Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1003 opinions found
Perricone v. Perricone
COA11
In Perricone v. Perricone, the Eastland Court of Appeals addressed a contested Rule 145 statement of inability to afford court costs in litigation arising from divorce and custody-related disputes. After a defendant challenged the indigency filing, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found the declarant’s financial statement contained material misrepresentations and omissions, including unsupported claims of means-tested benefits, undisclosed assets, and inaccurate income and valuation information. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f), the court held that once a contest is filed, the burden shifts to the declarant to prove inability to pay by a preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s credibility findings and concluded the record supported denial of indigency status. The court also held that the challenger’s unsworn declaration was sufficient because it substantially complied with Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 132.001 despite minor technical defects.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 145 form is only the starting point. If the other side contests indigency, the party claiming inability to pay must back it up with credible, documented proof, and courts will closely examine omissions, inconsistencies, household support, and prior financial representations. For family-law litigators, Perricone is a roadmap both for attacking weak indigency claims and for preparing defensible ones."
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed a notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still insufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within the grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion until after the grace period had expired, the late explanation could not be construed to revive jurisdiction. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an appeal may be accelerated, treat Rule 26.3 as a two-step jurisdictional checklist: if the notice is late but still within the 15-day grace period, file both the notice of appeal and a motion for extension within that same window. A later explanation will not save the appeal."
Youlan Varasteh-Tafti v. Manouchehr Varasteh-Tafti
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the wife challenged the trial court’s characterization of several assets as the husband’s separate property and argued the record lacked enough valuation evidence for a just-and-right division. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the husband rebutted the community-property presumption with clear and convincing evidence through specific, uncontroverted testimony that one property bought during marriage was purchased entirely with premarital investment funds and that two other properties were owned before marriage. The court explained that while documentary tracing is often helpful, it is not always required when credible testimony clearly identifies the source and character of the property and the opposing spouse offers no contrary evidence. The court also rejected the wife’s argument that paying expenses or providing unpaid labor created an ownership interest, noting those facts may relate to reimbursement but do not change title. Finally, because the wife failed to present valuation evidence at trial, she could not complain on appeal that the trial court lacked sufficient information to divide the estate or show the division was an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas property-characterization fights, uncontroverted live testimony can be enough to prove separate property even without perfect paper tracing—but only if it is specific, credible, and unrebutted. On the flip side, a spouse who does not challenge tracing testimony or put on valuation evidence will have a very hard time overturning the property division on appeal."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Melissa A. Paredes v. Trini J. Paredes, Jr. and In the Interest of V.N.P. and T.J.P. III, Children
COA05
In Paredes v. Paredes, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed an enforcement judgment based on a divorce decree provision requiring the wife to pay the husband “twelve months’ worth of the proceeds” if she sold certain real property. After the wife sold the property, the husband asked the trial court to enforce the decree and relied on an email and his own calculation to argue the phrase meant one year’s worth of annualized net proceeds. The appellate court held that the decree’s operative language was not merely ambiguous but facially unintelligible, because proceeds cannot coherently be measured in units of time. Applying Texas law requiring judgments to be definite enough to be executed from their four corners, the court concluded the provision was a nullity and could not be enforced through extra-textual evidence or the parties’ claimed shared understanding. The court therefore reversed the damages award and the derivative attorney’s-fees awards and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree’s property language does not state a clear, mathematically coherent obligation on its face, it may be unenforceable altogether. Family-law litigators should draft future-sale and deferred-payment provisions with precise formulas, defined terms, and objective triggers, because emails, testimony, or course of dealing will not rescue a decree that is unintelligible as written."
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed the notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still not enough to invoke jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within that grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension in the appellate court that reasonably explains the delay. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion or equivalent filing until after the grace period expired, the late explanation could not cure the defect, and the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law-related appeals, a late notice of appeal is not self-curing just because it lands within Rule 26.3’s grace period. If the notice is late, counsel must also file a Rule 26.3 extension motion in the appellate court within that same window, with a reasonable explanation. Do not wait for a clerk’s defect notice or assume a later response will save jurisdiction."
In Re Richard Earl Purkey Jr. and Ashlyn Purkey Jordan
COA09
In re Purkey holds that a district court cannot use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 to authorize pre-suit depositions aimed at developing claims that belong in a statutory probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction. The petitioners sought depositions to investigate alleged lack of capacity, undue influence, and trust-related issues surrounding a decedent’s 2024 will and amended trust. Looking past the Rule 202 label to the substance of the requested discovery, the Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded the anticipated claims were classic probate matters—a will contest, an effort to set aside probate, and trust disputes incident to an estate. Because Rule 202 does not expand subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court exceeded its authority by ordering the depositions. The court conditionally granted mandamus, holding that the improper pre-suit discovery could not be adequately cured on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing a Rule 202 petition, identify the real dispute and the court that actually has power to hear it. If the discovery is really designed to build a will contest, probate challenge, or trust dispute tied to an estate, you must proceed in probate court—not through a separate district-court discovery action. For family lawyers, the lesson is to screen early for probate overlap and avoid using Rule 202 as an end-run around jurisdictional limits."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Caroline Brookshire and Trenton Brookshire and in the Interest of R.L.B., D.B.B. and H.A.B., Children
COA12
In this Texas family-law appeal arising from a contested divorce and SAPCR, the appellee argued the judgment should be affirmed because the appellate record was supposedly incomplete: although audio and video exhibits were admitted and included in the record, the court reporter did not identify the exact timestamps or clips played at trial. The Tyler Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and held that the incomplete-record presumption in Rule 34.6(c) applies only when an appellant elects to proceed on a partial reporter’s record. Because the appellant requested the complete reporter’s record and the admitted digital exhibits were actually included, the absence of clip-by-clip transcription or timestamp notation did not make the record incomplete. The court therefore rejected the appellee’s request for a presumption in favor of the judgment and allowed merits review to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want appellate review of digital evidence, request the full reporter’s record and make sure the admitted audio/video exhibits are included. Brookshire also teaches trial lawyers not to rely on the court reporter to identify clips—state timestamps and excerpts on the record whenever possible—but an appellee cannot turn that imprecision alone into an automatic affirmance under Rule 34.6(c)."
In re Bradley Welsh
COA02
In a child-support enforcement proceeding, the trial court orally found Bradley Welsh in contempt on April 8, 2026 and ordered him confined for sixty days, but did not sign the written contempt and commitment order until thirty-six days later. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that due process permits only a short and reasonable time between an oral contempt finding with confinement and the signed written order under Ex parte Calvillo Amaya. The court rejected arguments that later work-release discussions meant the contempt ruling was incomplete or that Welsh invited the delay, concluding the hearing had effectively ended and the postponement was caused by the court’s process. Because the delayed written order violated due process, the contempt and commitment order was void, and the court granted habeas relief and vacated the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas contempt practice, an oral confinement ruling is not enough. If a court orally finds contempt and orders jail time, the written contempt and commitment order must be prepared and signed almost immediately; otherwise the order may be void regardless of the underlying violation. Family-law lawyers should have proposed contempt orders ready at the hearing and, for respondents, should closely compare the oral ruling date to the signature date for a potential habeas challenge."
In the Interest of J.J. III and D.R.L.J., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and he also challenged best interest. But he did not challenge the separate constructive-abandonment finding under subsection (N). The Fourth Court of Appeals applied the settled rule that one valid predicate ground under section 161.001(b)(1), coupled with a best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2), is enough to affirm termination. Because subsection (N) was an independent ground and was left unchallenged, the court treated it as established on appeal and affirmed the termination order without needing to decide the father’s attacks on subsections (D) and (E).
Litigation Takeaway
"In a termination appeal, you must challenge every independent predicate ground that can support the judgment. If even one statutory ground is left unchallenged, the court can affirm so long as the best-interest finding stands, making issue selection on appeal potentially case-dispositive."
In re A.T.
COA04
In re A.T. involved a post-divorce enforcement action seeking criminal contempt for missed child-support and medical-support payments allegedly due in 2022. The enforcement motion and resulting contempt order were both based on a November 8, 2019 final divorce decree, but that decree had been set aside on February 21, 2020 and replaced the same day by an amended decree. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that criminal contempt requires disobedience of a valid, operative court order, so a vacated decree cannot serve as the basis for contempt. Because the relator was not restrained under the contempt order, mandamus—not habeas—was the proper remedy, and the court conditionally granted mandamus, holding the contempt order void.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing or defending any family-law enforcement action, confirm the exact operative order in effect on the date of the alleged violation. If contempt is based on a vacated or superseded decree, the contempt order is void, and defects in notice, service, and the required order to appear can create additional due-process problems."