Weekly Digest
June 13 – June 19, 2026
18 opinions this week
In the Interest of J.D.H., a Child
SCOTX
In this parental-rights termination case, the mother’s notice of appeal was filed after the 20-day deadline for accelerated appeals because counsel apparently believed a motion for new trial extended the deadline. The Texas Supreme Court agreed the notice was untimely under Rule 26.1(b) and existing precedent, but held that termination cases are different from ordinary civil cases because the statutory right to counsel includes effective assistance, including counsel’s duty to timely perfect an appeal. Applying Strickland principles and drawing on criminal lost-appeal cases, the Court held that a parent may seek an out-of-time appeal when ineffective assistance caused the missed deadline. Rather than automatically accepting the late notice or dismissing outright, the proper remedy is to reverse the dismissal and remand so the court of appeals can abate the case for an evidentiary hearing in the trial court on deficient performance and prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas termination cases, a missed accelerated appellate deadline is not always the end of the case if counsel’s ineffective assistance caused it. Lawyers must separately calendar the 20-day notice-of-appeal deadline and should seek abatement and remand for a Strickland hearing—not equitable forgiveness of the deadline—when a lost appeal stems from attorney error.”
Davis v. State
COA02
In Davis v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support deadly-weapon findings in a family-violence prosecution where the defendant used both his hands and a knife. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia legal-sufficiency standard and Texas Penal Code section 1.07(a)(17), the court focused on whether the hands and knife, in the manner used or intended to be used, were capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The court held that repeated strangulation, choking until the complainant turned blue and nearly lost consciousness, resumed choking when she began breathing again, and the severe resulting medical injuries supported the jury’s finding that the defendant’s hands were used as deadly weapons. The court also held that the knife qualified as a deadly weapon because the defendant wielded it, threatened to hurt the complainant if she ran, and used it to force her movement and compliance, even though he did not stab her. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law cases involving family violence, Davis shows that courts will treat strangulation, coercive control, and threats with a household knife as highly serious evidence even when the assailant used only hands or never actually stabbed the victim. Build the record around the manner of assault, the victim’s inability to breathe or escape, threats tied to a weapon, and the medical consequences, because those facts can strongly support protective orders, custody restrictions, supervised possession, and other safety-based relief.”
Flatt v. Tornow
COA01
In Flatt v. Tornow, a third party sued a wife involved in a divorce, alleging she accessed private communications and disclosed intimate photos and private information to others. The wife sought dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, arguing the suit was based on her petitioning activity in the divorce and her speech about the marriage and affair. The First Court of Appeals rejected that framing, focusing on the gravamen of the pleaded claims: private disclosure conduct, not protected litigation activity or speech on a matter of public concern. Because the wife failed to meet her threshold burden to show the TCPA applied, the court held the analysis ended at step one and affirmed denial of the TCPA motion to dismiss.
Litigation Takeaway
“A pending divorce does not automatically turn related misconduct into protected TCPA activity. In privacy-based tort cases involving alleged disclosure of intimate images or private communications, courts will look to the actual pleaded injury and conduct, not the broader litigation backdrop. Family-law litigators should not assume subpoenas, depositions, or affair-related communications create TCPA protection.”
Perry v. Perry
COA09
In Perry v. Perry, the husband tried to use a bill of review to set aside a final divorce decree, arguing he was denied a fair chance to seek a larger share of the marital estate, a jury trial, and relief from allegedly unfair binding arbitration. The court affirmed summary judgment against him because a bill of review is an equitable remedy that is unavailable when an adequate legal remedy existed. Here, the record showed he had already filed a direct appeal from the same final decree and then voluntarily dismissed it. Because those complaints could have been raised on direct appeal, and in fact were pursued through that route, the bill of review could not be used to relitigate the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“A bill of review is not a fallback option for issues that could have been raised on direct appeal. In family-law cases, if a party challenges a divorce decree on matters like property division, arbitration, or jury-trial complaints, counsel must treat the direct appeal as the primary vehicle. Once that appellate remedy exists—and especially if it is actually invoked—a later bill of review is likely barred.”
In Re WhiteWater Midstream, LLC, WWM Operating, LLC, MXP Parent, LLC, and Matterhorn Express Pipeline, LLC
COA14
In In re WhiteWater Midstream, the relators sought mandamus relief from orders compelling discovery and denying reconsideration, arguing the requests were overbroad and unduly burdensome. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused first on preservation under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.2(e), not on the merits of those objections. Because the relators did not timely assert overbreadth and undue-burden objections in writing before their response deadline, those objections were waived unless the trial court excused the waiver for good cause. The appellate court held the record supported the trial court’s implied finding that no good cause was shown, so compelling discovery was not an abuse of discretion. Without a clear abuse of discretion, mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law discovery fights, timing can matter more than the substance of your objection: if you do not serve specific written overbreadth or undue-burden objections by the response deadline, you may lose them entirely. For requesting parties, this case is a strong waiver tool; for responding parties, it is a reminder to preserve objections early, specifically, and in writing.”
In the Interest of A.D., S.R., and K.A., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to three children after she challenged only the sufficiency of the best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court restated the clear-and-convincing standard, the Holley best-interest factors, and the rule that evidence supporting endangerment grounds may also support best interest. The opinion highlighted evidence of methamphetamine use, a meth-possession conviction, domestic violence, a child born testing positive for methamphetamine and marihuana, prior Department involvement, and the mother’s failure to complete services and demonstrate stable, drug-free living. Applying those standards, the court held the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family cases, past drug use, instability, CPS history, and incomplete services can strongly support a best-interest finding because courts may infer future risk from past conduct. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to build a clear timeline connecting substance abuse, criminal history, safety concerns, and service-plan performance to the child’s present and future needs.”
Grant Hanson v. Tara Louise Nugent
COA03
In this SAPCR appeal, the father challenged a final order appointing the mother sole managing conservator, restricting his possession through a tiered supervised schedule tied to negative drug tests, and excluding evidence he said showed a disability, medication-assisted recovery, and a lawful THC prescription. The court reiterated that conservatorship and possession rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with sufficiency complaints folded into that review. But the excerpted opinion expressly resolved only the evidentiary complaint, holding it was forfeited because the father’s briefing failed to clearly identify the excluded evidence, address the trial objections, or provide supporting legal authority and analysis. The court affirmed the final SAPCR order.
Litigation Takeaway
“In custody appeals, preservation and briefing matter as much as the merits. If you want to complain about excluded evidence, identify the exact testimony or exhibit, make sure it is in the record, address the objection and ruling, and explain with authority why it was admissible. More broadly, trial courts can support sole managing conservatorship and stepped possession restrictions when the record ties a parent’s substance use to the child’s specific best-interest needs.”
Perricone v. Perricone
COA11
In Perricone v. Perricone, the Eleventh Court of Appeals dismissed a family-law-related appeal for lack of jurisdiction because none of the challenged trial-court orders was appealable. The appellant tried to appeal an order denying leave to file a late nonsuit and related relief, and later a Rule 91a dismissal order. The court analyzed finality under Lehmann, Sealy Emergency Room, and In re C.K.M., explaining that appellate jurisdiction exists only over a final judgment or a statutorily authorized interlocutory order. Here, the orders did not dispose of all parties and all claims, one Rule 91a order expressly left Chapter 42 Family Code claims pending, there was no severance, and there was no unequivocal finality language. Because Rule 27's premature-notice framework does not create appellate jurisdiction by itself, the court declined to retain or abate the appeal and dismissed it without prejudice to refiling after an appealable order is signed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before filing a notice of appeal in a Texas family-law case, confirm there is a true final judgment or a statute authorizing interlocutory review. Partial dismissals, nonsuit-related orders, and orders resolving fewer than all claims or parties are usually not appealable unless the case is severed or the order clearly and unequivocally disposes of everything.”
In re Mandy Jo Cook
COA09
In In re Cook, the relator challenged a divorce decree signed nunc pro tunc after plenary power expired, arguing the substituted decree made substantive judicial changes rather than clerical corrections, including changes to property obligations, contempt-related provisions, and child-related language. But after perfecting a direct appeal from the nunc pro tunc judgment, she also sought mandamus relief. The Beaumont Court of Appeals did not decide whether the changes were clerical or judicial. Instead, applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(a) and the adequate-remedy analysis from In re Prudential and In re Team Rocket, the court held mandamus was unavailable because the relator already had an adequate appellate remedy through her pending appeal. The court also noted the mandamus record lacked the hearing transcript and that the relator had not shown she sought narrower trial-court relief, such as protecting disputed sale proceeds by depositing them into the court registry. Mandamus and temporary relief were denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you already perfected an appeal from a judgment nunc pro tunc, a parallel mandamus attack will usually fail unless you can clearly show the appeal cannot protect your client. In family-law enforcement and property disputes, do not rely on calling the order 'void' alone—build a full record, seek immediate preservation remedies in the trial court, and explain why ordinary appellate review is truly inadequate.”
Davet v. State
COA14
In Davet v. State, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court violated due process by not halting the case and completing competency procedures after counsel raised concerns about his competency. The court noted that the trial judge had granted the defense motion and ordered a competency evaluation, but the process stalled when the defendant failed to appear for the scheduled exam and the evaluator reported that no opinion could be formed. Because the defendant never renewed the request, objected to proceeding to trial, or obtained an adverse ruling after the evaluation failed, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 that the complaint was not preserved. The court therefore overruled the competency issue and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Getting the initial order is not enough. If an evaluation, procedural safeguard, or court-ordered step breaks down, counsel must re-urge the issue, object to moving forward, and obtain a ruling on the record or the appellate complaint may be lost.”
Rains v. State
COA03
In Rains v. State, the Third Court of Appeals reviewed a conviction for repeated violation of a Chapter 85 protective order based on jail calls to the protected person. The court held the jury charge was erroneous under Harvey v. State because it failed to require the jury to find that the respondent had been served with the protective-order application and received notice of the protective-order hearing, and it also failed to define “in violation of a protective order” to include those notice elements. But because no objection was made at trial, the court applied Almanza’s egregious-harm standard and affirmed, concluding the omission did not cause egregious harm where the order recited that the respondent appeared in person and announced ready, the signed order was later served on him in jail, and the defense did not actually contest service of the application or notice of hearing at trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“Protective-order enforcement starts with the family-court record. If a Chapter 85 order may later support criminal enforcement, lawyers should make sure the file clearly proves service of the application, notice of hearing, appearance or nonappearance, and service of the signed order. And if a criminal charge is later tried to a jury, counsel must object if the charge omits Harvey’s required notice-and-service elements, because without an objection appellate relief becomes much harder.”
In the Interest of X.H.Q., a Child
COA05
In *In the Interest of X.H.Q.*, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a Texas court acting under UIFSA may establish an initial child support obligation even though the registered Arizona divorce decree previously ordered no child support. The Office of the Attorney General registered the Arizona decree and sought support after Father moved to Texas. Father argued the Texas court lacked authority to create support and lacked personal jurisdiction over him. The court rejected both arguments. Relying on Texas Family Code section 159.401 and *In re T.B.*, it concluded that a foreign decree setting support at zero does not bar a Texas UIFSA proceeding to establish support for the first time. On jurisdiction, the court held Father’s sworn waiver of service—stating he received the papers, entered an appearance for all purposes, and waived service—supported personal jurisdiction, and his coercion argument failed because the record did not show he was prevented from reading the waiver or that his free will was overborne. The court further held that, even if the waiver were ineffective, Father made a general appearance that independently submitted him to the court’s jurisdiction. The order establishing child support and medical support was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“A foreign decree ordering no child support does not prevent a Texas court from establishing support under UIFSA. In interstate support cases, the real battleground is usually personal jurisdiction over the obligor, and a signed waiver or later general appearance can be enough to bind that party to a Texas support order.”
In the Interest of J.C.B.G., et al., Children
COA04
The San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court treated the case as a pattern-of-endangerment case, relying on repeated unsafe home conditions, chronic supervision failures, exposure to domestic conflict and inappropriate adults, unsafe transportation practices including children riding unrestrained, failure to obtain proper medical care after injuries, and the severe burn injuries suffered by an infant while in Mother’s care. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the distinct analyses for environmental endangerment under subsection (D) and conduct-based endangerment under subsection (E), the court held the record showed both an endangering environment and a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the children’s physical and emotional well-being. Because the best-interest finding also stood, the termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment findings are often won or lost through accumulation, not one dramatic event. In Texas family cases, a documented pattern of poor supervision, unsafe caretakers, transportation safety failures, minimization of injuries, and chronic instability can justify severe restrictions or termination even when the parent points to service compliance or some favorable facts.”
In the Interest of N.P.H. a/k/a N.H. and C.M.M. a/k/a C.M., Children
COA14
In In re N.P.H., Mother argued the termination decrees were void because trial allegedly did not commence before the dismissal deadline in Texas Family Code section 263.401. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected that record-based challenge, holding that because the trial on the merits began before the statutory deadline, the trial court retained jurisdiction and the decrees were not void. The court also reviewed the merits and held legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the best-interest findings, the findings that the Department made reasonable efforts but a continuing danger remained in the home, and the conservatorship rulings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Deadline-based jurisdiction attacks rise or fall on the trial record. If you want to preserve or defeat a section 263.401 challenge, make a clear record of the dismissal date, the trial setting, the parties’ announcements, and exactly when the merits trial begins; and never assume a procedural issue eliminates the need to build a strong evidentiary record on termination and conservatorship.”
In the Interest of I.G., a Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights to I.G. after Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on both predicate grounds and best interest. The record described neglect concerns shortly after the child’s birth, validated methamphetamine use, unsafe home conditions, Mother’s incarceration, and her later conviction and 45-year sentence for possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver, while the child was thriving in a grandparent placement. The court recited the governing rule that termination requires clear and convincing evidence of at least one ground under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1) plus best interest under § 161.001(b)(2), and that one supported predicate ground is enough to affirm if best interest is also supported. Although the excerpt does not include the court’s detailed merits analysis, it establishes that the trial court found grounds under § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P), and (Q), found termination in the child’s best interest, and the appellate court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In termination cases, the appeal usually turns on the record built long before trial: prove multiple predicate grounds, develop separate best-interest evidence, and document how substance abuse, unsafe conditions, incarceration, and the child’s progress in placement affect the analysis. For parents, a thin record on services, alternative care options, and best interest leaves little room for a successful sufficiency challenge on appeal.”
Servello v. VillaSport LLC
COA14
In Servello v. VillaSport LLC, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered a temporary injunction entered in a business-disparagement and defamation suit ordering a former employee to remove a social-media video. Although the parties did not raise the issue, the court reviewed sua sponte whether the injunction complied with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. Rule 683 requires a temporary injunction order to set the cause for trial on the merits in the order itself. Because the injunction omitted a trial setting, the court held the order was void, reversed the temporary injunction, and remanded. The court also affirmed denial of the appellant’s TCPA motion to dismiss.
Litigation Takeaway
“When seeking or opposing temporary injunctive relief, do not treat Rule 683 as a technicality. The signed injunction order itself must include a merits trial setting, and appellate courts may reverse a temporary injunction for that omission even if no party raises it. In family-law cases, careful injunction drafting is as important as proving the injunction elements.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Sheetal Rane and Prasanth Marreddy
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court improperly included a Mumbai property in the marital estate and ordered it sold because the evidence showed Wife had gifted the property to her mother before the divorce. Under Texas Family Code section 7.001, a court may divide only property that is part of the marital estate, so once the property was transferred to a third party it was no longer divisible between the spouses. Because the erroneous inclusion of the Mumbai property affected the overall property division, the court reversed and remanded for a new division.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before asking a court to divide or sell an asset in divorce, prove the spouses actually owned it at the time of divorce. In foreign-property and informal-title cases especially, a completed pre-divorce transfer to a third party takes the asset outside the marital estate and can undo the entire property division on appeal.”
Ex parte Warren McGee
COA01
In Ex parte Warren McGee, the First Court of Appeals addressed a habeas challenge to a criminal-contempt judgment after the underlying show-cause order broadly alleged that McGee had committed a crime or engaged in conduct leading to his arrest, but did not identify the specific offense or conduct. The court’s discussion emphasized that in criminal contempt proceedings, the show-cause order operates as the charging instrument and must give constitutionally adequate notice of the alleged offense under Ex parte Estevez and Jenkins v. State. The excerpted opinion notes that a show-cause order that fails to state an offense is void, and any contempt judgment based on it is likewise void. But because the supplied opinion text is truncated, the only clear case-specific disposition is that the court affirmed the habeas court’s denial of relief after considering whether the trial court had jurisdiction to later set aside the contempt judgment and dismiss the show-cause order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat every contempt show-cause order like a criminal charging instrument. In family-law enforcement and protective-order contempt practice, vague allegations can create a structural notice defect that may jeopardize the entire contempt proceeding, so plead the exact violated provision and the specific conduct with precision—and attack deficient notice early.”