Moore v. State

Moore v. State, 05-24-01456-CR, June 26, 2026.

On appeal from Criminal District Court No. 7, Dallas County, Texas

Synopsis

The Dallas Court of Appeals held that a juvenile transfer under Texas Family Code § 54.02 was supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence where the juvenile court ordered and reviewed a diagnostic study, social evaluation, psychological material, and a full investigation, and where the evidence supported probable cause and serious doubt about rehabilitation through juvenile services. The court further held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in waiving jurisdiction and transferring a sixteen-year-old murder defendant for adult prosecution based on the violent nature of the offense, the child’s background, and the community-welfare findings required by § 54.02.

Relevance to Family Law

Although Moore is a juvenile-transfer case, Texas family law litigators should pay close attention to it because its reasoning centers on evidentiary sufficiency, trial-court fact finding, judicial discretion, and the weight given to court-ordered social and psychological evaluations—features that recur in SAPCRs, modification suits, custody restrictions, supervised-access disputes, and termination litigation. Strategically, Moore reinforces a familiar lesson in family court: when the governing statute requires a court to consider a set of factors after an investigation or evaluation, the appellate fight will usually turn less on whether the record is perfect and more on whether the record gives the trial court a legally sufficient basis to make reasoned findings; that same dynamic often decides conservatorship, possession, relocation, and property-control disputes involving violence, risk, credibility, and disputed expert material.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Keonte Moore was sixteen when he was alleged to have shot D’Angelo Roane inside Roane’s apartment and then stolen Roane’s car. After the offense, law enforcement interviewed Moore and later apprehended him at Love Field airport at the TSA checkpoint. Because Moore was a juvenile at the time of the charged conduct, the case began in juvenile court.

Before the certification hearing, the juvenile court entered an order requiring a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, and full investigation of the child, his circumstances, and the circumstances of the alleged offense, including a social study and psychological material. After conducting the transfer hearing and considering the investigation and testimony, the juvenile court made express written findings that Moore was old enough to be transferred under the statute, that there was probable cause to believe he committed the charged murder, that the offense was serious, willful, and violent, that a deadly weapon was used, and that the welfare of the community required criminal prosecution. The court also found that the extreme and severe nature of the crime, together with the prospects for public protection and rehabilitation through juvenile procedures, services, and facilities, placed rehabilitation in serious doubt.

The juvenile court waived jurisdiction and transferred the matter for adult prosecution. Moore was later tried in district court, convicted of murder, and sentenced to prison. On appeal, he challenged the transfer decision, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show a statutorily adequate full investigation and insufficient to support the determination that he could not likely be rehabilitated in the juvenile system.

Issues Decided

• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to support the juvenile court’s § 54.02 findings supporting waiver of juvenile jurisdiction.
• Whether the evidence was factually sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings, including the finding that rehabilitation through juvenile procedures and services was in serious doubt.
• Whether the juvenile court could treat the investigation as sufficiently “full” under Texas Family Code § 54.02 even though certain forensic testing and electronic-device analysis remained pending.
• Whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in transferring Moore for adult prosecution based on the seriousness of the offense, the child’s background, and the welfare-of-the-community determination.

Rules Applied

The court applied Texas Family Code § 54.02(a), which permits waiver of juvenile jurisdiction and transfer for criminal proceedings after a full investigation and hearing if the court finds probable cause that the child committed the alleged felony and further finds that, because of the seriousness of the offense or the child’s background, the welfare of the community requires criminal proceedings.

The court also relied on Texas Family Code § 54.02(f), which directs the juvenile court to consider, among other matters:

• whether the offense was against person or property, with greater weight favoring transfer for offenses against a person;
• the sophistication and maturity of the child;
• the child’s record and previous history; and
• the prospects of adequate public protection and the likelihood of rehabilitation through available juvenile procedures, services, and facilities.

The opinion emphasized that these § 54.02(f) considerations are not elements the State must separately prove, and no single factor is mandatory or dispositive. For that proposition, the court relied on Ex parte Thomas, 623 S.W.3d 370 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021), which recognized that the statutory factors are non-exclusive and need not each be established in any particular way.

On appellate review, the court followed the two-step framework articulated in In re J.J.T., 711 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. 2025). Under that framework, the reviewing court first evaluates the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the juvenile court’s findings. If those findings are sufficiently supported, the reviewing court then examines the ultimate transfer decision for abuse of discretion.

The court also drew on prior transfer cases recognizing that the Family Code does not define “full investigation,” and that the scope of a full investigation varies with the circumstances. In that respect, the opinion cited Turner v. State, 796 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ), for the proposition that the trial court makes the initial determination whether the investigation was sufficiently complete.

Application

The appellate court treated Moore’s complaint about the incompleteness of the investigation as narrower than he framed it. His principal argument was that the police investigation was still awaiting certain forensic results—specifically, testing on a firearm found at his residence and reports regarding electronic devices recovered during the investigation. From that premise, he argued that the statutory prerequisite of a “full investigation” had not been satisfied.

The court rejected that argument by focusing on the function of the transfer hearing. A § 54.02 hearing is not a trial on the merits, and it does not require the State to conclusively prove guilt. The relevant inquiry is whether the juvenile court had a sufficient investigative record to decide probable cause and the welfare-of-the-community question. Here, the juvenile court had ordered extensive investigative material, took judicial notice of the file, and had before it the reports generated through that process. In the court’s view, the existence of some unfinished forensic work did not negate the adequacy of the investigation where the existing record still supported the transfer findings.

That analysis was particularly strong because the offense alleged was murder—an offense against the person, and the category to which § 54.02(f) gives greater weight. The juvenile court’s written findings also reflected that it considered not just the allegations themselves, but the violent, willful, and deadly-weapon aspects of the conduct, along with Moore’s background and the court’s doubts about rehabilitation through juvenile resources. In other words, the transfer decision did not rest on a skeletal probable-cause showing alone; it rested on a developed record tied to the statutory framework.

The court’s treatment of rehabilitation is also important. Moore argued that the record did not sufficiently establish that he could not be rehabilitated in the juvenile system. But the appellate court did not require the State to prove impossibility of rehabilitation. Instead, consistent with § 54.02 and Ex parte Thomas, the court looked to whether the evidence supported the juvenile court’s finding that rehabilitation through available juvenile procedures and services was in serious doubt when measured against the severity of the alleged conduct and the need to protect the public. That is a materially different inquiry, and it is one that gives substantial room for trial-court discretion when the record includes evidence of extreme violence and a poor fit for juvenile-system interventions.

Holding

The court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the juvenile court’s determination that the statutory prerequisites for transfer under Texas Family Code § 54.02 were met. The juvenile court had ordered and considered a complete diagnostic study, social evaluation, psychological material, and a full investigation, and the record supported the court’s conclusion that the investigation was sufficiently complete for transfer purposes even though some forensic analysis remained pending.

The court also held that the evidence supported the juvenile court’s findings of probable cause, seriousness of the offense, and serious doubt about adequate rehabilitation through available juvenile services and facilities. In light of the murder allegation, the deadly-weapon and violence findings, and the court’s written reasons addressing community welfare and the child’s background, the transfer order was not arbitrary and therefore did not constitute an abuse of discretion.

Practical Application

For family law litigators, Moore is a useful appellate template on how Texas courts review discretionary rulings that depend on statutory factors, court-ordered evaluations, and risk-based findings. In custody and modification litigation, lawyers routinely confront arguments that an evaluation was incomplete, a social study was imperfect, records were still outstanding, or the trial court moved too quickly. Moore suggests that those arguments will not carry the day on appeal unless the missing information is tied directly to a statutory prerequisite and shown to undermine the court’s ability to make the required findings.

The case is especially relevant in suits involving family violence, serious endangerment allegations, access restrictions, firearm concerns, substance abuse, or mental-health instability. In those cases, appellate courts often defer to trial judges who can point to a concrete record showing that they considered the right statutory factors and articulated a rational basis for their decision. The lesson is straightforward: if you want to preserve a meaningful appellate challenge, do not merely argue that the record was incomplete; identify what statutory finding fails without the missing evidence and explain why the omission makes the ruling legally or factually unsustainable.

Moore also has value in property and protective-order adjacent litigation, particularly where one party argues that the court acted prematurely without waiting for every conceivable piece of corroborating evidence. The opinion reinforces that Texas trial courts are permitted to act on a developed, sufficient record; they are not always required to delay decision-making until every investigative thread is exhausted. For the advocate seeking urgent relief, that principle can be useful. For the advocate resisting adverse relief, it means the better strategy is often to attack materiality, reliability, and statutory fit—not just incompleteness in the abstract.

In practical trial work, the opinion underscores several strategic points:

• Build your record around the statute the court must apply, not around generalized fairness complaints.
• If you are attacking an investigation, identify the specific missing evidence, the specific statutory finding it affects, and why the existing record cannot support that finding without it.
• If you are defending the order, emphasize the trial court’s written findings, the materials it reviewed, and the deferential standard that applies once legally and factually sufficient evidence exists.
• In custody and conservatorship cases, use this same framework when dealing with amicus reports, social studies, custody evaluations, psychological records, and violence-related evidence.

Checklists

Challenging the Sufficiency of a Court-Ordered Investigation

• Identify the exact statutory finding the trial court was required to make.
• Tie each alleged investigative gap to that specific finding.
• Explain why the missing material is outcome-determinative rather than merely cumulative.
• Show why the existing record does not amount to more than a scintilla on the challenged finding.
• Preserve both legal-sufficiency and factual-sufficiency complaints where available.
• Object clearly in the trial court to the incompleteness of the investigation or evaluation.
• Request a continuance or supplemental evaluation when the missing material is genuinely material.
• Avoid arguing only that “more evidence might exist”; explain why the current record is inadequate under the governing statute.

Defending a Discretionary Transfer or Comparable Family-Court Order

• Secure a written order with specific findings tied to the governing statute.
• Make sure the record reflects the court reviewed all ordered reports, studies, and evaluations.
• Emphasize that statutory factors are considerations, not rigid elements, unless the statute says otherwise.
• Show how the evidence supports the ultimate public-protection, best-interest, or welfare determination.
• Highlight serious violence, risk, instability, or other facts that justify prompt judicial action.
• Frame any missing evidence as nonessential to the findings actually required.
• Cite the applicable deferential review standard early and often.
• On appeal, separate sufficiency review from abuse-of-discretion review.

Using Moore in Conservatorship and Modification Litigation

• Argue that the court may act on a sufficiently developed record even if every collateral record has not yet been produced.
• Use the opinion to support reliance on social studies, psychological material, and court-ordered investigative reports.
• Emphasize risk-to-child or risk-to-community facts when seeking restrictions on possession or decision-making authority.
• Where family violence is alleged, stress that violent conduct carries outsized significance in discretionary rulings.
• If opposing restrictions, distinguish Moore by showing the absence of violence, weak factual development, or lack of specific findings.
• Ask the trial court to articulate why the evidence supports its ruling under the relevant Family Code standard.
• Preserve complaints about missing records by making a concrete offer of why those records matter.

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Party’s Problem

• Do not rely on abstract claims that the investigation was “not complete.”
• Do not ignore the written findings in the order; attack them one by one.
• Do not fail to connect pending forensic or documentary evidence to a required statutory element or factor.
• Do not assume an appellate court will treat a transfer hearing or temporary-orders hearing like a trial on the merits.
• Do not overlook the significance of a violent-offense or violence-based record in deferential appellate review.
• Do not underdevelop the record on rehabilitation, treatment options, or available services if that issue is central to your position.

Citation

Moore v. State, No. 05-24-01456-CR, memorandum opinion (Tex. App.—Dallas June 26, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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