Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
787 opinions found
Coleman v. State
COA05
In Coleman v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old murder defendant for adult prosecution under Family Code § 54.02. The appellant argued the transfer was improper because the investigation was not “full” and the written transfer order did not spell out every factor-specific finding or item of evidence. The court applied a two-step review: first testing the transfer findings for legal and factual sufficiency, then reviewing the ultimate waiver decision for abuse of discretion. It held that § 54.02 requires a full investigation, probable-cause finding, and specific reasons for waiver, but does not require an exhaustive recitation of every evidentiary detail or every statutory factor. Because the record included the ordered psychological, diagnostic, and social evaluations, testimony about the juvenile’s background and risk factors, and evidence supporting probable cause and community-welfare concerns, the findings were sufficient and the transfer order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, Coleman is a strong appellate-record case: when a statute requires findings or reasons, the trial court must be specific enough to satisfy the statute, but it does not have to write an encyclopedic order summarizing every exhibit, witness, or factor. On appeal, broad complaints that the court did not investigate enough or did not say enough usually fail unless tied to a true statutory prerequisite, a preserved objection, and a materially deficient record."
In the Interest of E.A., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of E.A., a Child, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a bill of review seeking to set aside a default divorce decree. The former wife argued she was never served, which would excuse her from proving the usual bill-of-review elements, but the court held the record did not conclusively prove nonservice. The court relied on the substituted-service order and return, her admission that she lived at the service address, and contemporaneous evidence suggesting she knew about the divorce papers. Because nonservice was not established, she had to satisfy the traditional bill-of-review requirements, including showing that the judgment remained in place due to official mistake and without any fault or negligence on her part. The court held the failure to obtain a signed written order granting new trial within plenary power did not justify relief on this record, especially where counsel did not secure the signature and no direct appeal was pursued.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to overturn a default family-law judgment years later, a bare claim of nonservice is not enough when the service record and surrounding evidence point the other way. And if a judge orally grants a new trial, do not assume that saves the case—a written signed order must be entered before plenary power expires, or the original judgment stands."
In the Interest of C.G.H. and C.H.H., Children
COA07
In a SAPCR modification appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals upheld an order requiring the children to attend public school after the current year and affirming counseling provisions for the children and mother. Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held there was sufficient evidence of a material and substantial change and best interest, including testimony about the private school’s lack of accreditation, uncertified teachers, academic delay, and concerns about transparency and safety, as well as evidence of the mother’s manipulative conduct and interference with the father-child relationship. The court deferred to the trial court’s resolution of conflicting testimony and also held the mother waived her First and Fourteenth Amendment complaints by failing to preserve them in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a schooling or counseling modification to stick, build a child-specific record with objective academic proof, concrete safety or co-parenting concerns, and a narrowly tailored request. And if you intend to raise constitutional objections to educational or therapeutic provisions, preserve them clearly in the trial court or they will be waived on appeal."
In the Interest of W.L.G., a Child
COA14
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant moved to voluntarily dismiss the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals did not address the underlying parent-child dispute or review the merits; it simply applied Rule 42.1(a)(1), found no reason to deny the request, granted the motion, and dismissed the appeal. Because the appeal was dismissed rather than decided on the merits, the trial court’s August 29, 2025 judgment remained in effect and undisturbed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you voluntarily dismiss a family-law appeal, you usually end appellate review and leave the trial court’s order fully in place. In custody and other SAPCR cases, that means conservatorship, possession, support, and related rulings continue to control unless changed through some separate procedural vehicle."
In the Interest of G.L.M., a Child
COA11
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief asserting no nonfrivolous issues. The Eleventh Court independently reviewed the record and held the evidence was legally sufficient to support termination under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), based on the mother’s pattern of drug and alcohol abuse and the resulting danger to the child, as well as the best-interest finding. The court also held that the trial court improperly relied on former section 161.001(b)(1)(O) because that predicate ground had been repealed by the 2025 amendments and the case was still pending after the amendment’s effective date. Rather than reverse, the court modified the termination order to delete the void subsection (O) finding, affirmed the order as modified, and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two practical lessons stand out: first, family-law lawyers must update pleadings and proposed orders for statutory changes because a repealed predicate ground can become void in a pending case; second, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) remain critically important on appeal because they can sustain termination and carry collateral consequences in future custody litigation. The case also reminds appointed counsel that an Anders affirmance does not automatically end representation in a termination appeal."
In the Interest of D.W., D.B., and J.B., Children
COA02
In this SAPCR appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the mother filed her notice of appeal nearly nine months after the final order was signed. The court held that a final SAPCR order is subject to the accelerated appellate timetable, so the notice of appeal was due within 20 days under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and 28.1(b). Because no timely notice of appeal or motion for extension was filed, and neither the mother nor appointed counsel responded to the court’s jurisdictional inquiry, the appeal was not perfected and the court lacked jurisdiction. The court also noted that pro se status does not excuse compliance with appellate deadlines.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, a final SAPCR order triggers an accelerated appeal, and missing the 20-day notice-of-appeal deadline can permanently forfeit appellate review. Lawyers must classify the order correctly, calendar the deadline from the signing date, and make sure responsibility for the appeal is clear—especially when appointed counsel, successor counsel, or pro se filings create confusion."
In re James Robert Lawson, IV
COA03
In In re James Robert Lawson, IV, the Third Court of Appeals held that a Bell County trial court lost jurisdiction to act on a child-support enforcement matter once the obligor filed a notice of removal in federal court and filed that notice in state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). Even though the enforcement hearing proceeded and the trial court later signed a capias for the father’s arrest, the court of appeals concluded the state court was barred from proceeding at all during the period between removal and remand. Relying on federal removal law and Texas precedent treating post-removal state-court orders as void, the court held the capias and related orders were legal nullities, not merely erroneous rulings. Because the challenged order was void and involved confinement-related process in a child-support enforcement case, habeas relief was proper, and the court conditionally granted relief directing the trial court to vacate the capias and related orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a notice of removal is filed in state court, the family court must stop immediately. Any contempt, capias, enforcement, or temporary order signed before remand is vulnerable as void, so practitioners should shift their efforts to federal remand practice rather than asking the state court to proceed anyway."
Darren Marcel Hanson v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Hanson, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a capital-murder conviction arising from the brutal beating and robbery of an elderly victim. The court held the evidence was legally sufficient because the defendant’s own admissions, the victim’s extreme injuries, the victim’s vulnerability, and the surrounding robbery evidence allowed the jury to infer intent to kill. The court also rejected the defendant’s hearsay challenge to the victim’s identification statements, not on the merits, but because the complaint was not preserved: a pretrial hearsay objection did not suffice when substantially similar evidence later came in without a renewed or running objection. Finally, the court held that a variance between the oral sentence and written judgment did not require remand and instead modified the judgment to correct clerical error before affirming as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"The family-law crossover lesson is preservation. In abuse-driven custody, protective-order, termination, and divorce trials, a pretrial hearsay objection is not enough if the same statement later comes in through another witness or exhibit without a renewed or expressly running objection. Trial lawyers must preserve evidentiary complaints with precision every time the evidence is offered—or risk waiving a potentially strong appellate issue."
Brian Alex Bermudez v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Bermudez v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a family-violence assault conviction and the denial of a motion for new trial. The defendant argued his lawyer had an actual conflict because counsel had pending criminal charges of his own, that counsel was ineffective for not securing an additional witness to testify the complainant was intoxicated, and that the trial court wrongly excluded the complainant’s testimony after a sequestration violation. The court held the conflict claim failed because the record did not show counsel’s personal charges adversely affected any specific trial decision; in fact, counsel affirmatively pursued intoxication as a central defense theme. The omitted-witness claim also failed because the proposed testimony was cumulative of other evidence showing intoxication and did not address the assault itself. Finally, the court held the trial court acted within its discretion under Rule 614 by excluding the complainant after the defendant discussed another witness’s testimony with her during a jail call, creating a concrete risk of tailored testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law litigators, Bermudez is a strong crossover case on three recurring themes: sequestration matters, speculative conflict claims usually fail, and cumulative omitted-witness testimony rarely justifies post-judgment relief. If a witness has been exposed to trial testimony through calls, texts, or hallway updates, the court has broad discretion to exclude that witness to protect the integrity of the proceeding. And if a party attacks counsel based on personal legal troubles, the attack must be tied to a specific adverse effect on representation—not just optics or suspicion."
Tutt v. State
COA02
In Tutt v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a domestic-violence conviction after rejecting a hearsay challenge to the complainant’s on-scene statements and a sufficiency challenge to habitual-offender enhancement proof. Officers forced entry after a distress call and scream, then found the complainant frightened, crying, and bearing fresh cuts. The court held that her statements to the responding officer that Tutt had cut her arm and choked her were admissible as excited utterances because the circumstances showed a startling event, close temporal proximity, ongoing stress, and statements directly related to the assault. The court also held that, under the totality of the evidence, the State sufficiently linked Tutt to two prior Missouri felony convictions for enhancement purposes. The judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving family violence, on-scene statements to police, 911 narratives, and similar contemporaneous disclosures are far more likely to come in when you can show immediacy, fear, fresh injuries, and little time for reflection. Build or attack the evidentiary mosaic—timing, demeanor, corroborating texts, photos, dispatch records, and officer observations—because those surrounding facts often determine whether violence evidence shapes custody, protective-order, and divorce outcomes."