Weekly Digest
August 1 – August 7, 2026
37 opinions this week
Susan Mack Cooper v. Thomas Christian Cooper
COA05
In Cooper v. Cooper, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a jury-based divorce decree because the wife’s appellate complaints were inadequately briefed. Although she alleged serious problems—including discovery abuse, concealment of assets, improper transfers, restrictions on character evidence, and an unfair property division—her brief did not identify specific reversible rulings or jury findings, apply the correct standards of review, cite the record, or support her arguments with relevant authority as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. The court treated the appeal as a briefing-waiver case rather than reaching the merits, holding that broad accusations of unfairness and generalized sufficiency attacks were not enough to overturn a decree implementing a unanimous jury verdict and equal division of the estate.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appeals are won with precise legal briefing, not broad complaints that the trial was unfair. In a divorce appeal, each complaint must be tied to a specific ruling or jury finding, preserved in the record, supported by authority, and accompanied by a harm analysis—or the issue is likely waived.”
J.L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In J.L. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Third Court of Appeals upheld an order denying the father both managing and possessory conservatorship of his infant child. The record showed repeated domestic violence between the parents, the father’s methamphetamine use, the child’s positive methamphetamine hair test, untreated mental-health issues, threats to the caregiver, and the father’s failure to complete key court-ordered services. Applying Family Code sections 153.002 and 153.191 under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the court held that the usual presumption favoring appointment of a non-managing parent as possessory conservator was rebutted because appointment was not in the child’s best interest and the father’s possession or access would endanger the child’s physical or emotional welfare. The court also rejected the father’s complaint about discretionary visitation because he was not entitled to possessory-conservator status in the first place.
Litigation Takeaway
“The Section 153.191 possessory-conservator presumption is real, but it can be overcome with a strong danger record. Repeated family violence, substance abuse, direct child drug exposure, untreated mental-health instability, threats, and failure to complete services can justify denying a parent any conservatorship role at all—not just restricting visitation.”
Ardon v. State
COA02
In Ardon v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that even if the trial court erred by designating a forensic interviewer as the child’s Article 38.072 outcry witness and by excluding or redacting sexual-history evidence under Rules 107 and 412, those errors were harmless. The court focused on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), reasoning that the complainant herself testified to the same core abuse allegations at trial, making the interviewer’s testimony cumulative, and that the excluded sexual-knowledge evidence would not have materially advanced the defense beyond evidence the jury already heard. Because the complained-of rulings did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, the convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Preserving evidentiary error is not enough—on appeal, the real fight is often harm. If substantially the same evidence comes in through other witnesses, or excluded evidence adds little to the theory already presented, reversal is unlikely. In family-law cases involving child statements, forensic interviews, and sexual-knowledge evidence, build the record to show why the disputed evidence is uniquely important rather than merely cumulative.”
In the Interest of S.S.W., a Child
COA05
In *In re S.S.W.*, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed that Texas retained continuing exclusive jurisdiction over a custody-modification dispute under Family Code section 152.202, even though the child had long lived in California with Mother. Mother argued Texas lacked jurisdiction or should decline it as an inconvenient forum, but the court separated those issues and held that Father’s Texas residence and the ongoing Texas-based parent-child order supported continuing exclusive jurisdiction. The court further held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the inconvenient-forum challenge because the record did not show the chapter 152 factors required Texas to defer to California. The court also affirmed the modification naming Father as the conservator with the right to designate the child’s primary residence.
Litigation Takeaway
“A child’s out-of-state residence does not automatically strip Texas of modification jurisdiction once a Texas court has continuing exclusive jurisdiction. Family-law litigators should analyze UCCJEA cases in two steps: first, whether Texas still has continuing exclusive jurisdiction; second, whether Texas should nevertheless decline jurisdiction as an inconvenient forum. To move a case out of Texas, build a full statutory record on both issues rather than relying only on the child’s residence, school, or medical care in another state.”
In the Interest of V.C., a Child
COA13
In this private termination-and-adoption appeal, the court reversed a trial court order terminating the mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(C) and (F). The father and stepmother relied mainly on the mother’s incarceration, nonpayment of child support, and absence from the child’s life. The court strictly scrutinized the evidence under the clear-and-convincing standard and held it was insufficient on both predicate grounds. As to subsection (C), the evidence showed the child was adequately supported in the father’s home, so the record did not establish that the mother voluntarily left the child without adequate support. As to subsection (F), the petitioners proved nonpayment but did not prove the mother had the ability to pay during the relevant statutory period, especially while incarcerated and in a halfway house. The mother’s post-release efforts to contact the child, along with evidence that the father controlled or blocked access, also undermined any abandonment theory. The court reversed and rendered judgment without reaching best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“Termination cases rise or fall on exact statutory proof, not sympathy or bad optics. Incarceration, missed support, and a weak relationship with the child do not by themselves prove abandonment or failure to support under § 161.001(b)(1)(C) or (F). Petitioners must prove each element—especially adequate-support facts under subsection (C) and actual ability to pay during the statutory window under subsection (F). For respondents, evidence of attempted contact, blocked access, and inability to pay can be decisive.”
In the Interest of D.C.C. and R.C.C., Children
COA05
In this Dallas appeal, Father argued the final divorce decree improperly departed from the parties’ binding mediated settlement agreement by imposing monthly child support when the MSA only required the parents to split daycare costs. The court acknowledged that qualifying MSAs under Texas Family Code sections 6.602 and 153.0071 are binding and that courts generally may not render judgments that vary from them, but it held that ordinary error-preservation rules still apply. Because Father did not clearly object when the trial court announced it would include standard child-support language, did not seek enforcement of the MSA as written, and did not file a post-judgment motion complaining that the decree varied from the MSA, he failed to preserve the complaint. The court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“A binding MSA is only as good as the record you make to enforce it. If a trial court signals that a decree will add or alter terms from the MSA, counsel must object clearly, request a conforming decree, and, if necessary, file a motion to modify or for new trial—or the complaint may be waived on appeal.”
In re The State of Texas, ex rel. Jennifer A. Tharp
COA03
In this original mandamus proceeding, the State challenged a trial court’s refusal to include an affirmative family-violence finding in a criminal judgment and its refusal to impose the mandatory $100 family-violence fine after placing the defendant on community supervision for assault causing bodily injury, family violence. The Austin Court of Appeals analyzed Code of Criminal Procedure articles 42.013 and 42A.504(b), emphasizing that both statutes use mandatory language: once the court determines a Title 5 offense involved family violence as defined by Family Code section 71.004, it must enter the finding in the judgment and must impose the fine if community supervision is granted. The court rejected the trial court’s attempt to hold those consequences in abeyance as a probation incentive, concluding the duties were ministerial rather than discretionary. Because the State lacked an adequate appellate remedy, mandamus was proper, and the court conditionally granted relief compelling entry of both the family-violence finding and the fine.
Litigation Takeaway
“A family-violence finding is not a negotiable probation detail. Once a criminal court determines family violence occurred in a qualifying Title 5 case, the finding must be entered immediately, and family-law litigators should expect that judgment to become a powerful exhibit in custody, possession, protective-order, and divorce-related disputes.”
Olivares v. Sanchez
COA08
In Olivares v. Sanchez, the appellant tried to appeal a July 1, 2025 final judgment by filing a notice of appeal on November 10, 2025, after the trial court denied her timely motion for new trial on October 9, 2025. The court explained that a timely motion for new trial extends the deadline to file a notice of appeal to 90 days after the final judgment is signed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(a)(1), making the deadline September 29, 2025. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that the later order denying new trial created a separate 30-day deadline, because an order denying a motion for new trial is not independently appealable. Since the notice of appeal was filed after the extended deadline measured from the final judgment, and outside the Rule 26.3 grace period calculated from that same date, the court held it lacked appellate jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, the appellate clock runs from the signed final judgment or final appealable order—not from the order denying a motion for new trial. A timely new-trial motion can extend the notice-of-appeal deadline to 90 days, but it does not restart the clock. Calendar the final-order date, the Rule 26.1 extended deadline, and the Rule 26.3 grace period immediately, or the appeal may be lost entirely.”
In re M.M.
COA02
In this original proceeding arising from post-divorce enforcement litigation, the mother obtained a contempt order against the father for violating possession, medical, and property-division provisions of the divorce decree. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held the order was void because the criminal-contempt portion contained inconsistent confinement terms, and the civil-contempt portion merely declared the father in civil contempt without imposing a coercive sanction or stating how he could purge the contempt. Applying settled Texas contempt law, the court emphasized that civil contempt must be coercive and must tell the contemnor exactly what act will secure compliance or release. Because the order lacked those essential features, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a Texas family-law contempt order to survive review, drafting matters as much as proof. A valid civil-contempt order must do more than list violations—it must specify the coercive sanction and the exact purge condition within the contemnor’s power. If the order blurs civil and criminal contempt, or leaves the respondent guessing how to comply, it is vulnerable to mandamus as void.”
Romero v. State
COA14
In Romero v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove continuous sexual abuse of a child under Penal Code section 21.02 when the child could not give exact dates for each incident. The court applied the standard legal-sufficiency framework and held that exact dates were not required so long as a rational factfinder could infer that at least two acts of sexual abuse occurred over 30 or more days. The child’s testimony that the abuse happened about every other weekend, together with her description of three memorable incidents occurring more than a month apart, was enough to satisfy the statute’s duration element. The court also reaffirmed that a child complainant’s testimony alone can support the conviction and affirmed Romero’s conviction and sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
“When exact dates are unavailable, lawyers can still prove repeated child abuse by building a pattern-based record anchored to routines, recurring opportunities, and a few memorable incidents separated in time. In family-law cases, that approach can support findings about endangerment, possession restrictions, supervised access, and best interest without requiring false calendar precision.”
In the Interest of A.W., a Child
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating that, after reviewing the record, no nonfrivolous issue could be raised. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals independently reviewed the clerk’s and reporter’s records under Anders and In re K.M., including the trial court’s findings under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), and (Q) and best interest under section 161.001(b)(2). Given the record of drug use during pregnancy, the child’s positive test at birth, incarceration, noncompliance, instability, and the absence of any pro se response, the court found no arguable ground for appeal and affirmed the termination order. The court separately denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding under In re P.M. that a no-merit appeal alone is not good cause for withdrawal and that appointed counsel’s duties continue through Texas Supreme Court proceedings unless relieved on some independent basis.
Litigation Takeaway
“An Anders affirmance in a termination case does not end appointed counsel’s job. For family-law litigators, the case highlights two practical lessons: build and preserve appellate issues at trial because a bad record is hard to overcome on accelerated review, and if appointed on appeal, comply fully with Anders procedures while expecting to remain counsel through possible Texas Supreme Court review unless the court grants withdrawal for a reason beyond frivolousness.”
In the Interest of M.B., a Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to M.B. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E) because the mother engaged in a voluntary course of conduct that endangered the child, including drug use, leaving the children with unsafe caregivers, chronic school neglect, and disappearing for weeks without communication. The court also held the mother failed to preserve any complaint about the specificity of the trial court’s statutory findings, upheld the best-interest finding, and declined to address alternative predicate grounds because one supported ground plus best interest was enough to affirm.
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment cases are won or lost on pattern evidence, not isolated incidents. Proof of drug use, unsafe caregiver choices, prolonged absence, school neglect, and failure to engage with services can collectively support termination under subsection (E), and the same themes can strongly influence conservatorship and possession disputes short of termination. On appeal, complaints about insufficiently specific statutory findings must be preserved in the trial court.”
John Tomaszewski and Heather Bryan v. K. Hovnanian of Houston II, LLC d/b/a Brighton Homes
COA01
In Tomaszewski v. K. Hovnanian of Houston II, LLC, the First Court of Appeals held that although a trial court may impose monetary discovery sanctions under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 215.2(b), the amount of those sanctions must be supported by competent evidence showing a direct nexus between the discovery abuse and the reasonable fees, costs, and expenses awarded. The trial court imposed more than $50,000 in sanctions for third-party depositions, sanctions-motion practice, and later discovery work after finding discovery misconduct, but the appellate court concluded the record lacked sufficient evidence of reasonable hours, rates, expenses, and causation under Nath and Rohrmoos. The court reversed the sanctions orders as to amount and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing, while also declining to reinstate the plaintiffs’ nonsuited claims and recognizing that the related contempt order tied to nonpayment could not stand once the sanctions were reversed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even when discovery sanctions are justified, a fee-based sanctions award will not survive appeal unless the movant proves the amount with real evidence. In family-law cases, lawyers seeking Rule 215 sanctions should prove hours, rates, expenses, and causation with the same rigor as any fee claim; lawyers opposing sanctions should attack lump-sum requests that are not tied to work actually caused by the discovery violation.”
Rodriguez v. State
COA03
In Rodriguez v. State, the defendant was convicted of violating a protective order, and the trial court enhanced his punishment under Texas Penal Code section 12.42 based on two prior felony convictions. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodriguez was the same person convicted in the prior cases. The court explained that similar identifiers and investigative testimony, without a reliable evidentiary link such as fingerprints, certified penitentiary records, stipulations, or other competent identity evidence, were legally insufficient to support the habitual-offender findings. The court left the underlying conviction intact, reversed the punishment portion of the judgment, and remanded for a new punishment hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
“If prior convictions matter, do not assume identity from a shared name or partial identifiers. In family-law cases involving protective orders, conservatorship, possession restrictions, or family-violence allegations, lawyers should be prepared to prove that the opposing party is the person actually convicted through certified records and a clean identity link—or attack that link if the proof is weak.”
In re Phillip James Emerson, Jr.
COA06
In this original proceeding, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that once a Rule 18a motion to recuse is filed, the trial judge may not take further substantive action until the judge either recuses or refers the motion to the regional presiding judge. Here, the relator filed a habeas application and a motion to disqualify or recuse on the same day, but the county judge later denied habeas relief before entering a recusal or referral order. Relying on Rule 18a(f)(1) and prior cases holding that orders signed during that freeze period are void, the court concluded the habeas-denial order was signed without authority. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the void order, while denying all other requested relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Timing matters. In Texas, a filed Rule 18a recusal motion immediately freezes the judge’s power to sign substantive orders until the judge either recuses or refers the motion. Family-law lawyers should audit the docket before any ruling on temporary orders, enforcement, possession, support, or property issues, because an order signed during that freeze period may be void and subject to mandamus.”
Tom Carse v. Rachel Huntress Pinkerton
COA05
In Tom Carse v. Rachel Huntress Pinkerton, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a Rule 13 sanctions order entered against an attorney who had signed an amended petition adding Pinkerton as a defendant. The court explained that Rule 13 sanctions require evidence that the pleading was both groundless and filed in bad faith or for purposes of harassment, and that pleadings are presumed to be filed in good faith. Here, the sanctions record showed only that Pinkerton denied the allegations and that the claims against her were later nonsuited, which did not prove the attorney knew the allegations were false when he filed the amended pleading. Because there was no legally sufficient evidence rebutting the presumption of good faith or showing improper motive at the time of filing, the appellate court reversed and rendered judgment denying sanctions.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 13 sanctions are not a shortcut for winning a factual dispute. To obtain sanctions, the movant must prove not just that the pleading was weak or later abandoned, but that it was groundless and filed in bad faith or to harass based on what counsel knew at the time of filing. Lawyers should preserve their pre-filing investigation, and parties seeking sanctions must build an evidentiary record aimed at the signer’s contemporaneous knowledge and intent.”
Stephens v. Stephens
COA03
In Stephens v. Stephens, the Third Court of Appeals dismissed a father’s attempted appeal from a post-decree child-possession habeas ruling. The mother sought a writ of habeas corpus under Texas Family Code sections 157.371-.376 to obtain return of the child under an existing possession order, and the father tried to appeal both the habeas ruling and what he described as the denial of a temporary restraining order. The court applied Gray v. Rankin to hold that orders granting or denying habeas relief in child-custody possession disputes are not appealable, and it rejected the TRO theory because denials of TROs are generally not appealable and the record contained no order denying a temporary injunction. With no appealable order in the record, the court dismissed for want of jurisdiction under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
“In emergency child-possession disputes, do not assume every adverse ruling can be directly appealed. A child-custody habeas order is not appealable, and a TRO denial usually is not either; lawyers must identify the correct procedural vehicle—often mandamus or other emergency relief—and make sure the record contains an actually appealable injunction order before filing a notice of appeal.”
Paul Daniel Cooper v. The State of Texas
COA12
In Cooper v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a defendant’s pre-warning statement that he did not want to talk “if” officers were going to interview him was too conditional and equivocal to constitute an unambiguous invocation of the right to remain silent. The court emphasized that officers did not interrogate him at that point, instead took him to an interview room, administered full Miranda warnings, confirmed he understood them, and obtained an immediate and explicit agreement to talk when he answered “Absolutely.” Applying Miranda, Berghuis v. Thompkins, and Article 38.22, the court concluded there was no clear invocation that officers were required to scrupulously honor as a bar to further questioning, and it also held that the trial court’s initial failure to enter voluntariness findings was cured after abatement and supplementation of the record.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-violence-related family law cases, recorded criminal statements can become powerful evidence in custody, protective-order, and divorce litigation. Cooper teaches that courts distinguish between vague reluctance to talk and a clear invocation of silence, so if a party later receives warnings and clearly agrees to speak, the interview will likely remain usable. Lawyers challenging such statements may be more effective attacking context, voluntariness, completeness, and evidentiary weight rather than overstating a Miranda-based exclusion argument.”
Pineda v. State
COA09
In Pineda v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals considered whether child-victim statements contained in sexual-assault nurse examiner and related medical records were admissible over a hearsay objection. The defendant argued the records were too forensic in nature and that the State failed to prove the children understood they were speaking for medical diagnosis or treatment. Applying Texas Rule of Evidence 803(4) and an abuse-of-discretion standard, the court focused on whether the statements were made in a medical context and were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment, rather than on whether the examination also served investigative purposes. The court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the records because a dual medical-forensic examination does not, by itself, defeat Rule 803(4), and it also upheld limits on cross-examination as within the zone of reasonable disagreement.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law cases involving abuse allegations, do not assume SANE, CAC, or child-abuse medical records are inadmissible just because they have a forensic component. The real fight is foundation: show, or attack, whether the child’s statements were made for a genuine medical purpose and were reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment. Targeted redactions and precise Rule 803(4) objections are usually stronger than all-or-nothing hearsay arguments.”
In the Interest of A.N.S., M.A.W., K.K.S., S.N.W., and A.E.S., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court evaluated the Holley and section 263.307 factors and emphasized Mother’s continuing instability in housing and employment, unresolved mental-health and safety concerns, inconsistent visitation, and failure to show she could safely meet the children’s significant therapeutic and emotional needs. The court also relied on evidence that the children were improving and thriving in stable placements. Mother’s partial compliance with services, recent improvements, and request for more time did not outweigh the broader record supporting termination.
Litigation Takeaway
“Partial compliance is not enough in a best-interest case. If the overall record still shows instability, unresolved mental-health or safety concerns, inconsistent visitation, and a child doing better in a stable placement, a trial court can still find termination is in the child’s best interest. For litigators, the case underscores the importance of building a child-specific record focused on safety, stability, follow-through, and the child’s actual progress in care.”
In the Interest of J.C.L.L. and J.C.H.L., Children
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals held that temporary SAPCR and enforcement findings that Father lived within the decree’s geographic area did not bar the trial court from reconsidering that issue at the final modification trial because res judicata applies to final judgments, not interlocutory temporary orders. On the merits, the court concluded the evidence showed material and substantial post-decree changes in the parties’ circumstances, including Father’s divided Texas-California living situation and Mother’s relocation-related support and financial considerations, and that the children’s best interest supported a tailored modification. The court therefore affirmed the order allowing Mother to designate the children’s primary residence in either Collin County, Texas, or Los Angeles County, California.
Litigation Takeaway
“Temporary-order wins do not prove your modification case at final trial. In relocation disputes, lawyers must build fresh, trial-ready evidence on actual residence, material and substantial change, and best interest rather than relying on temporary findings or enforcement language.”
In the Interest of A.C.L.B., a Child
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father challenged only the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and the best-interest finding, while leaving unchallenged separate predicate grounds under subsections (N) and (O). The Fourth Court of Appeals held that under In re A.V., any one predicate ground plus best interest is enough to affirm termination, so the unchallenged (N) and (O) findings independently supported the judgment. The court nevertheless reviewed the challenged (D) and (E) findings under In re N.G. because those endangerment findings can carry future collateral consequences. Applying the clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards, the court concluded the evidence supported both findings based on domestic violence while the child was present, methamphetamine exposure, continued drug use, violations of no-contact conditions, missed services, and ongoing instability. The court affirmed the termination decree in full.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas termination appeals, you must challenge every independent predicate ground necessary to obtain reversal. Attacking only (D), (E), and best interest is not enough if the decree also rests on unchallenged grounds like constructive abandonment or service-plan noncompliance. For trial lawyers, the case also shows the value of proving multiple termination grounds and building a record around domestic violence, drug exposure, court-order violations, and instability.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Tara Shaila Kalra and Vineel Rao-Aourpally
COA05
In Kalra v. Rao-Aourpally, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether several financial accounts tied to the husband were his separate property or community property. The husband relied mainly on testimony that most accounts were opened before marriage, along with limited account summaries. The court held that this was not enough to overcome the Texas community-property presumption under Family Code § 3.003 because he did not trace the divorce-date balances with clear and convincing evidence or rule out community contributions, commingling, and post-marital changes in the accounts. The court also rejected the wife’s alleged waiver, explaining that requesting an asset be awarded to the husband in a proposed division did not concede separate-property characterization. The court reversed the mischaracterization, rendered judgment characterizing the disputed accounts as community property, and remanded for a new just-and-right division.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas divorce cases, saying an account existed before marriage is not enough. Separate-property claims for investment, retirement, or foreign accounts rise or fall on tracing. Without records showing exactly how the asset remained separate throughout the marriage, the community-property presumption will control and can undo the entire property division on appeal.”
Thermilus v. State
COA05
In Thermilus v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed that the evidence was legally sufficient to show Brandon Thermilus caused A.S.’s broken arm and that the injury qualified as serious bodily injury. The court analyzed the case under the legal-sufficiency standard, emphasizing that juries may rely on circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences from the full sequence of events. A.S. testified she was assaulted, fled to a neighbor’s house, and was then violently tackled onto the pavement, after which she immediately experienced severe pain and discovered her arm was broken. Eyewitness testimony, police and paramedic observations, and medical evidence describing a displaced humerus fracture caused by significant force supported causation. The court also held the fracture met the serious-bodily-injury standard because it required surgery, prolonged immobilization, extensive therapy, caused inability to work, and left lasting range-of-motion and strength limitations.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law cases involving family violence, Thermilus shows that courts can find causation and significant injury from the overall evidentiary mosaic—not just direct eyewitness or expert testimony pinpointing the exact moment of injury. Medical records, immediate symptoms, witness observations, and proof of long-term functional impairment can be enough to support protective-order relief, custody restrictions, and disproportionate property arguments.”
In the Interest of B.T.T.T., a Child
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.003. The court held that clear-and-convincing evidence showed Mother’s treatment-resistant schizoaffective disorder and chronic psychosis rendered her unable to provide for the child, and that this incapacity would likely continue until the child turned eighteen. In reaching that conclusion, the court focused on functional parenting incapacity—not diagnosis alone—relying on evidence of repeated psychiatric hospitalizations, persistent psychosis despite treatment, assisted-living needs, inability to secure a safe placement where the child could live with her, and lack of durable improvement. The court also held the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child by investigating placements, contacting relatives, and pursuing reunification-oriented options within the limits created by Mother’s condition. Finally, the court rejected Mother’s complaint about expert testimony by videoconference because she failed to preserve the issue in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
“In severe-mental-illness cases, Texas courts look past labels and focus on whether the illness functionally prevents safe parenting and is likely to keep doing so long-term. Build or attack the record on concrete daily limitations, prognosis, housing, treatment stability, and reunification efforts—and preserve every procedural objection, including remote-testimony complaints, or lose it on appeal.”
In the Interest of J.M.M., S.A.M., and N.R.M., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father argued the trial court lost jurisdiction because it signed the final order after the 90-day deadline in Texas Family Code section 263.4011. The Fourth Court of Appeals agreed the statutory deadline was missed, but held the deadline is mandatory rather than jurisdictional, relying on its prior decision in In re T.D. Because the father did not preserve the complaint in the trial court through a timely objection, motion, or request, the issue was waived. The court therefore affirmed the order terminating Father’s rights and appointing Mother sole managing conservator, while also noting the evidentiary record against Father was unusually sparse.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume a missed statutory deadline will void a family-law order on appeal. If a deadline violation is not jurisdictional, you must preserve it in the trial court with a timely objection, motion, or request—and in split-setting cases, track the deadline from the first day trial begins because recesses do not stop the clock.”
Seavey v. State
COA14
In Seavey v. State, the defendant argued his Confrontation Clause rights were violated when a substitute medical examiner testified about cause and manner of death using an autopsy file prepared by a different examiner who did not appear at trial. On remand after Smith v. Arizona, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the State had introduced the absent examiner’s testimonial statements for their truth or instead presented an expert who independently reviewed the autopsy report, photographs, radiology, and toxicology and formed his own opinion. The court held the testimony was permissible because the substitute examiner offered an independent causation opinion rather than merely relaying the original examiner’s conclusions, so overruling the confrontation objection was not an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
“When using a substitute expert, build the record that the witness personally reviewed the underlying materials, applied independent professional judgment, and is offering the witness’s own opinion—not acting as a conduit for an absent professional’s conclusions. In family-law cases, that distinction can determine whether expert testimony survives objection.”
Tina Thuy Truong and Tina 1960 Nails Salon, Inc. v. Hoa Hiep Hoang
COA01
In Truong v. Hoang, the spouses disputed how to treat value generated during marriage by the wife’s separate-property nail salon corporation. The trial court awarded the husband $384,307 as his share of a supposed community interest in salon income and entered judgment against both the wife and the corporation. The court of appeals held that community labor devoted to a spouse’s separate-property business does not create a direct ownership interest in the business or its income; instead, the proper theory is an equitable reimbursement claim under Texas Family Code section 3.402 for inadequate compensation to the community. Because reimbursement is resolved through reconstitution and just-and-right division between the spouses, and no independent basis for corporate liability was established, the judgment against the separate-property corporation was improper. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the property division to be reconsidered under the proper reimbursement framework.
Litigation Takeaway
“If community labor enhanced one spouse’s separate business during marriage, plead and prove reimbursement—not ownership of the business profits. And if you want a judgment against the business entity itself, you need an independent theory like alter ego, fraud, or another entity-specific basis for liability.”
Robert Anthony Rios v. The State of Texas
COA14
In *Robert Anthony Rios v. The State of Texas*, the defendant tried to elicit testimony from the complainant’s mother that the child later said, “Mommy, I’m sorry. I lied.” The State objected on hearsay grounds, and the trial court sustained the objection while expressly giving defense counsel the chance to explain any non-hearsay purpose or exception. Counsel did not identify any admissibility theory, instead rephrased the question, drew another hearsay objection, and then moved on. On appeal, Rios argued the testimony was admissible as impeachment by prior inconsistent statement, a statement against interest, under optional completeness, and under confrontation principles. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held those arguments were not preserved because none was presented to the trial court as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1. The court also rejected the related ineffective-assistance claim on the direct-appeal record. The holding is that when a hearsay objection is sustained, the proponent must timely state the specific basis for admission or the complaint is forfeited on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the other side says “hearsay,” do not assume the judge will fill in the rule for you. In any Texas family case, you must immediately state the exact admissibility theory—non-hearsay purpose, specific exception, impeachment, completeness, or constitutional ground—or you will likely lose the issue on appeal.”
In the Matter of A.F. and I.M.A.F. v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this juvenile-delinquency appeal, the juveniles argued the State’s petitions should have been dismissed because, although the mother was served, the father was not, even though his identity and address were allegedly known. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals treated the issue as one of statutory construction and focused on the text of Texas Family Code § 53.04(d)(3), which refers to “the parent, guardian, or custodian” in the singular and disjunctive. Rejecting the argument that plural words like “names” and “residence addresses” required service on both parents, the court held it would not read “both” or “all” into the statute when the Legislature did not include that language. The court also held § 53.04(d)(4) did not impose any additional service duty because that subsection applies only when the relevant adult is out of state, cannot be found in Texas, or has an unknown residence. Because service on one parent satisfied the statute, the trial court properly denied the motions to dismiss and the judgments were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Notice fights in Texas family-law-related cases turn on the exact statutory text, not broad fairness arguments. If a statute uses singular or disjunctive wording like “the parent, guardian, or custodian,” courts may treat service on one qualifying adult as enough unless the Legislature expressly requires notice to both or all interested parties.”
In the Interest of A.S.E. a/k/a A.E., a Child
COA01
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E). The court reviewed the father’s conduct over time—not as isolated incidents—and focused on the child’s positive drug test at birth, the father’s repeated positive drug tests, numerous missed tests treated as positive, failed treatment efforts, failure to complete services, criminal charges and convictions, incarceration, domestic violence, and repeated violations of the Department’s safety plan. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and settled law that subsection (E) is proved through a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient. The court also upheld best interest, concluding that the father’s late improvement did not outweigh the child’s need for permanence and the stability of the relative placement that wished to adopt.
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment cases are won or lost on patterns, not excuses. Repeated drug use, missed tests, failed services, criminal trouble, and violations of safety measures can add up to a compelling course-of-conduct record, and late progress may not undo years of instability. In private custody cases, the same pattern evidence can justify restrictions, supervised possession, or limits on decision-making.”
Sprung v. Velazquez
COA03
In Sprung v. Velazquez, a husband in a divorce case argued that language in his counter-petition objecting to an associate judge 'hearing a trial on the merits or presiding at a jury trial' counted as a written jury demand. The Austin Court of Appeals rejected that argument, holding that Rule 216 requires an explicit written jury demand filed timely before trial, and that a reference to a jury trial in an objection to an associate judge is not enough. The court also held that the husband’s oral jury request, made only after the bench trial had begun and after the wife rested, was plainly untimely and could be denied without abusing discretion because granting it would disrupt the docket. The court further affirmed denial of his oral, unverified motion for continuance under Rules 251 and 252.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a jury in a Texas family-law case, file a clear written jury demand early and pay the fee—do not assume other pleadings preserve that right. An objection to an associate judge is not a jury demand, and trial-day oral requests for a jury or continuance are usually too late.”
In the Matter of A.F. and I.M.A.F. v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this juvenile-delinquency appeal, the juveniles argued the State’s petitions should have been dismissed because only their mother was served even though the father’s name and address were allegedly known. The Fourteenth Court treated the issue as one of statutory construction and focused on the text of Texas Family Code §§ 53.04 and 53.06. It held that the statute’s singular, disjunctive wording—“parent, guardian, or custodian”—does not require service on both parents absent express language such as “both” or “all.” The court also held that § 53.04(d)(4) was not triggered because one parent was known, located in Texas, and served. The denial of the motions to dismiss was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Service and notice fights rise or fall on the exact statutory text. If the Family Code uses singular and disjunctive language, a court may reject arguments that notice had to be given to every known parent or conservator unless the statute expressly says so. For family-law litigators, this case is a reminder to ground dismissal and due-process arguments in specific notice language, and to distinguish between complete failure of notice and partial-service complaints.”
In re Enriqueta Medina
COA14
In a divorce case, the trial court signed a final default divorce decree on September 30, 2024. The husband later claimed he never received notice of the decree and filed a motion for new trial months after the court’s plenary power expired. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(d), the trial court lost plenary power thirty days after signing the decree because no timely post-judgment motion extended that deadline. The court further explained that the clerk’s failure to send default-judgment notice under Rule 239a does not indefinitely extend the trial court’s power; any relief based on lack of notice must fit within the limited Rule 306a framework. Because the new-trial order was signed long after plenary power expired, it was void, and mandamus was the proper remedy to require the trial court to vacate it.
Litigation Takeaway
“Jurisdictional deadlines control, even when a party says they never got notice of a default decree. In family-law cases, lawyers must immediately analyze Rule 329b and Rule 306a deadlines after judgment; once plenary power expires, the trial court cannot grant an out-of-time new trial, and the available remedies shift to restricted appeal, bill of review, or mandamus against any void order.”
In the Matter of C.B.
COA14
In In the Matter of C.B., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a juvenile court retained authority under Texas Family Code section 54.11 to conduct a determinate-sentence transfer hearing and transfer C.B. to TDCJ, even though he was already confined in TDCJ on an adult robbery conviction and had never been physically admitted to TJJD. The court focused on the statutory prerequisites rather than physical placement, reasoning that C.B. remained subject to an uncompleted juvenile determinate sentence that had been committed to TJJD, and TJJD properly made the referral required for the transfer hearing. The court rejected arguments that adult custody divested the juvenile court of power, found sufficient evidence to support transfer based on the underlying offense, later adult conviction, TJJD recommendation, and inability to complete the sentence in the juvenile system before age nineteen, and held that no reversible due-process error was shown from C.B.’s Zoom appearance because no objection was preserved. The court also found no reversible error in the deadly-weapon finding in the transfer order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not confuse a party’s physical custody status with a court’s continuing statutory authority. In overlapping Family Code and criminal matters, the key questions are whether the governing statute still authorizes action and whether the required procedural triggers have occurred. Also, preserve procedural objections—especially to remote appearances—because unpreserved complaints are unlikely to succeed on appeal.”
Bisor v. State
COA05
In Bisor v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a general hearsay objection to an entire TDCJ prison pen packet did not preserve a narrower complaint that specific disciplinary entries contained inadmissible embedded hearsay. The court explained that when a composite exhibit contains both admissible and allegedly inadmissible material, the objecting party must identify the particular pages or statements being challenged so the trial court has a fair opportunity to rule. The court further indicated that, even if preserved, the pen packet was generally admissible as a self-authenticated public record and under the business-records exception, with the defendant’s own statements also admissible as party-opponent admissions. Finally, the court held that any assumed error was harmless because the punishment record already included a prior murder conviction, other misconduct evidence, and a 23-year sentence near the low end of the enhanced range.
Litigation Takeaway
“Blanket objections to mixed records usually are not enough. If only part of a composite exhibit is objectionable, identify the exact page, entry, or statement and state the precise basis—especially for embedded hearsay—so the issue is preserved for appeal. In family-law trials, this lesson applies directly to CPS files, medical records, school records, counseling records, police reports, and other multi-layered exhibits.”
In Re Guardianship of S.M.D.
COA05
In this Texas guardianship case, the proposed ward’s cousin sought temporary and permanent guardianship and alleged that the ward’s agent under a power of attorney had used that authority for self-dealing, including creating a trust, naming himself trustee, and transferring assets. After the agent opposed guardianship and argued that less restrictive alternatives already existed, the probate court granted a motion under Estates Code § 1055.001, found his interests adverse to the proposed ward, and dismissed his contest for lack of standing. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of that standing ruling. Instead, applying Estates Code § 1022.001(c) and the probate-finality framework from De Ayala v. Mackie and Crowson, the court held the order was interlocutory because it did not dispose of a discrete phase of the proceeding: the permanent guardianship application remained pending and no permanent guardian had been appointed. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A major standing ruling in a guardianship case is not necessarily immediately appealable. If the probate court excludes your client from contesting guardianship under Estates Code § 1055.001 but the permanent guardianship phase is still pending, you likely must preserve error and wait for an appealable final probate order before seeking review.”