Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Foster v. Wise
COA01
In Foster v. Wise, the respondent challenged a default protective order by restricted appeal, arguing the record did not show the notice and service required by Family Code sections 82.041 and 82.043. The court examined only whether error was apparent on the face of the record and held the citation itself functioned as the required notice because it included the hearing setting and default warning. It further held that a citation bearing the court’s seal and a deputy clerk’s typed name satisfied the statutory signature requirement in a nonelectronic-service context, that the return sufficiently showed personal service, and that service of an amended application was unnecessary because the amendment did not seek a more onerous judgment. The court therefore affirmed the default lifetime protective order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Default orders in family cases usually survive restricted appeal when the clerk’s record and return facially show strict compliance with statutory notice and service requirements. Substance matters more than labels, a typed clerk signature on a sealed nonelectronic citation may be enough, and amended pleadings do not require re-service unless they seek more onerous relief."
In the Interest of D.K.L., D.C.L., and R.R.M., Children
COA13
In this SAPCR-related appeal, the appellant tried to challenge a final order signed on October 14, 2025, by filing notices of appeal in July 2026. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and held that the notice of appeal was untimely under either the 30-day deadline or the 90-day deadline that would have applied even if a qualifying post-judgment motion had been filed. Relying on Mitschke v. Borromeo, the court explained that a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite. It also rejected the appellant’s argument that the final order was void and therefore could be attacked at any time, holding that an allegedly void order still cannot be reviewed through an untimely direct appeal. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if the notice of appeal is late, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction, and calling the order “void” will not save a direct appeal. Lawyers must calendar the Rule 26.1 deadline from the date the order is signed and quickly evaluate other remedies if that deadline is missed."
Waleski v. State
COA11
In Waleski v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed revocation of community supervision after Michael Waleski admitted he drank alcohol in violation of a supervision condition in cases involving continuous family violence and protective-order violations. The court applied settled Texas revocation law: the State need prove only one supervision violation by a preponderance of the evidence, and a plea of true alone can support revocation. Because Waleski pleaded true to the alcohol-use allegation, disputes about the other alleged violations did not matter. The court also held that he could not use the revocation appeal to challenge the reasonableness of conditions imposed in the original community-supervision order. It modified the judgments only to correct clerical errors misstating his pleas and otherwise affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A single admitted supervision violation can decide the whole case. For family-law litigators, if a party is on supervision tied to family violence or protective-order conduct, even a 'technical' violation like alcohol use may become powerful evidence on credibility, safety, conservatorship, and possession restrictions. Get the revocation records early, identify any plea of true, and do not assume disputed allegations matter once one violation is proven."
Mora v. Morales
COA13
In Mora v. Morales, the appellant tried to use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a to extend post-judgment and appellate deadlines after claiming late notice of a final judgment. The court held the Rule 306a(5) motion was defective because its sworn allegations referred only to one lawyer as “counsel” and failed to negate timely notice or actual knowledge as to the client and another attorney of record. Without a proper Rule 306a showing, plenary power expired 30 days after the original judgment, making the later amended judgment void. The court also held that even if Rule 306a had applied, the notice of appeal was still untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the alleged date of first actual knowledge. The amended judgment was vacated and the appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you are relying on Rule 306a to revive deadlines in a family-law case, your sworn motion must specifically address the client and every attorney of record—not just one lawyer or “counsel” generally. And even with a valid Rule 306a motion, you must immediately recalculate and protect the new appellate deadlines."
Deola T. Ali v. Discover Bank
COA14
After Discover Bank obtained a money judgment, it sought a post-judgment receiver based largely on alleged deemed admissions from unanswered requests for admissions. The court held that Ali’s filed Rule 21a certificate of service created a presumption that his discovery responses were timely served, and Discover’s unsworn motion claiming nonreceipt was not competent evidence to rebut that presumption. Because the requests were not deemed admitted and Discover offered no other competent evidence that the judgment remained unpaid or that Ali owned non-exempt property subject to turnover, the trial court abused its discretion in appointing a receiver. The receivership order was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In post-judgment enforcement, especially turnover or receivership proceedings, do not rely on unsworn assertions to establish discovery default or statutory elements. A Rule 21a certificate of service can defeat deemed admissions unless rebutted with competent evidence, so family-law litigators must build the record with affidavits, testimony, payment proof, and evidence of non-exempt property."
Ryan Keith Markowski v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Markowski v. State, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for violating a family-violence bond condition under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A). The court rejected his attempt to treat the case like a protective-order prosecution, explaining that the charging instrument alleged violation of a bond condition, not a protective order, so the State did not need to prove the statutory pedigree of a protective order. Applying the legal-sufficiency standard, the court held the evidence was enough because the bond-condition order was admitted, it prohibited the defendant from coming within 200 yards of the protected person’s residence, officers testified the underlying criminal case was still pending, and officers observed him within the prohibited zone. The court further held that the lack of an express expiration date did not make the bond condition unenforceable while the underlying criminal case remained unresolved.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a family-violence bond condition expires just because the order omits an end date. In parallel family and criminal cases, lawyers should obtain the actual bond paperwork, confirm whether the criminal case is still pending, and make sure temporary orders, residence access, and exchange plans do not require conduct that would violate a still-active criminal stay-away condition."
WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio
COA11
In WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio, a limited partner sought access to partnership books and records after seeing apparent disparities in distributions and unexplained accounting related to partnership assets. The partnership refused, arguing Fenoglio may have transferred his interest in an earlier divorce, that the records could be used in collateral litigation, and that he had to sign a unilateral confidentiality agreement before inspection. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Fenoglio’s stated purpose—determining whether partnership assets were properly managed and whether revenues and expenses were properly accounted for and allocated—was a proper purpose under Texas Business Organizations Code section 153.552. The court further held that speculation about other litigation, an unresolved allegation that his interest had been transferred in the divorce, and reliance on a general prudence clause in the partnership agreement did not defeat his contractual and statutory inspection rights. It affirmed summary judgment enforcing inspection and the award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family-law dispute involves an entity interest, frame any records demand around valuation, accounting, distributions, tracing, and management review. This case shows that a proper-purpose inspection right cannot be defeated by speculation about divorce-related litigation, unsupported claims that the ownership interest changed hands in the divorce, or extra-contractual confidentiality conditions."
In the Interest of J.G.S., a Child
COA01
In In re J.G.S., the First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights and held that her complaint that the Department failed to provide ADA accommodations in her service plan was waived because she never raised it in the trial court. Mother argued the court should overlook preservation because termination implicates fundamental rights and because Family Code section 161.001(f) and (g) require the Department to prove reasonable efforts to return the child. The court rejected both arguments, reaffirmed In re C.M., and concluded that an ADA-based challenge to reunification services remains an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved below. The court also held that Mother’s request for more time, based only on scheduling and technical problems, did not preserve a disability-accommodation complaint, and it affirmed the termination order on the challenged predicate grounds and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"If disability affects a parent’s ability to complete services or participate in a family-law case, do not assume the court or opposing party’s awareness preserves the issue. Make a specific ADA or accommodation request on the record, tie it to the client’s actual limitations, seek a ruling, and connect any continuance or extension request to that accommodation need. In Texas family cases, even in termination appeals, unpreserved accommodation complaints are likely waived."
Krueger v. Krueger
COA02
In Krueger v. Krueger, the wife tried to amend her divorce counterpetition ten days before trial to add new fault-based theories—including cruelty, family violence, adultery, and waste—and to seek a disproportionate share of the community estate. The trial court struck the late amendments and excluded related business records, affidavits, and supplemental discovery because those theories had not been timely pleaded or disclosed and would unfairly surprise the husband after discovery had already proceeded on different claims. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Rule 63 allowed the trial court to deny the late amendments as prejudicial and that Rule 193.6 supported exclusion of the late-produced supporting evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to pursue fault-based property arguments in a Texas divorce, plead them early and disclose the supporting evidence on time. Waiting until the eve of trial to add disproportionate-division theories can get both the claims and the evidence thrown out as unfair surprise."
Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina
COA09
In Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina, the Beaumont Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the parties had an informal marriage under Texas Family Code section 2.401. Medina sought to prove a common-law marriage as part of her divorce and property-division case, while Lara argued the evidence was insufficient because the parties filed separate taxes, lacked joint financial accounts, and did not consistently use traditional marital markers. The court analyzed the totality of the evidence under the three statutory elements—agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others as married—and emphasized that, in a bench trial without findings of fact, implied findings favor the judgment if supported by the record. Crediting testimony that the parties lived together as husband and wife, introduced each other as spouses, celebrated their marriage, and were described in at least one property-related document as husband and wife, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the informal-marriage finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informal-marriage cases are usually decided on credibility and record-building, not on whether the couple checked every traditional marriage box. If there is some evidence of agreement, cohabitation as spouses, and holding out, appellate courts will heavily defer to the trial judge—especially when no findings of fact are requested. For lawyers, that means the real battle is at trial: build corroboration if you are proving the marriage, and do more than point to separate finances or tax filings if you are trying to defeat it."