office of the Attorney General of Texas
COA03
In this mandamus proceeding, the Texas Office of the Attorney General challenged a trial court order transferring an entire SAPCR from Texas to Arizona, including the child-support portion of the case. The court held that even if custody-related issues could be transferred under UCCJEA-type principles, child support is governed separately by UIFSA. Because Texas issued the support order and Father still lived in Texas, Texas retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over support under Family Code section 159.205(a). The court also concluded that Family Code section 155.301 authorizes only intrastate transfers, not interstate transfer of support jurisdiction. Because the transfer order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable, mandamus was the proper remedy. The court further rejected the argument that the support-transfer language was merely a clerical error correctable by nunc pro tunc, holding the mistake was judicial. Mandamus was conditionally granted to vacate the order insofar as it transferred child support to Arizona.
Litigation Takeaway
"Custody jurisdiction and support jurisdiction do not automatically travel together. Even when another state may become the proper forum for conservatorship or possession issues, Texas keeps child-support jurisdiction under UIFSA so long as the obligor, obligee, or child still resides here, absent a statutory exception. Family lawyers should draft transfer motions and orders with precision, carve out support expressly, and treat an improper interstate support transfer as a mandamus issue."