Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1003 opinions found
In re A.T.
COA04
In re A.T. involved a post-divorce enforcement action seeking criminal contempt for missed child-support and medical-support payments allegedly due in 2022. The enforcement motion and resulting contempt order were both based on a November 8, 2019 final divorce decree, but that decree had been set aside on February 21, 2020 and replaced the same day by an amended decree. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that criminal contempt requires disobedience of a valid, operative court order, so a vacated decree cannot serve as the basis for contempt. Because the relator was not restrained under the contempt order, mandamus—not habeas—was the proper remedy, and the court conditionally granted mandamus, holding the contempt order void.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing or defending any family-law enforcement action, confirm the exact operative order in effect on the date of the alleged violation. If contempt is based on a vacated or superseded decree, the contempt order is void, and defects in notice, service, and the required order to appear can create additional due-process problems."
In re Bradley Welsh
COA02
In a child-support enforcement proceeding, the trial court orally found Bradley Welsh in contempt on April 8, 2026 and ordered him confined for sixty days, but did not sign the written contempt and commitment order until thirty-six days later. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that due process permits only a short and reasonable time between an oral contempt finding with confinement and the signed written order under Ex parte Calvillo Amaya. The court rejected arguments that later work-release discussions meant the contempt ruling was incomplete or that Welsh invited the delay, concluding the hearing had effectively ended and the postponement was caused by the court’s process. Because the delayed written order violated due process, the contempt and commitment order was void, and the court granted habeas relief and vacated the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas contempt practice, an oral confinement ruling is not enough. If a court orally finds contempt and orders jail time, the written contempt and commitment order must be prepared and signed almost immediately; otherwise the order may be void regardless of the underlying violation. Family-law lawyers should have proposed contempt orders ready at the hearing and, for respondents, should closely compare the oral ruling date to the signature date for a potential habeas challenge."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Fred Garland Henson and Tiffanie Karon Henson and in the Interest of C.R.H., a Child
COA12
In Henson v. Henson, the Tyler Court of Appeals addressed whether a divorce decree could both restrict a father’s possession and require him to complete a battering intervention program, parenting classes, and negative drug tests before he could later seek modification of that no-contact order. The court held that the trial court acted within its broad authority under Chapter 153 to impose a no-contact possession restriction based on evidence of methamphetamine use, family violence, and danger to the child. But it also held that Chapter 156 exclusively governs when a party may seek modification, so the trial court could not add extra-statutory preconditions to filing a future modification action. The improper filing barriers were ordered deleted from the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts can impose very strict current possession restrictions to protect a child, but they cannot block a parent’s statutory right to file a future modification suit by adding decree-based prerequisites. When drafting protective orders, tie treatment, testing, or classes to possession or reunification—not to courthouse access."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Caroline Brookshire and Trenton Brookshire and in the Interest of R.L.B., D.B.B. and H.A.B., Children
COA12
In this Texas family-law appeal arising from a contested divorce and SAPCR, the appellee argued the judgment should be affirmed because the appellate record was supposedly incomplete: although audio and video exhibits were admitted and included in the record, the court reporter did not identify the exact timestamps or clips played at trial. The Tyler Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and held that the incomplete-record presumption in Rule 34.6(c) applies only when an appellant elects to proceed on a partial reporter’s record. Because the appellant requested the complete reporter’s record and the admitted digital exhibits were actually included, the absence of clip-by-clip transcription or timestamp notation did not make the record incomplete. The court therefore rejected the appellee’s request for a presumption in favor of the judgment and allowed merits review to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want appellate review of digital evidence, request the full reporter’s record and make sure the admitted audio/video exhibits are included. Brookshire also teaches trial lawyers not to rely on the court reporter to identify clips—state timestamps and excerpts on the record whenever possible—but an appellee cannot turn that imprecision alone into an automatic affirmance under Rule 34.6(c)."
Diaz-Perez v. State
COA04
In Diaz-Perez v. State, the defendant challenged his convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child by arguing, among other things, that the trial court improperly admitted the mother’s outcry testimony because the State’s Article 38.072 written summary allegedly did not specifically disclose penile penetration. The Fourth Court of Appeals did not need to definitively decide whether the summary was too imprecise because any error was nonconstitutional and harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). The court emphasized that the child later testified without objection to the same penetration detail, making the complained-of testimony cumulative and not outcome-determinative. The court also rejected ineffective-assistance claims tied to the failure to obtain a rebuttal expert because the appellate record did not show an available expert, proposed testimony, or resulting prejudice. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family-law cases, winning an evidentiary objection is not enough if the same fact comes in later through another witness or exhibit without objection. Preserve the issue across the full proof chain, because appellate courts are likely to treat notice or disclosure defects as harmless when the challenged allegation is later proved through cumulative evidence."
In re Sandra Ramirez
COA08
In In re Sandra Ramirez, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by transferring venue from El Paso County to Kaufman County without a Rule 87-compliant setting, notice, and hearing. The movant argued the matter was effectively set during a status conference and heard by submission, but the mandamus record and certified register of actions showed no actual setting or hearing. Relying on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 87 and Henderson v. O’Neill, the court concluded unsupported attorney assertions could not establish compliance, rejected the argument that Ramirez failed to preserve error, and conditionally granted mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the transfer order.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other side wants to transfer venue, they must create a clean Rule 87 record with an actual setting, proper notice, and a hearing or documented submission setting. In family-law cases, an informal status conference or off-record discussion is not enough, and a transfer order entered without those procedural safeguards is a strong candidate for immediate mandamus relief."
Flores v. Flores
COA04
In Flores v. Flores, a post-divorce appellant sought to proceed on appeal without paying costs under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. After the court reporter effectively contested his statement of inability to afford costs, the trial court held the required Rule 145(f) evidentiary hearing. Flores did not appear, and the trial court relied on evidence from the family-law record showing prior findings of net monthly income, business ownership, earning capacity, real-property interests, and an $80,000 vehicle purchase to find he could afford appellate costs. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that Rule 145(f) places the burden on the declarant to prove inability to afford costs, that a filed indigency statement alone is not enough once contested, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the contest and requiring payment of costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you claim you cannot afford appellate costs in a family-law case, you must prove it with admissible evidence at the Rule 145 hearing. Prior divorce findings about income, assets, business ownership, and spending can defeat an indigency claim, and failing to appear at the hearing is often fatal."
In re Paula Law
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a party seeking a pre-suit deposition under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 must do more than file a verified petition reciting the rule. Alliantgroup wanted to depose former employee Paula Law before filing suit to investigate possible non-compete, confidentiality, and trade-secret claims. The court scrutinized whether Alliantgroup had satisfied Rule 202.4(a)(2), which requires a finding that the likely benefit of the deposition outweighs its burden or expense. It concluded Alliantgroup neither pleaded specific, case-based facts explaining that balance nor proved those facts with competent evidence at the hearing. Because verified pleadings ordinarily are not evidence, and no testimony, admitted affidavits, stipulations, or other evidence supported the order, the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the Rule 202 order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 202 is an extraordinary pre-suit tool, not a shortcut to fish for claims. If you want a pre-suit deposition, you must plead specific facts showing why the deposition’s likely benefit outweighs its burden and back that up with actual evidence. If you are opposing Rule 202 in a family-law-adjacent dispute, attack both the pleadings and the proof—especially any attempt to rely on a verified petition alone."
Hollman v. State
COA05
In Hollman v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether four photographs of a complainant’s injuries and damaged phone were properly authenticated when the witness could not recall the exact date they were taken. Applying Texas Rule of Evidence 901, the court held the State met its threshold burden because the complainant had personal knowledge, recognized the photos, testified she was present when they were taken, and said they fairly and accurately depicted the injuries and damage from the assault. The court rejected the argument that Rule 901 requires proof of a precise date or that the photos were taken exactly at or near the event, explaining that such uncertainty generally goes to weight rather than admissibility. The court affirmed admission of the photographs and modified the judgment to reflect the correct enhanced offense level.
Litigation Takeaway
"Exact-date recall is not required to authenticate a photograph. In family-law cases, a witness with personal knowledge who can testify a photo fairly and accurately depicts injuries, property damage, living conditions, or the aftermath of an incident will often satisfy Rule 901 even without a precise timestamp; if chronology matters, attack or defend the exhibit on linkage, weight, relevance, or alteration—not on a nonexistent exact-date requirement."
In the Interest of E.C.O. and A.J.O., Children
COA05
In this family-law appeal, the appellant filed a Rule 145 statement claiming he could not afford appellate costs or bond, but the opposing party contested indigency. The Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion in sustaining the contest because the appellant admitted he earned about $180,000 per year, had a monthly surplus after expenses, owned a vehicle of value, and failed to provide documentary proof showing he could not pay all or part of the costs or provide security despite a good-faith effort. The court also upheld the trial court’s detailed post-abatement findings, treated unobjected-to unsworn hearing statements as evidence, rejected any right to a second evidentiary hearing after abatement, found omission of Rule 145(f)(4) notice harmless, and held the installment-payment complaint was waived.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 145 has no automatic high-income bar, but indigency must be proven with evidence, not conclusions. In family-law appeals, lawyers should treat a Rule 145 contest like a mini-trial: develop proof of income, surplus, assets, and discretionary spending if contesting indigency, and if proving indigency, bring records showing why the client cannot pay even part of the costs or post security despite a genuine good-faith effort."