Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1216 opinions found
David Cortez v. Alicia Cortez
COA04
In a default-divorce appeal, the parties settled during the appeal and asked the court of appeals to render an agreed judgment adopting their mediated parenting plan and child-support terms. The court held it could not do so because Texas Family Code § 153.007 requires the trial court to approve any agreed parenting plan involving conservatorship, possession, or support based on a best-interest finding, and appellate courts cannot make that factual determination in the first instance. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)(B), the court set aside the judgment and remanded the case so the trial court could consider the agreement and, if appropriate, render judgment consistent with it after making the required best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-law appeal settles on child-related issues, do not ask the court of appeals to simply render the agreement. Structure the disposition as vacatur and remand, because only the trial court can approve a parenting plan under § 153.007 after finding it is in the child’s best interest."
In the Interest of M.R.L.
COA04
In a contested SAPCR, the trial court entered a default final order after the mother failed to appear, even though no reporter’s record was made and the order recited that the parties waived the record. The court of appeals held that Family Code § 105.003(c) imposes an affirmative duty on the trial court to ensure a record is made in any contested SAPCR final hearing unless all parties validly waive it with the court’s consent. Because the pleadings showed an active dispute over conservatorship and residence restrictions, the case remained contested despite the mother’s absence. And because the mother was absent and unrepresented at trial, she could not waive the reporter’s record. The absence of a record was error apparent on the face of the record and harmful because it prevented meaningful appellate review, so the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not treat a default prove-up on parent-child issues like an ordinary civil default. If the pleadings make the SAPCR contested, get a court reporter and make a record; an absent, unrepresented party cannot waive it, and skipping the record can make the default order easy to reverse on appeal."
Jose Agosto v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Jose Agosto v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether testimony from a forensic interviewer and a police sergeant improperly vouched for a child complainant’s credibility in a child-sex-offense trial. The interviewer testified she had no concerns during the interview that required referral to a detective, and the sergeant testified the child’s forensic interview was consistent with the earlier outcry. The court analyzed the objections as turning not on the label 'bolstering' alone, but on whether the testimony actually expressed an opinion that the complainant was truthful. Relying on Texas cases distinguishing factual consistency and process-based observations from direct credibility endorsements, the court held that testimony about an absence of concerns and consistency across disclosures was admissible because neither witness expressly stated the child was truthful, credible, or believable. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by overruling the objections.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-allegation cases, professionals can usually testify that a child’s statements were consistent or that they observed no concerns requiring further action, so long as they do not cross the line into saying they believed the child or that the child was truthful. For family-law litigators, the key is careful question framing: descriptive and process-based testimony is more likely admissible, while explicit credibility-vouching remains vulnerable to objection."
Wilson v. State
COA05
In Wilson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support aggravated assault by threat against a child who was inside an apartment when the defendant intentionally set it on fire. The court analyzed the case under the legal-sufficiency standard and emphasized that a threat of imminent bodily injury can be proven through circumstantial evidence, including the defendant’s conduct, knowledge that the child was home, the spread of the fire, and the child’s reaction in escaping through a second-story window. The court held that even without an express verbal threat aimed at the child, a rational factfinder could infer that intentionally starting a fire in an occupied home knowingly threatened the child with imminent bodily injury and involved a deadly weapon.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, you do not need an express verbal threat to prove danger to a child or household member. If a parent or partner knowingly creates an immediately dangerous condition in the home, the court can infer a threat from the conduct, the living arrangement, the child’s presence, and the surrounding circumstances—making this case especially useful in custody, protective-order, and family-violence disputes."
Wilson v. State
COA05
In Wilson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed an aggravated-assault-by-threat conviction arising from a domestic-violence fire set inside an occupied apartment. Wilson poured gasoline on his girlfriend, ignited it, and fled while her teenage son, NF, was asleep in the home. On appeal, Wilson argued there was no evidence he intentionally or knowingly threatened NF because he made no express threat to the child and the child was not his primary target. The court rejected that argument, holding that circumstantial evidence was enough: Wilson knew NF was home, intentionally started a fire in the residence, fled through NF’s window, and created an immediate life-threatening condition that caused NF to believe he would die and to jump from a second-story window to escape. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court held a rational jury could find an intentional or knowing threat of imminent bodily injury and could also find use of a deadly weapon, because fire and the means used to ignite it were inherently dangerous. The court affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child does not have to be the direct target of household violence for the conduct to support serious safety findings. In family-law cases, circumstantial evidence that a parent knowingly created an immediately dangerous condition in an occupied home can strongly support family-violence allegations, endangerment findings, protective orders, and restrictions on conservatorship or possession."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Lenore Hernandez Mowafy and Mohamed Rizk Mowafy and in the Interest of R.M.M., a Child
COA07
In this Texas divorce appeal, the husband had answered and counterpetitioned, but later failed to appear for the final hearing. The trial court proceeded by post-answer default and signed a divorce decree after a hearing set only 42 days after the setting order was filed. The Seventh Court of Appeals held that because this was a post-answer default, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 required at least 45 days’ notice of the first trial setting. Relying on Highsmith, the court concluded that the record affirmatively showed inadequate notice, which amounted to a Rule 245 and due-process violation. The default divorce decree was therefore ineffectual, so the court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other side has filed any answer, you cannot safely take a default final order on short notice. In an answered family-law case, Rule 245’s 45-day notice requirement is a hard appellate trap, and a decree entered on less notice is vulnerable to reversal even if the absent party does not appear at trial."
In the Interest of J.J.C., a Child
COA05
In In re J.J.C., the Dallas Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from an order denying post-judgment motions filed more than twelve years after a 2013 child-support order. The appellant argued the earlier order was void for jurisdictional reasons, but the court focused on procedure rather than the underlying voidness claim. It held that motions filed in the original family-law case under the same cause number were not a true collateral attack; under Texas law, a collateral attack on an allegedly void judgment must be brought as a new proceeding under a different cause number. Because the 2025 motions were merely untimely post-judgment motions in the old case, the denial order was neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, and any effort to challenge the 2013 order directly was untimely. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Calling an old family-law order “void” does not make a later denial order appealable. If deadlines for a direct attack have expired, a party seeking to challenge a judgment as void must use the correct procedural vehicle—typically a new collateral proceeding under a new cause number—or risk having the case dismissed before any court reaches the merits."
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA01
In In the Matter of A.M., the First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer A.M. to criminal court under Texas Family Code section 54.02. The State alleged three aggravated assaults and one murder, and presented surveillance footage, officer testimony, and psychological and probation evidence showing A.M.’s involvement in multiple violent shootings, including a fatal shooting into an occupied vehicle. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support probable cause and the finding that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings, despite evidence of A.M.’s intellectual and mental-health limitations. It also held probable cause existed for felony murder under the law of parties even though the fatal bullet was not tied to A.M. specifically, and affirmed the denial of a fitness-to-proceed hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts do not treat diagnoses, low IQ, or mental-health history as automatic barriers to transfer or other protective rulings; they focus on functional evidence, prior interventions, public safety, and whether existing services can realistically prevent further harm. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a concrete record linking behavior, supervision history, treatment response, and objective evidence to the governing best-interest or safety standard."
Shaikh v. Rodriguez
COA01
In Shaikh v. Rodriguez, a diabetic patient sued her rheumatologist, alleging negligent prednisone treatment because the doctor failed to ensure glucose monitoring, warn about steroid-related risks, and coordinate diabetic care, which allegedly contributed to serious vision complications. On interlocutory appeal from the denial of dismissal under Chapter 74, the defendant argued the plaintiff’s experts were unqualified because they were not rheumatologists. The First Court of Appeals rejected that specialty-matching argument and held the qualification inquiry is issue-specific: whether the expert has knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the precise medical questions at issue. Because the ophthalmologist and the internal-medicine/critical-care physician tied their experience to prednisone use in diabetic patients, glucose monitoring, risk disclosure, and coordinated care, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the reports sufficient and denying dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
"When defending or attacking an expert, focus on the exact issue in dispute—not job titles or subspecialty labels. An expert need not share the opposing party’s specialty if the expert can show real, issue-specific experience with the standard of care, risk, monitoring duty, or methodology actually at issue."
In re U. L.
COA14
In re U. L. involved a party who sought emergency mandamus relief after a regional presiding judge denied her motion to recuse in a pending Harris County case. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(j) controls and makes a denial of recusal reviewable only for abuse of discretion on appeal from a final judgment, which forecloses interlocutory mandamus review of the denial itself. The court also analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and concluded it lacked authority to order the regional presiding judge to vacate the recusal denial or conduct further proceedings absent a specific statutory grant. The court therefore denied the mandamus petitions.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a recusal motion is denied in a family-law case, do not count on emergency mandamus to fix it. Build a complete Rule 18a record, preserve objections and harm, and prepare to challenge the denial only after final judgment."