Opinion Library

Bernardo Diaz v. Delia Cavazos-Gamez

COA13

In this original proceeding, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule 202 cannot be used as broad presuit discovery to identify actors and obtain documents without strict compliance with Rule 202.4. The petitioner sought presuit depositions and six categories of documents relating to a campaign mailer, and the trial court granted the request while also denying a motion to dismiss. The appellate court emphasized that Rule 202 is a narrow, ancillary remedy requiring an evidentiary basis and express findings that either the deposition may prevent a failure or delay of justice in an anticipated suit or that the likely benefit outweighs the burden and expense when investigating a potential claim. Because the order rested on insufficient evidentiary support and formulaic recitations rather than the required substantive showing, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief vacating the Rule 202 order and dismissed the related appeal as moot.

Litigation Takeaway

"Rule 202 is not a presuit fishing license. In family-law-adjacent disputes involving sensitive financial, medical, school, mental-health, or business records, a party seeking presuit discovery must offer actual evidence supporting the specific Rule 202.4 findings; bare suspicion and broad document requests are not enough. If a trial court orders Rule 202 discovery without that strict showing, mandamus should be considered immediately because the disclosure cannot be undone."

General trial issues

Lorenzo Ramirez v. The State of Texas

COA07

In this criminal appeal with strong crossover value for family-law trials, the defendant objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 614 when the trial court allowed the 17-year-old complainant’s mother to remain in the courtroom after testifying as the complainant’s guardian. On appeal, he tried to expand that evidentiary objection into facial and as-applied constitutional challenges to Code of Criminal Procedure article 56A.051(b). The Amarillo Court of Appeals held those constitutional complaints were not preserved because they were never timely and specifically raised in the trial court as required by Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court further held the trial judge did not abuse its discretion on the sequestration issue because the mother qualified as the minor victim’s guardian and the judge reasonably concluded her testimony was already fixed and would not be materially affected by hearing the rest of the evidence.

Litigation Takeaway

"If your real complaint is constitutional, statutory, or as-applied, say so clearly in the trial court. A generic Rule 614 sequestration objection preserves only the evidentiary issue, not a later due-process or constitutional attack. In family cases, lawyers should separately preserve witness-presence, guardian-status, and constitutional objections with specificity."

Eric Robert Kendrick v. The State of Texas

COA06

In this criminal appeal, the defendant argued his lawyer was ineffective for not objecting to extraneous-offense testimony from the complainant’s adult sister. The court applied Strickland and held that, on a silent record, it could not find deficient performance because counsel’s reasons were undeveloped and several reasonable strategies were apparent, including a belief that the evidence was admissible under Article 38.371, Rule 404(b), or would survive Rule 403 balancing. Because the record supported plausible strategic reasons for not objecting, and the defendant also failed to show harmful jury-charge error, the court affirmed.

Litigation Takeaway

"If you may need to complain on appeal that counsel should have objected to prejudicial relationship or prior-acts evidence, build the record. Texas appellate courts usually will not infer ineffective assistance from silence when a plausible trial strategy can be imagined, so objections, rulings, limiting instructions, and—if necessary—a motion for new trial are critical."

Lincoln Lee Lankford v. Gregory Kevin Cline

COA09

In Lankford v. Cline, the plaintiff’s live petition alleged a stand-alone assault and battery claim, along with conspiracy-related and other derivative theories. The defendant filed a no-evidence summary-judgment motion under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(i), but the motion challenged only conspiracy, aiding-and-abetting, theft, attorney’s fees, and exemplary-damages predicates. The Beaumont Court of Appeals compared the live pleading to the motion and held that a no-evidence motion must expressly identify the elements of the specific claim being attacked. Because the motion never challenged the elements of direct assault, the trial court could not grant summary judgment on that claim. The court reversed and remanded as to assault, while affirming the judgment on the claims actually addressed in the motion.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family cases that include tort-style claims, do not assume a no-evidence motion aimed at one theory will dispose of every related claim. Match the motion to the live pleading claim by claim and element by element. If a stand-alone claim like assault, conversion, or fraud is not expressly challenged, summary judgment on that claim is vulnerable on appeal."

In re Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc.

COA06

In this original mandamus proceeding, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by compelling responses to facially overbroad discovery requests in a civil sexual-abuse suit against IBLP. The requests swept across broad subjects—including religious publications, political-campaign policies, and organization-wide financial records—over expansive time periods untethered to the pleaded claims. Applying settled Texas discovery law, the court emphasized that discovery must be reasonably tailored to the claims and defenses and that mandamus is appropriate because disclosure of sensitive information cannot be undone on appeal. The court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its blanket order compelling discovery, resolving the case on overbreadth grounds without reaching the relator’s constitutional objections.

Litigation Takeaway

"Even in hard-fought cases, discovery is not limitless. If a trial court compels broad requests that are not narrowly tied to the live issues by time, subject matter, or scope—especially for sensitive records—mandamus may be the best remedy because the harm from disclosure often cannot be fixed later."

In re Ellis Farley

COA06

In In re Ellis Farley, a pro se relator in a child-custody matter sought mandamus relief against the trial judge and the official court reporter to force production of transcripts, bench remarks, and alleged recordings of in-chambers child interviews without cost. The Texarkana Court of Appeals first analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and held that, unlike trial judges, court reporters are not proper mandamus targets unless relief against them is necessary to enforce the court of appeals’ own jurisdiction, which Farley did not show. The court also held the petition was independently defective under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7 because it omitted required petition components, relied on unsupported factual assertions, and lacked a certified or sworn mandamus record. The court therefore denied mandamus relief without reaching the underlying merits of the record-access complaints.

Litigation Takeaway

"Mandamus in family-law cases is won or lost on jurisdiction and record-building. If a transcript or reporter problem threatens appellate relief, aim the petition at a proper target, explain why any relief against a non-judicial officer is necessary to protect appellate jurisdiction, and file a Rule 52-compliant petition with a certified or sworn record—because urgency and detailed accusations will not substitute for proof."

Termination of Parental Rights

In the Interest of B.B. and B.B., Children

COA11

In this parental-rights termination appeal, the mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The Eleventh Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing legal- and factual-sufficiency standards and focused on the cumulative pattern of danger: deplorable and hazardous home conditions, admitted methamphetamine use, repeated refusals to drug test, the children’s positive methamphetamine tests, failure to cooperate with FBSS and Department services, and continuing instability in housing and caregiving. Although the mother showed some favorable facts, including visitation and partial service completion, the court held that this did not outweigh the evidence that she could not provide a safe and stable environment. The court affirmed the termination order.

Litigation Takeaway

"Best-interest cases are usually won or lost on patterns, not isolated facts. Evidence of unsafe housing, drug use, refused testing, concealed third parties, and failure to follow through with services can outweigh partial compliance like attending visits or finishing classes. For family-law litigators, the case is a strong reminder to prove present safety and stability with concrete evidence, not promises of improvement."

In re James E. White, IV, Marti White Wright, Clinton Wesley White, James E. White, III, and Hester Ann White

COA08

In this mandamus proceeding, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that a prior trust-modification order was void because it was entered without joining all designated beneficiaries as required by the Texas Trust Code. The trial court in the ongoing family trust dispute therefore abused its discretion by relying on that void order to appoint a successor trustee different from the person named in the trust instrument. Because the error affected control of the trust and ongoing litigation, the court found no adequate appellate remedy, conditionally granted mandamus, ordered the trial court to vacate the improper trustee appointment, and directed it to issue scire facias to bring the named successor trustee into the case.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases that intersect with trusts, never assume a person has authority to act for the trust just because another court said so. If the underlying trust order was entered without all required beneficiaries, it may be void, and any later rulings built on it can be attacked by mandamus. Also, when a fiduciary dies during pending litigation, use proper substitution procedures like scire facias so the correct successor is before the court."

General trial issues

D&M Creative Custom Builders, Inc. v. Paul Pearce and Linda Pearce

COA09

In D&M Creative Custom Builders, Inc. v. Pearce, a homebuilder sued homeowners for unpaid extra work under quantum meruit. Before trial, the defendants objected under Texas Rule 193.6 to the builder’s expert and damages disclosures as inadequate. The trial court sustained the objection, ruled the builder had no evidence to prove its claim, dismissed the jury, and signed a take-nothing judgment. The Beaumont Court of Appeals reversed, explaining that Rule 193.6 is an evidentiary rule that permits exclusion of improperly disclosed evidence, but it does not authorize a court to convert that exclusion into a final merits judgment. Because no Rule 166a summary-judgment motion or other proper dispositive procedure was pending, the trial court effectively rendered an unauthorized sua sponte summary judgment. The court held the take-nothing judgment was improper and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases, even a valid Rule 193.6 exclusion does not let the court end the case on the spot without the right procedural vehicle. If key expert, tracing, valuation, reimbursement, or fee evidence is excluded, the opponent still must use a proper dispositive process—like summary judgment, directed verdict, or trial on the merits—before obtaining a final ruling. The lesson is simple: exclusion and disposition are not the same thing, and lawyers should object immediately if a court tries to turn a disclosure ruling into a surprise merits judgment."

Child Support Enforcement

DeSimone v. Zook

COA03

In DeSimone v. Zook, the Austin Court of Appeals considered whether an agreed SAPCR order requiring a parent to make monthly “voluntary payments” for the child created an enforceable obligation or merely described optional payments. Reading the order as a whole under ordinary contract-construction principles, the court held the provision was mandatory because it stated DeSimone “has agreed” to pay specific amounts on specific dates for a defined period, set a payment method, and included an express termination event. The court rejected DeSimone’s attempt to isolate the word “voluntary,” affirmed the trial court’s judgment for $54,000 in unpaid support-related arrearages, and also affirmed attorney’s fees and rejected any complaint about delayed findings as harmless.

Litigation Takeaway

"If support-like payment terms in an agreed SAPCR or decree are written with definite amounts, due dates, duration, and conditions, Texas courts will likely enforce them as mandatory once signed into an order—even if the provision uses soft language like “voluntary.” Draft carefully, and in enforcement cases focus on the clause’s full structure rather than one favorable word."