In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt

In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt, 05-26-00557-CV, June 26, 2026.

On appeal from 397th Judicial District Court, Grayson County, Texas

Synopsis

A stalking protective order issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is a final, appealable order if it disposes of all parties and all issues in the protective-order proceeding. Because an adequate remedy by direct appeal exists, mandamus is unavailable to attack that order—even where the relator let the appellate deadline pass.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters to Texas family lawyers because protective orders frequently intersect with divorce, SAPCR, custody, possession, and exclusive-use disputes. The Dallas Court of Appeals confirmed that Chapter 7B stalking protective orders should be treated procedurally like final protective orders under Title 4 of the Family Code for purposes of appellate finality, which means family-law litigators must evaluate appellate deadlines immediately rather than assuming mandamus can later be used as a procedural fallback. In practice, that affects litigation strategy where protective-order findings may influence temporary orders, conservatorship positions, firearms restrictions, residence access, parent-child contact, and leverage in parallel divorce or custody proceedings.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The relators, Kurtis Schmidt and Ashley Lynn Schmidt, proceeding pro se, filed petitions for writ of mandamus in the Dallas Court of Appeals challenging protective orders entered against them by the 397th Judicial District Court in Grayson County. They also sought emergency stays of those protective orders.

The opinion indicates that the challenged orders were stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The court’s analysis focused not on the factual merits of the stalking allegations, but on the procedural posture of the case—specifically, whether the orders were the kind of final orders that had to be challenged by direct appeal rather than by mandamus. The record before the court did not establish a basis for treating the protective orders as void, so the ordinary mandamus framework governed.

Issues Decided

• Whether a stalking protective order issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is a final appealable order when it disposes of all parties and all issues in the protective-order proceeding.
• Whether mandamus relief is unavailable because the relators had an adequate remedy by direct appeal.
• Whether the availability of appeal defeats mandamus even when the relators failed to timely pursue that appeal.
• Whether the relators showed the challenged orders were void, such that the adequate-remedy requirement would not apply.

Rules Applied

The court applied the standard mandamus rule that a relator must show both a clear abuse of discretion and the absence of an adequate appellate remedy. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding).

The court also recognized the established exception that a relator challenging a void order need not show the absence of an adequate remedy by appeal. For that proposition, the court cited In re Saving Grace #2, LLC, No. 05-23-00745-CV, 2023 WL 6783511, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 13, 2023, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

On finality, the court relied principally on Cooke v. Cooke, 65 S.W.3d 785, 788–89 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.), which held that a protective order rendered under the Family Code is final and appealable so long as it disposes of all parties and all issues. The court extended that same finality analysis to Chapter 7B stalking protective orders because those proceedings are civil in nature and are issued and enforced in the manner provided by Title 4 of the Texas Family Code.

The opinion also relied on the Texas Supreme Court’s rule that mandamus cannot be used to challenge an order that can be, or could have been, challenged by direct appeal. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. and Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 613–14 (Tex. 2006) (orig. proceeding). And it emphasized that this remains true even if the relator failed to take advantage of the available appellate remedy, citing In re Parnell, 283 S.W.3d 31, 35 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, orig. proceeding).

Statutorily, the court referenced Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, including Articles 7B.051, 7B.052, and 7B.053, which tie stalking protective-order applications, issuance, and enforcement to the procedures set out in Title 4 of the Family Code. The court also cited Goldstein v. Sabatino, 690 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tex. 2024), for the proposition that Chapter 7B protective-order proceedings are civil matters, and Garza v. Renteria, 726 S.W.3d 894, 897 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2025, no pet.), reinforcing that such orders are issued in the manner provided by Title 4.

Application

The court’s reasoning was direct and procedural. The relators attempted to use mandamus to set aside protective orders entered against them. But before the court could reach any alleged substantive error, it had to decide whether mandamus was even the correct vehicle. That inquiry turned on whether the protective orders were final appealable orders.

The court looked to Cooke, which established that protective orders are final and appealable when they dispose of all parties and all issues in the protective-order proceeding. Although Cooke involved a Family Code protective order, the Dallas Court concluded the same finality principle applies to Chapter 7B stalking protective orders because those proceedings are civil and operate through the procedural framework of Title 4. That was the key analytical move in the opinion: once the court treated the stalking protective orders as procedurally equivalent to final Title 4 protective orders for finality purposes, the ordinary rule against using mandamus as a substitute for appeal controlled.

The relators also did not show that the orders were void. Without a voidness showing, they remained subject to the usual requirement of proving no adequate appellate remedy. Because direct appeal was available from these final protective orders, that requirement could not be met. The court then took the next logical step and held that the existence of an available appeal defeated mandamus, even if the relators had allowed that remedy to lapse unused.

Holding

The court held that stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are final appealable orders when they dispose of all parties and all issues in the protective-order proceeding. In reaching that conclusion, the court applied the finality reasoning of Cooke to Chapter 7B proceedings because those proceedings are civil in nature and are governed procedurally by Title 4 of the Family Code.

The court further held that mandamus relief does not lie to challenge such protective orders when a direct appeal was available. The existence of an adequate appellate remedy barred extraordinary relief under mandamus principles.

Finally, the court held that the relators’ failure to pursue the available appeal did not revive mandamus as a substitute remedy. Because the relators did not demonstrate that the orders were void, and because appeal was or had been available, the petitions for writ of mandamus were denied and the stay requests were denied as moot.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, the immediate lesson is to treat Chapter 7B stalking protective orders as appeal-sensitive final orders, not as interlocutory rulings that can be revisited later through mandamus. If a protective order hearing runs alongside a divorce, SAPCR, modification, or enforcement action, do not let the overlap obscure the appellate posture of the protective-order case itself. The protective-order proceeding may produce a standalone final order with its own deadline and its own appellate consequences.

This matters most where the protective order will shape the rest of the family case. Findings or restrictions in a stalking protective order can affect possession schedules, supervised access arguments, injunction strategy, use of the marital residence, firearm possession, digital-contact restrictions, and judicial perceptions of safety risk. A lawyer who misses the protective-order appeal may lose the best procedural vehicle for attacking those rulings, while the order continues to influence temporary orders or final relief in the divorce or SAPCR.

Practitioners should also be careful when evaluating post-judgment options. Mandamus remains viable for genuinely void orders, but not merely erroneous ones. That distinction is critical. If the complaint is legal insufficiency, evidentiary error, improper findings, overbroad relief, or procedural irregularity falling short of voidness, the safe assumption should be that direct appeal—not mandamus—is the exclusive path.

A few strategic implications follow:

• Calendar appellate deadlines for every final protective order immediately upon signing.
• Analyze whether the protective-order proceeding disposed of all parties and all issues, rather than assuming nonfinality because related family litigation remains pending.
• Preserve error at the protective-order hearing with appeal in mind, including evidentiary objections, due-process complaints, and challenges to the scope or duration of relief.
• Coordinate the protective-order record with the broader family case, because factual positions taken in one proceeding may materially affect the other.
• Do not advise a client that mandamus can cure a missed appeal absent a serious and supportable voidness argument.

Checklists

Protective-Order Finality Assessment

• Confirm whether the order disposes of all parties in the protective-order proceeding.
• Confirm whether the order disposes of all issues raised by the application for protective order.
• Determine whether the order is a standalone final protective order, even if related divorce or SAPCR claims remain pending elsewhere.
• Identify whether the order was issued under Title 4 of the Family Code or Chapter 7B of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
• For Chapter 7B orders, analyze finality under the same practical framework used for Family Code protective orders.

Immediate Post-Signing Appellate Triage

• Obtain the signed order the same day it is entered, if possible.
• Calendar all appellate deadlines immediately.
• Order the reporter’s record without delay.
• Secure the clerk’s record or key filings needed to assess appellate issues.
• Evaluate whether a notice of appeal should be filed protectively.
• Advise the client in writing that failure to timely appeal may forfeit merits review.

Mandamus vs. Direct Appeal Analysis

• Ask first whether a direct appeal is available from the challenged order.
• Do not treat mandamus as a substitute for a missed appeal.
• Assess whether the alleged defect makes the order void, not merely reversible.
• Separate complaints about evidentiary sufficiency, procedural error, and overbreadth from true jurisdictional or voidness arguments.
• Document the basis for choosing appeal, mandamus, or both where good-faith grounds exist.

Family-Law Coordination Checklist

• Compare the protective-order findings with positions being advanced in the divorce or SAPCR.
• Assess whether the order affects possession, access, supervised visitation, exchange protocols, or residence use.
• Review firearm restrictions and their implications for related temporary orders or negotiated settlements.
• Consider whether the protective-order record will be used for impeachment or credibility determinations in the family case.
• Update the broader litigation strategy to account for the protective order’s practical and evidentiary impact.

Avoiding the Relator’s Problem

• Do not assume a stalking protective order is nonappealable because it arises under the Code of Criminal Procedure.
• Do not wait for related family litigation to conclude before evaluating appellate rights.
• Do not rely on a future mandamus petition if an appeal is presently available.
• Do not frame ordinary legal error as voidness without a solid jurisdictional basis.
• Do not let pro se procedural confusion become the client’s problem; provide a clear written roadmap immediately after rendition.

Citation

In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt, Nos. 05-26-00492-CV & 05-26-00557-CV, memorandum opinion (Tex. App.—Dallas June 26, 2026, orig. proceeding).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

~~d3ed5fb3-9afd-449c-bfa7-801d0519b08f~~