Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of C.F.S., a Child
COA04
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant tried to challenge trial-court rulings from June and September 2025, but the clerk’s record contained no written, signed order or judgment—only docket entries referencing the judge’s notes. The Fourth Court of Appeals applied settled Texas law holding that appellate jurisdiction depends on a written, signed appealable order, and that oral rulings, docket entries, and informal notes neither create an appealable order nor trigger appellate deadlines under Rule 26.1. The court also rejected the appellant’s reliance on a later modified temporary order because temporary orders under Family Code section 105.001 are not subject to interlocutory appeal. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want appellate review in a Texas family-law case, get a written, signed order into the record first. Bench rulings, judge’s notes, and docket entries do not create appellate jurisdiction, and temporary SAPCR orders generally cannot be challenged by interlocutory appeal—so lawyers must focus on obtaining a signed order, preserving error, and evaluating mandamus or final-judgment strategy instead."
In re Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance Company, Allstate Texas Lloyds, Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Company, and James Rudish
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief after a trial court authorized Rule 202 presuit depositions against Allstate and a claims handler without any actual evidence supporting the findings required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202.4(a). The appellate court held that pleadings, attorney argument, attached but unadmitted exhibits, and a non-evidentiary hearing do not satisfy Rule 202’s proof requirement. Because Rule 202 is an extraordinary presuit discovery device, the petitioner had to present admissible evidence showing either that the depositions might prevent a failure or delay of justice in anticipated litigation or that their likely benefit outweighed the burden and expense. With no evidentiary record supporting either finding, the trial court abused its discretion, and mandamus was proper because the harm from unauthorized presuit discovery cannot be adequately remedied on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 202 requires proof, not just a detailed petition and lawyer argument. If you want presuit discovery, set an evidentiary hearing and offer admissible evidence supporting one of Rule 202.4(a)’s required findings; if you are opposing the request and the court proceeds without evidence, mandamus is a strong and immediate remedy."
Hawley v. State
COA09
In Hawley v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for continuous sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and to the admission of testimony from other child victims. The court held that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37, section 2, allowed the State to admit evidence of Hawley’s other sexual acts against children for any relevant purpose, including character conformity, because the charged offenses were among those covered by the statute. The court then conducted a Rule 403 analysis and concluded the testimony’s strong probative value—showing a recurring pattern of abuse in caretaking settings and bolstering credibility in a case dependent on victim testimony—was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The judgments were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When abuse allegations turn on credibility and private conduct, pattern evidence involving other children can carry major probative force if it is tied to safety, risk, access, and method—not just bad character. For family-law cases, the practical lesson is that admission fights will often be won or lost on a detailed Rule 403 record about similarity, necessity, cumulativeness, and reliability rather than on broad prejudice objections."
Gonzales v. Contreras
COA04
After his mother’s death, Lorenzo Contreras tried to evict his stepfather, Alvino Gonzales, from the home through a forcible-detainer action, claiming ownership under an affidavit of heirship and warranty deed and alleging Gonzales was only a holdover tenant. Gonzales denied any true landlord-tenant relationship and asserted an independent right to remain as the surviving spouse based on homestead and life-estate protections. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that justice courts can decide eviction cases only when immediate possession can be resolved without deciding title. Because deciding possession here required resolving whether Gonzales’s surviving-spouse homestead or life-estate rights defeated Contreras’s ownership claim, title and possession were inseparable. The court therefore held the justice court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, the county court acquired no jurisdiction on de novo appeal, and both eviction judgments were void.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use JP-court eviction procedure to shortcut a real property dispute when the occupant claims an independent spousal, homestead, probate, or life-estate right to stay in the home. If possession depends on resolving ownership or protected occupancy rights, file in a court that can adjudicate title first; otherwise any eviction judgment may be void."
Hawley v. State
COA09
In Hawley v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed convictions for continuous sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child after the defendant challenged the admission of testimony from two additional witnesses describing other sexual offenses against children. The court held that Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.37, section 2 expressly permits this type of extraneous-offense evidence in qualifying child-sex prosecutions, including offenses like those charged here. It further held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Rule 403 because the testimony was highly probative of the defendant’s pattern of abuse, grooming, secrecy, and access to child victims, and its probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The court also found the evidence legally sufficient and affirmed the judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the governing rule or statute expressly allows pattern or other-incident evidence, the real evidentiary fight shifts to fit, similarity, remoteness, cumulativeness, and Rule 403 balancing. For family-law litigators handling abuse-related custody, modification, or protective-order cases, Hawley is a reminder to tie other-incident evidence to a concrete child-safety issue and to answer prejudice objections with precision rather than generalities."
Mouton v. State
COA14
In Mouton v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a 16-year-old’s recorded interview at Houston Police Department headquarters was noncustodial, so warnings under Miranda, article 38.22, and Family Code section 51.095 were not required. The juvenile argued the interview was effectively custodial because it occurred at police headquarters, she was separated from her mother, had to pass through security, and was questioned about serious criminal exposure. The court applied an objective reasonable-child standard and focused on the actual circumstances rather than the official setting alone: she voluntarily came with family, was not handcuffed or restrained, kept her belongings, the detectives were in plain clothes and unarmed, the door was unlocked, her mother remained nearby and could observe remotely, and detectives indicated she would be going home that day. Based on those facts, the court concluded a reasonable 16-year-old would not have believed she was under restraint to the degree associated with formal arrest, and it affirmed denial of the suppression motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving abuse allegations or child interviews, Mouton is a strong reminder that coercion arguments rise or fall on objective interview details—not labels like police station, CAC, or investigation. If you want a child’s statement credited, build a record showing voluntary attendance, lack of restraint, caregiver access, and a clear ability to leave. If you want to challenge the statement, focus on concrete signs of detention or isolation such as locked doors, blocked exits, caregiver exclusion, confiscated belongings, or statements implying the child could not end the encounter."
Rodriguez v. State
COA05
In Rodriguez v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a criminal judgment after rejecting challenges to the denial of a mistrial and to the qualifications of the State’s child-abuse expert, while also modifying the written judgment to correct clerical inaccuracies. The mistrial complaint arose after the prosecutor asked an improper redirect question implying another accused person had admitted sex with the complainant; because the trial court immediately sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard before any answer was given, the appellate court held the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the extraordinary remedy of mistrial. The court likewise found no reversible abuse of discretion in allowing the expert testimony. For family-law crossover purposes, the opinion’s most useful holding is that an appellate court may reform a written judgment to match the actual record when the discrepancy is clerical and the record clearly shows the truth of the trial court’s ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
"The best family-law lesson from Rodriguez is procedural, not substantive: if a decree or order contains a clerical mismatch with the reporter’s record, verdict, stipulation, or oral rendition, ask the appellate court to reform the order so the record speaks the truth rather than assuming reversal is required. The case also reinforces that curative instructions usually defeat mistrial complaints absent truly incurable prejudice, and that expert-qualification challenges need a strong record to overcome abuse-of-discretion review."
In the Interest of S.V., a Minor Child
COA05
In In re S.V., the Dallas Court of Appeals decided whether a mother’s child-support enforcement motion was timely under Texas Family Code § 157.005 when the two-year filing deadline fell on a Saturday, followed by Sunday and Memorial Day, and the motion was filed the next business day. The court held Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 applies to extend the deadline to the next non-holiday business day, so the May 31, 2022 filing was timely even though the support obligation terminated on May 28, 2020. Because the motion was timely, the trial court retained authority to confirm arrearages, reduce them and accrued interest to judgment, and award statutory attorney’s fees. The court also rejected the father’s service, amended-pleading, continuance, and other procedural complaints, finding no reversible error.
Litigation Takeaway
"When calculating the two-year deadline to confirm child-support arrearages under Family Code § 157.005, do not stop at the calendar anniversary date—apply Rule 4. If the last day falls on a weekend or legal holiday, filing on the next business day is timely. Practically, lawyers should carefully identify the true termination date of support, preserve proof of filing, and focus defense efforts on actual accounting or notice problems rather than weak weekend-deadline arguments."
In the Interest of H.E.C. and E.G.C., Children
COA06
In this Texarkana appeal, a former stepfather filed an original SAPCR seeking conservatorship of his former stepchildren, arguing he had standing under Texas Family Code § 102.004(a)(1) because he shared a biological child with the children’s mother and that child was the older children’s half-sibling. The court rejected that theory after applying the plain text of Government Code § 573.022(a), which defines consanguinity as existing only when one person is the descendant of the other or they share a common ancestor. Because the stepchildren were neither the stepfather’s descendants nor related to him through a common ancestor, the half-sibling connection did not create consanguinity standing. The court refused to expand the statute based on policy or absurdity arguments, affirmed dismissal for lack of standing, and reversed and remanded the attorney’s-fee award because the fee proof did not satisfy Rohrmoos lodestar standards.
Litigation Takeaway
"Blended-family facts and equitable caregiving narratives do not create SAPCR standing. If a former stepparent is filing under § 102.004, confirm a true consanguinity basis—descendant status or a shared common ancestor—before suit; a biological child in common with the other parent does not supply standing as to that child’s half-siblings. Also, even when you win a jurisdictional fight, attorney’s fees still require detailed, nonconclusory lodestar proof."
Ida Thomas, Willie Aron Pitre, and Beulah Giles v. Fidelity National Title
COA14
In this appeal arising from the sale of inherited real property, the heirs alleged that Fidelity National Title wrongfully distributed sale proceeds to at least one person who was not entitled to receive them. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that, although Fidelity’s summary-judgment motion attacked only negligence and breach-of-contract theories tied to its role as title insurer, the heirs’ live pleading could fairly be read under Texas fair-notice standards to assert a separate breach-of-fiduciary-duty claim based on Fidelity’s role as escrow agent responsible for holding and disbursing funds. Because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c) forbids summary judgment on a ground not expressly presented in the motion, the trial court could not dispose of that unaddressed escrow-agent fiduciary-duty theory. The court therefore reversed and remanded as to the fiduciary-duty claim and affirmed the remainder of the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Match the motion to the live pleading. If a neutral actor is alleged to have mishandled sale or settlement funds in an escrow or disbursing role, plead that fiduciary-duty theory clearly, and on defense, expressly move against it by name. A summary-judgment motion aimed only at negligence, contract, or title-insurer duties will not knock out an unaddressed escrow-duty claim."