What is the summary of Ex parte Warren McGee?

In Ex parte Warren McGee, the First Court of Appeals addressed a habeas challenge to a criminal-contempt judgment after the underlying show-cause order broadly alleged that McGee had committed a crime or engaged in conduct leading to his arrest, but did not identify the specific offense or conduct. The court’s discussion emphasized that in criminal contempt proceedings, the show-cause order operates as the charging instrument and must give constitutionally adequate notice of the alleged offense under Ex parte Estevez and Jenkins v. State. The excerpted opinion notes that a show-cause order that fails to state an offense is void, and any contempt judgment based on it is likewise void. But because the supplied opinion text is truncated, the only clear case-specific disposition is that the court affirmed the habeas court’s denial of relief after considering whether the trial court had jurisdiction to later set aside the contempt judgment and dismiss the show-cause order.

Can a Texas trial court vacate a criminal contempt judgment more than 30 days after signing it?

No. A Texas trial court generally loses jurisdiction to modify or vacate a criminal contempt judgment after its plenary power expires, and the court here held that orders signed more than 60 days after the contempt judgment were void. Relying on criminal contempt jurisdiction principles and the Court of Criminal Appeals’ remand, the court concluded the later order purporting to set aside the contempt judgment had no legal effect.

Does a later order dismissing a show cause order make a habeas challenge to a contempt judgment moot if the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the later order?

No. If the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the later dismissal or set-aside order, those orders do not moot the habeas challenge because they are themselves void. That was the key premise on remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals: the appellate court had to decide whether the trial court had power to undo the contempt judgment before treating the habeas case as moot.

When is a show cause order in a Texas criminal contempt case void for lack of notice?

A show cause order is void when it fails to give the accused constitutionally adequate notice of the specific contempt offense alleged. Citing Ex parte Estevez, 713 S.W.3d 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025), the court explained that a criminal contempt show cause order functions as the charging instrument and must state conduct amounting to an offense; a bare allegation that the defendant committed a crime or engaged in conduct resulting in arrest is insufficient.

Can habeas corpus relief be denied in Texas when the contempt judgment being challenged is already void?

Yes, if the applicant is no longer restrained or suffering a live custody-based consequence that habeas relief can remedy, a habeas court may deny relief even though the underlying contempt judgment was void. Here, the appellate court affirmed the denial after concluding the contempt and show cause orders were void but that the trial court’s later orders had not validly altered the jurisdictional posture in a way requiring different habeas relief.

What notice must a criminal contempt charging instrument provide under Texas law?

A criminal contempt charging instrument must provide the same essential notice function as an indictment or information: it must identify the alleged contemptuous conduct with enough specificity to inform the accused of the offense to be defended against. The court, citing Ex parte Estevez and Jenkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018), emphasized that the instrument must actually charge an offense to invoke jurisdiction.

Void Show Cause Order: Ex parte Warren McGee (2025)

Q: If a criminal contempt show cause order is void, is the resulting contempt judgment also void in Texas?

Yes. Under Ex parte Estevez, 713 S.W.3d 913, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025), a void show cause order cannot confer personal or subject-matter jurisdiction, so any contempt judgment based on it is likewise void. The court applied that rule to conclude that the defective notice in the show cause order rendered the contempt judgment void from inception.

Litigation Takeaway

"Treat every contempt show-cause order like a criminal charging instrument. In family-law enforcement and protective-order contempt practice, vague allegations can create a structural notice defect that may jeopardize the entire contempt proceeding, so plead the exact violated provision and the specific conduct with precision—and attack deficient notice early."

Ex parte Warren McGee, 01-23-00176-CR, June 16, 2026.

On appeal from 339th District Court, Harris County, Texas

Synopsis

The opinion text provided confirms the governing rule that, in a criminal contempt proceeding, the show-cause order functions as the charging instrument and must give sufficient notice of the alleged offense to be valid. It also confirms that under Ex parte Estevez and Jenkins v. State, if a show-cause order fails to state an offense, any contempt judgment based on it is likewise void.

Because the provided excerpt cuts off before the First Court of Appeals completes its analysis, this post is careful not to overstate the court’s ultimate holding beyond what the text supplied supports. For Texas family-law litigators, the warning is still immediate: imprecise show-cause practice in contempt-based enforcement can create a structural notice problem at the outset.

Relevance to Family Law

This matters directly in family-law enforcement practice because contempt remains a primary mechanism for enforcing divorce decrees, SAPCR orders, possession provisions, child-support obligations, and, in some settings, protective-order-related directives. When a contempt proceeding is initiated by a show-cause order that does not identify the alleged violation with sufficient specificity, the notice problem is not merely tactical; under the authorities cited in this opinion, it can undermine the validity of the contempt proceeding itself. For practitioners, that means drafting and attacking contempt notices with the same precision you would bring to any criminally inflected enforcement process.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

According to the opinion, this appeal arose from a judgment of contempt. In November 2022, a Harris County criminal court at law signed a show-cause order directing Warren McGee to appear and show cause why he should not be held in contempt for failing to abide by the court’s orders. The order stated that McGee had “COMMITTED A CRIME AND/OR ENGAGED IN CONDUCT THAT RESULTED IN HIS ARREST,” but, as the court noted, the order did not specify what crime or conduct he allegedly engaged in.

The appellate record did not contain a transcript of the show-cause hearing. On November 14, 2022, the same day McGee was to appear, the trial court signed a judgment of contempt and commitment order. The judgment found that McGee’s “behavior prevented the court from conducting its proceedings in a dignified, orderly, and expeditious manner,” and that he “persisted in disrupting the proceedings of the court” despite warnings of contempt. The court imposed one year of deferred-adjudication probation and later signed community-supervision conditions requiring, among other things, reporting, home and workplace visits, remaining in Texas, alcohol and drug testing, payment of supervision and testing fees, and installation of a court-approved alcohol breath analysis device in any vehicle he drove.

On January 31, 2023, McGee filed a habeas petition in a Harris County district court seeking relief from the contempt judgment. He argued that both the show-cause order and the contempt judgment were void from inception because neither sufficiently alleged that he committed an offense. The same day, the trial court signed an order setting aside the contempt judgment and an order dismissing the show-cause order. The set-aside order stated that the contempt judgment was being withdrawn because “deferred adjudication [is] not applicable in contempt cases.” The opinion emphasizes that both of those orders were signed more than 60 days after the November 14, 2022 contempt judgment.

McGee then amended his habeas petition, asserting that it was not obvious the trial court’s January 31 orders had legal effect because “it is not clear that [the trial court] can undo a final judgment two months after finding a person in contempt.” He maintained that, absent habeas relief, he would continue to suffer collateral consequences from the contempt adjudication. The habeas court denied relief, but stated that the trial court’s set-aside order “shall remain in effect.” McGee appealed. The First Court had previously dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction as moot, but the Court of Criminal Appeals vacated that judgment and remanded for consideration of the trial court’s jurisdiction to dismiss the contempt judgment.

Issues Decided

Based on the text provided, the opinion presents these issues for decision:

Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to dismiss its show-cause order and set aside its contempt judgment more than 60 days after signing the contempt judgment.
Whether the habeas court erred by denying habeas relief.
As part of the governing framework, whether a criminal contempt show-cause order must allege an offense with sufficient notice to be valid.

Rules Applied

The excerpt identifies the following rules and authorities:

In a criminal contempt proceeding, the show-cause order serves as the charging instrument providing the accused notice of the alleged offense. Ex parte Estevez, 713 S.W.3d 913, 919, 920 (Tex. Crim. App. 2025).
To be valid and to convey personal and subject-matter jurisdiction to the trial court, a charging instrument must charge a person with committing an offense. Jenkins v. State, 592 S.W.3d 894, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018).
Defendants charged with contempt enjoy most of the same constitutional protections applicable to other criminal defendants, including notice of charges. Estevez, 713 S.W.3d at 918.
If a show-cause order is void for failing to state an offense, any contempt judgment based on it is also void. Estevez, 713 S.W.3d at 919.
The court also noted that in Estevez, the Court of Criminal Appeals held a show-cause order void because it did not give the accused sufficient notice of the charged offense, and that the contempt order based on it was therefore also void. Id.
The First Court stated that it had followed Estevez in an unpublished memorandum opinion, citing Ex parte Eugene, No. 01-23-00174-CR, 2025 WL 2446364, at *2–4 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 26, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Application

The portion of the opinion provided shows the court setting up the merits analysis around notice and the legal significance of the show-cause order in criminal contempt proceedings. The court began by framing McGee’s first argument as a jurisdictional challenge to the trial court’s January 31, 2023 orders setting aside the contempt judgment and dismissing the show-cause order.

From there, the court did not treat the notice question as a mere pleading technicality. Instead, it emphasized that the show-cause order is the charging instrument in a criminal contempt matter and that, under Estevez and Jenkins, validity depends on whether the instrument actually charges an offense and provides sufficient notice. The court specifically recited the text of the show-cause order here and expressly noted that it “did not specify what crime or conduct McGee allegedly engaged in.” That factual observation is important because it explains why Estevez was central to the analysis.

The excerpt then links the governing law to the case by explaining the consequence recognized in Estevez: when a show-cause order fails to state an offense and is therefore void, a contempt judgment based on it is also void. The supplied text ends before the court completes its application of that framework to the January 31 orders and the habeas ruling. So while the direction of the analysis is clear, the precise final step in the court’s reasoning should be taken from the full opinion rather than inferred from the truncated excerpt alone.

Holding

The opinion text provided expressly states at the outset that the court considered the merits of McGee’s habeas appeal and that, “[i]n one issue, McGee contends that the habeas court erred by denying relief. We affirm.” That is the only ultimate disposition clearly stated in the supplied excerpt.

The supplied text also clearly states the legal rule, drawn from Estevez and Jenkins, that a criminal contempt show-cause order must function as a valid charging instrument by alleging an offense with sufficient notice, and that if such an order is void for failing to state an offense, any contempt judgment based on it is likewise void. But because the excerpt ends before the court finishes its analysis, this post does not attribute any more specific case-specific holding to the First Court without the full text.

Practical Application

For Texas family-law litigators, the practical lesson is to treat every contempt-based enforcement package as if the notice language will be stress-tested on habeas review. In enforcement proceedings involving child support, possession, geographic restrictions, property-division turnover language, or injunction-type directives in a decree, the initiating papers must identify the conduct alleged to violate the order with precision. Generalized accusations that a respondent “violated the court’s orders,” “failed to comply,” or “engaged in prohibited conduct” may invite the exact type of notice challenge discussed in Estevez and referenced in McGee.

The same point carries into protective-order practice when contempt is used as an enforcement mechanism. If the alleged violation is being presented in a contempt posture, the charging function of the show-cause order matters. A practitioner should assume that the reviewing court will ask whether the respondent could tell, from the face of the order, what offense or violation had to be defended against.

On the defense side, McGee underscores the value of examining the show-cause order first, before focusing exclusively on the later contempt judgment. If the initiating order does not specify the conduct, date, provision violated, or other essential notice components, the challenge may be directed at the foundation of the proceeding rather than only at the resulting sanction.

Checklists

Drafting a Contempt Show-Cause Package

Identify the specific order allegedly violated.
Quote or attach the exact provision at issue where appropriate.
State the specific act or omission alleged to constitute contempt.
Avoid generalized allegations that the respondent merely “failed to comply” with court orders.
Make sure the notice describes the alleged offense with enough precision for the respondent to prepare a defense.
Confirm that the relief requested matches the conduct alleged in the notice.

Reviewing an Enforcement File for Notice Defects

Read the show-cause order as a charging instrument, not just as a hearing notice.
Ask whether the order specifies the conduct alleged.
Check whether the order identifies the underlying command that was allegedly violated.
Compare the allegations in the show-cause order with the findings in the contempt judgment.
Determine whether the judgment rests on conduct that was actually described in the show-cause notice.
Preserve the record on notice objections whenever possible.

Habeas and Post-Judgment Assessment

Determine whether the contempt proceeding was criminal in nature.
Examine whether the show-cause order alleged an offense with sufficient notice.
Assess whether the contempt judgment rests on a potentially defective initiating order.
Review the procedural timeline, including any later orders purporting to set aside the contempt judgment.
Consult Estevez, Jenkins, and the full McGee opinion before taking a position on the effect of later trial-court orders.

Family-Law Enforcement Risk Management

Use heightened drafting discipline in contempt-based enforcement pleadings.
Distinguish between remedies that require contempt notice precision and those that do not.
Train trial teams to evaluate notice sufficiency before the hearing date.
Anticipate appellate and habeas scrutiny whenever incarceration, commitment, or criminal-contempt-type sanctions are in play.
Build a record that ties the alleged violation to a specific order and a specific act.

Family Law Crossover

The crossover principle here is procedural, not substantive: when contempt is criminal in nature, the show-cause order performs the work of a charging instrument, and the adequacy of that notice can control the validity of the ensuing contempt judgment. That rule can arise in family-law matters whenever a party seeks contempt for alleged violations of a decree, temporary orders, support obligations, possession terms, or other court commands enforceable by contempt. In that setting, the family-law practitioner should view the show-cause order as more than a scheduling device; it is the instrument that must define the alleged offense with enough specificity to satisfy the notice standards discussed in Estevez and cited in McGee.

Citation

Ex parte Warren McGee, No. 01-23-00176-CR, memorandum opinion issued June 16, 2026 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2026).

Full Opinion

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Ex parte Warren McGee