Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
James Hale v. Lanesborough Corporation and Texas SFI Partnership 24, Ltd.
COA01
In James Hale v. Lanesborough Corporation and Texas SFI Partnership 24, Ltd., the plaintiff claimed repeated apartment fire alarms caused his hearing loss. The defendants filed a no-evidence summary-judgment motion challenging causation. The First Court of Appeals held that because medical causation required expert testimony, Hale had to submit admissible expert summary-judgment evidence, such as an affidavit or deposition excerpts. His expert designation and Rule 194 disclosure were only notice tools, not evidence, and counsel’s description of expected testimony did not raise a fact issue. The court also held the trial court acted within its discretion by hearing the motion after the docket-control deadline, effectively modifying that deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert disclosures are not evidence. If a no-evidence motion targets an issue that requires expert proof, you must put admissible expert testimony into the summary-judgment record or lose—even if the expert has already been designated. Also, do not assume a docket-control deadline will bar a late summary-judgment motion absent a concrete showing of prejudice."
Moises Depazrobles v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Moises Depazrobles v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld admission of a defendant’s Spanish-language interview translated into English by a police-provided interpreter. The court analyzed whether the translation created an additional hearsay layer and, applying Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(C) and (D) and Saavedra v. State, held it did not because the record showed the defendant understood, accepted, and used the interpreter as his conduit. The court relied on the defendant’s express confirmation that he understood the interpreter, the detective’s testimony about the interpreter’s certification and prior work, the absence of evidence of any motive to distort, and the defendant’s responsive words and conduct during the interview. On that foundation, the court held the translated statements were admissible as party admissions and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases, statements made through an interpreter may come in as the opposing party’s own admission without a second hearsay problem if you build a Rule 801(e)(2) foundation showing the party authorized or adopted the interpreter and the translation was reliable. The practical lesson is to develop—or attack—the record on interpreter qualifications, dialect, confirmation of understanding, opportunities to clarify, neutrality, and conduct consistent with comprehension."
Villarreal v. State
COA10
In Villarreal v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a child’s forensic outcry admitted under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072 is substantive evidence that may be considered for its truth, even when the child later fully recants. The child initially gave a detailed forensic interview describing sexual abuse, but more than two years later recanted and maintained at trial that the accusation was false. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and relying on Rodriguez v. State, the court concluded that once the article 38.072 predicate is satisfied, the prior outcry can alone support the verdict without corroboration. The recantation created a credibility issue for the jury, not a legal-sufficiency defect, so the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A later recantation does not automatically erase the force of a child’s earlier disclosure. If the prior statement comes in through a proper substantive evidentiary pathway, the factfinder may still rely on it heavily, making admissibility and foundation critical battlegrounds in custody, protective-order, and conservatorship litigation."
In the Interest of Z.M., a Child
COA11
In In the Interest of Z.M., the father argued the trial court lost jurisdiction in a Department termination case because the statutory dismissal deadline under Texas Family Code Section 263.401 expired without a valid extension. The Eleventh Court of Appeals examined the actual procedural record, including the extension order and the monitored-return posture under Section 263.403, and held that the record showed a substantively compliant extension that preserved the trial court’s authority. Because the alleged defects were procedural criticisms rather than a true failure to satisfy the statutory prerequisites for continuing jurisdiction, dismissal for want of jurisdiction was not required.
Litigation Takeaway
"Deadline-based jurisdiction attacks rise or fall on the record. If you want to challenge or defend a Chapter 263 dismissal deadline, build a precise timeline, tie each order to the governing statute, and preserve objections specifically—Texas appellate courts will not treat every technical flaw in an extension order as jurisdiction-destroying if the record otherwise shows a valid statutory basis to keep the case alive."
Ex parte Randy Louis Dupree
COA09
In Ex parte Randy Louis Dupree, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over an attempted appeal from the summary dismissal of an SVP detainee’s habeas application, but it could treat the filing as a mandamus proceeding because Dupree expressly requested that alternative relief. On the merits, the court applied mandamus standards and rejected Dupree’s as-applied constitutional challenge to GPS-monitoring requirements under Health and Safety Code section 841.082 and TCCO Policy 3.36 because he failed to develop a factual record showing those provisions operated unconstitutionally in his specific circumstances. The court therefore denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If appealability is doubtful, ask the court to alternatively treat the filing as a mandamus proceeding—but do not expect procedural recasting to save a weak record. For family-law practitioners, the real lesson is to identify the correct appellate vehicle early and build a mandamus-ready, fact-specific record, especially for as-applied challenges to temporary orders, discovery rulings, or emergency custody decisions."
Scott Kenneth Higley v. Elesa Jo Jorgensen
COA03
In Higley v. Jorgensen, the father sought to reduce child support and modify conservatorship, claiming a material and substantial change in circumstances. The trial court found he failed to prove the required comparative change between the prior order and current circumstances, especially where his own income records did not clearly show a legally sufficient decline. The court also found the modification suit frivolous under Texas Family Code section 156.005 based on the lack of evidentiary support and the unnecessary litigation burden it imposed, and awarded the mother $14,222.50 in attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs. The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed both the denial of modification and the fee award.
Litigation Takeaway
"A modification petition needs proof, not just allegations. If a parent cannot present a clear apples-to-apples comparison showing a material and substantial change since the last order, the court can deny relief—and if the filing is weak, unsupported, or needlessly drives up litigation costs, the movant may also be ordered to pay the other side’s attorney’s fees."
Wally Yammine v. Propel Financial Services, LLC, as Agent and Attorney in Fact for Propel Funding National 1, LLC; and HK REO, LLC
COA02
In this appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly dismissed a bill-of-review case based on a hybrid motion to dismiss that was not tied to any recognized Texas procedural vehicle. The appellees argued lack of jurisdiction, failure to tender, and failure to state a claim, but they did not file or comply with Rule 91a, summary judgment, special exceptions, a proper plea to the jurisdiction, dismissal for want of prosecution, or the Baker v. Goldsmith procedure governing pretrial disposition of bills of review. The court emphasized that Texas trial courts do not have free-floating authority to dismiss civil claims on the merits simply because a party says the plaintiff should lose. Because no rule, statute, or recognized common-law procedure authorized the dismissal used here, the trial court abused its discretion. The court reversed the dismissal order and remanded without deciding the underlying merits of the bill of review.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family litigation, a strong merits argument is not itself a dismissal mechanism. If an opponent wants to knock out a bill of review, modification claim, enforcement-related pleading, or post-decree dispute, they must use the correct procedural vehicle—and comply with that vehicle’s rules. When a trial court grants an ad hoc “motion to dismiss” untethered to a valid rule, statute, or recognized procedure, that order is vulnerable on appeal."
In the Interest of X.I.C., a Child
COA07
In this restricted appeal from a default parentage judgment, the Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed because substituted service under Rule 106(b) was defective on the face of the record. The petitioner obtained orders allowing substituted service at a Grand Prairie address and by text, but the supporting affidavits did not provide sufficient probative facts showing the respondent could probably be found there or that the proposed substituted methods would be reasonably effective to give notice. The court also held service failed to strictly comply with the first order because the order required both delivery at the residence and service by text, while the record showed only texting occurred. Given Texas’s strict-compliance standard for service in default cases, the defective service required reversal and remand.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a default in family court, Rule 106(b) substituted service must be supported by detailed, fact-specific affidavits and carried out exactly as the order says—every step, every method, no shortcuts. Any mismatch between the motion, affidavit, order, return, or later address information can make error apparent on the face of the record and undo the judgment on restricted appeal."
Gonzalez v. State
COA10
In Gonzalez v. State, the appellant challenged a child-abuse conviction by arguing the State violated article 39.14 in connection with a therapist who had seen the child before the later outcry. The court did not reach the merits because the discovery complaint was not preserved: in the trial court, the defense argued the State should have investigated the therapist and developed exculpatory information, but on appeal the argument shifted to a narrower claim that the State failed to disclose the therapist’s contact information or notify the defense it was withholding it. Applying Rule 33.1 and noncomportment precedent, the court held those were materially different theories and the appellate complaint was forfeited. The court also upheld denial of mistrial on juror nondisclosure because counsel had not exercised sufficient voir dire diligence to uncover the juror’s relationship with the complainant.
Litigation Takeaway
"Preservation is theory-specific. In family-law discovery fights, a general complaint that the other side failed to investigate, search, supplement, or disclose will not necessarily preserve a narrower appellate complaint about a specific witness, provider, record, or contact detail. State the exact discovery failure, tie it to the correct rule or remedy, and obtain a ruling on each distinct theory."
In the Interest of E.O., a Child
COA07
In *In re E.O.*, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support termination under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) against a noncustodial father. The Department’s proof focused on the mother’s methamphetamine history, relapse, and instability, which explained removal from her care but did not show that father knowingly placed the child in endangering conditions or knowingly allowed the child to remain there. Applying the parent-specific requirements of subsection (D), and following *In re N.G.* because of the future collateral consequences of a (D) finding, the court modified the judgment to delete the subsection (D) ground while affirming termination on the unchallenged grounds under subsections (E) and (N).
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment findings must be tied to the parent you are targeting. In termination, custody, or modification cases, one parent’s dangerous home or drug use cannot automatically be imputed to the other parent without proof of that parent’s knowledge, control, placement, or acquiescence. Always separately challenge or prove subsection (D) and (E) findings because they can have major future consequences."