Jean Michel Szabuniewicz, Individually and in His Capacity as Former Trustee of the Oak Lawn Investment Trust; Oak Lawn General, Inc.; Oak Lawn Holdings I, L.P.; Texas Urban Properties, Ltd.; Texas Urban GP, Inc.; Oak Lawn Medical Properties, L.P.; Willow Park Construction, Inc.; and Guaranty Finance Company v. Todd May, in His Capacity as Trustee of the Beverly Trust

Jean Michel Szabuniewicz, Individually and in His Capacity as Former Trustee of the Oak Lawn Investment Trust; Oak Lawn General, Inc.; Oak Lawn Holdings I, L.P.; Texas Urban Properties, Ltd.; Texas Urban GP, Inc.; Oak Lawn Medical Properties, L.P.; Willow Park Construction, Inc.; and Guaranty Finance Company v. Todd May, in His Capacity as Trustee of the Beverly Trust, 02-25-00625-CV, June 25, 2026.

On appeal from 415th District Court, Parker County, Texas

Synopsis

Yes. In this restricted appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed a no-answer default judgment because the face of the record showed defective service under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 99 and 107. The court held that strict compliance failed where the returns were not filed with the clerk and the record reflected material discrepancies in the registered agent, the person actually served, and the service addresses.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this dispute arose outside the family-law docket, the opinion is highly relevant to Texas divorce, SAPCR, enforcement, and property-litigation practice because default judgments are common in family cases and are especially vulnerable to service defects on restricted appeal. The case is a pointed reminder that when a respondent, nonparty custodian, corporate entity, trust-related party, or business-controlled spouse is brought into a family case, strict compliance with Rules 99 and 107 remains jurisdictional in practical effect: if the face of the record does not affirmatively establish valid issuance, service, and return, a default decree, enforcement order, or property adjudication can be reversed even where the opposing party likely had actual notice.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The plaintiff sued multiple defendants, including an individual, several business entities, and trust-related parties, and then pursued a default judgment after none of them answered. The petition identified one service address for the individual defendant and identified the entities as being subject to service through a registered agent at a different address. Citations were requested and issued accordingly.

The service record, however, did not line up cleanly with those pleadings and citations. Most importantly, the returns of service were never separately filed with the clerk. Instead, they appeared only as attachments to the plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. Those returns lacked clerk file marks, did not include the clerk-issued citation, and reflected service on the entities by delivery to “Jean Michel Szabuniewicz aka John Szabuniewicz” at a residential-style address different from the registered-agent address identified in the petition and requested in the citations. The record also reflected a discrepancy in the named registered agent for one entity, with the petition/request referring to “Corporate Registered Agent Services, Inc.” while the citation for at least one entity referred to “Registered Agent Services, Inc.”

The individual return also contained address inconsistencies, including a variation between “Robert Bend” and “Roberts Bend.” The plaintiff nonetheless obtained a substantial default judgment that included actual damages, attorneys’ fees, exemplary damages, declaratory relief, and permanent injunctive relief. On restricted appeal, the defendants challenged the judgment on multiple grounds, but the court of appeals resolved the case on defective service alone.

Issues Decided

• Whether the defendants satisfied the elements for a restricted appeal.
• Whether error appeared on the face of the record because service of process failed to strictly comply with Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 99 and 107.
• Whether a default judgment must be reversed when the returns of service were not filed with the clerk before default judgment.
• Whether discrepancies in the identity of the registered agent, the person served, and the service address defeat strict compliance.

Rules Applied

The court applied the familiar restricted-appeal framework under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 and the Supreme Court’s formulation in Alexander v. Lynda’s Boutique, 134 S.W.3d 845 (Tex. 2004): the appellant must show timely filing, party status, nonparticipation in the judgment-producing hearing and no timely post-judgment filings, and error apparent on the face of the record.

On service, the court relied on the long-settled rule that a default judgment cannot survive direct attack unless the record affirmatively shows strict compliance with the rules governing issuance, service, and return of citation. The opinion invokes Wilson v. Dunn, 800 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Tex. 1990), and related authority emphasizing that there are no presumptions in favor of valid service in a restricted appeal and that actual notice does not cure defective service.

The operative procedural rules were Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 99 and 107. Rule 99 governs citation requirements, including the contents and direction of the citation. Rule 107 governs proof of service and requires the return to be completed and, critically, filed with the clerk for the prescribed period before default judgment may be taken. The opinion also reflects the appellate courts’ continuing insistence on exactness in no-answer default settings, consistent with recent Supreme Court skepticism toward default judgments.

Application

The court treated the case as a straightforward strict-compliance problem visible from the clerk’s record itself. The defendants satisfied the threshold restricted-appeal elements, so the dispositive question became whether the record affirmatively established proper service. It did not.

The first defect was procedural but fatal: the returns were never filed with the clerk as returns of service. They appeared only as attachments to the motion for default judgment. That matters because Rule 107 requires more than the mere existence of a return somewhere in the record. The proof of service must be filed with the clerk, and the default judgment record must show compliance with the filing requirement before judgment is rendered. A representation by counsel at the default hearing that the returns had been on file could not substitute for what the clerk’s record actually showed.

The second set of defects involved mismatches among the petition, the citations, and the returns. The petition and service requests identified a registered agent and a registered-agent address for the entities, yet the returns reflected delivery to an individual at a different address and “on behalf of” the entities. In a strict-compliance review, that kind of substitution is not a harmless irregularity. The record must demonstrate service exactly as authorized and reflected in the citation. If the citation directs service through a registered agent, but the return shows service on someone else or in some other capacity without clear conformity, the record fails.

The court also noted the discrepancy in the registered agent’s name for one entity and the inconsistencies in addresses, including “Robert Bend” versus “Roberts Bend.” In an ordinary merits setting, one might argue these were minor clerical variances. But in the default-judgment context, especially on restricted appeal, those variances are often outcome-determinative because courts do not indulge presumptions or infer compliance. The record must be self-proving. Here, it was not.

Holding

The court held that the default judgment had to be reversed because error appeared on the face of the record showing noncompliance with the strict-service requirements of Rules 99 and 107. The failure to file the returns with the clerk before default judgment, standing alone, undermined the judgment.

The court further held that the discrepancies regarding the entities’ registered agent, the named recipient of service, and the service addresses independently defeated strict compliance. Because a no-answer default judgment requires the record to affirmatively show exact compliance with the service rules, these defects required reversal and remand for further proceedings.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, this case is a strong warning against treating service as an administrative afterthought in default practice. In divorce cases, this issue arises when a respondent does not answer. In SAPCR and modification litigation, it appears when a parent, alleged father, or nonparent custodian defaults. In property-heavy divorces, it becomes even more dangerous when LLCs, LPs, corporations, trustees, or closely held entities must be joined for characterization, fraud-on-the-community, turnover, injunction, or receivership-related relief.

The strategic lesson is simple: if you intend to take a default, build the appellate record as though a restricted appeal is inevitable. That means matching the petition, citation, method of service, return, agent designation, and address line by line. If a business entity is to be served through a registered agent, do not assume service on a spouse, manager, or controlling individual will suffice unless the record and governing law clearly authorize that route. If the return is attached to a motion but never separately filed, you may have a judgment that looks final in the trial court and collapses on appeal.

The case also matters in post-divorce enforcement and injunctive proceedings. Family lawyers often seek powerful default relief—money judgments, turnover, injunctive restraints, contempt-adjacent enforcement remedies, and property-control orders. The broader and more aggressive the requested relief, the more disciplined the service record must be. A large default award does not insulate a judgment; if anything, it increases the likelihood of restricted-appeal scrutiny.

Practitioners defending a default should study this opinion for another reason: the appellate court focused on what the face of the record showed, not on whether the defendants probably knew about the suit. That is critical in family cases where parties often communicate outside formal channels or have overlapping business and household addresses. Actual notice remains irrelevant if the record does not strictly comply.

Checklists

Default-Proof Your Service Record

• Confirm that the petition identifies the correct legal name of every respondent and joined entity.
• Confirm that the citation issued by the clerk matches the petition exactly as to name, capacity, and service address.
• Confirm that the method of service shown on the return matches the method authorized by the citation and rules.
• Confirm that the person served is the person or agent identified in the citation.
• Confirm that all addresses are identical across the petition, citation, return, affidavit, and proposed judgment materials.
• Confirm that any trust, LLC, corporation, or partnership capacity is correctly stated in all service documents.
• Confirm that the return is complete, signed, dated, and compliant with Rule 107.
• Confirm that the return is actually filed with the clerk and appears in the clerk’s record before taking default.

Service on Business Entities in Family Cases

• Verify the entity’s current registered agent and registered office through the Secretary of State or other reliable records.
• Do not rely on a spouse’s control of the entity as a substitute for proper entity service.
• If serving through a registered agent, ensure the citation and return both identify that same agent.
• If an alternative statutory service route is used, document the statutory basis clearly in the record.
• Review whether the entity is necessary for complete relief on property characterization, reimbursement, fraudulent transfer, or injunctive claims.
• Avoid mixing individual-capacity and entity-capacity service language in the same return unless the record clearly supports both.

Before Taking a Family-Law Default Judgment

• Review the entire clerk’s record, not just your file copy.
• Confirm the return has been on file for the required period under Rule 107 before the prove-up hearing.
• Confirm that certificates of last known address are accurate and consistent with the service record.
• Compare the petition, citation, return, and default motion side by side for name and address consistency.
• Scrub for typographical errors in party names, suite numbers, street names, and capacities.
• If any inconsistency appears, correct it before judgment rather than trying to explain it later.
• Prepare the prove-up with restricted-appeal review in mind.

Attacking a Family-Law Default on Restricted Appeal

• Obtain the complete clerk’s record immediately.
• Check whether the return was ever separately filed with the clerk.
• Compare the petition’s service allegations with the actual citation issued.
• Compare the citation with the return for mismatches in party name, capacity, agent, and address.
• Examine whether the return includes all Rule 107-required information.
• Look for signs that service was made on an individual when the citation called for service on an entity through a registered agent.
• Evaluate whether the judgment grants relief broader than the pleadings, but first exhaust the service defects.
• Frame the argument around strict compliance and error on the face of the record, not actual notice.

Internal Office Controls to Prevent Reversal

• Use a standardized default-judgment service audit sheet.
• Require a second lawyer or senior paralegal to compare petition, citation, and return before prove-up.
• Calendar the Rule 107 waiting period from the actual clerk filing date of the return, not from the date of service.
• Save and review the file-stamped return from the clerk’s record portal.
• Do not assume an attachment to a motion is equivalent to a filed return.
• Train staff to flag mismatched agent names, alternate spellings, and inconsistent addresses.
• Re-check service whenever the case involves trusts, family businesses, or multiple related entities.

Citation

Jean Michel Szabuniewicz, Individually and in His Capacity as Former Trustee of the Oak Lawn Investment Trust; Oak Lawn General, Inc.; Oak Lawn Holdings I, L.P.; Texas Urban Properties, Ltd.; Texas Urban GP, Inc.; Oak Lawn Medical Properties, L.P.; Willow Park Construction, Inc.; and Guaranty Finance Company v. Todd May, in His Capacity as Trustee of the Beverly Trust, No. 02-25-00625-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 25, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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