Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
787 opinions found
In re Genevience Alexandrie Anthony
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus after a Bexar County trial court denied the mother’s jurisdictional challenge to the father’s SAPCR. The child was born in Mississippi and had lived there continuously with the mother since birth, while Texas had previously entered only a UIFSA support order establishing paternity and support. Applying the UCCJEA, the court held that Mississippi was the child’s home state under Family Code section 152.201(a)(1), so Texas lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination. The court rejected the father’s reliance on significant-connection jurisdiction because that basis applies only when no home state exists or the home state declines jurisdiction, and it also rejected use of the inconvenient-forum statute as an independent source of jurisdiction. The court further made clear that a prior Texas UIFSA support case does not create or support UCCJEA custody jurisdiction. Because improper assertion of custody jurisdiction is reviewable by mandamus, the court conditionally granted relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"In interstate custody cases, start with the child’s home state and keep UIFSA and UCCJEA analyses separate. A Texas support or paternity order does not give Texas power to decide conservatorship or possession if another state is the child’s home state. Before filing a Texas SAPCR, confirm that no other state has home-state jurisdiction or that the home state has expressly declined; otherwise the case is vulnerable to dismissal and mandamus."
Bryant Pearl v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Bryant Pearl v. State of Texas, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child where the child testified the abuse happened multiple times over more than thirty days, even though she could not give precise dates and the record included evidence that another person had also abused her. The court applied the usual sufficiency standard, deferred to the jury on credibility, and emphasized that exact dates are not required under Penal Code section 21.02 and that a child victim’s testimony alone can sustain the finding. The child’s account was further reinforced by SANE-history testimony describing repeated abuse and explaining why the absence of physical trauma did not negate abuse. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving abuse allegations, Pearl underscores that a factfinder may still credit a child’s core abuse narrative despite memory gaps, imprecise timing, no physical findings, and evidence of another possible abuser. The practical lesson is to build or attack the case around repetition, duration, attribution, and consistency of the core allegations—not around the expectation of date-perfect testimony."
In re Lisa Marie Clontz
COA01
In In re Lisa Marie Clontz, the relator sought mandamus to force the family-law trial court to rule on a motion to transfer venue and a motion to reinstate. The First Court of Appeals held that filing motions with the clerk was not enough to prove the trial court had a ministerial duty to rule at that point. Applying settled mandamus law, the court distinguished between filing and presentment and required record proof that the motions were actually brought to the judge’s attention, that a ruling was requested, and that the court failed or refused to act within a reasonable time. Because the mandamus record showed only file-stamped motions and did not show presentment, a hearing or submission setting, or a filed demand for ruling, the court denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you may need mandamus based on a trial court’s failure to rule, do more than file the motion—create a record showing presentment, judicial awareness, and a clear request for a ruling. In family-law cases, preservation of the paper trail can determine whether appellate relief is available, regardless of the motion’s merits."
In the Matter of J.T., a Juvenile
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile adjudication for sexual assault, rejecting a legal-sufficiency challenge focused solely on identity. The complainant testified that he fell asleep next to J.T. during a sleepover, awoke to the assault, and identified J.T. based on the sleeping arrangements, prior familiarity, and surrounding circumstances, even though he could not make a complete facial identification in the dark. Applying the criminal beyond-a-reasonable-doubt sufficiency standard used in juvenile cases, the court held that the trial court, as factfinder, could credit the complainant’s testimony, disbelieve J.T.’s denial, and find identity proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The adjudication and disposition were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A single credible witness can be enough. In abuse-driven family cases, trial courts may rely on one witness’s testimony—especially when it is specific, internally consistent, and supported by contextual facts like sleeping arrangements, familiarity, immediate confrontation, or behavioral changes—and appellate courts will rarely reweigh those credibility calls."
In the Interest of K.R.N.S., a Child
COA14
In a privately filed SAPCR between two parents, the father appealed the final order and, construed liberally, argued that his retained trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena witnesses, respond to arguments, cite favorable authority, and better present the child’s best-interest case. The Fourteenth Court did not reach whether counsel performed deficiently because it treated the right-to-counsel question as dispositive. Relying on Family Code section 107.013 and cases such as In re D.T., the court explained that ineffective-assistance claims in Texas family cases are cognizable only when a constitutional or statutory right to counsel exists, such as in certain governmental Subtitle E proceedings. Because this was a private SAPCR, not a suit filed by a governmental entity, and the father identified no other source of a right to counsel, the court held his ineffective-assistance complaint was unavailable and affirmed the final SAPCR order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In private SAPCRs and other non-governmental family cases, appellate courts generally will not reverse based on complaints that a party’s own retained lawyer performed poorly. Unless a statute or the constitution creates a right to counsel, the proper appellate focus is trial-court error, preservation, sufficiency, or abuse of discretion—not ineffective assistance."
In the Interest of K.L.M., a Child
COA05
In this default SAPCR appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court exceeded the record in two respects. First, it reversed and rendered the child-surname change because Mother’s testimony—that the parents were unmarried and she wanted the child to bear her surname—did not establish the required good cause or show that the child’s substantial welfare and best interest required the change. Second, it reversed and remanded the retroactive child-support award because the record lacked sufficient evidence of Father’s net resources during the relevant period and the statutory factors required by Family Code sections 154.009 and 154.131. The court affirmed the remainder of the order, including the finding that Father had a history or pattern of family violence, concluding the evidence was sufficient on that issue.
Litigation Takeaway
"A default prove-up is not a shortcut around pleadings and proof. Even in uncontested SAPCRs, name changes and retroactive support require evidence tied to the governing statutes and factors; if the record is thin, the judgment is vulnerable on appeal. By contrast, targeted testimony that directly addresses the family-violence standard can be enough to sustain that finding."
In re Costco Wholesale Corporation
COA14
In In re Costco Wholesale Corporation, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by granting Rule 202 pre-suit discovery based only on a verified petition and attorney declarations. The petitioner sought broad deposition and document discovery before filing a personal-injury suit, arguing she needed the information to identify additional parties and avoid delay from a possible federal removal. The court emphasized that Rule 202 requires proof, not pleading, and that verified pleadings are not competent evidence. Because no admissible evidence was offered at the hearing, and because the petitioner failed to prove either that the discovery would prevent a failure or delay of justice or that its likely benefit outweighed its burden, the Rule 202 order could not stand. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 202 is not a shortcut to merits discovery. If you want pre-suit discovery, you must present competent evidence from a witness with personal knowledge and prove a real Rule 202 necessity; if you are opposing it, attack the lack of evidence, the availability of ordinary post-filing discovery, and any speculative claim of urgency."
In the Interest of D.D.D.-H. a/k/a D.D.D.H., A.R.M., and O.N.H. a/k/a O.H., Children
COA01
The First Court of Appeals held that termination could not rest on former Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O) because the Legislature repealed that predicate ground before the termination decree was signed and made the change applicable to pending cases. The court treated that as a statutory-validity issue rather than a sufficiency issue. Even so, it affirmed because legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under subsections (D) and (E), based on evidence of Mother’s physical abuse of one child, indifference to his welfare, unstable and unsafe living conditions, inability to meet basic needs, and ongoing mental-health and possible substance-abuse concerns. The court also held the same pattern of abuse, instability, and unmet needs was sufficient to support the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Check the statute in effect on the date judgment is signed, not just the date of pleading or trial. A repealed ground can invalidate part of a judgment, but reversal may still be avoided if another independently supported ground and the best-interest finding survive—especially in termination cases involving subsections (D) and (E), which carry lasting collateral consequences."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Brendan Potyondy and Meredith Potyondy and in the Interest of D.P., C.P., and B.P., Children
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision voiding the parties’ premarital agreement in their divorce. The trial court had found the agreement unconscionable based on the circumstances of signing—two days before the wedding, no separate counsel for the wife, and a perceived “double recovery” because the husband’s premarital assets were no longer traceable. The appellate court held that those reasons did not satisfy Texas Family Code section 4.006, emphasized that unconscionability in this context must be analyzed under the statute rather than general equitable concerns, and noted the absence of any finding that the wife signed involuntarily. Because the agreement’s equalization payment was part of the bargain the parties made, not an improper double recovery, the court reversed the property division and remanded for entry of a division consistent with the premarital agreement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts cannot set aside a premarital agreement just because it seems unfair in hindsight or because the signing circumstances look imperfect. To defeat enforcement, the resisting spouse must prove a statutory ground under Family Code section 4.006 and obtain findings that match that theory. For trial lawyers, this case is a strong reminder to build the record around voluntariness and statutory disclosure issues—not generalized fairness, tracing complaints, or lack-of-counsel themes standing alone."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Craige Kevin Howlett and Corrine Howlett
COA07
In this Texas divorce appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the trial court could not support three $250,000 compensatory awards to the wife for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud on the community, and fraudulent inducement merely by pointing to the husband’s serious misconduct, including hidden accounts, altered bank statements, and unexplained transfers. The appellate court explained that damages must track the character of the property injured: if the alleged harm was to the wife’s separate estate, the record had to show a distinct separate-property injury; if the harm was to the community estate, the remedy had to proceed under Family Code section 7.009(b) through a reconstituted-estate and just-and-right division analysis. Because the findings did not tie each award to a specific legally recognized injury, did not show how the amounts were calculated, and did not determine the value of the community estate absent the fraud, the court reversed the compensatory awards, rendered that the wife take nothing on separate-estate claims, and remanded for further proceedings on any community-estate injury. The exemplary-damages award remained undisturbed because it was not challenged on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"In fraud-heavy divorce cases, proof of concealment or dissipation is not enough by itself. Lawyers must identify whether the alleged injury is to a spouse personally, to separate property, or to the community estate, then prove the correct remedy with tracing and valuation evidence. If the claim is really fraud on the community, the court needs findings showing the reconstituted estate and the math under Family Code section 7.009(b), not just a large round-number damages award."