Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Wally Yammine v. Propel Financial Services, LLC, as Agent and Attorney in Fact for Propel Funding National 1, LLC; and HK REO, LLC
COA02
In this appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly dismissed a bill-of-review case based on a hybrid motion to dismiss that was not tied to any recognized Texas procedural vehicle. The appellees argued lack of jurisdiction, failure to tender, and failure to state a claim, but they did not file or comply with Rule 91a, summary judgment, special exceptions, a proper plea to the jurisdiction, dismissal for want of prosecution, or the Baker v. Goldsmith procedure governing pretrial disposition of bills of review. The court emphasized that Texas trial courts do not have free-floating authority to dismiss civil claims on the merits simply because a party says the plaintiff should lose. Because no rule, statute, or recognized common-law procedure authorized the dismissal used here, the trial court abused its discretion. The court reversed the dismissal order and remanded without deciding the underlying merits of the bill of review.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family litigation, a strong merits argument is not itself a dismissal mechanism. If an opponent wants to knock out a bill of review, modification claim, enforcement-related pleading, or post-decree dispute, they must use the correct procedural vehicle—and comply with that vehicle’s rules. When a trial court grants an ad hoc “motion to dismiss” untethered to a valid rule, statute, or recognized procedure, that order is vulnerable on appeal."
Carey Lynn Johnson v. Jon P. Herrera
COA01
In Johnson v. Herrera, the First Court of Appeals held that a trial court exceeded its authority by using a Chapter 157 enforcement proceeding to impose new post-judgment speech and contact restrictions that were not contained in the final SAPCR order. The original order barred harassment and negative social-media reviews, but the later enforcement order went further by requiring Johnson to obtain court approval before contacting Quest Diagnostics, its employees or attorneys, or making additional complaints to Quest or regulators. The court analyzed the distinction between enforcement under Texas Family Code Chapter 157 and modification under Chapter 156, concluding that enforcement may compel compliance with existing terms but cannot materially alter the parties’ rights or obligations. Because the added restrictions functioned as a modification without Chapter 156 pleadings or proof, the court reversed and struck those provisions, while dismissing the remainder of the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the relief you want changes the operative terms of a final SAPCR order, you must plead and prove a Chapter 156 modification—not try to slip new restrictions into a Chapter 157 enforcement action. In post-judgment family cases, courts can enforce existing orders, but they cannot add new no-contact, speech, or prior-approval requirements unless the case is properly postured as a modification."
James Hale v. Lanesborough Corporation and Texas SFI Partnership 24, Ltd.
COA01
In James Hale v. Lanesborough Corporation and Texas SFI Partnership 24, Ltd., the plaintiff claimed repeated apartment fire alarms caused his hearing loss. The defendants filed a no-evidence summary-judgment motion challenging causation. The First Court of Appeals held that because medical causation required expert testimony, Hale had to submit admissible expert summary-judgment evidence, such as an affidavit or deposition excerpts. His expert designation and Rule 194 disclosure were only notice tools, not evidence, and counsel’s description of expected testimony did not raise a fact issue. The court also held the trial court acted within its discretion by hearing the motion after the docket-control deadline, effectively modifying that deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"Expert disclosures are not evidence. If a no-evidence motion targets an issue that requires expert proof, you must put admissible expert testimony into the summary-judgment record or lose—even if the expert has already been designated. Also, do not assume a docket-control deadline will bar a late summary-judgment motion absent a concrete showing of prejudice."
In the Interest of M.B.
COA02
In *In the Interest of M.B.*, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order modifying probation and committing M.B. to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department under Family Code section 54.05. The State proved multiple probation violations, including retaliatory threats against a witness, an assault on that witness, a separate assaultive spitting incident, and school-attendance violations. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because the trial judge could credit the witnesses, rely on corroborating officer testimony and M.B.’s partial admissions, and reject M.B.’s self-defense and denial theories. The court also held the disposition evidence was sufficient because the record showed escalating violence, prior firearm-related misconduct, chronic noncompliance, and failure of earlier, less restrictive probation interventions. M.B.’s complaint about the lack of a psychological evaluation was not preserved for appellate review.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a severe remedy affirmed on appeal, build a layered record showing clear violations, corroboration, escalation, and why lesser interventions already failed. If you want to resist that remedy, do more than deny the allegations—develop a concrete competing narrative and preserve every procedural complaint in the trial court."
Nancy Marguerite Maxwell v. Steven Joseph Maxwell
COA09
In Maxwell v. Maxwell, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that a trial court could clarify a post-divorce retirement order to state the exact monthly amount payable from a former husband’s FERS annuity without impermissibly modifying the divorce decree’s property division. The decree awarded the former wife 50% of the community portion of the retirement benefits as of the divorce valuation date, but OPM later administered the order using a marital-fraction method tied to retirement, which swept in post-divorce service credit and salary increases. After hearing testimony from the husband and a QDRO specialist, the trial court found that OPM’s implementation invaded the husband’s separate property and entered an amended order fixing the wife’s monthly share at a specific amount. The appellate court affirmed, reasoning that Texas Family Code sections 9.006 and 9.007 allow clarification orders that implement the original division so long as they do not change the substantive ownership interest awarded. Because the amended order merely translated the original valuation-date award into an administrable dollar figure and prevented payment of post-divorce accruals, it was a permissible clarification rather than an unlawful re-division of property.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a retirement order is being administered in a way that pays a former spouse from post-divorce accruals, a Texas court can clarify the order under Chapter 9 by converting vague percentage language into a precise amount or formula—as long as the new order only effectuates the original decree and does not change the substantive property division. Draft retirement provisions with plan-specific precision and build a strong evidentiary record showing exactly how the administrator’s method departs from the decree."
In the Interest of L.G.O.A.
COA09
In In re L.G.O.A., the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly used a judgment nunc pro tunc to add an omitted child-support start date to an agreed SAPCR order after plenary power expired. The original order set Father’s monthly support amount but left blank the date the first payment was due. Looking to the full record—including testimony from Mother and former counsel, the agreed nature of the order, the contemporaneous income withholding order signed during plenary power, and the parties’ later conduct—the court concluded the blank date was a clerical omission in memorializing the judgment actually rendered, not a judicial change creating a new substantive term. The court therefore upheld insertion of January 1, 2021, as the support commencement date.
Litigation Takeaway
"A nunc pro tunc can still fix an important omission after plenary power expires if the record shows the court already rendered judgment on the issue and the signed order simply failed to capture it. In family-law cases, lawyers should preserve contemporaneous proof—drafts, emails, withholding orders, and testimony—because the fight will turn on whether the defect is clerical or judicial."
In the Interest of C.F.S., a Child
COA04
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant tried to challenge trial-court rulings from June and September 2025, but the clerk’s record contained no written, signed order or judgment—only docket entries referencing the judge’s notes. The Fourth Court of Appeals applied settled Texas law holding that appellate jurisdiction depends on a written, signed appealable order, and that oral rulings, docket entries, and informal notes neither create an appealable order nor trigger appellate deadlines under Rule 26.1. The court also rejected the appellant’s reliance on a later modified temporary order because temporary orders under Family Code section 105.001 are not subject to interlocutory appeal. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want appellate review in a Texas family-law case, get a written, signed order into the record first. Bench rulings, judge’s notes, and docket entries do not create appellate jurisdiction, and temporary SAPCR orders generally cannot be challenged by interlocutory appeal—so lawyers must focus on obtaining a signed order, preserving error, and evaluating mandamus or final-judgment strategy instead."
Gonzales v. Contreras
COA04
After his mother’s death, Lorenzo Contreras tried to evict his stepfather, Alvino Gonzales, from the home through a forcible-detainer action, claiming ownership under an affidavit of heirship and warranty deed and alleging Gonzales was only a holdover tenant. Gonzales denied any true landlord-tenant relationship and asserted an independent right to remain as the surviving spouse based on homestead and life-estate protections. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that justice courts can decide eviction cases only when immediate possession can be resolved without deciding title. Because deciding possession here required resolving whether Gonzales’s surviving-spouse homestead or life-estate rights defeated Contreras’s ownership claim, title and possession were inseparable. The court therefore held the justice court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the county court acquired no jurisdiction on de novo appeal, and both eviction judgments were void.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use JP-court eviction procedure to shortcut a real property dispute when the occupant claims an independent spousal, homestead, probate, or life-estate right to stay in the home. If possession depends on resolving ownership or protected occupancy rights, file in a court that can adjudicate title first; otherwise any eviction judgment may be void."
Hawley v. State
COA09
In Hawley v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for continuous sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the admission of testimony from other child victims. The court held that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37, section 2, allowed the State to admit evidence of Hawley’s other sexual acts against children for any relevant purpose, including character conformity, because the charged offenses were among those covered by the statute. The court then conducted a Rule 403 analysis and concluded the testimony’s strong probative value—showing a recurring pattern of abuse in caretaking settings and bolstering credibility in a case dependent on victim testimony—was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The judgments were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When abuse allegations turn on credibility and private conduct, pattern evidence involving other children can carry major probative force if it is tied to safety, risk, access, and method—not just bad character. For family-law cases, the practical lesson is that admission fights will often be won or lost on a detailed Rule 403 record about similarity, necessity, cumulativeness, and reliability rather than on broad prejudice objections."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Darsi Rae Myers and Antonie Chris Vorster
COA06
In this Texas divorce appeal, the dispute centered on whether about fifty acres in Scroggins acquired during marriage was community property or the wife’s separate property. The trial court treated the property inconsistently, awarding it to Myers as separate property while also structuring a payout based on a finding that it was community. The Texarkana Court of Appeals applied the community-property presumption in Family Code section 3.003 together with the inception-of-title rule and held that the warranty deed, purchase-money note, and related title evidence naming Myers alone were clear and convincing evidence rebutting the community presumption, despite conflicting language in the deed of trust. The court also held Myers failed to prove reimbursement claims because her testimony about separate funds used for community expenses was vague, undocumented, and inadequately traced. Because the characterization error materially affected the overall just-and-right division, the court affirmed the divorce but reversed and remanded the property division for reconsideration.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume real property bought during marriage is automatically community. In characterization fights, deed and purchase-money documents can rebut the community presumption, but reimbursement claims still require organized tracing and documentary proof. A single characterization mistake can undo the entire property division on appeal."