Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1003 opinions found
In the Interest of E.B.J., J.B.J., B.B., and C.B.J., Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of parental rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E). The record showed Mother engaged in a deliberate course of abusive conduct, including severe physical abuse that caused one child to suffer multiple hand fractures in different stages of healing, along with other mistreatment and threats to keep the children silent. As to Father, the court held that direct abuse was not required because subsection (E) also reaches a parent who knows of abuse and fails to protect the children. The court relied on medical testimony, child statements, school-witness observations, trauma evidence, and the parents’ denial of responsibility to find both endangerment and best interest. Because one supported predicate ground plus best interest is enough to affirm, the court did not need to reach other grounds, and it rejected any argument that the Department also had to prove a material and substantial change in circumstances.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, failing to protect a child from known abuse can be just as damaging as committing the abuse yourself. Lawyers should build endangerment cases around patterns—repeated injuries, third-party observations, implausible explanations, secrecy, and ongoing denial—because those facts can support termination and also justify major conservatorship and possession restrictions in nontermination cases."
Balderas v. Balderas
COA09
In Balderas v. Balderas, the petitioner filed for divorce and made multiple attempts to serve the respondent, including citation, certified mail, substituted service, and publication-related efforts, but never perfected service as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. After the trial court twice issued notices of intent to dismiss for want of prosecution, the petitioner responded to the first but failed to file a timely motion to retain after the second notice. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing the case because attempted service is not the same as perfected service, a substituted-service order does not complete service without a Rule 107-compliant return, and the petitioner failed to show the diligence and good cause required to retain the case on the docket.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, service efforts alone will not save a case from dismissal—service must actually be perfected, and any dismissal notice must be answered with a timely, rule-compliant motion to retain showing specific diligence and good cause."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Latricia Mundorf and Dillon Dan Mundorf
COA13
In Mundorf v. Mundorf, the court of appeals considered whether a divorce decree improperly awarded one spouse’s separate property to the other as part of the community estate. The husband proved, and the wife conceded on appeal, that several horses and one tract acquired before marriage were his separate property. Applying the community-property presumption, the clear-and-convincing standard for rebuttal, and Eggemeyer’s rule against divestiture of separate property, the court held the trial court had no authority to award those proven separate-property horses to Wife, making reversal automatic as a matter of law. The court declined to recharacterize other disputed assets where Husband’s briefing lacked record citations or developed analysis, upheld the finding that the 570 FM 1358 property was community based on conflicting evidence, and upheld the characterization of DM High Roller as Wife’s separate property based on tracing testimony and admissions. Because the decree divested Husband of proven separate property, the court reversed and remanded the overall property division.
Litigation Takeaway
"Characterization wins or loses property cases in Texas divorce. If you can clearly trace an asset as separate property, the court cannot award it to the other spouse, and divestiture will usually require reversal without a harm analysis. But separate-property claims must be proved and briefed asset by asset with precise record citations, because weak tracing and undeveloped briefing will leave the community presumption intact."
Loyo v. Stephen
COA14
In Loyo v. Stephen, a tort creditor sought to execute on real property that had been community property during marriage but was later awarded to the nondebtor spouse in the divorce decree as her separate property. The court analyzed Texas Family Code § 3.202(d) using a plain-language approach and held that "all community property" remains subject to a spouse’s tort liability incurred during marriage. The court concluded that the debtor spouse’s liability was incurred, at the latest, when the arbitrator issued the fiduciary-duty award and the trial court confirmed it during the marriage, even though the confirmation order later merged into a final post-divorce judgment. The court also rejected the argument that the final judgment had to expressly restate the tort finding or attach the arbitration award. Because the liability arose during marriage, the former community property awarded to the nondebtor spouse remained reachable, and the judgment authorizing execution was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A divorce decree does not automatically shield former community property from a spouse’s tort creditors. Family lawyers must investigate pending tort and arbitration exposure before dividing property, because if liability was fixed during marriage, retitling an asset to the nondebtor spouse may not prevent later execution under Family Code § 3.202(d)."
Adrian Ross Bey v. Virginia Pond
COA14
In a bill-of-review proceeding, a father sought to set aside a prior SAPCR judgment. The mother obtained dismissal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, and the Office of the Attorney General separately succeeded in quashing the father’s subpoena. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Rule 91a is categorically unavailable in suits brought under the Texas Family Code, and that this bar extends to a bill of review attacking a SAPCR judgment because the proceeding’s purpose was to undo and retry a Family Code case. The court also rejected the argument that the dismissal could be affirmed under the trial court’s inherent authority, noting the father was not given a proper opportunity to present the prima facie merits of his bill of review. The court reversed the Rule 91a dismissal and remanded, but affirmed the order quashing the subpoena.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use Rule 91a as a dismissal shortcut in Family Code litigation—even in a procedurally separate bill of review. If the case arises under the Family Code, counsel must use authorized tools such as special exceptions, summary judgment where proper, jurisdictional challenges, or a merits hearing, and should preserve error if a court tries to dispose of the case under Rule 91a anyway."
Stockton v. State
COA13
In Stockton v. State, the court considered whether statements a domestic-violence complainant made to a responding officer and later to a paramedic, both captured on body-camera video, were barred by the Confrontation Clause after the complainant became unavailable at trial. Applying Crawford, Davis, Bryant, and Texas authority, the court focused on the objective primary purpose of the exchanges. It concluded the officer’s initial questions were asked during an unfolding domestic-disturbance response when the scene was not yet secure and the officer did not know who was involved, whether the suspect remained nearby, or whether weapons or additional danger existed. It likewise concluded the paramedic’s questions were aimed at assessing possible strangulation injuries and addressing immediate medical and safety concerns. Because both exchanges were primarily emergency-response and medical-assessment interactions rather than formal evidence-gathering for prosecution, the statements were non-testimonial, and the trial court properly admitted the videos.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, early body-cam, 911, and EMS statements can carry major evidentiary weight even if the complainant later recants, disappears, or refuses to testify. The key fight is often whether the statements were made during an ongoing emergency and for safety or medical purposes, which strengthens admissibility and persuasive value in custody, protective-order, and divorce litigation."
In the Interest of E.B.J., J.B.J., B.B., and C.B.J., Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). The record showed Mother engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children through severe and escalating abuse of Brian, corroborated by medical testimony, school observations, and the children’s statements. As to Father, the court held that knowing exposure to Mother’s abuse and failure to protect the children likewise supported an endangerment finding. The court also relied on trauma evidence, the parents’ shifting explanations and denials, and the children’s safety and permanency needs to uphold best interest. Because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough, the court did not need to reach the other predicate grounds or the parents’ argument that the Department had to prove a material and substantial change in circumstances.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on pattern, corroboration, and parental insight. A documented course of abuse, failure to protect, inconsistent explanations, and refusal to acknowledge responsibility can support termination—and in non-termination SAPCR cases, the same proof can justify major restrictions on conservatorship and possession."
In re Aaron Nicholas Thomas
COA09
After a trial court entered a default protective order, it granted the respondent’s motion for new trial during its plenary-power period based on alleged defective service and lack of notice. The relator sought mandamus, arguing among other things that he did not receive notice of the new-trial hearing. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held mandamus was unavailable because this was a nonjury new-trial order entered while the trial court still had plenary power, so the relator had an adequate appellate remedy: he could seek reconsideration and reinstatement in the trial court and, if necessary, challenge the ruling on appeal from a final order. The court also concluded the complained-of notice problem did not create the extraordinary circumstances needed for mandamus relief, and the order was not void.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-court judge sets aside a default order in a bench proceeding while plenary power is still open, do not assume mandamus is the answer. First build your record in the trial court, move for reconsideration, and preserve any service or notice complaints for a later appeal; absent a void order or truly exceptional harm, appellate courts will expect you to use those ordinary remedies."
In the Interest of R.R.D. and L.R.W., Children
COA05
In In re R.R.D., the parents tried to directly appeal temporary orders requiring them to participate in protective services under Texas Family Code § 264.203. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the issue as purely jurisdictional and held that because the challenged orders were temporary family-law orders, Family Code § 105.001(e) barred an interlocutory appeal. The court further concluded that § 264.203 did not create an independent right to immediate appellate review, and because the parents identified no other statute authorizing interlocutory jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a burdensome temporary family-law order can be appealed just because it has immediate consequences. Before filing a notice of appeal, confirm there is an express statutory basis for interlocutory review; otherwise, counsel should consider alternatives like mandamus, trial-court modification, and preserving error for appeal after a final order."
In re Rachel Michelle Atherton
COA09
In this original proceeding arising from a divorce, the parties’ marital residence was sold under temporary orders and the net proceeds were deposited into the court’s registry. Rachel Atherton argued the residence was the parties’ homestead and asked the trial court to either release enough proceeds for her to buy a replacement home before the six-month exemption period in Texas Property Code section 41.001(c) expired, or toll the exemption while the funds remained unavailable in the registry. The Beaumont Court of Appeals relied chiefly on London v. London and the protective purpose of section 41.001(c) to hold that when homestead-sale proceeds are unavailable because they are held in the court registry, the six-month exemption may be equitably tolled. Because no party showed a valid lien against the homestead proceeds and the trial court’s failure to rule threatened forfeiture of the exemption solely through delay, the court held the trial court abused its discretion. Mandamus was conditionally granted, directing the trial court to timely rule on the motion or preserve the exempt status of the proceeds while in the registry and for six months after delivery.
Litigation Takeaway
"If divorce-related homestead sale proceeds are sitting in the court registry, do not let the six-month exemption deadline pass without action. Ask early for either release of funds or an order tolling the exemption, and if the trial court’s inaction threatens loss of homestead protection, mandamus may be the right remedy."