Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1003 opinions found
In the Interest of S.K. and A.K., Children
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the mother did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence but instead argued that the jury charge improperly defined “endanger” and that her appointed counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge drug-test evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the jury-charge complaint was waived because no objection was made in the trial court, and longstanding Texas Supreme Court precedent forecloses any due-process exception to ordinary preservation rules in termination cases. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim because the criminal forensic licensing and accreditation statutes the mother relied on apply only in criminal cases, so counsel was not deficient for failing to make a meritless objection. The court affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination cases do not get a free pass on error preservation. If you want to complain about the jury charge on appeal, you must object clearly and on the record in the trial court. And ineffective-assistance arguments will fail if the omitted objection had no valid legal basis—especially when counsel tries to import criminal evidentiary rules into a civil family-law case."
In re Rachel Michelle Atherton
COA09
In this original proceeding arising from a divorce, the parties’ marital residence was sold under temporary orders and the net proceeds were deposited into the court’s registry. Rachel Atherton argued the residence was the parties’ homestead and asked the trial court to either release enough proceeds for her to buy a replacement home before the six-month exemption period in Texas Property Code section 41.001(c) expired, or toll the exemption while the funds remained unavailable in the registry. The Beaumont Court of Appeals relied chiefly on London v. London and the protective purpose of section 41.001(c) to hold that when homestead-sale proceeds are unavailable because they are held in the court registry, the six-month exemption may be equitably tolled. Because no party showed a valid lien against the homestead proceeds and the trial court’s failure to rule threatened forfeiture of the exemption solely through delay, the court held the trial court abused its discretion. Mandamus was conditionally granted, directing the trial court to timely rule on the motion or preserve the exempt status of the proceeds while in the registry and for six months after delivery.
Litigation Takeaway
"If divorce-related homestead sale proceeds are sitting in the court registry, do not let the six-month exemption deadline pass without action. Ask early for either release of funds or an order tolling the exemption, and if the trial court’s inaction threatens loss of homestead protection, mandamus may be the right remedy."
Loyo v. Stephen
COA14
In Loyo v. Stephen, a tort creditor sought to execute on real property that had been community property during marriage but was later awarded to the nondebtor spouse in the divorce decree as her separate property. The court analyzed Texas Family Code § 3.202(d) using a plain-language approach and held that "all community property" remains subject to a spouse’s tort liability incurred during marriage. The court concluded that the debtor spouse’s liability was incurred, at the latest, when the arbitrator issued the fiduciary-duty award and the trial court confirmed it during the marriage, even though the confirmation order later merged into a final post-divorce judgment. The court also rejected the argument that the final judgment had to expressly restate the tort finding or attach the arbitration award. Because the liability arose during marriage, the former community property awarded to the nondebtor spouse remained reachable, and the judgment authorizing execution was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A divorce decree does not automatically shield former community property from a spouse’s tort creditors. Family lawyers must investigate pending tort and arbitration exposure before dividing property, because if liability was fixed during marriage, retitling an asset to the nondebtor spouse may not prevent later execution under Family Code § 3.202(d)."
In re Jarrod Heath Aaron
COA12
In this original proceeding arising from a SAPCR modification case, the petitioner sought mandamus after the trial court denied his motion to transfer venue from Van Zandt County to Smith County, where the children had allegedly lived for more than six months. The court focused on Texas Family Code §§ 155.201(b) and 155.204(b), emphasizing that while transfer may be mandatory when residency requirements are met, timeliness depends on the movant’s procedural posture. Because the relator filed the modification petition himself, he was a petitioner and was required to file any motion to transfer at the same time as his initial pleading. His later-filed transfer motion was therefore untimely, and the residency facts could not cure that defect. The court held that the trial court correctly denied transfer, retained authority to proceed with case-management orders such as mediation, and did not abuse its discretion; mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you file the modification, file the transfer motion with the petition or lose the right to mandatory transfer. In Chapter 155 cases, strong residence facts do not matter if the petitioner misses the filing deadline."
In the Interest of M.S., M.J.S., and N.E.S., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights because clear and convincing evidence supported Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O) and best interest. The record showed the father used methamphetamine daily, including in the home and around the children, and that his drug use was tied to domestic violence, threats with firearms, neglect, financial instability, and unsafe living conditions. The court relied on current subsection (O), as informed by In re R.R.A., to analyze drug use in context rather than in isolation, concluding the father’s controlled-substance use endangered the children’s health or safety and that he failed to complete court-ordered substance-abuse treatment. Because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough to affirm, the court did not need to reach the father’s challenge to an additional predicate ground under subsection (N).
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug-use evidence is strongest when it is connected to real-world parenting danger. To prove endangerment, build a record showing not just substance use, but how it impaired parenting, fueled violence, destabilized the home, exposed children to risk, and remained unresolved through failure to complete treatment. For parents defending these cases, appearing at trial, documenting treatment compliance and sobriety, and breaking the link between use and child endangerment are critical."
In the Interest of E.J.S., a Child
COA04
In this parental-rights termination case, the mother tried to use a restricted appeal after the trial court terminated her rights in her absence. The Fourth Court of Appeals held restricted appeal was unavailable because Rule 30 requires non-participation in the decision-making event that produced the judgment, and the mother had already participated by filing a verified pleading expressly consenting to termination, acknowledging its consequences, and asking the court to terminate her rights at the scheduled hearing without her appearance. The court focused on the substance of that filing—not whether it was labeled a pleading instead of a statutory relinquishment affidavit—and concluded it made the termination judgment possible. Because the non-participation requirement is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the restricted appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Nonappearance alone does not preserve a restricted appeal. If a party files a signed document that affirmatively asks the court to grant relief—even if the party plans not to attend the hearing—that filing may count as participation in the decision-making event and destroy Rule 30 restricted-appeal jurisdiction. Family lawyers should draft consents, waivers, stipulations, and prove-up papers with extreme care."
In Re Maj. Christina I. Leake
COA07
In this mandamus proceeding arising from a long-running SAPCR, the relator argued that filing written objections under Texas Family Code section 201.015 automatically stripped the associate judge of authority to receive filings, send hearing communications, and continue handling the case. The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected that reading, holding that section 201.015 creates a mechanism for de novo review by the referring court after an associate judge’s order, but does not revoke the authority granted to associate judges under section 201.007. Because the relator did not show that the associate judge acted outside the powers authorized by statute, and also failed to establish other mandamus prerequisites such as presentment, unreasonable delay, and a precise record, the court denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"A section 201.015 objection is not a pause button on an associate judge’s authority. If you want mandamus relief, you must identify a specific act outside section 201.007, build a clean record showing presentment and delay where relevant, and act quickly—especially when challenging temporary orders or case-administration issues."
Genevieve Saulter v. Robert Saulter
COA03
In Saulter v. Saulter, the Austin Court of Appeals upheld a family-violence protective order entered for Robert Saulter against Genevieve Saulter. The main dispute was whether evidence of Genevieve’s post-separation harassment and hostile conduct was relevant in a protective-order case based on earlier assault allegations. The court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting that evidence because it helped explain the parties’ relationship, assisted the court in evaluating credibility in a bench trial, and supported the required finding that family violence was likely to occur in the future. The court also affirmed denial of Genevieve’s motion for new trial, concluding that the alleged newly discovered evidence merely impeached Robert on a collateral point and was not likely to change the outcome.
Litigation Takeaway
"Post-separation conduct can matter a great deal in family-violence protective-order cases. Even if later behavior is not itself the pleaded assault, Texas courts may consider it as context for the relationship, credibility, and future-danger findings. For trial lawyers, that means building or attacking the record with targeted relevance and Rule 403 arguments—not relying on a blanket claim that the evidence belongs only in a stalking case. It also reinforces how hard it is to win a new trial based on newly discovered impeachment evidence."
In re Tempus Holdings, Inc. d/b/a The Lodge Card Club, and Locus Enterprises, LLC
COA04
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an out-of-state lawyer’s Rule 19 pro hac vice application without evidence supporting any permissible ground under Rule 19(d). The opponent argued unauthorized practice, ethical concerns, and generalized “good cause,” based on the lawyer’s name appearing on pleadings signed by Texas counsel, attendance at a deposition, and speculation that he might be a witness. Relying on AutoZoners, Verhalen, Rule 19, Government Code section 81.101, and Rule 3.08 authorities, the court concluded those objections were unsupported and legally insufficient. Because the denial deprived the client of chosen counsel and could not be adequately remedied on appeal, the court granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to block pro hac vice admission in Texas, you need evidence tied to Rule 19(d)—not suspicion, rhetoric, or tactical complaints about duplication, expense, or a possible witness issue. For family lawyers, this case is a strong mandamus tool when a trial court excludes qualified out-of-state counsel without a record-based reason."
Ware v. State
COA06
In Ware v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals considered whether admitting a community supervision officer’s testimony about a police officer’s allegations concerning GPS-monitor tampering violated the Confrontation Clause or due process. Rather than decide the broader constitutional question, the court assumed error and conducted a harm analysis. It held any error was harmless because Ware himself admitted two independent violations of his deferred-adjudication conditions: removing the GPS monitor and failing to report when directed. Because Texas law permits revocation or adjudication based on proof of just one violation, those admissions independently supported the trial court’s judgment. The court also held Ware failed to preserve any complaint about the denial of his continuance motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any enforcement-style hearing, evidentiary objections may not matter on appeal if your client’s own testimony proves an independent violation. Preserve error, but also build or defend the record with harmless-error analysis in mind: one admitted breach can be enough to sustain the ruling."