Weekly Digest
May 30 – June 5, 2026
40 opinions this week
Kai Nonamé v. Nicholas Denbrock
COA03
In this SAPCR-related appeal, the trial court ordered the appellant to pay certain court costs after she filed a Rule 145 statement of inability to afford costs, even though the scheduled contest hearing was effectively cancelled when she did not appear and no reporter’s record was made. The Austin Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f) requires more than notice and a conclusory order: before requiring payment, the trial court must conduct an oral evidentiary hearing on the record and enter detailed findings showing the litigant can afford the costs without sacrificing basic necessities. Because the record showed no preserved evidentiary hearing and the findings were not sufficiently detailed, the court abated the appeal and remanded for a compliant hearing and findings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 145 shortcuts will not hold up on appeal. If a family-law court is going to require payment of filing, record, or other court costs, counsel must ensure there is an on-the-record evidentiary hearing and detailed affordability findings—even if the declarant fails to appear. For practitioners, the lesson is simple: make the Rule 145 record, prove or challenge actual affordability, and do not rely on bare docket entries or conclusory orders.”
English v. State
COA06
In English v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed revocation of deferred adjudication after the State proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the father committed injury to a child. The evidence showed he grabbed his son by the throat, pushed him against a truck, and headbutted him, causing pain and a visible knot on the child’s head. The court emphasized that in a revocation proceeding the State’s burden is only a preponderance, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that the trial court is the sole judge of witness credibility. Because the child’s testimony was corroborated by the brother’s observations, the deputy’s testimony, and the father’s own partial admissions, the trial court was entitled to reject the defense claim that the injury was accidental during discipline. The appellate court held there was no abuse of discretion in adjudicating guilt and revoking community supervision.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a case turns on whether a parent crossed the line from discipline into abuse, a trial judge may credit the child’s account even if testimony conflicts, some injuries are not photographed, or the accused parent claims the contact was accidental. In family-law litigation, visible injury, contemporaneous outcry, corroborating circumstances, and partial admissions can be enough to support findings that materially affect conservatorship, possession, protective orders, and supervised access.”
Headrick v. State
COA05
In Headrick v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed an order adjudicating guilt after the State alleged the defendant violated a no-contact supervision condition by emailing his daughter from her own account. The court held that any complaint that the petition to adjudicate was too vague was not preserved because Headrick did not file a motion to quash. On the merits, the court applied the revocation standard requiring proof by only a preponderance of the evidence and concluded circumstantial evidence was enough to identify Headrick as the sender: the email referenced a shared Wordle routine, he had previously used the daughter’s account in that way, he had access to a logged-in device, and the trial court was entitled to credit the daughter’s testimony and reject his alternative explanation. The court also rejected his disproportionality challenge and affirmed the judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family cases involving protective orders, custody restrictions, or no-contact provisions, judges can infer digital contact from circumstantial evidence without direct forensic proof. Build the record around device access, account history, message patterns, timing, and credibility—and if an enforcement or revocation pleading is vague, object early or the complaint may be waived.”
In the Interest of P.A., Jr., L.L.-A., and S.A., Children
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and on best interest. The court relied on evidence of repeated methamphetamine use, multiple refused or missed drug tests, failure to complete treatment and court-ordered services, instability, and unsafe parental decision-making, including Mother’s association with a dangerous individual. The court held that this pattern supported findings that the children were exposed to endangering conditions and that the parents engaged in a continuing course of endangering conduct. The children’s success in a safe kinship placement supported the best-interest finding. As to Mother, the court also noted that unchallenged predicate findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(I) and (P) independently supported affirmance.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas child-related cases, courts can infer endangerment from a pattern of drug use, test avoidance, service-plan noncompliance, and unsafe associates even without one dramatic harmful event. For trial lawyers, small facts build a powerful endangerment record; for appellate lawyers, failing to challenge every predicate ground can forfeit the appeal.”
Headrick v. State
COA05
In Headrick v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld revocation of deferred adjudication after the State alleged the defendant violated a no-contact condition by emailing his daughter. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard and held the State only had to prove the violation by a preponderance of the evidence. It concluded circumstantial evidence was enough to identify Headrick as the sender, including the parties’ prior Wordle-related communication pattern, his access to the daughter’s email account through an iPad at his home, and the daughter’s testimony recognizing the message as coming from him. The court also held that Headrick waived any complaint that the motion to adjudicate was too vague because he did not file a motion to quash in the trial court. The adjudication and sentence were therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When disputed electronic contact is at issue, courts may find authorship based on a mosaic of circumstantial evidence rather than direct forensic proof. For family-law litigators, the case is a strong reminder to build pattern-and-access evidence for no-contact, enforcement, and protective-order disputes—and to preserve any pleading-specificity or notice complaint in the trial court, or lose it on appeal.”
Headrick v. State
COA05
In Headrick v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant waived any complaint that the State’s motion to adjudicate was too vague because he never filed a motion to quash in the trial court. The State alleged only that Headrick had made contact with his daughter in violation of a no-contact condition of deferred adjudication, and on appeal he argued that the pleading lacked enough detail to give adequate notice. The court did not reach the merits of that notice argument, instead applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and longstanding revocation precedent requiring a timely motion to quash to preserve pleading-specificity complaints. The court also upheld the adjudication on the merits, concluding the daughter’s testimony and surrounding circumstances were sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Headrick made the prohibited contact, and it rejected the disproportionality challenge to the within-range sentences.
Litigation Takeaway
“If an enforcement, contempt, modification, or other family-law pleading is too vague to let your client prepare a defense, do not save that complaint for appeal. File a specific motion to quash, special exception, or other targeted objection in the trial court and get a ruling, because notice defects that could have been cured will usually be treated as waived.”
Porter v. State
COA08
In Porter v. State, the El Paso Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to a criminal defendant’s jury-trial waiver because the appellant failed to provide the reporter’s record from the hearing where the waiver occurred. The court held that under article 1.13 and ordinary appellate principles, the appellant bears the burden to present a record affirmatively showing error; when the record is silent or incomplete, a signed written waiver and judgment recitations support the presumption of regularity and defeat the complaint. The opinion also approved admission of an eyewitness’s near-immediate description of a violent assault as an excited utterance, offering a useful evidentiary framework for admitting prompt family-violence statements in civil family-law cases.
Litigation Takeaway
“Two practical lessons: first, appeals attacking a waiver, stipulation, or procedure usually fail without a complete record of the operative hearing, so preserve and order every relevant transcript. Second, in family-violence cases, early stress-driven statements to officers or other witnesses can often come in as excited utterances if timing, stress, and connection to the event are well developed.”
In the Interest of H.S., B.S., and M.S., Children
SCOTX
In In re H.S., the Supreme Court of Texas held the evidence was legally insufficient to support termination of Mother’s parental rights because the Department proved troubling circumstances, but not by clear and convincing evidence that termination itself was in the children’s best interest. The record showed Mother’s trauma history, delayed service-plan compliance, drug use, and ongoing connection to an abusive Father, but it also showed a strong parent-child bond, Mother’s reporting of Father’s violence, and evidence that the children deteriorated after removal and suspension of visitation. The Court emphasized that best interest is an independent requirement under Family Code section 161.001, that preserving the parent-child relationship is strongly presumed to be in the child’s best interest, and that termination is a last resort rather than a default response to family dysfunction. The Court affirmed termination as to Father, but reversed and rendered judgment denying termination as to Mother.
Litigation Takeaway
“Evidence that justifies intervention, restrictions, or supervised contact does not automatically justify termination. In any case involving abuse, trauma, drug use, or poor parental choices, lawyers must build a record explaining why the requested remedy is proportionate; if the goal is termination, the proof must show by clear and convincing evidence why lesser alternatives are inadequate and why permanent severance truly serves the child’s best interest.”
In the Interest of K.N., K.L., K.L., and K.L., Children
SCOTX
The Texas Supreme Court held that termination for endangerment under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) must be proven separately as to each parent by clear-and-convincing, legally and factually sufficient evidence. The Court rejected an approach that treated the family’s overall dysfunction as enough to terminate both parents’ rights. It upheld termination as to one parent because the record showed direct abuse allegations, visible injuries, threats against a reporter, obstruction of the investigation, refusal of services, and failure to address known safety risks. But it reversed as to the other parent because the evidence was too generalized and relied too heavily on association with the abusive household rather than parent-specific proof of knowing placement, knowing allowance, or endangering conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
“Serious parental restrictions and termination findings require parent-specific proof. If you want relief against a particular parent, build a record showing exactly what that parent did, knew, allowed, or refused to do—not just that the household was chaotic or another parent was abusive.”
In the Interest of C.S. Jr. and Z.S., Children
SCOTX
The Texas Supreme Court held that Family Code § 263.401(a) is strictly jurisdictional: if trial does not begin by the dismissal date and no extension is actually granted before that date, the case is automatically dismissed by operation of law. In this termination case, the trial judge said she was 'going to have to grant' an extension and asked counsel to submit an extension order before the deadline, but no order was signed and no other operative ruling granting an extension was made before the dismissal date. The Court analyzed the judge’s statements as expressing future intent rather than a present judicial act, concluded jurisdiction expired on the statutory deadline, and vacated the trial court’s termination judgment and the court of appeals’ judgment as void for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not rely on a judge’s anticipated ruling when a jurisdictional deadline is approaching. If continued jurisdiction depends on an extension or other time-sensitive ruling, make sure the record shows the court actually granted it before the deadline through a clear oral ruling, docket entry, and preferably a signed written order.”
In re S.H.
SCOTX
In In re S.H., the Supreme Court of Texas held that an indigent parent in a Department-filed termination of parental rights case is not restricted to representation only by court-appointed counsel under Family Code § 107.013(a)(1). After the trial court appointed counsel for S.H., a lawyer from the Harris County Public Defender’s Office appeared as S.H.’s chosen counsel and sought substitution. The trial court denied substitution and sua sponte removed the public defender, reasoning that the office lacked authority to appear in the civil termination case and had usurped the court’s appointment power. The Supreme Court rejected that view, explaining that the statute guarantees appointed counsel for indigent parents but does not make appointed counsel exclusive. The Court further held that free representation by outside counsel does not amount to a judicial appointment and does not interfere with the trial court’s indigence determination or appointment authority. Because the trial court’s removal order functioned as a disqualification of chosen counsel, mandamus was the proper remedy. The Court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the removal order.
Litigation Takeaway
“A Texas family court cannot use its power to appoint counsel as a reason to block a parent’s qualified counsel of choice. In TPR and other family cases, if outside counsel—such as a public defender, nonprofit lawyer, or pro bono attorney—appears for a party, the key question is whether that lawyer is appearing as chosen counsel rather than claiming a court appointment. If a trial court effectively removes that lawyer without a valid disqualification basis, mandamus may be the fastest and strongest remedy.”
In the Interest of L.E.-N.N., C.J.W. and C.R.W., Children
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, Mother argued the trial court erred by trying the case to the bench after she had requested a jury. The court held that filing a jury demand perfects the right to a jury but does not, by itself, preserve appellate error. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and prior Dallas precedent, the court focused on the trial record: when the case was called, Mother did not appear, her counsel appeared and participated, and neither Mother nor counsel objected to proceeding without a jury. Because no timely, specific objection was made when the court conducted the non-jury trial, any complaint about denial of a jury trial was waived. The court therefore affirmed the final SAPCR order appointing conservators and restricting Mother’s access.
Litigation Takeaway
“A jury demand is not self-executing error preservation. In Texas family cases, if the court proceeds without a jury, counsel must object on the record then and there—even if the client is absent, difficult, or claiming to proceed pro se—or the jury-trial complaint is likely waived on appeal.”
Youlan Varasteh-Tafti v. Manouchehr Varasteh-Tafti
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the wife challenged the trial court’s characterization of several assets as the husband’s separate property and argued the record lacked enough valuation evidence for a just-and-right division. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that the husband rebutted the community-property presumption with clear and convincing evidence through specific, uncontroverted testimony that one property bought during marriage was purchased entirely with premarital investment funds and that two other properties were owned before marriage. The court explained that while documentary tracing is often helpful, it is not always required when credible testimony clearly identifies the source and character of the property and the opposing spouse offers no contrary evidence. The court also rejected the wife’s argument that paying expenses or providing unpaid labor created an ownership interest, noting those facts may relate to reimbursement but do not change title. Finally, because the wife failed to present valuation evidence at trial, she could not complain on appeal that the trial court lacked sufficient information to divide the estate or show the division was an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas property-characterization fights, uncontroverted live testimony can be enough to prove separate property even without perfect paper tracing—but only if it is specific, credible, and unrebutted. On the flip side, a spouse who does not challenge tracing testimony or put on valuation evidence will have a very hard time overturning the property division on appeal.”
Perricone v. Perricone
COA11
In Perricone v. Perricone, the Eastland Court of Appeals addressed a contested Rule 145 statement of inability to afford court costs in litigation arising from divorce and custody-related disputes. After a defendant challenged the indigency filing, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found the declarant’s financial statement contained material misrepresentations and omissions, including unsupported claims of means-tested benefits, undisclosed assets, and inaccurate income and valuation information. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f), the court held that once a contest is filed, the burden shifts to the declarant to prove inability to pay by a preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s credibility findings and concluded the record supported denial of indigency status. The court also held that the challenger’s unsworn declaration was sufficient because it substantially complied with Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 132.001 despite minor technical defects.
Litigation Takeaway
“A Rule 145 form is only the starting point. If the other side contests indigency, the party claiming inability to pay must back it up with credible, documented proof, and courts will closely examine omissions, inconsistencies, household support, and prior financial representations. For family-law litigators, Perricone is a roadmap both for attacking weak indigency claims and for preparing defensible ones.”
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed the notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still not enough to invoke jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within that grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension in the appellate court that reasonably explains the delay. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion or equivalent filing until after the grace period expired, the late explanation could not cure the defect, and the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In accelerated family-law-related appeals, a late notice of appeal is not self-curing just because it lands within Rule 26.3’s grace period. If the notice is late, counsel must also file a Rule 26.3 extension motion in the appellate court within that same window, with a reasonable explanation. Do not wait for a clerk’s defect notice or assume a later response will save jurisdiction.”
In re Hoa Tran and Trang Tran
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that once defendants properly controverted a plaintiff’s medical-expense affidavit under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 18.001, they were entitled to nonparty discovery from the medical provider about how the charges were set and whether they were reasonable. The trial court had allowed only limited inquiry but barred broader topics concerning billing methodology, reimbursement history, referral relationships, and outsourced imaging arrangements. Relying on Texas’s broad discovery rules and cases such as In re North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co. and In re K&L Auto Crushers, LLC, the court concluded those topics were relevant to the live defense that the claimed medical expenses were unreasonable. Because the categorical restrictions prevented the defendants from developing that defense and could not be adequately remedied on appeal, the court found an abuse of discretion and granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the other side puts medical or treatment bills in issue, do not treat the invoice as untouchable. Once the charges are properly controverted, targeted discovery into the provider’s billing practices, reimbursement history, referral relationships, and third-party service arrangements may be available—and a blanket order blocking that discovery can justify mandamus.”
In Re Richard Earl Purkey Jr. and Ashlyn Purkey Jordan
COA09
In re Purkey holds that a district court cannot use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 to authorize pre-suit depositions aimed at developing claims that belong in a statutory probate court’s exclusive jurisdiction. The petitioners sought depositions to investigate alleged lack of capacity, undue influence, and trust-related issues surrounding a decedent’s 2024 will and amended trust. Looking past the Rule 202 label to the substance of the requested discovery, the Beaumont Court of Appeals concluded the anticipated claims were classic probate matters—a will contest, an effort to set aside probate, and trust disputes incident to an estate. Because Rule 202 does not expand subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court exceeded its authority by ordering the depositions. The court conditionally granted mandamus, holding that the improper pre-suit discovery could not be adequately cured on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before filing a Rule 202 petition, identify the real dispute and the court that actually has power to hear it. If the discovery is really designed to build a will contest, probate challenge, or trust dispute tied to an estate, you must proceed in probate court—not through a separate district-court discovery action. For family lawyers, the lesson is to screen early for probate overlap and avoid using Rule 202 as an end-run around jurisdictional limits.”
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed a notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still insufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within the grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion until after the grace period had expired, the late explanation could not be construed to revive jurisdiction. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“When an appeal may be accelerated, treat Rule 26.3 as a two-step jurisdictional checklist: if the notice is late but still within the 15-day grace period, file both the notice of appeal and a motion for extension within that same window. A later explanation will not save the appeal.”
Othalon Shaw v. Omowunmi Shaw
COA02
In Shaw v. Shaw, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a final family-violence protective order entered during the parties’ divorce. The wife testified to repeated threats, choking, physical assault, forced sex, and gun-related intimidation, while the husband denied the allegations and argued the evidence was inconsistent and insufficient without stronger corroboration. Applying legal- and factual-sufficiency standards for bench trials, the court held that the trial court was entitled to believe the wife’s testimony, disbelieve the husband’s denials, and infer both past family violence and likely future family violence under Texas Family Code sections 81.001 and 85.001(a). The court emphasized that credible testimony from the applicant alone can be enough to support a protective order and that appellate courts will not reweigh express trial-court credibility findings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Protective-order appeals usually rise or fall on credibility established at trial, not on re-arguing the facts on appeal. If you represent the applicant, build a clear, detailed record and seek express credibility findings; if you represent the respondent, general denials and lack-of-corroboration arguments usually will not overcome a trial court’s decision to believe the applicant.”
Blair v. Blair
COA02
In Blair v. Blair, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a post-divorce order appointing a receiver to sell marital real property because the 2013 divorce decree expressly authorized either party to seek a receiver if the property was not sold by March 15, 2014. The court treated the receivership as a straightforward enforcement of the decree’s property-division terms rather than an extraordinary equitable remedy requiring separate proof of waste, imminent harm, or inadequate legal remedies. The court also rejected the appellant’s limitations, laches, dormancy, and due-process complaints because they were either not preserved in the trial court, not supported by the appellate record, or contradicted by record evidence showing notice. The court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the receiver.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a divorce decree includes a clear receiver-on-default provision for sale of real property, enforcing that provision years later is much easier and more likely to survive appeal. For both sides, Blair is also a preservation case: defenses like limitations, laches, dormancy, and due process must be clearly raised, supported by evidence, and ruled on in the trial court, or they will likely fail on appeal.”
In the Interest of A.M., J.M., and K.W., Children
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to prove endangerment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on the mother’s years-long course of conduct: repeatedly entering or returning to abusive relationships, exposing the children to domestic violence, leaving them with a known violent caregiver, and minimizing or concealing the abuse even after serious assaults, police involvement, and one child’s murder. The court reasoned that endangerment may be shown by a continuing pattern of conduct that jeopardizes a child’s physical or emotional well-being, even when the violence is directed primarily at the parent rather than the child. That same pattern, combined with the mother’s instability in housing, employment, legal compliance, and protective decision-making, supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“Domestic violence evidence is powerful not just when a child is directly assaulted, but when a parent repeatedly exposes children to violent partners, ignores warning signs, and minimizes the danger. In custody, modification, and termination cases, lawyers should build a timeline showing the parent’s knowledge of the abuse, continued contact with the abuser, child exposure, and lack of protective change over time.”
Wood v. State
COA02
In Wood v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a complainant could testify under Texas Rules of Evidence 701 and 602 about what the defendant meant in sexualized text messages when her interpretation was based on her firsthand experience with him, their relationship history, and the surrounding context of the messages. The court treated the issue as one of adequate foundation rather than improper speculation and concluded the testimony helped the factfinder understand ambiguous or coded communications. The court also held that the defendant waived his complaint that a detective gave improper outcry testimony under Article 38.072 because he failed to make a timely, specific objection at trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“Context matters, and preservation matters just as much. In family cases involving texts, emails, threats, grooming, or coercive control, a witness with personal knowledge of the relationship can often explain what ambiguous messages meant if you lay a proper Rule 701/602 foundation. But if you want to challenge outcry-like or hearsay testimony, you must object specifically and on time or lose the issue on appeal.”
Bruno Gonzalez v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Gonzalez v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for assault causing bodily injury—family violence. The defendant argued the State failed to prove the complainant’s identity because of a name discrepancy, failed to prove bodily injury because the complainant later minimized the assault and the bruises were not tied precisely to the charged date, and failed to prove the required mental state. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Texas variance law, the court held the complainant’s exact name was not a substantive element and the evidence showed the person named in the information and the person proved at trial were the same individual. The court further held the jury could credit the 911 outcry, officer testimony, photographs of bruising, and surrounding circumstances over later recantation-style statements, and could infer intent, knowledge, or recklessness from the assaultive conduct and knife-related intimidation. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Contemporaneous family-violence evidence—especially 911 calls, officer observations, photographs, and other corroborating records—can outweigh later recantation or minimization. In family-law cases, do not assume a changed story, name discrepancy, or imprecise injury timing defeats a violence finding; build or attack the case around corroboration, causation, and credibility.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Melissa A. Paredes v. Trini J. Paredes, Jr. and In the Interest of V.N.P. and T.J.P. III, Children
COA05
In Paredes v. Paredes, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed an enforcement judgment based on a divorce decree provision requiring the wife to pay the husband “twelve months’ worth of the proceeds” if she sold certain real property. After the wife sold the property, the husband asked the trial court to enforce the decree and relied on an email and his own calculation to argue the phrase meant one year’s worth of annualized net proceeds. The appellate court held that the decree’s operative language was not merely ambiguous but facially unintelligible, because proceeds cannot coherently be measured in units of time. Applying Texas law requiring judgments to be definite enough to be executed from their four corners, the court concluded the provision was a nullity and could not be enforced through extra-textual evidence or the parties’ claimed shared understanding. The court therefore reversed the damages award and the derivative attorney’s-fees awards and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a divorce decree’s property language does not state a clear, mathematically coherent obligation on its face, it may be unenforceable altogether. Family-law litigators should draft future-sale and deferred-payment provisions with precise formulas, defined terms, and objective triggers, because emails, testimony, or course of dealing will not rescue a decree that is unintelligible as written.”
In the Interest of B.A. and B.A., Children
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and on best interest. The record showed repeated domestic violence by the father, the mother’s knowledge of that violence, her repeated minimization and recantation of serious assaults, her continued facilitation of the father’s return after arrests, and her denial of drug-use concerns. The court analyzed subsection (D) as an endangering environment case and subsection (E) as an endangering course-of-conduct case, concluding that the mother’s failure to protect the children from recurring violence and instability supported both predicates. The same evidence also supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, minimization of domestic violence can be as damaging as the violence itself. A parent’s recantation, selective memory, denial of risk, and continued association with a violent partner can support findings on endangerment, credibility, protective capacity, and best interest across termination, custody, modification, and protective-order litigation.”
Bowles v. Bowles
COA04
In Bowles v. Bowles, the parties disputed whether Flea Away, LLC was community property because the LLC was formed during the marriage, or Simon Bowles’s separate property because it was merely the later legal form of a business he already owned before marriage. The Fourth Court of Appeals applied Texas Family Code sections 3.001 and 3.003, along with inception-of-title and tracing principles, and focused on whether the LLC was a new acquisition or simply a mutation of the preexisting sole proprietorship. Simon proved by clear and convincing evidence that the original Flea Away business had been awarded to him as his separate property in a prior California divorce, and the evidence showed continuity of the same enterprise after it began operating as an LLC. Because there was no admitted evidence of any transfer, conveyance, or issuance of ownership to Lilian, the court held the LLC remained Simon’s separate property and affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“Forming an LLC during marriage does not automatically turn a separately owned business into community property. In a business-characterization fight, the winning strategy is to prove or disprove continuity: the spouse claiming separate property needs a clean tracing chain from the original asset to the new entity form, while the spouse challenging that claim must produce evidence of an actual transfer, capitalization, or new ownership event—not just testimony that the business changed or that the spouse worked in it.”
Flores v. Flores
COA04
In Flores v. Flores, a post-divorce appellant sought to proceed on appeal without paying costs under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. After the court reporter effectively contested his statement of inability to afford costs, the trial court held the required Rule 145(f) evidentiary hearing. Flores did not appear, and the trial court relied on evidence from the family-law record showing prior findings of net monthly income, business ownership, earning capacity, real-property interests, and an $80,000 vehicle purchase to find he could afford appellate costs. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that Rule 145(f) places the burden on the declarant to prove inability to afford costs, that a filed indigency statement alone is not enough once contested, and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining the contest and requiring payment of costs.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you claim you cannot afford appellate costs in a family-law case, you must prove it with admissible evidence at the Rule 145 hearing. Prior divorce findings about income, assets, business ownership, and spending can defeat an indigency claim, and failing to appear at the hearing is often fatal.”
In re Bradley Welsh
COA02
In a child-support enforcement proceeding, the trial court orally found Bradley Welsh in contempt on April 8, 2026 and ordered him confined for sixty days, but did not sign the written contempt and commitment order until thirty-six days later. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that due process permits only a short and reasonable time between an oral contempt finding with confinement and the signed written order under Ex parte Calvillo Amaya. The court rejected arguments that later work-release discussions meant the contempt ruling was incomplete or that Welsh invited the delay, concluding the hearing had effectively ended and the postponement was caused by the court’s process. Because the delayed written order violated due process, the contempt and commitment order was void, and the court granted habeas relief and vacated the order.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas contempt practice, an oral confinement ruling is not enough. If a court orally finds contempt and orders jail time, the written contempt and commitment order must be prepared and signed almost immediately; otherwise the order may be void regardless of the underlying violation. Family-law lawyers should have proposed contempt orders ready at the hearing and, for respondents, should closely compare the oral ruling date to the signature date for a potential habeas challenge.”
Diaz-Perez v. State
COA04
In Diaz-Perez v. State, the defendant challenged his convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child by arguing, among other things, that the trial court improperly admitted the mother’s outcry testimony because the State’s Article 38.072 written summary allegedly did not specifically disclose penile penetration. The Fourth Court of Appeals did not need to definitively decide whether the summary was too imprecise because any error was nonconstitutional and harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). The court emphasized that the child later testified without objection to the same penetration detail, making the complained-of testimony cumulative and not outcome-determinative. The court also rejected ineffective-assistance claims tied to the failure to obtain a rebuttal expert because the appellate record did not show an available expert, proposed testimony, or resulting prejudice. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven family-law cases, winning an evidentiary objection is not enough if the same fact comes in later through another witness or exhibit without objection. Preserve the issue across the full proof chain, because appellate courts are likely to treat notice or disclosure defects as harmless when the challenged allegation is later proved through cumulative evidence.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Caroline Brookshire and Trenton Brookshire and in the Interest of R.L.B., D.B.B. and H.A.B., Children
COA12
In this Texas family-law appeal arising from a contested divorce and SAPCR, the appellee argued the judgment should be affirmed because the appellate record was supposedly incomplete: although audio and video exhibits were admitted and included in the record, the court reporter did not identify the exact timestamps or clips played at trial. The Tyler Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and held that the incomplete-record presumption in Rule 34.6(c) applies only when an appellant elects to proceed on a partial reporter’s record. Because the appellant requested the complete reporter’s record and the admitted digital exhibits were actually included, the absence of clip-by-clip transcription or timestamp notation did not make the record incomplete. The court therefore rejected the appellee’s request for a presumption in favor of the judgment and allowed merits review to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want appellate review of digital evidence, request the full reporter’s record and make sure the admitted audio/video exhibits are included. Brookshire also teaches trial lawyers not to rely on the court reporter to identify clips—state timestamps and excerpts on the record whenever possible—but an appellee cannot turn that imprecision alone into an automatic affirmance under Rule 34.6(c).”
Brennan Short v. Jamie Short
COA04
In Short v. Short, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that although a deed from one spouse to the other during marriage creates a presumption of gift, that presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence when the deed does not contain an express separate-property recital. Wife owned the Boerne home before marriage, later deeded Husband a one-half interest during a refinance intended to pay off other debt and lower monthly payments, and testified she did not intend a gift. Relying on In re J.Y.O., the court held parol evidence of her intent was admissible, found sufficient evidence that the transfer was a financing accommodation rather than a donative transfer, and affirmed the trial court’s characterization of the entire property as Wife’s separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
“An interspousal deed is powerful, but not always dispositive. In Texas property-characterization disputes, a spouse can defeat the gift presumption with clear and convincing evidence showing the transfer was made for refinancing or debt-service purposes rather than out of donative intent—especially when the deed lacks an express separate-property recital. Plead lack of donative intent and any fraud, duress, or mistake theories, and preserve objections if the other side tries unpleaded issues.”
In the Interest of J.J. III and D.R.L.J., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and he also challenged best interest. But he did not challenge the separate constructive-abandonment finding under subsection (N). The Fourth Court of Appeals applied the settled rule that one valid predicate ground under section 161.001(b)(1), coupled with a best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2), is enough to affirm termination. Because subsection (N) was an independent ground and was left unchallenged, the court treated it as established on appeal and affirmed the termination order without needing to decide the father’s attacks on subsections (D) and (E).
Litigation Takeaway
“In a termination appeal, you must challenge every independent predicate ground that can support the judgment. If even one statutory ground is left unchallenged, the court can affirm so long as the best-interest finding stands, making issue selection on appeal potentially case-dispositive.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Fred Garland Henson and Tiffanie Karon Henson and in the Interest of C.R.H., a Child
COA12
In Henson v. Henson, the Tyler Court of Appeals addressed whether a divorce decree could both restrict a father’s possession and require him to complete a battering intervention program, parenting classes, and negative drug tests before he could later seek modification of that no-contact order. The court held that the trial court acted within its broad authority under Chapter 153 to impose a no-contact possession restriction based on evidence of methamphetamine use, family violence, and danger to the child. But it also held that Chapter 156 exclusively governs when a party may seek modification, so the trial court could not add extra-statutory preconditions to filing a future modification action. The improper filing barriers were ordered deleted from the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas courts can impose very strict current possession restrictions to protect a child, but they cannot block a parent’s statutory right to file a future modification suit by adding decree-based prerequisites. When drafting protective orders, tie treatment, testing, or classes to possession or reunification—not to courthouse access.”
In re A.T.
COA04
In re A.T. involved a post-divorce enforcement action seeking criminal contempt for missed child-support and medical-support payments allegedly due in 2022. The enforcement motion and resulting contempt order were both based on a November 8, 2019 final divorce decree, but that decree had been set aside on February 21, 2020 and replaced the same day by an amended decree. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that criminal contempt requires disobedience of a valid, operative court order, so a vacated decree cannot serve as the basis for contempt. Because the relator was not restrained under the contempt order, mandamus—not habeas—was the proper remedy, and the court conditionally granted mandamus, holding the contempt order void.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before filing or defending any family-law enforcement action, confirm the exact operative order in effect on the date of the alleged violation. If contempt is based on a vacated or superseded decree, the contempt order is void, and defects in notice, service, and the required order to appear can create additional due-process problems.”
In re Sandra Ramirez
COA08
In In re Sandra Ramirez, the El Paso Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by transferring venue from El Paso County to Kaufman County without a Rule 87-compliant setting, notice, and hearing. The movant argued the matter was effectively set during a status conference and heard by submission, but the mandamus record and certified register of actions showed no actual setting or hearing. Relying on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 87 and Henderson v. O’Neill, the court concluded unsupported attorney assertions could not establish compliance, rejected the argument that Ramirez failed to preserve error, and conditionally granted mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the transfer order.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the other side wants to transfer venue, they must create a clean Rule 87 record with an actual setting, proper notice, and a hearing or documented submission setting. In family-law cases, an informal status conference or off-record discussion is not enough, and a transfer order entered without those procedural safeguards is a strong candidate for immediate mandamus relief.”
In the Interest of A. A. S.
COA03
In a restricted appeal from a private termination suit, the Third Court of Appeals held that termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent had the ability to support the child during each month of the relevant twelve-month period. Although the grandmother proved the mother had been ordered to pay support and paid nothing, the court concluded that nonpayment and the existence of a prior support order do not establish actual ability to pay. Because the written termination order relied solely on subsection (F) and the record contained no evidence of the mother’s employment, income, assets, or other facts showing ability to support during the statutory period, the evidence was legally and factually insufficient. The court reversed the termination order and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you plead termination under § 161.001(b)(1)(F), arrearage evidence alone is not enough. You must build a month-by-month record showing the parent’s actual ability to support during the statutory period; if that proof is missing, subsection (F) is vulnerable on sufficiency review, including in a restricted appeal after a default prove-up.”
Hollman v. State
COA05
In Hollman v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether four photographs of a complainant’s injuries and damaged phone were properly authenticated when the witness could not recall the exact date they were taken. Applying Texas Rule of Evidence 901, the court held the State met its threshold burden because the complainant had personal knowledge, recognized the photos, testified she was present when they were taken, and said they fairly and accurately depicted the injuries and damage from the assault. The court rejected the argument that Rule 901 requires proof of a precise date or that the photos were taken exactly at or near the event, explaining that such uncertainty generally goes to weight rather than admissibility. The court affirmed admission of the photographs and modified the judgment to reflect the correct enhanced offense level.
Litigation Takeaway
“Exact-date recall is not required to authenticate a photograph. In family-law cases, a witness with personal knowledge who can testify a photo fairly and accurately depicts injuries, property damage, living conditions, or the aftermath of an incident will often satisfy Rule 901 even without a precise timestamp; if chronology matters, attack or defend the exhibit on linkage, weight, relevance, or alteration—not on a nonexistent exact-date requirement.”
In re Paula Law
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a party seeking a pre-suit deposition under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 must do more than file a verified petition reciting the rule. Alliantgroup wanted to depose former employee Paula Law before filing suit to investigate possible non-compete, confidentiality, and trade-secret claims. The court scrutinized whether Alliantgroup had satisfied Rule 202.4(a)(2), which requires a finding that the likely benefit of the deposition outweighs its burden or expense. It concluded Alliantgroup neither pleaded specific, case-based facts explaining that balance nor proved those facts with competent evidence at the hearing. Because verified pleadings ordinarily are not evidence, and no testimony, admitted affidavits, stipulations, or other evidence supported the order, the trial court abused its discretion. The appellate court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the Rule 202 order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 202 is an extraordinary pre-suit tool, not a shortcut to fish for claims. If you want a pre-suit deposition, you must plead specific facts showing why the deposition’s likely benefit outweighs its burden and back that up with actual evidence. If you are opposing Rule 202 in a family-law-adjacent dispute, attack both the pleadings and the proof—especially any attempt to rely on a verified petition alone.”
In the Interest of E.C.O. and A.J.O., Children
COA05
In this family-law appeal, the appellant filed a Rule 145 statement claiming he could not afford appellate costs or bond, but the opposing party contested indigency. The Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court acted within its discretion in sustaining the contest because the appellant admitted he earned about $180,000 per year, had a monthly surplus after expenses, owned a vehicle of value, and failed to provide documentary proof showing he could not pay all or part of the costs or provide security despite a good-faith effort. The court also upheld the trial court’s detailed post-abatement findings, treated unobjected-to unsworn hearing statements as evidence, rejected any right to a second evidentiary hearing after abatement, found omission of Rule 145(f)(4) notice harmless, and held the installment-payment complaint was waived.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 145 has no automatic high-income bar, but indigency must be proven with evidence, not conclusions. In family-law appeals, lawyers should treat a Rule 145 contest like a mini-trial: develop proof of income, surplus, assets, and discretionary spending if contesting indigency, and if proving indigency, bring records showing why the client cannot pay even part of the costs or post security despite a genuine good-faith effort.”
In the Interest of A.O.K. and A.O.K., Children
COA05
In this divorce and SAPCR appeal, the father challenged the child-support provisions of an agreed final decree, arguing the trial court prevented him from presenting testimony and financial evidence and set support incorrectly. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that, even after notice and an opportunity to amend, his brief still failed to comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 because it did not present coherent issues, meaningful legal analysis, preservation citations, record support, or reversible-harm analysis. The court also emphasized that, because no reporter’s record was requested, it had to presume the missing evidence supported the judgment and all necessary implied findings. With no reviewable appellate issues and an inadequate record, the court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“On appeal, even potentially sympathetic family-law complaints are lost if the brief is conclusory and the record is incomplete. Preserve error, order the reporter’s record, and tie each issue to specific rulings, record cites, governing law, and harm—or expect waiver and affirmance.”