Weekly Digest
April 25 – May 1, 2026
54 opinions this week
Ortiz v. Nelapatla
SCOTX
In Ortiz v. Nelapatla, the Texas Supreme Court decided whether a partial counteraffidavit under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 18.001 defeats an entire medical-expense affidavit or only the portions actually challenged. Ortiz submitted affidavits from three medical providers to prove past medical expenses, but Nelapatla’s counteraffidavits disputed only specific portions of two providers’ bills. The trial court nevertheless excluded those two provider affidavits in full absent live expert testimony, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court analyzed the text of § 18.001, especially its allowance for controverting “all or part” of an affidavit, and held that the statute does not impose an all-or-nothing result. Unchallenged portions of a compliant medical-expense affidavit remain competent evidence of reasonableness and necessity and may go to the factfinder without live expert testimony. Because the lower courts excluded the affidavits too broadly, the Court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“A targeted challenge only creates a targeted evidentiary problem. If the other side’s § 18.001 counteraffidavit attacks only certain medical charges, the remaining unchallenged charges should still be admissible without live expert proof. In family-law cases involving uninsured medical expenses, therapy bills, counseling costs, or medical-needs evidence, lawyers should separate disputed from undisputed charges and press for admission of the uncontested portion.”
Travis v. Vanderbilt
COA03
In Travis v. Vanderbilt, the parties resolved a divorce and related protective-order dispute through a statutorily compliant mediated settlement agreement that incorporated an agreed protective order lasting for the parties’ lifetimes. After signing the MSA and the protective order as to both form and substance, and waiving post-order relief and appeal, the respondent later argued the lifetime term was improper because the order contained no family-violence finding and should have defaulted to a two-year duration. The Third Court treated the issue as one of consent and waiver, not statutory construction. Relying on the binding effect of Family Code section 6.602 MSAs and the rule that a party generally cannot attack an agreed judgment absent a jurisdictional defect or vitiated consent, the court held that any complaint about the protective order’s duration was waived. The court affirmed denial of the motion to reconsider and left the lifetime agreed protective order in place.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your client signs a divorce-related MSA and agreed protective order as to both form and substance, especially with an express waiver of post-order relief and appeal, do not expect to undo negotiated terms later by recasting them as statutory defects. In family-law settlements, protective-order duration, findings, and collateral consequences must be negotiated and drafted carefully on the front end because consent will usually waive non-jurisdictional complaints.”
Wallace v. Powell
COA05
In Wallace v. Powell, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a bill of review after Wallace tried to overturn an underlying summary judgment by attacking only the affidavit supporting the traditional summary-judgment ground. The court explained that a bill-of-review petitioner who participated in the underlying case must make a prima facie showing of a meritorious appellate ground likely to succeed on appeal. Because the underlying judgment rested on both traditional and no-evidence summary-judgment grounds, Wallace had to challenge both independent bases. His failure to address the no-evidence ground, identify evidence raising a fact issue, or explain why that ruling would have been reversible was fatal, so he could not establish the threshold meritorious-ground-of-appeal element.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you are using a bill of review to attack a final judgment, you must show a likely winning appellate issue against every independent ground supporting that judgment. In family cases, attacking only the weakest affidavit or one legal theory is not enough when the order could also stand on a separate no-evidence, standing, limitations, or other dispositive ground.”
In the Interest of N.H.S. and H.A.F., Children
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). Mother challenged only best interest on appeal, so the court focused on the Holley factors and section 263.307 considerations, relying on evidence of repeated abuse allegations, prior CPS “reason to believe” findings, the children’s fear of Mother, self-harm and trauma tied to that fear, unsafe and unsanitary home conditions, medication noncompliance, positive drug tests during the case, and the children’s improvement in foster care. Although Mother completed some services and her related criminal charge was dismissed after pretrial intervention, the court held that favorable evidence did not outweigh the broader pattern of danger, instability, and emotional harm, and it affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest cases are won on a layered record, not a single bad incident. Evidence of abuse history, child fear, trauma symptoms, mental-health noncompliance, unsafe home conditions, and the child’s improvement in a stable placement can collectively support strong best-interest findings, while partial rehabilitation or service completion may not overcome a record showing ongoing danger and instability.”
Lartigue v. Farias
COA01
In Lartigue v. Farias, the First Court of Appeals held that a civil stalking claim under Chapter 85 was not subject to dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The dispute arose after Lartigue, in the context of separate unauthorized-practice litigation, sent repeated emails and placed repeated calls to attorney Farias that included abusive language, threats, and statements implying an in-person confrontation. Lartigue argued the communications were protected because they related to pending litigation and thus involved free speech and petitioning. The court rejected that framing and focused on the gravamen of the live claim: threatening, harassing, repeated conduct that allegedly caused fear and disrupted Farias’s work. Because the stalking claim was based on alleged intimidation rather than protected speech or petitioning activity, the TCPA did not apply at step one, so the court affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss without reaching prima facie proof or defenses.
Litigation Takeaway
“Not every communication connected to a lawsuit is TCPA-protected. When the real target of the claim is repeated threats, harassment, stalking, or intimidation, courts may stop the TCPA analysis at step one. In family-law cases, that makes pleading and framing critical: emphasize the coercive conduct, unwanted contacts, escalation, and safety impact—not just the fact that the parties were already in litigation.”
In re Anabel Lopez Perez
COA03
In In re Anabel Lopez Perez, the relator sought mandamus relief in the Third Court of Appeals to force an Austin County Court at Law judge to execute or clarify a QDRO arising from a divorce. The court did not reach the merits of the QDRO dispute. Instead, it analyzed Texas Government Code sections 22.221 and 22.201(d) and held that its ordinary mandamus power extends only to trial judges within its appellate district, and Austin County is not in the Third Court’s district. The relator also failed to show that mandamus was necessary to protect or enforce the Third Court’s appellate jurisdiction. The petition was therefore dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before filing mandamus in any post-divorce property case, especially a QDRO or decree-clarification dispute, confirm that the respondent judge sits within the appellate court’s territorial district. A strong merits argument cannot overcome filing in the wrong court, and family-law subject matter does not create mandamus jurisdiction.”
Travarius Leon Dent v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Dent, the court affirmed admission of the father’s prior injury-to-a-child deferred-adjudication evidence after he testified that he was a strict but not physically abusive parent and suggested the child fabricated sexual-abuse allegations in retaliation for discipline. The court held that this testimony opened the door by creating a false impression about his parenting and made the prior child-injury evidence relevant for non-propensity purposes: rebutting that impression and undermining his retaliation/fabrication defense. The court also held that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403, because the State had a real need for rebuttal evidence tailored to the defense theme, and the limiting instruction properly restricted the jury’s use of the evidence without commenting on the weight of the evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, a parent who claims to be merely “strict” and blames allegations on retaliation or coaching may open the door to prior abuse evidence. Frame the evidence as rebuttal of a false parenting narrative and fabrication defense—not just bad-character proof—and seek a careful limiting instruction.”
Nunez v. Nichols
COA03
In Nunez v. Nichols, the Austin Court of Appeals considered whether sufficient evidence supported an order requiring a father to pay ongoing and retroactive support for his adult disabled daughter under Texas Family Code section 154.302, plus health-insurance and unreimbursed medical-expense obligations. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because it showed the daughter’s serious physical and psychiatric conditions began before age eighteen, continued into adulthood, and left her requiring substantial care and personal supervision while not capable of self-support. The father’s evidence of limited independence, including travel and a restricted driver’s license, went to weight rather than negating the statutory elements, and his expert did not provide a vocational basis to establish employability. The court therefore affirmed the support and medical-support portions of the order, but reversed and remanded the $25,468.46 attorney’s-fee award because the record lacked the detailed proof of hours, rates, and value of services required to support that amount.
Litigation Takeaway
“For adult disabled-child support cases, courts want functional proof, not just diagnoses: build a timeline showing pre-majority onset, current inability to be self-supporting, and the need for substantial day-to-day supervision. For opponents, isolated signs of independence are usually not enough without developed evidence of actual self-sufficiency. And regardless of who wins on the merits, an attorney’s-fee award can still be undone on appeal if counsel does not present disciplined lodestar-style proof.”
In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B.
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed a Brazos County order terminating a father’s parental rights after appointed counsel filed an Anders brief. The court independently reviewed the full record, including the father’s pro se response, and held the appeal was wholly frivolous. In addressing the required endangerment grounds under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the court relied on severe evidence that father physically abused another child in the home, that the children at issue were exposed to that dangerous environment, that father minimized the abuse as discipline, failed to accept responsibility, failed to show meaningful therapeutic progress, and had no recommendation for reunification despite technical service completion. The court also held that appointed counsel in a termination appeal may not withdraw solely because counsel filed an Anders brief; absent additional good cause, counsel must continue representation through any petition-for-review stage.
Litigation Takeaway
“In termination and other child-safety cases, courts focus on actual danger and whether the parent truly changed—not just whether services were completed. Abuse of one child, denial or minimization, and failure to benefit from therapy can support findings that other children remain at risk. For appointed appellate counsel, an Anders brief does not automatically end the representation.”
Brys v. Cobb
COA01
In Brys v. Cobb, the First Court of Appeals held that when a properly authenticated California judgment was filed in Texas under the UEFJA on July 21, 2023, it immediately became a Texas judgment. The judgment debtor waited more than a year to file a motion for new trial and later asked the Texas court to declare the foreign judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court did not reach the underlying jurisdictional challenge to the California judgment because the dispositive issue was timing: under Chapter 35 and Texas Rules 306a and 329b, any attack on a domesticated foreign judgment must be brought through the same procedures and within the same deadlines that apply to Texas judgments. Because the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after domestication and no timely post-judgment motion was filed, the later orders granting a new trial and declaring the judgment void were themselves void. The court vacated those post-deadline orders and left the domesticated California judgment fully enforceable in Texas.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat the UEFJA filing date like the signing date of a Texas final judgment. If you want to attack a domesticated foreign judgment, move immediately—waiting can forfeit even a personal-jurisdiction or voidness challenge. If you represent the creditor, a proper UEFJA filing can quickly become a powerful enforcement and settlement tool once the deadline passes.”
In the Interest of I.S.
COA09
In *In the Interest of I.S.*, the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed a jury-tried termination order after concluding Father waived his appellate sufficiency complaints by failing to preserve them in the trial court. The case arose after the Department sought termination following evidence that the parties’ infant suffered multiple serious injuries, including a femur fracture and liver injury, that medical providers considered suspicious for abuse and inconsistent with the parents’ explanations. On appeal, Father challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting predicate grounds under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N), as well as best interest, but the court held that in a civil jury trial those complaints had to be preserved through recognized procedural steps such as a directed-verdict motion, charge objection, JNOV, motion to disregard, or motion for new trial. Because Father did not take the required steps, the court did not reach the merits of his sufficiency complaints. The court also rejected Mother’s issues, affirming termination, holding that the Department’s appointment as managing conservator stood once termination was affirmed, and concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for mistrial.
Litigation Takeaway
“In any Texas family case tried to a jury, even a strong appellate sufficiency argument is worthless if counsel does not preserve it. Legal-sufficiency complaints require the right trial-court vehicle, and factual-sufficiency complaints in a jury case generally require a motion for new trial. Treat jury-charge objections and post-verdict motions as essential trial work, not appellate clean-up.”
In re Tracy Hoots
COA12
In In re Tracy Hoots, a pro se relator sought mandamus relief in a family-law dispute, alleging her children were removed without lawful process and that the trial judge had a conflict of interest. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the petition failed to comply with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7: it included no certified or sworn copy of any challenged order, no adequate mandamus record, and identified no specific trial-court ruling or refusal to act that could be reviewed. Applying the rule that mandamus requires a sufficient record showing a clear abuse of discretion, and that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as lawyers, the court held the relator failed to establish entitlement to extraordinary relief and denied the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is won or lost on the record. In family-law cases, even serious complaints about child removal, due process, or judicial bias will fail unless the petition identifies a specific reviewable trial-court action and includes a Rule 52 appendix and mandamus record with certified or sworn materials supporting every factual assertion.”
Michael Colbert v. State of Texas
COA12
In Colbert v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld an assault/family-violence conviction even though the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution. The defendant argued on appeal that trying the case the day after he elected to represent himself violated Article 1.051(e) and due process, but the court held that complaint was not preserved because he did not object, request a continuance, or otherwise raise the issue in the trial court; in fact, he stated he was ready to proceed. On the merits, the court applied the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, concluding that the complainant’s 911 statements, her similar statements to the responding officer, and the defendant’s own admission that he may have hit her with the television were sufficient to support the finding of bodily injury despite her later recantation.
Litigation Takeaway
“Recantation does not erase family-violence evidence, and preservation matters. In family-law cases, judges may credit contemporaneous 911 calls, officer testimony, and party admissions over a later walk-back, so lawyers should gather and present that evidence early. And if notice or due-process problems arise in a rushed hearing, counsel must object, request specific relief, and make a record immediately or the complaint may be lost on appeal.”
In re G.M.
COA02
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Section 156.102 is triggered by the date a modification petition is filed, not the date the hearing occurs. Father filed within one year of the prior order and sought to change the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence, so he was required to file a sufficient supporting affidavit. After the trial court found the affidavit insufficient, Section 156.102(c) required it to deny the requested relief and refuse to proceed. By nevertheless conducting an evidentiary hearing and entering temporary orders, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you seek to change primary residence within one year of the last order, the affidavit requirement is a hard gatekeeper. The key date is the filing date, and once a court finds the affidavit insufficient, it cannot simply go forward with a hearing anyway. For movants, draft a fact-specific affidavit that tracks the statute; for respondents, press for an early ruling and preserve error if the court proceeds despite an insufficiency finding.”
In the Interest of C.F., a Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights, concluding legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that the parents used methamphetamine while caring for the infant, the child himself tested positive for methamphetamine, there were domestic-violence concerns, the home environment was unstable and unsafe, and the father later violated community supervision, was incarcerated, failed to complete services, and offered only a speculative post-release plan. Applying the Holley best-interest framework and sufficiency standards, the court held the trial court could reasonably infer ongoing danger and lack of stability from the father’s past and present conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
“Courts give heavy weight to concrete evidence of child endangerment—especially drug exposure, domestic violence, criminal instability, unsafe housing, and failure to complete services—and they may use past conduct to predict future risk. In any custody or termination case, promises of future improvement usually will not overcome a documented record of recent instability unless backed by credible, verifiable proof of rehabilitation, housing, employment, and safety.”
Khandria v. Al-Muslim
COA14
In Khandria v. Al-Muslim, the father sought to modify a prior SAPCR/divorce decree that gave him no specific possession or access, arguing the original decree effectively gave the mother unchecked control and that circumstances had materially changed because she was now somewhat open to reunification. The Fourteenth Court first held that this argument was an improper collateral attack on the original decree: any defect in the decree was non-jurisdictional, making the decree at most voidable and subject to direct appeal, not later repair through modification. On the merits, the court held the evidence did not require findings of a material and substantial change or present best interest under Family Code section 156.101. The mother’s testimony showed only cautious, therapy-based openness while continuing to express concerns about the child’s loss of trust, and the father’s reluctance to commit to therapeutic recommendations undercut his request for immediate access. The court also affirmed denial of the father’s request to reduce child support because the record showed assets and earning capacity despite his claimed setbacks.
Litigation Takeaway
“A modification case is not a do-over for errors in the original decree. If the real complaint is that the prior order was legally defective, that issue usually must be raised by direct appeal. And in access-modification cases, vague evidence that a parent’s attitude has softened is not enough—lawyers need concrete proof of post-decree change and a child-centered reunification plan, especially when the relationship has been fractured for years.”
In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B.
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights after an independent Anders review found no nonfrivolous appellate issues. The court nevertheless specifically analyzed Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) under In re N.G., relying on evidence of severe abuse in the home, the father’s failure to accept responsibility, unresolved safety concerns despite service completion, and the absence of any therapeutic support for reunification. The court also held that appointed counsel in a parental-rights appeal may not withdraw merely because an Anders brief was filed; under In re P.M., counsel must show independent good cause to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas termination appeals, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) will get specific appellate review even in an Anders case, so trial counsel must build a record on abuse, exposure, accountability, and actual remediation—not just service completion. Appointed appellate counsel should also expect to remain on the case through any petition-for-review stage unless they can show good cause beyond filing an Anders brief.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Jesus Gregorio Lopez and Isela Flores Richardson
COA13
In this divorce appeal, the wife argued she lacked notice that a May 7 hearing would serve as the final trial and complained that the court ruled on disputed property issues without live testimony, based instead on attorney proffer and documents. The Thirteenth Court rejected those arguments because the record showed the case was orally set for trial on May 7, wife’s counsel acknowledged that understanding at the hearing, and the parties expressly agreed to proceed by proffer with documentary review. The court also found no reversible error regarding alleged post-hearing exhibits, a late-filed amended pleading, relief awarded in the decree, or findings and conclusions, and it affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you agree on the record to try a divorce case by proffer, stipulation, and documents, you usually cannot wait until the judge seems unconvinced and then demand a full evidentiary hearing. Family-law lawyers should clarify whether a setting is final, object clearly to any late amendments or procedure they oppose, and preserve the record before agreeing to an informal trial format.”
In the Interest of D.J., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to D.J. As to Mother, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), a prior endangerment-based termination finding under subsection (M), and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on a pattern of evidence, including Mother’s prior endangerment termination history, the child’s positive drug test, Mother’s own positive hair-follicle test, missed testing, instability in housing and supervision, failure to know the child’s whereabouts, and inconsistent visitation. The court also rejected Mother’s argument that an earlier letter ruling controlled over the final judgment, reiterating that the signed order governs. As to Father, the court accepted appointed counsel’s Anders brief, conducted an independent review, found no nonfrivolous appellate issue, and affirmed termination.
Litigation Takeaway
“Family courts decide endangerment and best-interest disputes by looking at the whole pattern, not isolated recent improvements. Positive drug tests, missed tests, instability, prior CPS history, and inconsistent contact can combine to support severe relief, while informal letter rulings or oral pronouncements do not override the signed order.”
In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a post-remand order confirming $63,508.86 in child-support arrearages against Father. Father argued Mother had not pleaded for arrearages, that a prior 2020 modification order terminating his support obligation barred any arrearage finding, and that the evidence was insufficient. The court rejected those arguments, explaining that on remand the support accounting issue was part of the live controversy because both parties presented competing support calculations, payment records, and requested relief concerning what Father should have paid from 2016 forward. The court also held the earlier modification order could not shield Father because that order had already been reversed on appeal, leaving the trial court free to recalculate support consequences consistent with the decree, the evidence, and the appellate mandate. Finally, the court found the evidence sufficient because the record included the operative divorce decree, the Attorney General payment history, Father’s records, and Mother’s arrearage summary, which supported the trial court’s arithmetic and arrearage finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“A reversed modification order does not keep protecting a client on remand. If you open the door by asking for retroactive support reductions, credits, offsets, or termination, the court can just as easily determine the opposite and confirm arrearages if the decree, mandate, and payment records support that result. In support cases, lawyers should treat historical payment calculations as a two-way street and build a precise evidentiary record around the operative order and actual payments.”
Boswell v. State
COA02
In Boswell v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the State’s proof of an aggravated assault on a date different from the indictment’s “on or about” date did not make the evidence legally insufficient because, under Texas law, the State need only prove a date before indictment and within limitations unless time is a material element. The court rejected the defendant’s attempt to treat the date mismatch as a fatal variance or sufficiency defect. But the court agreed that double jeopardy barred punishing Boswell for both aggravated assault and continuous family violence when the aggravated assault was one of the predicate acts supporting the continuous-family-violence count. The court affirmed the aggravated-assault and assault/family-violence convictions, reversed the continuous-family-violence conviction, and rendered an acquittal on that count.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law litigators, a mismatch between a pleaded date and the proved date of a family-violence incident is usually better used as a credibility attack than as a dispositive legal argument. The bigger lesson is to carefully track how each abuse incident is being used across claims and requested relief so the same event is not carelessly double-counted as both a standalone act and part of a broader pattern.”
Jason Murray Davis and Davis & Santos, P.C. v. Graham Weston; Carowest Land Ltd.; Graham Weston as Trustee of Countyline Land Trust; and Kuehler Road, LLC f/k/a Kuehler Road, Ltd.
COA03
In this divorce-related crossover dispute, the Austin Court of Appeals held that former clients’ claims against their longtime lawyer and his firm for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud by nondisclosure could proceed despite a TCPA motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs alleged the lawyer had represented Graham Weston, related family entities, and other family interests over many years, then switched sides and represented Graham’s wife in the divorce while using trust and confidential information gained from those prior relationships. The court analyzed the case as a substantive conflict-and-loyalty dispute rather than merely an attack on protected petitioning or litigation conduct. Relying on the record, including prior disqualification findings that described the lawyer as effectively a family attorney with fiduciary duties to Graham, the court concluded the suit was not subject to TCPA dismissal on the record presented and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion.
Litigation Takeaway
“In entity-heavy divorces, a lawyer’s prior work for one spouse, family businesses, trusts, or the broader family enterprise can create fiduciary-duty exposure that survives early dismissal. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a strong record on the practical scope of prior representation and frame conflict claims as loyalty, confidentiality, and nondisclosure violations—not just complaints about litigation activity.”
Chappell v. State
COA01
In Chappell v. State, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a life-sentence conviction for aggravated sexual assault of a child after rejecting claims of ineffective assistance and evidentiary error. The case centered on a child’s disclosure of sexual abuse to her mother, followed by testimony from the mother, stepfather, and the child about the disclosure, surrounding circumstances, and the child’s later behavioral changes. The court applied the usual Strickland framework to the ineffective-assistance claim and held the record did not overcome the presumption that counsel acted reasonably or show prejudice. On the evidentiary issues, the court emphasized preservation principles, concluding there was no preserved, harmful error in admitting the challenged disclosure-related testimony. The opinion’s practical significance is its reminder that when child outcry and related statements are involved, appellate success depends on specific, timely objections and a clear record identifying the hearsay theory and purpose of the evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven custody, SAPCR, protective-order, and termination litigation, the fight is usually won or lost through precise evidentiary objections and a clean appellate record. Don’t rely on broad hearsay complaints—identify each statement, each hearsay layer, and the exact basis for admissibility or exclusion, because preservation failures can sink both trial objections and later appellate attacks.”
Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas
COA10
In this criminal crossover opinion with clear family-law implications, the Waco Court of Appeals held that Sanchez waived his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial complaint because he never made an unambiguous speedy-trial demand and never obtained an adverse ruling. His priority-setting request, ready announcements, court appearances, and rejection of a plea offer were not enough, especially where the record also showed defense-acquiesced and defense-caused delays. The court also upheld admission of an examining physician’s testimony and report recounting a child’s statements translated from Spanish by an advocacy-center employee, concluding the trial court properly treated the translator as a language conduit after developing a reliability record under Saavedra, and any confrontation complaint failed because the child testified and was cross-examined at trial. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If delay matters, preserve it precisely: file a clear motion for prompt trial or hearing, state the prejudice, object to resets, and get a ruling. And when child statements come through a translator, admissibility will often turn on whether the proponent builds a record showing the interpreter was neutral, qualified, and functioning only as a language conduit.”
In the Interest of K.L.G., K.L.G., K.A.R.G., and K.L.G., Children
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights and refused to delete the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Father did not challenge the separate subsection (N) predicate ground or the best-interest finding, so termination stood regardless, but the court still reviewed the challenged endangerment findings because of their collateral consequences. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because the record showed severe abuse and neglect of the children, and Father’s own statements showed he knew for months that Mother and her boyfriend were abusing and neglecting the children yet failed to take effective protective action. That knowledge-plus-inaction supported both environmental endangerment under subsection (D) and endangering conduct under subsection (E).
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family cases, a parent cannot avoid endangerment findings simply by saying, “I wasn’t the abuser.” If the evidence shows the parent knew the children were being abused or neglected and still left them in that environment without meaningful intervention, courts can uphold subsection (D) and (E) findings—with serious future consequences for custody, conservatorship, and later termination litigation.”
Michael Solomon and Andria Roque-Solomon v. The Law Office of Keith M. Harris and Keith M. Harris
COA14
In this Texas appeal, former clients sued their prior lawyers for legal malpractice, but at trial the court excluded all causation and damages evidence under Rule 193.6 after a dispute over whether initial disclosures had actually been served. The exclusion swept too far: it barred the plaintiffs’ own testimony and a timely designated expert, then led directly to a directed verdict and take-nothing judgment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held Rule 193.6 does not permit exclusion of a named party’s testimony and does not justify a blanket evidentiary wipeout that effectively disposes of the case. Because the order functioned as a death-penalty sanction, the trial court was required to consider lesser sanctions, such as a continuance, before imposing it. The failure to do so was an abuse of discretion, so the judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 193.6 is a disclosure-enforcement tool, not a shortcut to end a case. If an exclusion request would knock out a party’s own testimony or otherwise leave the other side unable to present the merits, the court must treat it like a case-dispositive sanction and consider lesser remedies first.”
In re O.L.M., a Child
COA01
In In re O.L.M., a Child, the mother tried to directly appeal temporary orders entered in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship. The First Court of Appeals treated the issue as purely jurisdictional and explained that Texas appellate courts may review interlocutory orders only when a statute expressly permits it. Relying on Texas Family Code section 105.001(e), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014, and prior cases, the court held that temporary SAPCR modification orders are not subject to interlocutory appeal. Because the mother used a notice of appeal instead of the proper potential vehicle of mandamus, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume an urgent temporary custody or SAPCR modification order can be appealed immediately. In Texas, temporary modification orders are generally not directly appealable, so lawyers should analyze appellate jurisdiction first, preserve a mandamus-ready record, and move quickly on mandamus if immediate review is truly necessary.”
Dillon v. Bamford
COA03
In Dillon v. Bamford, the Austin Court of Appeals largely affirmed the trial court’s refusal to modify conservatorship, holding the father did not prove a material and substantial change in circumstances that would justify giving him the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence or broader tie-breaking authority. The court emphasized the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, the conflicting evidence about parental conflict and safety concerns, and the guardian ad litem’s testimony that both parents were active, both homes were generally safe, and the children wanted the schedule to remain the same. But the court reversed the enforcement ruling on the parties’ agreed tax-dependency provision, concluding the trial court improperly rewrote the decree by shifting the father’s right to claim the children from 2019 to 2026 instead of enforcing the unambiguous odd-year allocation as written. The court affirmed the denial of enforcement as to tax year 2021 because the father failed to present sufficient proof of that alleged violation.
Litigation Takeaway
“Modification cases need concrete proof of a material change affecting the children, not just evidence of coparenting conflict or isolated parenting problems. And in enforcement proceedings, courts must enforce unambiguous decree language as written—especially tax-allocation provisions—but the movant still has to prove the violation with competent evidence year by year.”
Vera v. State
COA03
In Vera v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed exclusion of a defense psychologist’s proposed testimony that stress-induced “fight-or-flight” physiology and alcohol effects reduced the defendant’s culpable mental state during a fatal bar fight. The court held the expert was qualified, but her opinions were too general and did not meaningfully connect the science to whether Vera intentionally or knowingly stabbed the victims; the testimony also risked confusing the jury by effectively smuggling voluntary-intoxication evidence in as a defense. The court further held that Vera was not entitled to a sudden-passion instruction because the escalating confrontation and intervening events did not amount to adequate cause that would render an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases involving family violence, child abuse, or coercive conduct, expert testimony about trauma, dysregulation, or “fight-or-flight” must be tightly tied to a specific legal issue and the party-specific facts. Generalized psychology that merely reframes intentional conduct as reactive can be excluded as unhelpful, confusing, or an improper excuse narrative.”
Harolyn Graves-Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this aggravated-assault family-violence appeal, the defendant argued the trial court wrongly excluded handwritten letters and prison messages allegedly sent by the complainant that she wanted to use to impeach him and to show the nature of their relationship under article 38.371. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion because the defense did not properly authenticate the communications and did not satisfy Texas Rule of Evidence 613 by confronting the complainant with the specific statements before offering the writings as extrinsic impeachment evidence. The court also explained that article 38.371 does not override ordinary evidentiary requirements, so unauthenticated and unsupported relationship evidence may still be excluded.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texts, jail messages, emails, and letters can be powerful family-violence evidence, but only if counsel lays the foundation. Authenticate the communication, connect it to the witness, give context, and if using it for impeachment, confront the witness with the exact statement first. Article 38.371 and broad “relationship evidence” arguments will not rescue sloppy predicate work.”
K.C. v. D.R.
COA02
In K.C. v. D.R., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a protective order entered against a father’s romantic partner after the child’s mother alleged threatening conduct, including an encounter involving a ski mask and baseball bat during a custody-related dispute. The court rejected the respondent’s argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or misapplied Family Code Chapter 71, explaining that Section 71.0021 can cover violence or threats directed at a person because of that person’s dating relationship with a shared third party; the applicant and respondent do not have to have dated each other. The court also rejected complaints about due process, evidentiary rulings, defensive theories, and overbreadth because they were inadequately preserved, inadequately briefed, or unsupported by accurate authority and record citations. The court ultimately held that the protective order was properly issued and emphasized that pro se litigants must comply with the same appellate briefing and preservation rules as attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
“Chapter 71 protective orders can reach threats by a parent’s current partner against the other parent even when those two people never dated each other, so long as the conduct fits the statute’s third-party dating-violence language. For litigators, the bigger lesson is procedural: preserve every complaint, tie it to the record and the statute, and brief it accurately—Texas appellate courts will not rescue unsupported or sloppy arguments, even from pro se parties.”
Morales v. Morales
COA01
In this Harris County divorce, the First Court of Appeals reviewed a property division that included confirmation of the husband’s Raspberry Lane property as separate property, a reimbursement award to the community for mortgage principal paid on that separate property, and allocation of a six-figure SBA loan tied to the wife’s LLC. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard governing just-and-right divisions, with sufficiency review folded into that analysis, and noted that implied findings supported the decree because no past-due notice for findings was filed. Even so, implied findings could not replace evidence. The court held the record supported treating Raspberry Lane as separate property and did not reject the reimbursement framework or equitable lien securing that award. But it concluded the trial court lacked sufficient evidentiary support to assign the SBA debt as the wife’s personal liability where the evidence showed the loan belonged to Action Ready Mix, LLC and there was no adequate proof of personal liability. Because that unsupported debt allocation could have distorted the overall just-and-right division, the court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part.
Litigation Takeaway
“In divorce cases, debt allocation must be proved as carefully as asset characterization. If a liability belongs to an LLC or corporation, do not assume the court can assign it personally to a spouse without loan documents, guaranties, or another legal basis. And when pursuing reimbursement for community funds used on separate property, prove the separate character, trace the payments, and tie the remedy clearly to the overall property division.”
In re Cristina Gallegos Ortega
COA13
In this original proceeding, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a Hidalgo County trial court improperly used temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to order a child returned from Texas to Mexico. The father alleged the child had always lived in Mexico, that Mexican custody proceedings were already pending, and that concerns existed about the child’s tourist-visa status, school enrollment, the mother’s immigration status, and criminal allegations tied to the child’s removal from Mexico. The appellate court concluded those facts did not show abandonment, mistreatment, abuse, or an immediate threat to the child as required by Texas Family Code § 152.204. Because emergency jurisdiction cannot be used as a substitute for home-state jurisdiction or to accomplish a merits-based transfer of possession, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its emergency order and writ of attachment.
Litigation Takeaway
“UCCJEA emergency jurisdiction is narrow and requires evidence of a real, immediate danger to the child—not wrongful removal allegations, immigration concerns, or a desire to return the child to the home-state forum. In cross-border custody cases, Texas courts cannot use § 152.204 as a shortcut to decide possession when another country is the child’s home state and no actual emergency is proven.”
In the Interest of M.H.E., a Child
COA02
In a pending SAPCR, Mother tried to appeal a trial court order requiring mediation and dispute resolution. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order was appealable under Texas jurisdictional rules, explaining that direct appeals generally lie only from final judgments or from interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. Because the mediation order did not dispose of all parties and claims, the SAPCR remained pending, and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal from this type of case-management order, the court held it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Don’t assume an unfavorable family-law procedure order can be appealed right away. Mediation and other case-management orders are usually not appealable unless they are part of a final judgment or a statute expressly allows interlocutory review; if immediate relief is necessary, mandamus—not direct appeal—is often the proper vehicle.”
In the Interest of A.A.C.C., a Child
COA10
In *In the Interest of A.A.C.C., a Child*, the Tenth Court of Appeals held that a father’s bill of review attacking a termination order was barred by Texas Family Code section 161.211(a) because it was filed more than six months after the order was signed. The father argued he had already been adjudicated the child’s father in a separate parentage case and therefore should not have been terminated as merely an alleged father under section 161.002(b). But the court focused on procedure and finality: the termination order expressly relied on section 161.002(b), and the father filed his collateral attack well outside the six-month statutory deadline. The court also held that because he filed no written response to the Department’s summary-judgment motion, he failed to preserve arguments about misclassification, evidentiary insufficiency, lack of counsel, and invalid waiver of service. The Department’s summary-judgment evidence conclusively established the statutory basis for termination and the untimeliness of the bill of review, so summary judgment was proper.
Litigation Takeaway
“Deadlines and preservation can decide a family-law case before the merits are ever reached. If a termination order is signed under Family Code section 161.002(b), any direct or collateral attack must be pursued within the six-month window in section 161.211(a), and any reason the statute supposedly does not apply must be raised in a written trial-court response—not for the first time on appeal.”
In the Interest of E.T., E.T., E.T., and E.D., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s rights to four children and the father’s rights to one child, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support best-interest findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court analyzed the Holley best-interest factors through the parents’ history of endangering conduct, emphasizing that the mother’s partial service-plan compliance did not outweigh a failed monitored return and cocaine-positive tests for both her and one child, and that the father’s federal drug conviction and incarceration supported findings of continuing instability and inability to parent. Giving deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the court held the trial judge could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas best-interest litigation, partial compliance with services is not enough if the larger record shows relapse, criminal conduct, poor judgment, or instability. A failed monitored return, positive drug tests during reunification, and incarceration for serious drug offenses can outweigh favorable evidence and are powerful predictors of future risk.”
In the Interest of A.M., a Child
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to A.M. after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support Father’s predicate grounds under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and (N) and the best-interest findings as to both parents. The court analyzed Father’s repeated incarcerations, criminal conduct, long-term absence, and inability to provide a stable home holistically rather than in isolation, holding that this pattern constituted endangering conduct and constructive abandonment. It also held that A.M.’s history of instability, trauma, failed placements, both parents’ continued incarceration, and evidence that she was moving toward acceptance of adoption supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in her best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“In termination and other family-law cases, incarceration rarely stands alone—the winning record ties repeated criminal conduct and absence to a larger pattern of instability, lack of caregiving, and the child’s need for permanence. Trial lawyers should build a child-specific chronology showing how parental unavailability affected this child, because appellate courts will review endangerment holistically and defer heavily to credibility-based best-interest findings.”
Raymond Matthew Thibault v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this criminal appeal, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child by contact and upheld the admission of extraneous-act evidence that the defendant sought or took breast photographs of women, including a prior incident involving another thirteen-year-old girl. The court held the evidence was admissible for noncharacter purposes under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), especially to show intent and to rebut any claim that the touching or photographing was accidental or mistaken. The court also concluded under Rule 403 that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, particularly given the similarity of the prior conduct and the limiting instruction. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Prior sexualized conduct may be admissible when it is tied to a specific disputed issue like intent, grooming, or absence of accident—not just bad character. In family-law cases, lawyers should frame or attack this kind of evidence with precision under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403, because those rulings can heavily affect custody, possession, and protective-order outcomes.”
Aliza Groups, Inc. v. Roshan K. Noorani
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment declaring void a deed that purported to transfer a married couple’s community homestead because the named grantor, Karim Noorani, did not sign it and the son who signed Karim’s name had no authority to do so. The court applied Texas law that a forged deed is void, not voidable, and passes no title. Roshan Noorani’s summary-judgment evidence directly established that Karim never signed the deed and that neither spouse authorized the son to execute any deed or lien on the property. The buyer’s agency and equity arguments failed because they did not create a genuine fact issue on authorization, and its appellate authority theory was not preserved because it did not match the theory raised in the trial court. The court therefore affirmed the order quieting title in Roshan’s favor.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-property litigation, especially homestead disputes, an unauthorized signature on a deed can be attacked as a void forgery, and vague claims that a child or other family member had “authority” will not defeat summary judgment without competent evidence of actual authorization. Lock down the record early on who signed, who authorized, and whether the property was community homestead property.”
Paul O’Brien v. Tiffanie O’Brien
COA03
In a divorce appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 109.001 does not limit a trial court to only the precise temporary relief it granted within 60 days after the notice of appeal. Because the trial court had timely entered a valid temporary order pending appeal, it retained continuing jurisdiction under sections 109.001(b-3) and (b-4) to later modify that order after notice and hearing if circumstances had materially and substantially changed and the modification was equitable and necessary for the child’s safety and welfare. The court rejected the husband’s argument that any new relief requested after the 60-day window was jurisdictionally barred, distinguishing Morris v. Veilleux as a case where no timely temporary order had existed to modify. The court abated the appeal so the trial court could consider the requested modification under the correct legal standard.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you get a timely temporary order pending appeal, the trial court’s power is not frozen in place after 60 days. Lawyers should focus less on a blanket jurisdiction objection and more on building or attacking the statutory modification record: changed circumstances, equity, and a clear child-welfare connection.”
Bryant Pearl v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Bryant Pearl v. State of Texas, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child where the child testified the abuse happened multiple times over more than thirty days, even though she could not give precise dates and the record included evidence that another person had also abused her. The court applied the usual sufficiency standard, deferred to the jury on credibility, and emphasized that exact dates are not required under Penal Code section 21.02 and that a child victim’s testimony alone can sustain the finding. The child’s account was further reinforced by SANE-history testimony describing repeated abuse and explaining why the absence of physical trauma did not negate abuse. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law cases involving abuse allegations, Pearl underscores that a factfinder may still credit a child’s core abuse narrative despite memory gaps, imprecise timing, no physical findings, and evidence of another possible abuser. The practical lesson is to build or attack the case around repetition, duration, attribution, and consistency of the core allegations—not around the expectation of date-perfect testimony.”
In the Interest of E.M.M. Jr., N.M.M., N.J.M., I.A.M., M.S.R., A.L.M., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b). Mother challenged only best interest, so the court accepted the unchallenged predicate grounds as true and evaluated the record under the Holley factors and Family Code section 263.307. The court relied on evidence that Mother and a newborn tested positive for marijuana, the children reported domestic violence, the family lived in unsafe housing without electricity, Mother refused or failed to engage in services, and she went about 175 days without contacting the Department or visiting the children. Considering that pattern of conduct, the court held a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief that termination was in the children’s best interest and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family cases, courts can infer future risk from a parent’s pattern of past conduct—especially when drug use, domestic violence, unsafe housing, and noncompliance all appear together. On appeal, leaving predicate findings unchallenged can be outcome-determinative because those findings will reinforce the best-interest analysis.”
In re Genevience Alexandrie Anthony
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus after a Bexar County trial court denied the mother’s jurisdictional challenge to the father’s SAPCR. The child was born in Mississippi and had lived there continuously with the mother since birth, while Texas had previously entered only a UIFSA support order establishing paternity and support. Applying the UCCJEA, the court held that Mississippi was the child’s home state under Family Code section 152.201(a)(1), so Texas lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination. The court rejected the father’s reliance on significant-connection jurisdiction because that basis applies only when no home state exists or the home state declines jurisdiction, and it also rejected use of the inconvenient-forum statute as an independent source of jurisdiction. The court further made clear that a prior Texas UIFSA support case does not create or support UCCJEA custody jurisdiction. Because improper assertion of custody jurisdiction is reviewable by mandamus, the court conditionally granted relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“In interstate custody cases, start with the child’s home state and keep UIFSA and UCCJEA analyses separate. A Texas support or paternity order does not give Texas power to decide conservatorship or possession if another state is the child’s home state. Before filing a Texas SAPCR, confirm that no other state has home-state jurisdiction or that the home state has expressly declined; otherwise the case is vulnerable to dismissal and mandamus.”
Lorkovic v. Lorkovic
COA04
In Lorkovic v. Lorkovic, the Fourth Court of Appeals considered whether a final divorce decree improperly included permanent injunctions and a child-support amount that were not fully resolved at trial. The court held that most of the injunctions were valid because the wife had pleaded for harmful-contact relief and the trial evidence about abuse, safety concerns, communication problems, and interference with possession supported protective restrictions tied to the parent-child relationship. The court also concluded that the decree did not become reversible merely because its injunction language was more detailed than the trial court’s oral rendition. But the court reversed the child-support provision because the trial court never actually adjudicated the amount at trial; it only stated that the husband would owe support and later indicated the parties were expected to calculate the figure or return for a further hearing. Because the decree inserted $650 per month without a prior adjudication of that amount, the support award had to be reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“Protective injunctions in a divorce decree can survive appeal if they are grounded in the pleadings, the evidence, and conservatorship-related concerns, even when the written decree is more detailed than the oral rendition. Child support is different: the exact amount must be actually decided by evidence, stipulation, or later hearing before it can appear in the final decree. Do not treat support numbers as decree-drafting details.”
Curtis Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Curtis Johnson v. State, the Amarillo court held that a defendant complaining the State’s article 38.37 notice of extraneous sexual-offense evidence was too vague did not preserve error by objecting alone. The defense argued the notice lacked specifics about the number of incidents, precise conduct, and locations, but never requested a continuance, postponement, or other curative relief to address the claimed surprise. The court treated the complaint as a surprise-based notice issue, applied preservation rules requiring a request for time to prepare, and concluded the issue was waived. The court also found no harm because the defense had long-range notice of the general allegations, heard and cross-examined the witness at the pretrial hearing, and failed to show how more detail would have changed trial preparation or strategy.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your real complaint is trial surprise from vague or late notice of prejudicial conduct evidence, an objection is not enough—you must ask for a continuance, postponement, or other specific curative relief. In family-law cases, this preservation rule matters whenever abuse, bad acts, or misconduct evidence surfaces without enough detail to prepare.”
In the Interest of K.L.M., a Child
COA05
In this default SAPCR appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court exceeded the record in two respects. First, it reversed and rendered the child-surname change because Mother’s testimony—that the parents were unmarried and she wanted the child to bear her surname—did not establish the required good cause or show that the child’s substantial welfare and best interest required the change. Second, it reversed and remanded the retroactive child-support award because the record lacked sufficient evidence of Father’s net resources during the relevant period and the statutory factors required by Family Code sections 154.009 and 154.131. The court affirmed the remainder of the order, including the finding that Father had a history or pattern of family violence, concluding the evidence was sufficient on that issue.
Litigation Takeaway
“A default prove-up is not a shortcut around pleadings and proof. Even in uncontested SAPCRs, name changes and retroactive support require evidence tied to the governing statutes and factors; if the record is thin, the judgment is vulnerable on appeal. By contrast, targeted testimony that directly addresses the family-violence standard can be enough to sustain that finding.”
In the Interest of D.D.D.-H. a/k/a D.D.D.H., A.R.M., and O.N.H. a/k/a O.H., Children
COA01
The First Court of Appeals held that termination could not rest on former Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O) because the Legislature repealed that predicate ground before the termination decree was signed and made the change applicable to pending cases. The court treated that as a statutory-validity issue rather than a sufficiency issue. Even so, it affirmed because legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under subsections (D) and (E), based on evidence of Mother’s physical abuse of one child, indifference to his welfare, unstable and unsafe living conditions, inability to meet basic needs, and ongoing mental-health and possible substance-abuse concerns. The court also held the same pattern of abuse, instability, and unmet needs was sufficient to support the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Check the statute in effect on the date judgment is signed, not just the date of pleading or trial. A repealed ground can invalidate part of a judgment, but reversal may still be avoided if another independently supported ground and the best-interest finding survive—especially in termination cases involving subsections (D) and (E), which carry lasting collateral consequences.”
In re Costco Wholesale Corporation
COA14
In In re Costco Wholesale Corporation, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by granting Rule 202 pre-suit discovery based only on a verified petition and attorney declarations. The petitioner sought broad deposition and document discovery before filing a personal-injury suit, arguing she needed the information to identify additional parties and avoid delay from a possible federal removal. The court emphasized that Rule 202 requires proof, not pleading, and that verified pleadings are not competent evidence. Because no admissible evidence was offered at the hearing, and because the petitioner failed to prove either that the discovery would prevent a failure or delay of justice or that its likely benefit outweighed its burden, the Rule 202 order could not stand. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 202 is not a shortcut to merits discovery. If you want pre-suit discovery, you must present competent evidence from a witness with personal knowledge and prove a real Rule 202 necessity; if you are opposing it, attack the lack of evidence, the availability of ordinary post-filing discovery, and any speculative claim of urgency.”
In re Lisa Marie Clontz
COA01
In In re Lisa Marie Clontz, the relator sought mandamus to force the family-law trial court to rule on a motion to transfer venue and a motion to reinstate. The First Court of Appeals held that filing motions with the clerk was not enough to prove the trial court had a ministerial duty to rule at that point. Applying settled mandamus law, the court distinguished between filing and presentment and required record proof that the motions were actually brought to the judge’s attention, that a ruling was requested, and that the court failed or refused to act within a reasonable time. Because the mandamus record showed only file-stamped motions and did not show presentment, a hearing or submission setting, or a filed demand for ruling, the court denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you may need mandamus based on a trial court’s failure to rule, do more than file the motion—create a record showing presentment, judicial awareness, and a clear request for a ruling. In family-law cases, preservation of the paper trail can determine whether appellate relief is available, regardless of the motion’s merits.”
In the Matter of J.T., a Juvenile
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile adjudication for sexual assault, rejecting a legal-sufficiency challenge focused solely on identity. The complainant testified that he fell asleep next to J.T. during a sleepover, awoke to the assault, and identified J.T. based on the sleeping arrangements, prior familiarity, and surrounding circumstances, even though he could not make a complete facial identification in the dark. Applying the criminal beyond-a-reasonable-doubt sufficiency standard used in juvenile cases, the court held that the trial court, as factfinder, could credit the complainant’s testimony, disbelieve J.T.’s denial, and find identity proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The adjudication and disposition were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“A single credible witness can be enough. In abuse-driven family cases, trial courts may rely on one witness’s testimony—especially when it is specific, internally consistent, and supported by contextual facts like sleeping arrangements, familiarity, immediate confrontation, or behavioral changes—and appellate courts will rarely reweigh those credibility calls.”
In the Interest of K.R.N.S., a Child
COA14
In a privately filed SAPCR between two parents, the father appealed the final order and, construed liberally, argued that his retained trial counsel was ineffective for failing to subpoena witnesses, respond to arguments, cite favorable authority, and better present the child’s best-interest case. The Fourteenth Court did not reach whether counsel performed deficiently because it treated the right-to-counsel question as dispositive. Relying on Family Code section 107.013 and cases such as In re D.T., the court explained that ineffective-assistance claims in Texas family cases are cognizable only when a constitutional or statutory right to counsel exists, such as in certain governmental Subtitle E proceedings. Because this was a private SAPCR, not a suit filed by a governmental entity, and the father identified no other source of a right to counsel, the court held his ineffective-assistance complaint was unavailable and affirmed the final SAPCR order.
Litigation Takeaway
“In private SAPCRs and other non-governmental family cases, appellate courts generally will not reverse based on complaints that a party’s own retained lawyer performed poorly. Unless a statute or the constitution creates a right to counsel, the proper appellate focus is trial-court error, preservation, sufficiency, or abuse of discretion—not ineffective assistance.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Brendan Potyondy and Meredith Potyondy and in the Interest of D.P., C.P., and B.P., Children
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision voiding the parties’ premarital agreement in their divorce. The trial court had found the agreement unconscionable based on the circumstances of signing—two days before the wedding, no separate counsel for the wife, and a perceived “double recovery” because the husband’s premarital assets were no longer traceable. The appellate court held that those reasons did not satisfy Texas Family Code section 4.006, emphasized that unconscionability in this context must be analyzed under the statute rather than general equitable concerns, and noted the absence of any finding that the wife signed involuntarily. Because the agreement’s equalization payment was part of the bargain the parties made, not an improper double recovery, the court reversed the property division and remanded for entry of a division consistent with the premarital agreement.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas courts cannot set aside a premarital agreement just because it seems unfair in hindsight or because the signing circumstances look imperfect. To defeat enforcement, the resisting spouse must prove a statutory ground under Family Code section 4.006 and obtain findings that match that theory. For trial lawyers, this case is a strong reminder to build the record around voluntariness and statutory disclosure issues—not generalized fairness, tracing complaints, or lack-of-counsel themes standing alone.”
Coleman v. State
COA05
In Coleman v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old murder defendant for adult prosecution under Family Code § 54.02. The appellant argued the transfer was improper because the investigation was not “full” and the written transfer order did not spell out every factor-specific finding or item of evidence. The court applied a two-step review: first testing the transfer findings for legal and factual sufficiency, then reviewing the ultimate waiver decision for abuse of discretion. It held that § 54.02 requires a full investigation, probable-cause finding, and specific reasons for waiver, but does not require an exhaustive recitation of every evidentiary detail or every statutory factor. Because the record included the ordered psychological, diagnostic, and social evaluations, testimony about the juvenile’s background and risk factors, and evidence supporting probable cause and community-welfare concerns, the findings were sufficient and the transfer order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law litigators, Coleman is a strong appellate-record case: when a statute requires findings or reasons, the trial court must be specific enough to satisfy the statute, but it does not have to write an encyclopedic order summarizing every exhibit, witness, or factor. On appeal, broad complaints that the court did not investigate enough or did not say enough usually fail unless tied to a true statutory prerequisite, a preserved objection, and a materially deficient record.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Craige Kevin Howlett and Corrine Howlett
COA07
In this Texas divorce appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the trial court could not support three $250,000 compensatory awards to the wife for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud on the community, and fraudulent inducement merely by pointing to the husband’s serious misconduct, including hidden accounts, altered bank statements, and unexplained transfers. The appellate court explained that damages must track the character of the property injured: if the alleged harm was to the wife’s separate estate, the record had to show a distinct separate-property injury; if the harm was to the community estate, the remedy had to proceed under Family Code section 7.009(b) through a reconstituted-estate and just-and-right division analysis. Because the findings did not tie each award to a specific legally recognized injury, did not show how the amounts were calculated, and did not determine the value of the community estate absent the fraud, the court reversed the compensatory awards, rendered that the wife take nothing on separate-estate claims, and remanded for further proceedings on any community-estate injury. The exemplary-damages award remained undisturbed because it was not challenged on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“In fraud-heavy divorce cases, proof of concealment or dissipation is not enough by itself. Lawyers must identify whether the alleged injury is to a spouse personally, to separate property, or to the community estate, then prove the correct remedy with tracing and valuation evidence. If the claim is really fraud on the community, the court needs findings showing the reconstituted estate and the math under Family Code section 7.009(b), not just a large round-number damages award.”