Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
787 opinions found
In re Brittany Hilbert
COA05
In In re Brittany Hilbert, a pro se relator sought mandamus relief in a conservatorship-related case, asking the Dallas Court of Appeals to undo post-hearing orders affecting due process, attorney’s fees, and interim conservatorship or possession. The court did not reach those substantive complaints because the petition failed to comply with multiple mandatory requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52, including required sections, a proper certification, an appendix, and a sworn or certified mandamus record. The court also found that the petition and appendix contained unredacted sensitive data in violation of Rule 9.9. Because these procedural defects were dispositive, the court denied mandamus relief and struck the filing without addressing the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"In emergency family-law appellate practice, procedure can decide the case before the merits ever matter. A mandamus petition must strictly comply with Rule 52, include a proper certified or sworn record, and be fully redacted under Rule 9.9; otherwise even strong due-process or custody arguments may never be heard."
Tutt v. State
COA02
In Tutt v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a domestic-violence conviction after rejecting a hearsay challenge to the complainant’s on-scene statements and a sufficiency challenge to habitual-offender enhancement proof. Officers forced entry after a distress call and scream, then found the complainant frightened, crying, and bearing fresh cuts. The court held that her statements to the responding officer that Tutt had cut her arm and choked her were admissible as excited utterances because the circumstances showed a startling event, close temporal proximity, ongoing stress, and statements directly related to the assault. The court also held that, under the totality of the evidence, the State sufficiently linked Tutt to two prior Missouri felony convictions for enhancement purposes. The judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving family violence, on-scene statements to police, 911 narratives, and similar contemporaneous disclosures are far more likely to come in when you can show immediacy, fear, fresh injuries, and little time for reflection. Build or attack the evidentiary mosaic—timing, demeanor, corroborating texts, photos, dispatch records, and officer observations—because those surrounding facts often determine whether violence evidence shapes custody, protective-order, and divorce outcomes."
Kong v. Department of Family and Protective Services
COA10
In Kong v. Department of Family and Protective Services, the Tenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order striking a paternal aunt’s petition in intervention seeking managing conservatorship of two children after the parents’ rights had already been terminated. The aunt filed nearly five months after the final termination order. The court held the filing was untimely for two independent reasons: intervention generally must occur before final judgment, and once the termination order became final and plenary power expired, the closed case could not be reopened by a new intervention unless the judgment had first been set aside; separately, Texas Family Code section 102.006(c) barred a relative’s post-termination conservatorship request filed more than 90 days after termination. The court also rejected any attempt to save the pleading by treating it as an original SAPCR rather than an intervention, because the statutory deadline still controlled. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in striking the aunt’s filing.
Litigation Takeaway
"Deadlines and standing can end a family-law case before best-interest evidence ever matters. If a relative wants conservatorship after termination, counsel must act quickly—preferably before final judgment and, at minimum, within Family Code section 102.006(c)’s 90-day window. Post-judgment relabeling of a pleading will not cure untimeliness once finality and statutory standing barriers attach."
Laura Mann v. Manuel Diaz Cabrera
COA14
In this Harris County family-law appeal, the appellant voluntarily moved to dismiss her own appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(1). The Fourteenth Court of Appeals did not address the underlying divorce or SAPCR issues because the only question before it was whether dismissal should be granted. Finding the motion unopposed and no indication that dismissal would impair any party’s right to relief, the court granted the motion and dismissed the appeal, leaving the trial-court judgment in place without any merits ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"A voluntary appellate dismissal is usually a clean exit, but it does not undo the trial court’s order. Family-law litigators should make sure the client understands that abandoning the appeal typically cements the judgment below unless the parties seek and obtain additional relief."
Kelsey v. Rocha
COA13
In Kelsey v. Rocha, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a bill of review seeking to set aside an agreed divorce decree nearly four years after it became final. Kelsey argued the decree was procured through fraud and duress, mischaracterized his separate property as community property, awarded Rocha an unfair share of the estate, and was invalid because no marriage existed. The court applied Texas’s strict bill-of-review standard, requiring proof of a meritorious claim or defense, wrongful prevention from asserting it, and that the failure to assert it was unmixed with the petitioner’s own fault or negligence. The court emphasized that Kelsey had been served, participated in the divorce, and signed a notarized agreed decree containing recitals that he read and understood it and signed voluntarily without coercion or duress. His complaints largely attacked the substantive correctness of the property division—issues for direct appeal, not a late equitable attack—and he failed to show he was prevented from raising them earlier. Because he did not satisfy the elements for bill-of-review relief, the court held the trial court properly denied his petition and left the agreed divorce decree in place.
Litigation Takeaway
"Final agreed divorce decrees are extremely hard to unwind through a bill of review. If a party believes property was mischaracterized, the division was unjust, or the marriage itself is disputed, those issues must be raised and preserved in the original case or by direct post-judgment review. Strong decree recitals about voluntariness, understanding, and fairness can be powerful protection against later attacks."
In the Interest of D.W., D.B., and J.B., Children
COA02
In this SAPCR appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals dismissed for want of jurisdiction because the mother filed her notice of appeal nearly nine months after the final order was signed. The court held that a final SAPCR order is subject to the accelerated appellate timetable, so the notice of appeal was due within 20 days under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and 28.1(b). Because no timely notice of appeal or motion for extension was filed, and neither the mother nor appointed counsel responded to the court’s jurisdictional inquiry, the appeal was not perfected and the court lacked jurisdiction. The court also noted that pro se status does not excuse compliance with appellate deadlines.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, a final SAPCR order triggers an accelerated appeal, and missing the 20-day notice-of-appeal deadline can permanently forfeit appellate review. Lawyers must classify the order correctly, calendar the deadline from the signing date, and make sure responsibility for the appeal is clear—especially when appointed counsel, successor counsel, or pro se filings create confusion."
Lopez v. Inzhutova
COA07
In Lopez v. Inzhutova, the Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a final protective order after the respondent, appearing pro se, failed to adequately brief any appellate issue. Lopez challenged the order on due-process, protective-order-violation, and cumulative-error grounds, but even after being notified that his original brief violated Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) and being given a chance to amend, his revised brief still lacked developed argument, meaningful application of authority to the facts, and sufficient legal support. The court held that pro se litigants are held to the same briefing standards as represented parties and that inadequate briefing waives appellate complaints. Because Lopez presented no issue in a form the court could review, the court affirmed the protective order without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"On appeal, preservation is not enough—your brief must clearly connect the law, the record, and the complained-of ruling. Family-law litigants, including pro se parties, can lose potentially viable complaints outright if they submit conclusory arguments, unsupported citations, or undeveloped analysis. For appellees, Rule 38.1 waiver can be the fastest path to affirmance when the opposing brief is defective."
In the Interest of A.M., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights because Father challenged only one of three predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)—subsection (N)—while leaving unchallenged the trial court’s findings under subsections (B) and (C), and he also did not challenge the best-interest finding. Applying settled termination law, the court held that one unchallenged predicate ground plus an unchallenged best-interest finding is enough to support affirmance, so reversal was unavailable regardless of Father’s attack on subsection (N). The court also rejected Father’s due-process complaint about alleged statutory and service-plan irregularities because he did not preserve that complaint in the trial court and, on appeal, failed to support it with meaningful authority, analysis, or record citations, resulting in waiver.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any family-law appeal, you must challenge every independent basis supporting the judgment and separately attack best interest when required; otherwise, the appellate court can affirm without reaching your preferred issue. Just as important, procedural and due-process complaints must be raised in the trial court and then fully briefed on appeal with authority and record support."
McBride v. Rios-Flores
COA08
In McBride v. Rios-Flores, the Eighth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the underlying family-law dispute because the appeal failed on briefing. After striking the appellant’s original brief for noncompliance with Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4 and 38.1, the court gave notice, a deadline to cure, and an express warning that continued noncompliance could result in dismissal. The appellant timely filed an amended brief, but it still consisted largely of conclusory bullet points with almost no meaningful record citations and no developed legal analysis connecting authority to the facts. Applying Rules 38.1, 38.9(a), 38.8(a), 42.3, and 44.3, the court explained that while briefing rules are construed liberally to preserve appellate review, that liberality does not require the court to research arguments or search the record on a party’s behalf. Because the amended brief still flagrantly violated the appellate rules after an opportunity to cure, the court struck the brief and dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution.
Litigation Takeaway
"A family-law appeal can be lost before the court ever reaches custody, modification, support, or property issues if the brief does not actually brief them. Conclusory complaints, bare statutory citations, and weak record references are not enough; the appellant must identify the ruling challenged, state the standard of review, cite the controlling law and the exact record support, and explain why reversal is required. For appellees, this case is a useful reminder that persistent, serious briefing defects can justify waiver arguments, a motion to strike, and ultimately dismissal after notice and an opportunity to cure."
In re Steven Joseph Slivinski
COA14
In this original habeas proceeding, Steven Joseph Slivinski challenged a Galveston County family-law contempt restraint and sought interim relief. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the narrow civil habeas standard under Texas Government Code section 22.221(d), explaining that habeas review does not revisit the merits of the contempt ruling but asks only whether the relator is unlawfully restrained because he was denied due process or because the underlying order is void. The court held Slivinski failed to show either a due-process violation or a void order, so his restraint was not shown to be unlawful. The court therefore denied both habeas relief and interim relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Habeas relief from a family-law contempt order is a narrow remedy. To win, the relator must present a tight record showing unlawful restraint based on a true due-process defect or a void underlying order—not just alleged trial-court error. In enforcement cases, precise drafting, clear notice, and a complete appellate record are critical."