Opinion Library

Kai Nonamé v. Nicholas Denbrock

COA03

In this SAPCR-related appeal, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay certain court costs after she filed a Rule 145 statement of inability to afford costs, even though the scheduled contest hearing was effectively cancelled when she did not appear and no reporter’s record was made. The Austin Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f) requires more than notice and a conclusory order: before requiring payment, the trial court must conduct an oral evidentiary hearing on the record and enter detailed findings showing the litigant can afford the costs without sacrificing basic necessities. Because the record showed no preserved evidentiary hearing and the findings were not sufficiently detailed, the court abated the appeal and remanded for a compliant hearing and findings.

Litigation Takeaway

"Rule 145 shortcuts will not hold up on appeal. If a family-law court is going to require payment of filing, record, or other court costs, counsel must ensure there is an on-the-record evidentiary hearing and detailed affordability findings—even if the declarant fails to appear. For practitioners, the lesson is simple: make the Rule 145 record, prove or challenge actual affordability, and do not rely on bare docket entries or conclusory orders."

June 5, 2026

Headrick v. State

COA05

In Headrick v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant waived any complaint that the State’s motion to adjudicate was too vague because he never filed a motion to quash in the trial court. The State alleged only that Headrick had made contact with his daughter in violation of a no-contact condition of deferred adjudication, and on appeal he argued that the pleading lacked enough detail to give adequate notice. The court did not reach the merits of that notice argument, instead applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and longstanding revocation precedent requiring a timely motion to quash to preserve pleading-specificity complaints. The court also upheld the adjudication on the merits, concluding the daughter’s testimony and surrounding circumstances were sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Headrick made the prohibited contact, and it rejected the disproportionality challenge to the within-range sentences.

Litigation Takeaway

"If an enforcement, contempt, modification, or other family-law pleading is too vague to let your client prepare a defense, do not save that complaint for appeal. File a specific motion to quash, special exception, or other targeted objection in the trial court and get a ruling, because notice defects that could have been cured will usually be treated as waived."

June 5, 2026

Child Custody

In the Interest of L.E.-N.N., C.J.W. and C.R.W., Children

COA05

In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, Mother argued the trial court erred by trying the case to the bench after she had requested a jury. The court held that filing a jury demand perfects the right to a jury but does not, by itself, preserve appellate error. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and prior Dallas precedent, the court focused on the trial record: when the case was called, Mother did not appear, her counsel appeared and participated, and neither Mother nor counsel objected to proceeding without a jury. Because no timely, specific objection was made when the court conducted the non-jury trial, any complaint about denial of a jury trial was waived. The court therefore affirmed the final SAPCR order appointing conservators and restricting Mother’s access.

Litigation Takeaway

"A jury demand is not self-executing error preservation. In Texas family cases, if the court proceeds without a jury, counsel must object on the record then and there—even if the client is absent, difficult, or claiming to proceed pro se—or the jury-trial complaint is likely waived on appeal."

In re Hoa Tran and Trang Tran

COA14

In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that once defendants properly controverted a plaintiff’s medical-expense affidavit under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 18.001, they were entitled to nonparty discovery from the medical provider about how the charges were set and whether they were reasonable. The trial court had allowed only limited inquiry but barred broader topics concerning billing methodology, reimbursement history, referral relationships, and outsourced imaging arrangements. Relying on Texas’s broad discovery rules and cases such as In re North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co. and In re K&L Auto Crushers, LLC, the court concluded those topics were relevant to the live defense that the claimed medical expenses were unreasonable. Because the categorical restrictions prevented the defendants from developing that defense and could not be adequately remedied on appeal, the court found an abuse of discretion and granted mandamus relief.

Litigation Takeaway

"If the other side puts medical or treatment bills in issue, do not treat the invoice as untouchable. Once the charges are properly controverted, targeted discovery into the provider’s billing practices, reimbursement history, referral relationships, and third-party service arrangements may be available—and a blanket order blocking that discovery can justify mandamus."

In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile

COA13

In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed the notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still not enough to invoke jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within that grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension in the appellate court that reasonably explains the delay. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion or equivalent filing until after the grace period expired, the late explanation could not cure the defect, and the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Litigation Takeaway

"In accelerated family-law-related appeals, a late notice of appeal is not self-curing just because it lands within Rule 26.3’s grace period. If the notice is late, counsel must also file a Rule 26.3 extension motion in the appellate court within that same window, with a reasonable explanation. Do not wait for a clerk’s defect notice or assume a later response will save jurisdiction."

Perricone v. Perricone

COA11

In Perricone v. Perricone, the Eastland Court of Appeals addressed a contested Rule 145 statement of inability to afford court costs in litigation arising from divorce and custody-related disputes. After a defendant challenged the indigency filing, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found the declarant’s financial statement contained material misrepresentations and omissions, including unsupported claims of means-tested benefits, undisclosed assets, and inaccurate income and valuation information. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f), the court held that once a contest is filed, the burden shifts to the declarant to prove inability to pay by a preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s credibility findings and concluded the record supported denial of indigency status. The court also held that the challenger’s unsworn declaration was sufficient because it substantially complied with Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 132.001 despite minor technical defects.

Litigation Takeaway

"A Rule 145 form is only the starting point. If the other side contests indigency, the party claiming inability to pay must back it up with credible, documented proof, and courts will closely examine omissions, inconsistencies, household support, and prior financial representations. For family-law litigators, Perricone is a roadmap both for attacking weak indigency claims and for preparing defensible ones."

In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile

COA13

In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed a notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still insufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within the grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion until after the grace period had expired, the late explanation could not be construed to revive jurisdiction. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Litigation Takeaway

"When an appeal may be accelerated, treat Rule 26.3 as a two-step jurisdictional checklist: if the notice is late but still within the 15-day grace period, file both the notice of appeal and a motion for extension within that same window. A later explanation will not save the appeal."

In Re Richard Earl Purkey Jr. and Ashlyn Purkey Jordan

COA09

In re Purkey holds that a district court cannot use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 to authorize pre-suit depositions aimed at developing claims that belong in a statutory probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction. The petitioners sought depositions to investigate alleged lack of capacity, undue influence, and trust-related issues surrounding a decedent’s 2024 will and amended trust. Looking past the Rule 202 label to the substance of the requested discovery, the Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded the anticipated claims were classic probate matters—a will contest, an effort to set aside probate, and trust disputes incident to an estate. Because Rule 202 does not expand subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court exceeded its authority by ordering the depositions. The court conditionally granted mandamus, holding that the improper pre-suit discovery could not be adequately cured on appeal.

Litigation Takeaway

"Before filing a Rule 202 petition, identify the real dispute and the court that actually has power to hear it. If the discovery is really designed to build a will contest, probate challenge, or trust dispute tied to an estate, you must proceed in probate court—not through a separate district-court discovery action. For family lawyers, the lesson is to screen early for probate overlap and avoid using Rule 202 as an end-run around jurisdictional limits."

Property Division Enforcement

In the Matter of the Marriage of Melissa A. Paredes v. Trini J. Paredes, Jr. and In the Interest of V.N.P. and T.J.P. III, Children

COA05

In Paredes v. Paredes, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed an enforcement judgment based on a divorce decree provision requiring the wife to pay the husband “twelve months’ worth of the proceeds” if she sold certain real property. After the wife sold the property, the husband asked the trial court to enforce the decree and relied on an email and his own calculation to argue the phrase meant one year’s worth of annualized net proceeds. The appellate court held that the decree’s operative language was not merely ambiguous but facially unintelligible, because proceeds cannot coherently be measured in units of time. Applying Texas law requiring judgments to be definite enough to be executed from their four corners, the court concluded the provision was a nullity and could not be enforced through extra-textual evidence or the parties’ claimed shared understanding. The court therefore reversed the damages award and the derivative attorney’s-fees awards and remanded the case.

Litigation Takeaway

"If a divorce decree’s property language does not state a clear, mathematically coherent obligation on its face, it may be unenforceable altogether. Family-law litigators should draft future-sale and deferred-payment provisions with precise formulas, defined terms, and objective triggers, because emails, testimony, or course of dealing will not rescue a decree that is unintelligible as written."

Termination of Parental Rights

In the Interest of B.A. and B.A., Children

COA02

The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and on best interest. The record showed repeated domestic violence by the father, the mother’s knowledge of that violence, her repeated minimization and recantation of serious assaults, her continued facilitation of the father’s return after arrests, and her denial of drug-use concerns. The court analyzed subsection (D) as an endangering environment case and subsection (E) as an endangering course-of-conduct case, concluding that the mother’s failure to protect the children from recurring violence and instability supported both predicates. The same evidence also supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest.

Litigation Takeaway

"In family-law cases, minimization of domestic violence can be as damaging as the violence itself. A parent’s recantation, selective memory, denial of risk, and continued association with a violent partner can support findings on endangerment, credibility, protective capacity, and best interest across termination, custody, modification, and protective-order litigation."