Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
787 opinions found
In re Levi Hardy
COA08
After a bench-trial divorce decree was signed, the wife moved for new trial and, after the original judge recused, a successor judge granted the motion without stating reasons. The husband sought mandamus, arguing the order was arbitrary because it set aside a nonjury decree without explanation and was entered by a judge who had not heard the evidence. The Eighth Court of Appeals denied relief, holding that the Texas Supreme Court’s merits-based mandamus review of new-trial orders under Columbia Medical, United Scaffolding, and Toyota is tied to protection of the constitutional right to a jury trial and has not been extended to bench-trial family-law cases. Because this was a nonjury divorce case and the relator did not show the order was void or otherwise exceptionally subject to mandamus review, any complaint about the new-trial ruling must await appeal after a new final judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law bench trials, do not count on mandamus to undo an order granting new trial—even if the order gives no reasons and even if a successor judge entered it. Treat motions for new trial as a serious merits threat, make a full record in opposition, preserve findings and post-judgment issues carefully, and prepare for retrial unless you have a true voidness or other extraordinary mandamus ground."
In the Interest of E.A.A., a Child
COA12
In *In the Interest of E.A.A., a Child*, the Twelfth Court of Appeals dismissed a child-related appeal after the pro se appellant failed to file the docketing statement required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1. The court sent two notices and gave the appellant an opportunity to cure, but no docketing statement was filed by the final deadline. Applying Rule 42.3(c), the court held dismissal was proper because the appellant failed to comply with the appellate rules after notice. The court also emphasized that pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as attorneys, so self-representation did not excuse the default.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family-law appeals can be lost before briefing begins if basic appellate filing requirements are ignored. Treat the docketing statement and other initial appellate filings as mandatory, monitor deficiency notices immediately, and do not assume a pro se party will receive procedural leniency."
In the Interest of L.W. & M.W., Children
COA12
The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed a modification order removing the mother from managing conservatorship and appointing the children’s maternal grandparents as joint managing conservators. The court held the evidence was sufficient to show a material and substantial change and that modification was in the children’s best interest where the mother’s home had become an unsafe, neglectful environment involving recurring parties, alcohol and drug use, sexual activity, criminal conduct, firearms incidents, and unstable overnight guests. Applying deferential abuse-of-discretion review, and implying findings in support of the judgment because no findings of fact were requested, the court concluded the evidence also rebutted the parental presumption by supporting a finding that the mother’s continued appointment would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development. The court further upheld unusually severe restrictions on the mother’s possession and communication because the trial court expressly found those limits were necessary to protect the children.
Litigation Takeaway
"In nonparent modification cases, grandparents can overcome the parental presumption with a strong, fact-specific record showing a persistent pattern of neglectful or dangerous home conditions—not just that they offer a better home. For parents, repeated evidence of drugs, alcohol, criminal activity, unsafe guests, and instability around the children is extremely hard to overcome on appeal, especially without requested findings of fact. Build or attack the case at trial, because abuse-of-discretion review gives trial courts broad latitude to impose even very restrictive access orders when tied to child safety."
In the Matter of the Name Change of A.J.G., a Child
COA08
In *In the Matter of the Name Change of A.J.G., a Child*, the El Paso Court of Appeals reversed a trial court order requiring a mother to pay $400 in reduced court costs after she filed a Rule 145 statement showing she could not afford fees in a minor name-change case. The appellate court held that her sworn indigency statement and supporting benefit, income, asset, and expense information were uncontroverted, and that the trial court abused its discretion by relying on an off-record interview process and attached documents rather than admissible evidence presented in a proper evidentiary hearing. Because the existing record showed inability to pay and no valid evidentiary basis for reduced costs, the court directed that the case proceed without payment of court costs or fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-law client files a compliant Rule 145 indigency statement, the court cannot impose filing fees or even reduced costs based on informal interviews, assumptions, or off-record documents. Make sure any challenge to indigency is handled through a formal, on-the-record evidentiary hearing with admissible proof; otherwise, the indigency showing should stand."
Brooks v. Wycough
COA12
In Brooks v. Wycough, a rural property dispute returned to the Tyler Court of Appeals after the trial court struck Brooks’s affidavit as a sham and granted summary judgment against his remaining equitable claims. The appellate court held that the sham-affidavit doctrine applies only when a later affidavit clearly contradicts prior sworn testimony on a material point without adequate explanation. Because Wycough relied on alleged inconsistencies between Brooks’s affidavit and his pleadings—and especially superseded pleadings—the doctrine did not apply. The court emphasized that superseded pleadings are displaced by amended pleadings and that pleadings generally are not competent summary-judgment evidence. It therefore held the trial court erred in disregarding the affidavit as a sham on that basis and rejected expanding the doctrine beyond its evidentiary foundation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not try to strike an affidavit as a sham by comparing it to earlier pleadings. In Texas summary-judgment practice, you need a contradiction with prior sworn testimony, not just inconsistent advocacy in petitions. For family lawyers, this is especially useful in property and reimbursement disputes where theories evolve through amended pleadings."
In the Interest of C.S.S.
COA03
The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s refusal to terminate child-support wage withholding where the obligor claimed he had overpaid, but the Office of the Attorney General’s records and the trial court’s unchallenged findings showed unpaid arrearages and accrued interest remained. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, treated the unchallenged findings as binding, and held that under the Family Code, withholding may continue after current support ends if arrears and interest are still owed. Because the obligor did not produce competent evidence disproving the OAG’s accounting, the trial court properly denied relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Ending current child support does not end income withholding if arrearages and interest remain. If you want withholding terminated, you need a real evidentiary accounting—not just a claim that the numbers seem too high—and on appeal you must specifically challenge findings of fact or they will likely control the outcome."
Gallegos v. State
COA04
In Gallegos v. State, the Fourth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support an indecency-with-a-child count alleging contact with a child’s breast even though the child said the defendant touched her “chest.” The court analyzed the issue under a context-based sufficiency framework, relying on the child’s young age, her undeveloped anatomy, and her testimony distinguishing her “chest” from other body areas like her stomach and tummy. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Arroyo, the court concluded a rational factfinder could infer she meant her breast area. The court also rejected unpreserved jury-charge complaints for lack of egregious harm and upheld the assessed court costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child’s imperfect or age-limited body-part vocabulary does not automatically destroy the evidentiary value of the child’s statement. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, courts may rely on context—age, developmental stage, narrative detail, and differentiation among body areas—to draw reasonable inferences about what the child meant. The case also underscores that charge complaints must be preserved to have real appellate traction."
In the Interest of D.A.V. and N.B.V., Children
COA04
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR modification order naming the father sole managing conservator and the mother possessory conservator because the mother’s pro se appeal was fatally defective. After striking her original brief and allowing rebriefing, the court held the amended brief still failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 because it lacked record citations, legal authority, and developed analysis. The court also emphasized that the appellate record did not include the reporter’s record from the November 20, 2025 modification hearing that produced the order under review, making meaningful review impossible. Applying the rule that even pro se litigants must comply with appellate procedure, the court held the mother waived her complaints and affirmed the modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law appeals, the merits do not matter if the appellant cannot present a compliant brief and the reporter’s record from the actual hearing that produced the challenged order. Preservation, Rule 38.1 compliance, and record control are often outcome-determinative—especially in custody modification cases reviewed for abuse of discretion."
Gomez v. Richard
COA06
In Gomez v. Richard, the Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could render summary judgment after a defendant died but before any estate representative or heir was substituted into the case. After a suggestion of death was filed, the trial court still granted no-evidence summary judgment for the deceased driver and his employer. The appellate court held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 152, once a party dies, the suit cannot proceed against that person unless a proper substitute—such as an executor, administrator, or heir—is brought in through scire facias or an equivalent substitution procedure. Because no substitute was joined for Richard, he became a legal non-entity for purposes of the litigation, and the judgment as to him was void. The court vacated that portion of the judgment and dismissed that part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. As to the surviving employer, however, the court held the no-evidence motion was sufficiently specific and that the plaintiffs failed to produce more than a scintilla of evidence, so the summary judgment for the employer was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party dies before judgment, stop and fix the parties before the court does anything else. In Texas, failing to substitute a proper representative under Rule 152 can make a later order void, not merely erroneous. In family cases, that gives lawyers a powerful basis to challenge or prevent rulings entered after a spouse, conservator, or other key litigant dies."
Armando Jesus Pedraza v. The State of Texas
COA01
In *Armando Jesus Pedraza v. The State of Texas*, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a 30-year punishment judgment after Pedraza argued his lawyer was ineffective during punishment. He claimed counsel should have objected to hearsay testimony about an online article describing prior violent conduct and wrongly advised him that he could testify while still invoking the Fifth Amendment about pending charges. The court applied *Strickland* and held the record was too undeveloped to show deficient performance or prejudice. Because counsel had no opportunity to explain the reasons for not objecting or for calling Pedraza to testify, the court would not speculate on a silent record, especially given the already extensive punishment evidence of prior violence, convictions, bond violations, and pending charges. The court therefore affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case overlaps with criminal exposure, lawyers must prepare clients carefully before they testify because taking the stand may waive any ability to refuse related cross-examination. The case also shows that appellate complaints about bad evidence or bad strategy usually fail without a well-developed record explaining counsel’s choices, so trial lawyers should preserve objections, seek limiting rulings when appropriate, and build a record if strategy may later be challenged."