Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1216 opinions found
WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio
COA11
In WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio, a limited partner sought access to partnership books and records after seeing apparent disparities in distributions and unexplained accounting related to partnership assets. The partnership refused, arguing Fenoglio may have transferred his interest in an earlier divorce, that the records could be used in collateral litigation, and that he had to sign a unilateral confidentiality agreement before inspection. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Fenoglio’s stated purpose—determining whether partnership assets were properly managed and whether revenues and expenses were properly accounted for and allocated—was a proper purpose under Texas Business Organizations Code section 153.552. The court further held that speculation about other litigation, an unresolved allegation that his interest had been transferred in the divorce, and reliance on a general prudence clause in the partnership agreement did not defeat his contractual and statutory inspection rights. It affirmed summary judgment enforcing inspection and the award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family-law dispute involves an entity interest, frame any records demand around valuation, accounting, distributions, tracing, and management review. This case shows that a proper-purpose inspection right cannot be defeated by speculation about divorce-related litigation, unsupported claims that the ownership interest changed hands in the divorce, or extra-contractual confidentiality conditions."
In the Interest of J.G.S., a Child
COA01
In In re J.G.S., the First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights and held that her complaint that the Department failed to provide ADA accommodations in her service plan was waived because she never raised it in the trial court. Mother argued the court should overlook preservation because termination implicates fundamental rights and because Family Code section 161.001(f) and (g) require the Department to prove reasonable efforts to return the child. The court rejected both arguments, reaffirmed In re C.M., and concluded that an ADA-based challenge to reunification services remains an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved below. The court also held that Mother’s request for more time, based only on scheduling and technical problems, did not preserve a disability-accommodation complaint, and it affirmed the termination order on the challenged predicate grounds and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"If disability affects a parent’s ability to complete services or participate in a family-law case, do not assume the court or opposing party’s awareness preserves the issue. Make a specific ADA or accommodation request on the record, tie it to the client’s actual limitations, seek a ruling, and connect any continuance or extension request to that accommodation need. In Texas family cases, even in termination appeals, unpreserved accommodation complaints are likely waived."
Ryan Keith Markowski v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Markowski v. State, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for violating a family-violence bond condition under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A). The court rejected his attempt to treat the case like a protective-order prosecution, explaining that the charging instrument alleged violation of a bond condition, not a protective order, so the State did not need to prove the statutory pedigree of a protective order. Applying the legal-sufficiency standard, the court held the evidence was enough because the bond-condition order was admitted, it prohibited the defendant from coming within 200 yards of the protected person’s residence, officers testified the underlying criminal case was still pending, and officers observed him within the prohibited zone. The court further held that the lack of an express expiration date did not make the bond condition unenforceable while the underlying criminal case remained unresolved.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a family-violence bond condition expires just because the order omits an end date. In parallel family and criminal cases, lawyers should obtain the actual bond paperwork, confirm whether the criminal case is still pending, and make sure temporary orders, residence access, and exchange plans do not require conduct that would violate a still-active criminal stay-away condition."
Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina
COA09
In Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina, the Beaumont Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the parties had an informal marriage under Texas Family Code section 2.401. Medina sought to prove a common-law marriage as part of her divorce and property-division case, while Lara argued the evidence was insufficient because the parties filed separate taxes, lacked joint financial accounts, and did not consistently use traditional marital markers. The court analyzed the totality of the evidence under the three statutory elements—agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others as married—and emphasized that, in a bench trial without findings of fact, implied findings favor the judgment if supported by the record. Crediting testimony that the parties lived together as husband and wife, introduced each other as spouses, celebrated their marriage, and were described in at least one property-related document as husband and wife, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the informal-marriage finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informal-marriage cases are usually decided on credibility and record-building, not on whether the couple checked every traditional marriage box. If there is some evidence of agreement, cohabitation as spouses, and holding out, appellate courts will heavily defer to the trial judge—especially when no findings of fact are requested. For lawyers, that means the real battle is at trial: build corroboration if you are proving the marriage, and do more than point to separate finances or tax filings if you are trying to defeat it."
In the Interest of V.R., A.R., and M.R., Children
COA02
In In re V.R., the father appealed an order dismissing his child-support enforcement-related motions, arguing the Office of the Attorney General lacked authority to continue withholding and garnishing income and that various procedural defects required reversal. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the dispositive associate-judge hearing was not included in the appellate reporter’s record. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and Christiansen v. Prezelski, the court presumed the missing hearing record supported the trial court’s ruling and held that, without that record, the father could not show reversible error. The court also rejected attempts to rely on materials not admitted below and noted that new complaints raised for the first time in a reply brief were not properly before the court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your appeal depends on what happened at the hearing, you must bring the reporter’s record. In Texas family-law cases, an incomplete appellate record usually means the court will presume the missing evidence supports the judgment, which can doom challenges to enforcement, modification, custody, and other post-judgment rulings before the merits are ever reached."
Krueger v. Krueger
COA02
In Krueger v. Krueger, the wife tried to amend her divorce counterpetition ten days before trial to add new fault-based theories—including cruelty, family violence, adultery, and waste—and to seek a disproportionate share of the community estate. The trial court struck the late amendments and excluded related business records, affidavits, and supplemental discovery because those theories had not been timely pleaded or disclosed and would unfairly surprise the husband after discovery had already proceeded on different claims. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Rule 63 allowed the trial court to deny the late amendments as prejudicial and that Rule 193.6 supported exclusion of the late-produced supporting evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to pursue fault-based property arguments in a Texas divorce, plead them early and disclose the supporting evidence on time. Waiting until the eve of trial to add disproportionate-division theories can get both the claims and the evidence thrown out as unfair surprise."
Waleski v. State
COA11
In Waleski v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that a revocation judgment may be reformed when the written judgment incorrectly states the pleas made in open court. Waleski pleaded true to only one alleged supervision violation and not true to the other two, but the written revocation judgments recited that he pleaded true to all three. The court concluded revocation was still proper because one proven violation is enough to support revocation, and Waleski’s plea of true plus supporting evidence established at least one violation. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) and Bigley v. State, the court modified the judgments to accurately reflect the actual pleas and affirmed them as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not ignore inaccurate recitals in a signed order just because the judgment itself is likely to stand. If the written order does not match what happened in court, ask the trial or appellate court to correct it so the record “speaks the truth,” especially where those inaccuracies could affect future enforcement, modification, protective-order, or credibility disputes."
In the Interest of T.L.F.
COA09
In In the Interest of T.L.F., the Beaumont Court of Appeals reviewed a mother’s appeal from an order terminating her parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (L), along with a best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). Appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal and moved to withdraw. The court independently reviewed the entire record, confirmed counsel’s no-merit assessment, and found no arguable ground for reversal. The court therefore affirmed the termination order. But relying on Texas Family Code §§ 107.013 and 107.016 and In re P.M., the court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding that appointed counsel in termination appeals generally must continue representation through further appellate proceedings unless additional good cause for withdrawal is shown.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas parental-termination appeals, a strong trial record can leave little room for reversal, and an Anders affirmance will stand if the appellate court finds no arguable issue after its own review. Just as important, appointed counsel cannot assume that filing an Anders brief ends the representation; absent good cause, counsel must stay on through the completion or waiver of further appellate review."
In Re Jessica Coronado
COA11
In this mandamus proceeding arising from temporary orders in a divorce and SAPCR, the mother challenged the trial court’s appointment of both parents as temporary joint managing conservators and a travel-exchange provision after evidence showed the father physically abused her son from a prior relationship. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 153.004(b) is a mandatory bar to joint managing conservatorship when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse against a child, spouse, or the other parent. The court relied on the mother’s testimony about two bruising incidents, photographs, text messages, and permissible adverse inferences from the father’s repeated Fifth Amendment invocations to conclude the abuse evidence was credible. It also held the travel requirement was an abuse of discretion because the trial court expressly imposed it to burden the mother for moving, not to protect the child’s safety and welfare. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If credible abuse evidence is in the record, § 153.004(b) does more than weigh against joint conservatorship—it forbids it, even in temporary orders and even when the abuse was directed at a stepchild rather than the subject child. For litigators, the case underscores the importance of building a corroborated abuse record and preserving any punitive, child-untethered temporary-order rulings for mandamus."
The State of Texas v. Frankie Lee Hines
COA08
In Hines, the State repeatedly dismissed and reindicted child-sexual-abuse charges arising from the same underlying allegations while the defendant remained incarcerated for more than two years. The Eighth Court of Appeals applied the Barker v. Wingo speedy-trial factors across the entire prosecution timeline, holding the clock did not restart with each new indictment because all charges stemmed from the same factual nucleus. The court found the extraordinary delay, the State’s trial-readiness and charging-theory problems, Hines’s repeated assertion of his speedy-trial right, and resulting prejudice from prolonged incarceration and evidentiary drift supported dismissal with prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"Changing pleadings or legal theories does not erase delay when the case is still built on the same core facts. In family-law cases involving evolving abuse allegations, lawyers should preserve a unified chronology, force clarification of what actually changed, and show concrete prejudice from repeated resets, fading witness memories, and ongoing temporary restrictions."