Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
787 opinions found
Shepard v. Shepard
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the wife, acting without a lawyer, challenged numerous rulings including recusal decisions, due-process concerns, evidentiary limits, ADA accommodation issues, temporary orders, and the trial court’s confirmation of the marital residence as the husband’s separate property. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach those merits because, even after being notified of defects and given a chance to amend, her brief still failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. Applying the rule that pro se litigants must follow the same appellate briefing standards as attorneys, the court held that the amended brief lacked clear argument, meaningful record citations, and supporting legal authority. Because nothing was properly presented for appellate review, the court dismissed the appeal under Rule 42.3(c).
Litigation Takeaway
"A family-law appeal can be lost before the court ever considers the merits if the brief does not clearly connect preserved complaints to the record, legal authority, and the applicable standard of review. Even serious complaints about recusal, temporary orders, property characterization, or trial fairness will not be reviewed if the appellant does not comply with Rule 38.1—and pro se parties get no special exemption."
In re JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. d/b/a Chase Bank
COA13
In this original proceeding, the court held that a trial court overreached when it sanctioned and held Chase Bank in contempt for alleged failure to produce subpoenaed records, release trust assets, and honor a successor trustee appointment order, even though Chase was a nonparty and had not been properly brought within the court’s personal jurisdiction for that relief. The appellate court focused on procedural due process rather than the underlying trust dispute, explaining that a subpoena, appointment order, or generalized motion in the main case does not automatically authorize contempt-style remedies or Rule 215 sanctions against a nonparty financial institution. Because the necessary procedural and jurisdictional predicates were not established on the record, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief in part and vacated the challenged contempt and sanctions relief to that extent.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want enforceable relief against a bank or other nonparty in a family-law case, build the procedural runway first. You cannot turn a subpoena dispute or third-party compliance problem into contempt or major sanctions unless service, jurisdiction, notice, and the specific rule-based remedy are all properly established."
In re Ja’Dawn Lee-Ann Harrison
COA14
In In re Ja’Dawn Lee-Ann Harrison, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a parent could not directly appeal the trial court’s dismissal of a contempt-based motion to enforce a possession order. Because no confinement was imposed, the court treated the attempted appeal as a mandamus proceeding. On the merits, the court found no clear abuse of discretion because the movant failed to identify specific dates or instances showing violations of the possession order, and the order had expired once the child reached adulthood and graduated from high school. The court therefore denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"Contempt-based enforcement of possession orders requires precision: plead and prove specific violations of an order that is still in effect. If the trial court denies contempt relief and no one is jailed, the remedy is mandamus—not a direct appeal."
In the Interest of B.G.T. aka E.T., a Child
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding. The case began when both Mother and newborn tested positive for amphetamine, and the record later showed ongoing methamphetamine use, repeated positive and refused drug tests, untreated mental-health issues, incarceration, failure to complete court-ordered services, and an unsafe proposed home with a known drug user. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest factors, the court emphasized that unchallenged predicate findings and overlapping endangerment evidence strongly supported best interest, especially when contrasted with the child’s stable and successful placement with relatives. The court held that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won with comparative, current evidence: ongoing drug use, untreated mental illness, service-plan noncompliance, incarceration, and unsafe housing can outweigh a biological parent’s rights when the child is thriving in a stable placement. On appeal, leaving predicate grounds unchallenged can sharply narrow the fight and make a best-interest-only challenge much harder to win."
In the Interest of N.A.G.A., a Child
COA05
Foster parents sought a family-violence protective order on behalf of a child against the child’s permanent managing conservator, relying on evidence of a prior intoxication-based endangerment incident, a criminal plea, a USCIS T-visa approval, and allegations of abuse and trafficking. The Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court, as factfinder, was entitled to conclude that this record did not prove the statutory predicates for a protective order, including trafficking, abuse, and the required family or household relationship under the Family Code. Because the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the denial, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A compelling story is not enough in a protective-order case. Family-law practitioners must prove each statutory element with admissible, case-specific evidence—especially the qualifying relationship or household nexus—and cannot assume CPS history, criminal pleas, immigration findings, or a respondent’s default will carry the application."
Estrada v. State
COA03
The Austin Court of Appeals affirmed Estrada’s conviction for repeated protective-order violations. The State proved two violations within twelve months: Estrada’s contact with the protected person at the airport despite a no-contact order, and a later incident in which the complainant called 911 reporting that he came to her home and strangled her. Although the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution, the court held the trial court properly admitted the 911 call and EMS records because they were created during an ongoing emergency and for medical-response purposes, making them admissible under hearsay principles and non-testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes. The court also found no abuse of discretion in excusing a juror for cause and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-violence cases, a later recantation usually does not erase strong contemporaneous evidence. 911 audio, EMS records, photos, neighbor testimony, and other emergency-response evidence can outweigh a complainant’s later change of story and may strongly affect protective-order, custody, and divorce litigation. Also, reconciliation does not suspend a protective order—only a court can modify it."
Sheehan v. Sheehan
COA11
In Sheehan v. Sheehan, the divorce decree awarded the wife $64,661.44 from a BB&T account in the husband’s name, but he later depleted the account and failed to deliver the funds. On enforcement, the husband argued that a money judgment would improperly modify the decree because the specific account no longer contained the money. The Eleventh Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that Texas Family Code §§ 9.002, 9.006, and especially 9.010 allow a trial court to enforce an existing property award through a money judgment when direct delivery of the awarded property is no longer an adequate remedy. Because the decree had already awarded the wife that sum, reducing the undelivered award to a money judgment did not change the substantive property division; it simply implemented it. The court also affirmed attorney’s fees under § 9.014.
Litigation Takeaway
"A spouse cannot defeat a divorce decree’s property award by draining the account or liquidating the asset from which payment was supposed to come. If the decree already awarded a sum certain, the court can enforce that award with a money judgment—and attorney’s fees—without impermissibly modifying the decree."
In the Interest of S.M.T. and S.J.T., Children
COA14
In a pending SAPCR, the appellant tried to immediately appeal trial-court orders denying motions to correct the reporter’s record and clerk’s record. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied the final-judgment rule, noted that interlocutory orders are appealable only when a statute expressly authorizes it, and found no statute permitting an interlocutory appeal from record-correction rulings. Because the challenged orders were purely interlocutory and did not dispose of all parties and claims, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"You cannot create appellate jurisdiction by appealing a procedural ruling about the contents of the record. In family-law cases, record-correction disputes usually must be handled through the proper correction procedures, preserved for review after a final judgment, or—if truly extraordinary—addressed by mandamus rather than a stand-alone interlocutory appeal."
In the Interest of B.C., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals largely upheld a post-answer default SAPCR order against a pro se father. The court concluded the record showed he had actual notice of the trial setting, his eve-of-trial email continuance request was not verified or supported by affidavit as Rule 251 requires, and his post-judgment effort to set aside the default did not establish reversible error under the standards governing post-answer defaults. The court also rejected his other complaints as unpreserved, inadequately briefed, or contradicted by the record. But it modified the final order to strike the child’s surname change because the mother never pleaded for that relief, and a court may not grant affirmative relief not supported by the live pleadings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two family-law lessons stand out: post-answer defaults are hard to undo without a properly supported Craddock record, and even in SAPCR cases a final order cannot include affirmative relief that was never pleaded. Plead every item of requested relief, and if you seek to set aside a default, use a properly signed, sworn, and fully developed motion."
Bradford v. State
COA10
In Bradford v. State, the Waco Court of Appeals held that a six-year-old child’s three out-of-court identifications of her assailant were admissible as excited utterances under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(2), even though the trial court declined to admit them under Article 38.072. The court focused on whether the child remained dominated by fear, pain, and emotional shock from the assault, and concluded that the record showed continuous stress from the immediate porch disclosure through later hospital statements. The court also rejected the Confrontation Clause challenge, reasoning that the statements were spontaneous, made to the child’s mother during crisis and treatment, and were non-testimonial rather than formal accusations for prosecution. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a child’s abuse disclosure does not fit a specialized hearsay statute, do not assume admissibility is lost. Build a Rule 803(2) record showing spontaneity, timing, visible distress, injuries, and continuing trauma; in family court, that can support admission of immediate child disclosures in emergency custody, protective-order, and supervised-possession disputes. To defeat admission, focus on reflection, prompting, intervening calm, and litigation-driven questioning."