Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
In the Interest of J.G.S., a Child
COA01
In In re J.G.S., the First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights and held that her complaint that the Department failed to provide ADA accommodations in her service plan was waived because she never raised it in the trial court. Mother argued the court should overlook preservation because termination implicates fundamental rights and because Family Code section 161.001(f) and (g) require the Department to prove reasonable efforts to return the child. The court rejected both arguments, reaffirmed In re C.M., and concluded that an ADA-based challenge to reunification services remains an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved below. The court also held that Mother’s request for more time, based only on scheduling and technical problems, did not preserve a disability-accommodation complaint, and it affirmed the termination order on the challenged predicate grounds and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"If disability affects a parent’s ability to complete services or participate in a family-law case, do not assume the court or opposing party’s awareness preserves the issue. Make a specific ADA or accommodation request on the record, tie it to the client’s actual limitations, seek a ruling, and connect any continuance or extension request to that accommodation need. In Texas family cases, even in termination appeals, unpreserved accommodation complaints are likely waived."
Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina
COA09
In Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina, the Beaumont Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the parties had an informal marriage under Texas Family Code section 2.401. Medina sought to prove a common-law marriage as part of her divorce and property-division case, while Lara argued the evidence was insufficient because the parties filed separate taxes, lacked joint financial accounts, and did not consistently use traditional marital markers. The court analyzed the totality of the evidence under the three statutory elements—agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others as married—and emphasized that, in a bench trial without findings of fact, implied findings favor the judgment if supported by the record. Crediting testimony that the parties lived together as husband and wife, introduced each other as spouses, celebrated their marriage, and were described in at least one property-related document as husband and wife, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the informal-marriage finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informal-marriage cases are usually decided on credibility and record-building, not on whether the couple checked every traditional marriage box. If there is some evidence of agreement, cohabitation as spouses, and holding out, appellate courts will heavily defer to the trial judge—especially when no findings of fact are requested. For lawyers, that means the real battle is at trial: build corroboration if you are proving the marriage, and do more than point to separate finances or tax filings if you are trying to defeat it."
In the Interest of V.R., A.R., and M.R., Children
COA02
In In re V.R., the father appealed an order dismissing his child-support enforcement-related motions, arguing the Office of the Attorney General lacked authority to continue withholding and garnishing income and that various procedural defects required reversal. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the dispositive associate-judge hearing was not included in the appellate reporter’s record. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and Christiansen v. Prezelski, the court presumed the missing hearing record supported the trial court’s ruling and held that, without that record, the father could not show reversible error. The court also rejected attempts to rely on materials not admitted below and noted that new complaints raised for the first time in a reply brief were not properly before the court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your appeal depends on what happened at the hearing, you must bring the reporter’s record. In Texas family-law cases, an incomplete appellate record usually means the court will presume the missing evidence supports the judgment, which can doom challenges to enforcement, modification, custody, and other post-judgment rulings before the merits are ever reached."
Khaled Mohammad Ikhlas v. Farzana Rasooli
COA14
In Ikhlas v. Rasooli, the appellant tried to appeal an order denying his Texas Family Code section 85.025(b) motion to review, modify, or dissolve an existing protective order. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed section 81.009(a), which allows appeals from a protective order rendered under Subtitle B, and held that a denial of post-judgment review under section 85.025(b) is not a new protective order and does not independently create appellate jurisdiction. The court also refused to treat the attempted appeal as a mandamus proceeding because the appellant’s complaints were fact-bound and challenged evidentiary sufficiency rather than presenting a pure legal issue. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not treat a section 85.025(b) review hearing as a second chance to appeal a protective order. If you may need appellate review, build the record and calendar deadlines from the original protective order; later denials of review or dissolution are likely not appealable, and mandamus will usually require a clear legal error rather than a fact-based attack on the evidence."
Foster v. Wise
COA01
In Foster v. Wise, the respondent challenged a default protective order by restricted appeal, arguing the record did not show the notice and service required by Family Code sections 82.041 and 82.043. The court examined only whether error was apparent on the face of the record and held the citation itself functioned as the required notice because it included the hearing setting and default warning. It further held that a citation bearing the court’s seal and a deputy clerk’s typed name satisfied the statutory signature requirement in a nonelectronic-service context, that the return sufficiently showed personal service, and that service of an amended application was unnecessary because the amendment did not seek a more onerous judgment. The court therefore affirmed the default lifetime protective order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Default orders in family cases usually survive restricted appeal when the clerk’s record and return facially show strict compliance with statutory notice and service requirements. Substance matters more than labels, a typed clerk signature on a sealed nonelectronic citation may be enough, and amended pleadings do not require re-service unless they seek more onerous relief."
In Re Jessica Coronado
COA11
In this mandamus proceeding arising from temporary orders in a divorce and SAPCR, the mother challenged the trial court’s appointment of both parents as temporary joint managing conservators and a travel-exchange provision after evidence showed the father physically abused her son from a prior relationship. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 153.004(b) is a mandatory bar to joint managing conservatorship when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse against a child, spouse, or the other parent. The court relied on the mother’s testimony about two bruising incidents, photographs, text messages, and permissible adverse inferences from the father’s repeated Fifth Amendment invocations to conclude the abuse evidence was credible. It also held the travel requirement was an abuse of discretion because the trial court expressly imposed it to burden the mother for moving, not to protect the child’s safety and welfare. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If credible abuse evidence is in the record, § 153.004(b) does more than weigh against joint conservatorship—it forbids it, even in temporary orders and even when the abuse was directed at a stepchild rather than the subject child. For litigators, the case underscores the importance of building a corroborated abuse record and preserving any punitive, child-untethered temporary-order rulings for mandamus."
McFarland v. Bouyer
COA11
In McFarland v. Bouyer, the husband appealed a divorce decree awarding the wife the marital residence and argued he was not given a meaningful chance to present evidence. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code section 7.001 and emphasized that a property division is reversible only if it is manifestly unjust and unfair. Because the husband failed to provide the reporter’s record from the final hearing, the appellate court presumed the missing evidence supported the trial court’s decree. The court also rejected his due-process complaint, concluding the record showed he had opportunities to cross-examine, object, testify, and offer evidence, and that his failure to understand how to present electronic evidence was a preparation problem, not trial-court error. The court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge a divorce property division on appeal, you need a full record and proof that the overall division—not just one asset award—was manifestly unfair. This case also shows that courts will not reverse simply because a pro se party failed to prepare or did not understand how to admit evidence when the record shows the party was given a fair opportunity to participate."
Gonzales v. State
COA04
In Gonzales v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed whether a juvenile-transfer order under Texas Family Code section 54.02 could be challenged through a later criminal appeal after conviction. The juvenile court had signed a November 1, 2024 order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring Gonzales for adult criminal prosecution, but Gonzales did not file a notice of appeal in the juvenile court within 20 days. Instead, he filed a notice of appeal in the criminal case after his April 2, 2026 conviction. The court analyzed sections 54.02 and 56.01 of the Family Code together with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and held that a transfer order is directly appealable, the appeal is accelerated, and the notice of appeal must be filed in the juvenile court within 20 days after the transfer order is signed. Because Gonzales filed only an untimely post-conviction notice in the criminal case, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a Family Code order is immediately appealable, lawyers must identify the correct order, file in the correct court, and meet the statute-driven deadline. A later judgment, trial-court certification, or notice filed in a related case will not revive a missed appeal deadline or create appellate jurisdiction."
In the Interest of T.S.L., a Child
COA04
In In re T.S.L., the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of an alleged father’s rights because the trial court’s judgment rested on an independent ground under Texas Family Code § 161.002(b)(3): the child was under one year old when the case was filed, and the father neither registered with the paternity registry nor otherwise acknowledged or adjudicated paternity. On appeal, the father challenged only best interest and the denial of his oral continuance, but he did not attack the § 161.002(b)(3) finding. The court held that an unchallenged independent ground requires affirmance and reiterated that termination under § 161.002(b)(3) does not require a separate best-interest finding. The court also held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the father’s oral motion for continuance because it was not written or verified under Rule 251 and the case was near the statutory dismissal deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"For fathers and their counsel, paternity status is not a side issue—if a client remains only an alleged father and does not register, acknowledge, or adjudicate paternity, § 161.002(b)(3) can become a stand-alone path to termination. For appellate lawyers, the case is a blunt reminder that every independent ground in the judgment must be challenged or the appeal can be lost automatically."
In the Interest of J.W.H. and T.L.H., Children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the paternal grandparents lacked standing to bring an original SAPCR under Texas Family Code § 102.004(a)(1) because they did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence as of the filing date, that Mother’s specific conduct would probably cause significant impairment to the children’s physical health or emotional development. The court analyzed the grandparents’ allegations about marijuana use, leaving a child unattended, educational problems, and cohabitation through the required filing-date lens and concluded the evidence showed only generalized concerns, stale events, or post-filing developments—not present circumstances meeting the statute’s high threshold. Because standing is jurisdictional, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, so the court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the suit.
Litigation Takeaway
"In third-party custody cases, standing is a jurisdictional hurdle that must be proven with date-specific evidence at the time of filing. Nonparents cannot rely on sympathy, family conflict, lifestyle criticism, old incidents, or proof they could provide a better home; they must tie a parent’s identifiable conduct to probable significant impairment. For parents’ counsel, this case is a strong blueprint for an early plea to the jurisdiction."