Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of Y.N.P., a Child
COA13
In *In re Y.N.P.*, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed appointment of foster parents as permanent managing conservators over Father, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to overcome the parental presumption in Texas Family Code § 153.131. Although Father completed services and had agency support, the court focused on unresolved severe injuries to a sibling in the same household, Father’s lack of candor with investigators, his continued cohabitation and alignment with Mother, and the weakness of his proposed safety plan. The court emphasized that a nonparent cannot defeat the parental presumption merely by offering a better placement, but here the record supported a finding that appointing Father would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development. The court also rejected Father’s constitutional complaint and standing challenge, and affirmed the judgment in full.
Litigation Takeaway
"The key lesson is that nonparents must prove impairment, not just superiority. Evidence of stability, bonding, and better services helps only after the statutory threshold is met; the real battleground is whether placing the child with the parent would create a significant risk of physical or emotional harm. For parents, service-plan completion alone may not carry the day if they remain aligned with the person tied to the danger or cannot present a credible safety plan."
In the Matter of J.C.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed orders waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring J.C. to criminal district court after holding the evidence was factually sufficient to support the juvenile court’s finding that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings under Texas Family Code § 54.02. The court weighed the statutory transfer factors and emphasized that the alleged offenses were multiple violent aggravated sexual assaults against persons, supported by surveillance and strong DNA evidence. Although J.C. presented evidence of very low intellectual functioning and treatment needs, the court concluded those facts did not outweigh evidence of escalating misconduct, detention violence, runaway behavior, threats, substance abuse, and expert testimony that J.C. posed a high risk of violent reoffending and had below-average amenability to treatment. Because the transfer finding was not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Serious safety findings usually survive appeal when the record combines objective corroboration, a pattern of escalating misconduct, and expert testimony linking past behavior to future danger. Cognitive limitations or diagnoses alone will not defeat a transfer, custody, or protective-risk finding without a concrete treatment and supervision plan showing the person can be managed safely."
In the Matter of J.C.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed orders waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring J.C. to criminal district court after three alleged aggravated sexual assaults. Applying Texas Family Code § 54.02, the court held the evidence was factually sufficient to support the finding that the welfare of the community required criminal proceedings. The court emphasized the violent, repeated nature of the assaults, J.C.’s removal of his ankle monitor, prior misconduct, threats, detention violence, and expert testimony that he posed above-average danger and had below-average amenability to treatment. Although J.C. had an extremely low IQ and some potential to benefit from treatment, the court concluded those facts did not outweigh the evidence of dangerousness, escalation, and weak rehabilitation prospects.
Litigation Takeaway
"Low IQ, youth, or diagnosable impairment will not by themselves defeat a protection-forward ruling when the record shows repeated violence, escalation, supervision failures, and poor treatment prospects. In family-law cases, lawyers should build or rebut restriction requests with concrete evidence of pattern conduct, risk, compliance history, and whether available services can realistically protect others."
In the Interest of Z.M., a Child
COA11
In In the Interest of Z.M., the father argued the trial court lost jurisdiction in a Department termination case because the statutory dismissal deadline under Texas Family Code Section 263.401 expired without a valid extension. The Eleventh Court of Appeals examined the actual procedural record, including the extension order and the monitored-return posture under Section 263.403, and held that the record showed a substantively compliant extension that preserved the trial court’s authority. Because the alleged defects were procedural criticisms rather than a true failure to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for continuing jurisdiction, dismissal for want of jurisdiction was not required.
Litigation Takeaway
"Deadline-based jurisdiction attacks rise or fall on the record. If you want to challenge or defend a Chapter 263 dismissal deadline, build a precise timeline, tie each order to the governing statute, and preserve objections specifically—Texas appellate courts will not treat every technical flaw in an extension order as jurisdiction-destroying if the record otherwise shows a valid statutory basis to keep the case alive."
Wally Yammine v. Propel Financial Services, LLC, as Agent and Attorney in Fact for Propel Funding National 1, LLC; and HK REO, LLC
COA02
In this appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly dismissed a bill-of-review case based on a hybrid motion to dismiss that was not tied to any recognized Texas procedural vehicle. The appellees argued lack of jurisdiction, failure to tender, and failure to state a claim, but they did not file or comply with Rule 91a, summary judgment, special exceptions, a proper plea to the jurisdiction, dismissal for want of prosecution, or the Baker v. Goldsmith procedure governing pretrial disposition of bills of review. The court emphasized that Texas trial courts do not have free-floating authority to dismiss civil claims on the merits simply because a party says the plaintiff should lose. Because no rule, statute, or recognized common-law procedure authorized the dismissal used here, the trial court abused its discretion. The court reversed the dismissal order and remanded without deciding the underlying merits of the bill of review.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family litigation, a strong merits argument is not itself a dismissal mechanism. If an opponent wants to knock out a bill of review, modification claim, enforcement-related pleading, or post-decree dispute, they must use the correct procedural vehicle—and comply with that vehicle’s rules. When a trial court grants an ad hoc “motion to dismiss” untethered to a valid rule, statute, or recognized procedure, that order is vulnerable on appeal."
Gonzalez v. State
COA10
In Gonzalez v. State, the appellant challenged a child-abuse conviction by arguing the State violated article 39.14 in connection with a therapist who had seen the child before the later outcry. The court did not reach the merits because the discovery complaint was not preserved: in the trial court, the defense argued the State should have investigated the therapist and developed exculpatory information, but on appeal the argument shifted to a narrower claim that the State failed to disclose the therapist’s contact information or notify the defense it was withholding it. Applying Rule 33.1 and noncomportment precedent, the court held those were materially different theories and the appellate complaint was forfeited. The court also upheld denial of mistrial on juror nondisclosure because counsel had not exercised sufficient voir dire diligence to uncover the juror’s relationship with the complainant.
Litigation Takeaway
"Preservation is theory-specific. In family-law discovery fights, a general complaint that the other side failed to investigate, search, supplement, or disclose will not necessarily preserve a narrower appellate complaint about a specific witness, provider, record, or contact detail. State the exact discovery failure, tie it to the correct rule or remedy, and obtain a ruling on each distinct theory."
In the Interest of E.O., a Child
COA07
In *In re E.O.*, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support termination under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) against a noncustodial father. The Department’s proof focused on the mother’s methamphetamine history, relapse, and instability, which explained removal from her care but did not show that father knowingly placed the child in endangering conditions or knowingly allowed the child to remain there. Applying the parent-specific requirements of subsection (D), and following *In re N.G.* because of the future collateral consequences of a (D) finding, the court modified the judgment to delete the subsection (D) ground while affirming termination on the unchallenged grounds under subsections (E) and (N).
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment findings must be tied to the parent you are targeting. In termination, custody, or modification cases, one parent’s dangerous home or drug use cannot automatically be imputed to the other parent without proof of that parent’s knowledge, control, placement, or acquiescence. Always separately challenge or prove subsection (D) and (E) findings because they can have major future consequences."
IMP Oak Hill LP v. Jordan Ajhaji Kpaka
COA03
In this Austin Court of Appeals case, a landlord nonsuited an eviction action after the tenant had already pleaded for attorney’s fees under Texas Property Code § 24.006(c) and after a potentially dispositive Rule 91a challenge exposed defects in the landlord’s notice-to-vacate theory. The court held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 162 and Villafani, the tenant’s fee request was a pending claim for affirmative relief that survived the nonsuit, so the trial court retained plenary power to decide fees even more than 30 days after the nonsuit order. Applying Epps, the court also concluded the record supported treating the tenant as the prevailing party because the nonsuit appeared to have been taken to avoid an unfavorable merits ruling, and it affirmed the fee award.
Litigation Takeaway
"A nonsuit does not necessarily end fee exposure. If the opposing party has already pleaded a clear, independent claim for attorney’s fees, that claim can survive dismissal under Rule 162 and keep the court’s power alive to award fees—an important lesson in family cases involving withdrawn modifications, enforcement actions, temporary-order disputes, or other claims abandoned after adverse motion practice."
In the Interest of E.R.T., a Child
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights after a two-year-old child presented with severe unexplained injuries, multiple old and new fractures, bruising, respiratory distress, and extreme malnourishment. The court held that the medical evidence, the child’s overall condition, the mother’s status as primary caregiver, her failure to obtain regular medical care, and her shifting explanations supported clear-and-convincing findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The same evidence supported the best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2), and the mother’s complaint about the de novo hearing was rejected because she failed to preserve error.
Litigation Takeaway
"You do not need an eyewitness to prove endangerment. In Texas family cases, objective medical records, injury patterns, caregiver exclusivity, delayed treatment, and inconsistent parental explanations can be enough to support severe conservatorship restrictions or even termination. Just as important, procedural complaints are worthless on appeal if counsel does not preserve them clearly in the trial court."
Villarreal v. State
COA10
In Villarreal v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a child’s forensic outcry admitted under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072 is substantive evidence that may be considered for its truth, even when the child later fully recants. The child initially gave a detailed forensic interview describing sexual abuse, but more than two years later recanted and maintained at trial that the accusation was false. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and relying on Rodriguez v. State, the court concluded that once the article 38.072 predicate is satisfied, the prior outcry can alone support the verdict without corroboration. The recantation created a credibility issue for the jury, not a legal-sufficiency defect, so the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A later recantation does not automatically erase the force of a child’s earlier disclosure. If the prior statement comes in through a proper substantive evidentiary pathway, the factfinder may still rely on it heavily, making admissibility and foundation critical battlegrounds in custody, protective-order, and conservatorship litigation."