Weekly Digest
May 2 – May 8, 2026
26 opinions this week
Fair v. Powell
COA03
In Fair v. Powell, the Austin Court of Appeals rejected a claimed implied easement by necessity across neighboring property in a family land dispute. Fair argued her guesthouse and event-center tract needed access over the Powells’ driveway, but the court focused on Texas’s strict-necessity standard and the time-of-severance requirement. Relying on deed history, recorded instruments, and affidavit testimony showing Fair’s property already had access to Keeneland Drive by a road on her own land, the court held the tract was not landlocked. Because an easement by necessity cannot arise from convenience, lower cost, or longstanding permissive family use, and because alternate access existed, no implied easement by necessity was established.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your client claims a right to keep using a family roadway, driveway, or gate after divorce, partition, or sale, historical practice alone is not enough. Courts will demand objective proof—deeds, surveys, severance history, and actual access to a public road—and any alternate route, even if unpaved or less desirable, can defeat an implied-easement-by-necessity claim.”
The Bryant Law Firm and Deborah E. Bryant v. Robert Walker
SCOTX
In a fee-dispute case with family-law implications, the Texas Supreme Court held that a client’s claims against his former lawyer were barred by accord and satisfaction under Texas Business and Commerce Code Section 3.311. After the client demanded a refund and complained that the lawyer’s alleged mishandling of his child-support-termination matter caused additional losses, the lawyer sent a $3,300 refund check and a release. The check conspicuously stated that cashing it would be a full and final settlement and release of all claims. The Court concluded the statutory elements were satisfied because the refund was tendered in good faith, there was a bona fide dispute over the amount and scope of the client’s claims, and the client deposited the check with actual knowledge of the settlement condition. The client’s attempt to cross out the release language and refusal to sign a separate release did not matter because negotiating the check itself completed the accord and satisfaction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat any check marked as full settlement like a binding settlement offer, not routine payment. In family-law disputes over fees, reimbursements, equalization payments, or support-related expenses, depositing a conspicuously conditioned check can wipe out larger claims—even if you write "under protest," strike the language, or decline to sign a separate release.”
In the Interest of Z.D., a Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. The court first analyzed whether counsel complied with Anders, In re Schulman, and Kelly by thoroughly reviewing the record, serving the mother with the brief and motion to withdraw, and advising her of her right to review the record and file a pro se response. After conducting its own independent review, the court found no arguable ground for reversal, including no viable challenge to the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), where the record showed a pattern of drug abuse creating substantial risk of harm to the child and impairing the mother’s ability to parent. The court also held that counsel’s motion to withdraw was premature because appointed counsel in termination appeals generally must continue representation through exhaustion of further appellate remedies under Family Code section 107.016(2) and In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
“In termination cases, Anders review will not save a weak record challenge where the evidence clearly ties a parent’s substance abuse to danger, instability, and inability to safely parent. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to build a record that specifically connects conduct to child endangerment and best interest; for appointed appellate counsel, the lesson is to strictly follow Anders procedures and expect representation to continue beyond the court of appeals unless properly relieved.”
Bouvier v. Thompson
COA02
In Bouvier v. Thompson, the plaintiff sued family members in 2024 claiming they concealed inheritance information, committed fraud, breached fiduciary duties, and conspired to deprive her of assets she said she should have inherited. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment because the defendant used the plaintiff’s own prior filings to show she knew the key facts no later than 2014: she believed Ezelle was her biological mother, believed an inheritance was owed to her, and believed family members were concealing it. Applying Texas’s four-year limitations periods for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, and the derivative limitations rule for conspiracy, the court held the claims accrued by 2014 and were therefore time-barred when filed in 2024. The court also emphasized that arguments about delayed discovery or concealment do not defeat summary judgment without competent evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“Labels do not save stale claims. If a client’s earlier pleadings, letters, or filings show they already knew the essential facts, Texas limitations likely starts running then—even if they later say they lacked full proof. In family-related property, probate-overlap, and fraud cases, lawyers should audit prior statements carefully, plead only recognized causes of action, and support any tolling theory with actual summary-judgment evidence.”
In the Interest of K.M.N., P.N. III, E.J.N., I.A.N., B.L.N., C.A.N., S.V.N., L.F.N., and S.N., Children
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. The court relied on extensive evidence of danger and instability, including Mother’s cocaine use at the birth of the youngest child, unsafe and unsanitary housing, educational neglect, parentification of older siblings, Father’s sexual-abuse conviction and history of physical abuse, and Mother’s prolonged failure to protect the children despite knowing of Father’s violence and alleged killing of one child. Applying the Family Code best-interest framework and Holley factors, the court held the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief that termination was in the children’s best interest, and it separately affirmed Father’s termination after independent Anders review revealed no non-frivolous appellate issue.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law cases, failure to protect can be just as powerful as direct abuse. A parent who continues to align with a known abuser, minimizes danger, or cannot show a real safety plan risks losing conservatorship or parental rights even if that parent was not the primary perpetrator.”
In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child
COA13
In *In the Interest of A.R.B., a Child*, the mother challenged only one part of the termination judgment: whether the trial court used the correct version of Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O). The suit was filed in 2023, but the Legislature amended § 161.001 effective September 1, 2025, repealing the old service-plan ground in subsection (O) and renumbering the substance-abuse ground into subsection (O). The Thirteenth Court focused on the amendment’s express transition clause, which made the new law apply to SAPCRs pending in the trial court on the effective date. Because this case was still pending on September 1, 2025 and was tried afterward, the amended statute controlled. The court held the trial court correctly applied amended subsection (O) and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a family case stays pending across a legislative change, do not assume the filing date controls. Always check the session law’s effective-date and transition provisions, because amended Family Code sections can apply to pending SAPCRs and change pleadings, proof, jury charge, judgment language, and appellate strategy.”
In the Interest of H.P. Jr. and H.P. III, Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (b)(2). The court viewed the evidence cumulatively, not incident by incident, and held that the parents’ repeated domestic violence, incarceration, criminal conduct, instability, missed medical care for the children, substance-abuse and mental-health concerns, failure to complete services, and inability to provide safe care showed a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children. The same evidence, along with the children’s improvement in foster care, supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas courts can infer endangerment and best interest from a parent’s overall pattern of violence, criminality, instability, untreated substance-abuse or mental-health issues, missed medical care, and service-plan noncompliance. In family cases, a party who wants to prove or defeat risk-based restrictions should build or attack the full course-of-conduct narrative, not just isolated events.”
In the Interest of L.D.M.W.
COA09
The Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights to his child after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient on multiple predicate grounds and on best interest. The court emphasized Father’s prior termination order containing endangerment findings, his decision to continue a relationship with Mother despite prior CPS history and similar risks, his incarceration before the child’s birth and throughout the case, and his resulting inability to care for the child or meaningfully complete services. The court also held that an approved relative home study did not outweigh evidence of parental unfitness and the child’s successful, stable foster placement with a family ready to adopt.
Litigation Takeaway
“Past endangerment findings, repeated exposure of a child to known risky relationships, and incarceration-related inability to parent can strongly support termination—especially when the child is thriving in a stable adoptive placement. An approved relative placement is helpful but does not, by itself, defeat termination or overcome a strong best-interest record.”
Loria v. Loria
COA03
In Loria v. Loria, the Third Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s order modifying conservatorship rights after a bench trial. The father sought to change the prior joint-managing-conservatorship structure by obtaining the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence and greater medical and tie-breaking authority, arguing that circumstances had materially and substantially changed and that the existing arrangement had become unworkable. The appellate court, applying the abuse-of-discretion standard and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations, held that evidence of persistent coparenting conflict, interference with communication, disputes over vaccinations and therapy, lack of follow-through on the children’s developmental needs, and the father’s more stable household was sufficient to support findings of material and substantial change and best interest. The court therefore upheld the reallocation of primary-residence and decision-making rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“Modification cases are rarely won by one dramatic fact; they are won by proving a pattern of specific, child-centered problems showing the current order no longer works. If you want to modify conservatorship, build a record with concrete evidence of communication breakdowns, medical and educational conflict, parenting instability, and why a clearer allocation of rights will better serve the child.”
In the Interest of A.W., N.W., N.W., P.W., Children
COA13
After a jury terminated Mother’s parental rights to four children, she appealed claiming the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support constructive abandonment and best interest, and also complained the order lacked required statutory findings. The court did not reach the merits because Texas preservation rules apply in termination jury trials just as in other civil jury cases. Mother filed none of the recognized preservation vehicles for legal sufficiency and no motion for new trial, which is required to preserve factual-sufficiency complaints. The court also noted that Mother challenged only subsection (N) while the jury also found unchallenged predicate grounds under subsections (D), (E), and (O), any one of which could support termination with a best-interest finding. The court held all complained-of issues were waived or would not afford relief and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“In any jury-tried family case, appellate sufficiency complaints must be preserved in the trial court or they are likely gone forever. If you may challenge a jury finding on appeal, use a recognized preservation motion, and for factual sufficiency always file a motion for new trial. In termination cases especially, challenge every predicate ground necessary for meaningful relief and promptly object to missing statutory findings in the final order.”
In the Interest of J.M.V.V., a Child
COA10
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no non-frivolous grounds for appeal after the trial court terminated the father’s rights under Family Code section 161.001 and appointed DFPS as managing conservator. The Waco Court of Appeals reviewed whether counsel’s Anders filing was adequate, confirmed counsel had summarized the facts, procedural history, and governing law, and then independently examined the full record, the father’s pro se response, and the State’s response. Finding no arguable basis for reversal, the court affirmed the termination order. The court also denied counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature, holding that appointed counsel remains obligated through potential Texas Supreme Court proceedings unless formally relieved.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas termination appeals, an Anders brief is not a shortcut out of the case: counsel must fully review the record, explain why no arguable issue exists, and continue representing the client through the petition-for-review stage unless relieved. For trial lawyers, the case is another reminder that appellate outcomes usually turn on preservation and a well-developed record.”
Adejokun v. Obosi
COA14
In this divorce SAPCR, the mother sought to block the father’s access based on the child’s alleged abuse outcry and also asked the court to interview the 10-year-old child in chambers. The court of appeals held that the mother did not preserve any complaint about exclusion of the child’s hearsay statements because, when hearsay objections were made, she never invoked Texas Family Code section 104.006 or requested the statute’s required reliability hearing. The court further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the request to interview the child regarding possession and access, so the final judgment appointing the mother sole managing conservator and the father possessory conservator with supervised visitation was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to admit a child’s abuse outcry under Family Code section 104.006, you must expressly say so at trial, request the reliability hearing, and make a clear record. Serious allegations alone will not preserve error, and a motion for new trial cannot fix the omission later. Likewise, a request for an in-chambers child interview is not automatic and should be tied carefully to the governing statute and the specific issue before the court.”
In the Interest of M.T., a Child
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed a judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no non-frivolous issues to raise. The court reviewed whether Anders procedures apply in termination cases, whether counsel’s brief provided the required professional evaluation of the record, and whether the court’s own independent review revealed any arguable appellate issue. After confirming counsel addressed potential jurisdictional and evidentiary-sufficiency issues, including predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2), and after finding the mother’s pro se response identified no legal error, the court held the appeal was frivolous, affirmed the termination order, and dismissed the mother’s emergency motion for temporary relief as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family appeals, especially termination cases, appellate success depends on a preserved and legally developed trial record. If no concrete, non-frivolous issue was preserved below, appointed counsel may proceed under Anders, and a general plea for reversal will not substitute for an actual legal complaint.”
Armstrong v. Thomas
COA03
In Armstrong v. Thomas, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a same-day handwritten post-divorce side agreement allegedly giving one ex-spouse the right to buy the other’s house could not be enforced against the parties’ divorce paperwork. The agreement incident to divorce and final decree confirmed the property as the husband’s property, included present-tense conveyancing and quitclaim language, and the AID contained a merger clause stating it was the parties’ entire agreement. The court analyzed the dispute primarily through quiet-title and statute-of-frauds principles, concluding that the handwritten note lacked the essential terms required for an enforceable real-estate sale and that oral testimony and later conduct could not supply those missing terms. The court also held that findings of fact and conclusions of law are improper after summary judgment and that the wife’s nonsuit did not eliminate the husband’s pending counterclaims for affirmative relief. The summary judgment declaring the side agreement unenforceable and quieting title in the husband was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a divorce-related real estate deal matters, put every material term in the decree package or referenced closing documents. A vague side agreement, even one signed the same day as the divorce papers, may be wiped out by merger language, quitclaim language, and the statute of frauds. For litigators, Armstrong is a strong early-summary-judgment case for attacking post-divorce property claims based on informal side deals.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Sini Ann Mathews and Wesley Mon Mathews
COA13
In this divorce case, the appellant tried to use a restricted appeal to challenge the final divorce decree after already filing a timely motion for new trial. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a restricted appeal is available only if the appellant did not timely file any post-judgment motion, and that requirement is jurisdictional under the appellate rules and Ex parte E.H. Because the motion for new trial was filed within thirty days of the decree, the appellant could not satisfy a required element of restricted appeal. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction and held that later efforts to obtain the appellate record could not cure the defect.
Litigation Takeaway
“Choose your post-judgment remedy carefully. In Texas family cases, a timely motion for new trial and a restricted appeal are not interchangeable fallback options—filing the motion for new trial destroys restricted-appeal jurisdiction.”
Juan Morales a/k/a Juan Manuel Morales v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Juan Morales a/k/a Juan Manuel Morales v. The State of Texas, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the defendant’s fourth and fifth motions for continuance in a retrial for continuous sexual abuse of a child. The defense argued it needed more time because its proposed expert was unavailable, first citing medical issues and later scheduling conflicts. The court applied Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 29.03, 29.06, 29.07, and 29.08 and held that the trial court acted within its discretion because the continuance motions did not meet the strict statutory requirements for an absent-witness continuance. The fourth motion lacked required specifics about diligence, the expected testimony, and other mandatory elements, and the fifth motion was unverified, which preserved nothing for appellate review. The court also noted the case had already been continued multiple times and the record did not show the expert was medically unavailable on the actual trial date. The conviction was therefore affirmed on the continuance issue.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a continuance because an expert cannot appear, do not rely on general fairness arguments. File a sworn motion, show specific diligence, explain exactly why the expert matters, prove the absence was not self-created, and give the court a concrete timeline for availability. In family cases, Morales is a strong tool for defeating vague last-minute reset requests and a warning that repeated continuances seriously weaken any appellate complaint.”
Spragins v. Lunn 34 Cattle
COA02
In Spragins v. Lunn 34 Cattle, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals looked past the trial court’s label of a “restraining order” and held that the order was actually a temporary injunction because it was entered after a contested evidentiary hearing and remained in effect “until further order” during the pendency of the case. Applying Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 683 and 684, the court held the order was void because it did not affirmatively set the case for trial on the merits and did not fix a bond. The court rejected the idea that an “until further order” clause could satisfy Rule 683 and dissolved the injunction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, the label on an order does not control—its function does. If an order entered after notice and hearing operates like a temporary injunction, it must strictly comply with Rules 683 and 684 by including a merits trial setting and a bond amount. Otherwise, the order may be void and vulnerable to immediate interlocutory attack.”
In re Claudia Jacobs
COA05
In this post-divorce enforcement dispute, the relator sought mandamus relief and an emergency stay to block an order to appear and an upcoming enforcement hearing. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the mandamus filing was procedurally defective: the petition lacked the certification required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52, the record did not contain sworn or certified copies of material documents, and the appendix included unredacted sensitive information in violation of Rule 9.9. The court held that these threshold defects defeated mandamus relief, denied the stay as moot, and struck the petition and appendix for the redaction violation.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law mandamus practice, procedure is substance. If your petition lacks a Rule 52 certification, your record is not sworn or certified, or your filing contains unredacted sensitive data, the court may deny relief without ever reaching the underlying enforcement issue.”
In re Rebel Hayz Breaux
COA09
After completing his sentence for misdemeanor assault family violence, Breaux filed an article 11.09 habeas application alleging ongoing restraints from the conviction, including the lifetime federal firearm ban under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) and a final protective order. The trial court denied relief solely because his sentence had expired and it concluded he was no longer restrained. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the pleaded federal firearm disability is a sufficient present restraint to support article 11.09 habeas jurisdiction, so the trial court erred in denying the application on that categorical ground. But the court also held that this did not automatically require issuance of the writ, an evidentiary hearing, merits rulings, or appointment of counsel, because the applicant still had to satisfy article 11.14’s procedural and verification requirements.
Litigation Takeaway
“A family-violence conviction does not become legally irrelevant once the sentence ends: the federal firearm ban can be enough continuing restraint to keep post-conviction habeas relief alive. For family-law litigators, that means old assault-family-violence convictions can still carry real leverage in custody, safety, and firearm-related disputes—but any collateral attack on the conviction must be pleaded and verified with precision.”
Hutton v. Alfrido
COA14
In Hutton v. Alfrido, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from a final protective order for lack of jurisdiction because the notice of appeal was filed too late. Although the appellant filed a timely post-judgment motion that functioned like a motion for new trial and extended the deadline to 90 days after the order was signed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a), the notice of appeal still had to be filed by February 3, 2026, or within the additional 15-day Verburgt grace period by February 18, 2026. Filing on February 27 was outside both deadlines. The court also rejected the appellant’s apparent attempt to rely on a later denial of a motion to set aside or reconsider the protective order, explaining that such a denial is not independently appealable and does not create a new appellate deadline. And because the record showed only a docket-sheet notation—not a signed order—there was no appealable later order in any event. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, calendar appellate deadlines from the original final order, not from a later ruling on a motion to reconsider or set aside. A post-judgment motion may extend the deadline, but it does not restart it indefinitely, and docket-sheet entries are not appealable orders. If there is any doubt, get a signed order, calculate the Rule 26.1 and Verburgt deadlines immediately, and file the notice of appeal early.”
In the Interest of I.P.P., a Child
COA05
In *In the Interest of I.P.P., a Child*, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed an order declaring a pro se mother a vexatious litigant in an ongoing SAPCR. After years of repeated filings—including modification, enforcement, TRO, reconsideration, and emergency requests—the father moved under Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code to restrict her future pro se filings. The mother argued Chapter 11 should not apply within a single SAPCR, that her filings did not qualify as repeated relitigation, and that refusing to hear her emergency conservatorship-modification request violated due process and parental-rights protections. The court reviewed the ruling for abuse of discretion and held the order was independently supported by § 11.054(2), which permits vexatious-litigant findings based on repeated relitigation or attempted relitigation after adverse determinations. The court rejected any categorical exemption for SAPCR or “emergency” filings and found no reversible constitutional error on the briefing and record presented.
Litigation Takeaway
“Chapter 11 is available in family cases, including SAPCRs, to curb serial pro se filings that recycle issues already decided. If you want vexatious-litigant relief, build a chronology tying each new filing to prior final rulings and show why the new pleading has no reasonable chance of success. If you are filing a modification or emergency motion, make sure it rests on genuinely new facts—not just a new label for old complaints.”
Newrez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing v. Kinney L. Barcuch
COA05
In a restricted appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a default judgment against Newrez LLC because the record showed the plaintiff failed to strictly comply with Texas service rules. The plaintiff served an unrelated individual and then an incorrect South Carolina entity rather than Newrez’s actual registered agent or another statutorily authorized person. The court rejected the appellee’s argument that the restricted appeal failed due to a supposedly incomplete clerk’s record, concluding the existing record sufficiently established nonparticipation and no timely post-judgment filings. Because defective service was apparent on the face of the record, the trial court never acquired personal jurisdiction, so the default judgment was void and had to be reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“Default judgments are only as strong as the service record. In Texas, especially in default settings, courts require strict compliance with service rules, and serving the wrong agent, wrong entity, or wrong address can make the judgment void months later on restricted appeal. For family lawyers, this is a major warning in default divorces, modifications, enforcements, and cases involving LLCs or third-party entities tied to the marital estate: verify the exact legal identity and registered agent before prove-up, or risk losing the judgment entirely.”
Griffith v. Barrett
COA14
In Griffith v. Barrett, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a temporary injunction was void because the order did not set the case for trial on the merits as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. The injunction stated only that it would remain in effect until final judgment or further order, which the court found was not a substitute for an affirmative merits trial setting. Applying the strict-compliance rule from InterFirst Bank and Qwest, the court treated the omission as a facial defect that rendered the injunction void, reversed the order, dissolved the injunction, and remanded without reaching other issues.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want temporary injunctive relief in a family-law-adjacent case, draft the order like a real Rule 683 injunction. An order that says it lasts until final judgment is not enough; the injunction itself must set the case for trial on the merits. For the responding party, this is a strong procedural attack point that can dissolve an overbroad injunction before litigating the underlying facts.”
In re Brittany Hilbert
COA05
In this original proceeding arising from a conservatorship-related case, the relator asked the Dallas Court of Appeals to vacate a final order, attorney’s-fee award, and interim conservatorship or possession rulings based on parental-presumption and best-interest complaints. The court did not reach those merits because the mandamus filing was procedurally defective: the appendix and record were not supported by properly certified or sworn copies as required by Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7, the challenged final order and relevant hearing transcript were missing, and the petition disclosed unredacted sensitive data in violation of Rule 9.9. Applying Walker v. Packer and Dallas mandamus-record precedent, the court held that the relator failed to provide a sufficient record to establish entitlement to mandamus relief and struck the filing for the confidentiality violation.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus relief can be lost before the court ever considers the merits. In family-law emergency appellate practice, lawyers must file a complete, properly authenticated mandamus record, include the exact order and any necessary reporter’s record, and scrub all sensitive information under Rule 9.9. Even serious conservatorship complaints will fail if the filing is procedurally noncompliant.”
Patrick Adam Ortiz v. The State of Texas
COA08
The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed Patrick Adam Ortiz’s convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child and two indecency-with-a-child counts. The defense argued the child complainant was not credible because she delayed reporting, previously did not disclose abuse to CPS, had some inconsistencies, and her mother allegedly wanted to use the allegations in a custody dispute. The court held those points went to weight and credibility for the jury, not legal sufficiency. Applying ordinary sufficiency and preservation rules, the court concluded the complainant’s detailed testimony alone was enough to prove repeated qualifying acts over the required period, and it rejected the remaining complaints about judicial comments, charge and indictment defects, prosecutorial misconduct, ineffective assistance, and double jeopardy.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, “this was raised for custody leverage” is not a silver bullet. Courts may still credit abuse allegations when the record shows repeated access, a detailed disclosure history, explainable delay, and contextual corroboration. Lawyers should build or attack these cases through chronology, access, prior statements, and corroborating circumstances—not motive rhetoric alone.”
In re Malik Adonis Dartell Conyers
COA05
In this original proceeding arising from a child-return dispute, the relator asked the Dallas Court of Appeals to prohibit enforcement of a trial court’s return order and to stay related proceedings. The court did not reach the merits. Instead, it held the petition failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52 because it lacked the required certification and was supported largely by documents that were neither sworn nor certified, leaving an insufficient record for extraordinary relief. The court also denied the emergency motion as moot after denying the petition and struck the filings for including unredacted sensitive data in violation of Rule 9.9.
Litigation Takeaway
“Emergency appellate relief in family-law cases can be lost on procedure alone. If a writ petition is missing the Rule 52 certification, relies on unauthenticated attachments, or includes unredacted sensitive information, the court may deny or strike the filing without ever considering the underlying custody or child-return issue.”