Weekly Digest
May 23 – May 29, 2026
36 opinions this week
In the Matter of the Marriage of Brittany Palumbo Torres and Gibran Jalil Torres and in the Interest of F.J.T., a Child
COA12
In this Texas divorce appeal, the wife challenged the decree’s use of the divorce-filing date as the end date for dividing the community portion of the parties’ retirement accounts. The Tyler Court of Appeals held the complaint was waived because her brief offered only a conclusory assertion, without developed legal analysis, supporting authority, or meaningful record citations, which failed to satisfy Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). The court also explained that even if the issue were construed as a broader attack on the just-and-right property division, the wife failed to provide a reporter’s record, so the court had to presume the missing evidence supported the trial court’s valuation choice and overall property division. The decree was therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“On appeal, a property-division complaint is only as good as the brief and the record. If you want to challenge a valuation date or other discretionary property ruling, you need a fully developed appellate argument and a complete reporter’s record showing why the ruling made the overall division unjust.”
In re Phillip Snyder
COA12
In In re Phillip Snyder, the Tyler Court of Appeals denied mandamus relief from an order denying a special appearance in a child name-change case because the relator failed to provide a complete mandamus record. Snyder argued that, as an Ohio resident with no Texas contacts, the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. But under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7(a), a relator must provide a properly authenticated record including all relevant hearing testimony and exhibits. Because Snyder filed only part of the special-appearance hearing transcript, the court could not determine what evidence or arguments the trial court considered and therefore could not assess whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion. The court denied mandamus without reaching the merits of the jurisdictional challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Family Code cases, mandamus may be the only immediate way to challenge a special-appearance ruling, so record preparation is everything. If the hearing included live testimony, exhibits, or relevant argument, file the full authenticated reporter’s record and all material documents—or expect the appellate court to deny relief without ever reaching the merits.”
Joseph Mugisha v. Brianna McLeod
COA03
In Mugisha v. McLeod, the Austin Court of Appeals addressed whether a Texas trial court could turn a temporary emergency custody case into a final conservatorship order involving children who had been living in Uganda. After the mother stayed in Texas with the children and filed a SAPCR, the trial court relied on Family Code section 152.105(c) to conclude that Uganda’s custody law violated fundamental human-rights principles and therefore bypassed the UCCJEA’s foreign-country and simultaneous-proceedings requirements. The appellate court held that this exception requires actual evidence in the record, not attorney argument, briefing, or unadmitted attachments. Because no sufficient evidence supported the human-rights finding, the trial court could not avoid sections 152.204 and 152.206 or enter a final custody order. The court vacated and remanded the conservatorship and possession portions of the judgment, while separately concluding that Texas had personal jurisdiction for child-support purposes but the support evidence was insufficient as to net resources.
Litigation Takeaway
“In international custody disputes, section 152.105(c) is not a shortcut. If you want a Texas court to disregard a foreign country under the UCCJEA, you must present admissible evidence that the foreign nation’s child-custody law violates fundamental human-rights principles. Briefs and lawyer argument will not support a final custody order, and default does not fix a thin jurisdictional record.”
Kocks v. State
COA11
In Kocks v. State, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that the child complainant’s testimony was legally sufficient to support convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by exposure, even though the child disclosed the abuse later, disclosed it in stages, and had some inconsistencies in her account. Applying the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard, the court emphasized that appellate courts do not reweigh credibility and that delayed outcry, partial initial disclosure, and conflicting details generally present jury questions rather than legal defects. The court also noted surrounding corroborative evidence, including messages suggesting grooming and photographs matching the child’s description of the defendant’s genital features. The convictions were affirmed because a rational factfinder could believe the child’s testimony and find the statutory elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven family cases, do not assume delayed disclosure, piecemeal outcry, or trauma-related inconsistency will defeat the claim. Courts may still credit a child’s core account, especially when texts, behavioral changes, or other surrounding facts reinforce it. For the defense, merely highlighting inconsistencies is usually a weight argument—not a case-ending one—so stronger strategy requires affirmative contradictory evidence and objective timeline attacks.”
Tijerina v. State
COA12
In Tijerina v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld the admission of testimony from a second child victim under Article 38.37 in a continuous-sexual-abuse prosecution. The case turned largely on credibility because there was no physical evidence, eyewitness, or confession. The court held the trial judge could reasonably find that the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the separate acts against the other child, and that the testimony was highly probative because it showed a similar pattern of abuse in the household. Applying Rule 403, the court concluded the evidence was not unfairly prejudicial because it was similar in kind to the charged conduct, was not more inflammatory, and was important to help the jury evaluate credibility and pattern in a delayed-outcry case.
Litigation Takeaway
“When abuse allegations rise or fall on credibility, similar-act evidence involving another child or household member can be powerful if you build a tight record showing genuine similarity, need, and a proper non-character purpose. For family-law lawyers, Tijerina is a blueprint both for offering pattern-abuse evidence in custody or protective-order litigation and for opposing it by attacking similarity, reliability, remoteness, and cumulativeness rather than relying on a generic prejudice objection.”
Tilleman v. Tilleman
COA03
In Tilleman v. Tilleman, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a mediated settlement agreement that complied with Texas Family Code sections 6.602 and 153.0071 remained binding even after the parties jointly nonsuited their first divorce case without prejudice. The wife argued the MSA applied only to the original cause because it referred to the “pending action,” the “above-numbered suit,” and entry of a final order in “this Cause.” The court rejected that reading, applying ordinary contract principles alongside the strong statutory rule that compliant family-law MSAs are irrevocable and generally entitle a party to judgment. Reading the agreement as a whole, the court concluded those docket-specific references described the context of the settlement, not an express limitation on its durability, especially where the MSA also declared itself nonrevocable and included lasting property and SAPCR terms. The court affirmed the decree entered in the second divorce case based on the earlier MSA.
Litigation Takeaway
“A valid Texas family-law MSA is hard to undo: a nonsuit, reconciliation attempt, or refiling does not usually wipe it out. If you want an MSA to survive procedural detours, Tilleman supports enforcement; if you want it limited to one case, say so expressly in the agreement.”
Rothlis v. State
COA02
In Rothlis v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether a 47-minute video of the defendant threatening the complainant should have been excluded under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 in a family-violence prosecution. The court held that Article 38.371 allows admission of relevant relationship evidence, including threats, domination, and coercive conduct, to help the factfinder understand the nature of the parties’ relationship. Applying the Gigliobianco Rule 403 factors, the court found the video highly probative because it showed coercive control in real time, helped explain the complainant’s behavior, and bore directly on credibility in a case largely dependent on her testimony. Because the defendant did not show that any unfair prejudice substantially outweighed that strong probative value, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the video, and the convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-violence-related litigation, courts may admit threatening or coercive relationship evidence when it helps explain the true dynamics of the relationship, a party’s credibility, delayed reporting, minimization, or continued contact with the abuser. The key Rule 403 lesson is that emotional impact alone is not enough for exclusion; lawyers should tie the evidence to a specific live issue, while opponents should focus on narrowing, redactions, cumulativeness, and concrete improper-prejudice arguments rather than generic complaints.”
Morales v. Lowenberg
COA03
In Morales v. Lowenberg, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a settlement email satisfied Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 11 when it contained definite material terms, was accepted before the stated deadline, and ended with the sender’s typed professional signature block used to authenticate the message. The court analyzed Rule 11’s writing and signature requirements functionally rather than formalistically, concluding that the signature requirement is met when the surrounding circumstances show the sender intended the name block to authenticate the offer. Because the offeree unequivocally accepted before expiration, a binding settlement was formed, and the sender’s later attempt to revoke it was ineffective. The court affirmed enforcement of the agreement but modified the attorney’s-fees award to exclude fees unrelated to enforcing the Rule 11 settlement.
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat settlement emails like they can bind your client. In Texas family cases, an email with material terms, acceptance language, a deadline, and a typed signature block may become an enforceable Rule 11 agreement even if no formal decree or release has been signed yet. If you do not want to be bound until a later document is executed, say so expressly, and if you seek enforcement, segregate fees tied only to enforcement work.”
In the Interest of K.L.B., a Child
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to K.L.B., holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient on endangerment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), best interest under § 161.001(b)(2), and appointment of DFPS as sole managing conservator. The court analyzed the case as a pattern-of-conduct record: a medically fragile child suffered severe chronic malnutrition and developmental regression after missed medical follow-up, discontinued nutritional support, the mother’s daily marijuana use and failed substance-abuse services, and the mother’s refusal to protect the child from a violent caregiver in the home. The child’s dramatic improvement in foster care, combined with the mother’s instability, noncompliance, and inability to prove a safe home, supported the trial court’s findings and judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Endangerment and best interest are often proven through cumulative patterns, not one dramatic event. In custody and termination cases alike, chronic medical neglect, substance use, and failure to protect a child from household violence can strongly support sole conservatorship, supervised access, or termination—especially when the child improves once placed in a safe, stable environment.”
Bizimana v. Ogunsanya
COA03
In this SAPCR appeal, the father challenged temporary orders governing conservatorship, child support, prenatal expenses, and interim attorney’s fees, arguing procedural and substantive error at the temporary-orders stage. The Third Court of Appeals explained that under the Family Code, SAPCR temporary orders are interlocutory and, once a final order is signed, those temporary rulings merge into and are superseded by the final judgment. Because the father’s appellate complaints were aimed primarily at the temporary orders rather than the final SAPCR order, those complaints were moot and could not support reversal. The court further noted that any attack on the final judgment had to be based on the final-hearing record, and prior temporary-hearing testimony was not part of that record unless properly admitted. Finding no reversible error in the final order itself, the court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want appellate relief after a final SAPCR order, challenge the final order—not just the temporary orders. Temporary rulings usually become moot once final judgment is signed, so family-law litigators must build and preserve a full final-hearing record and frame appellate issues around the final judgment’s actual provisions.”
City of Houston v. Tamike Crumpton
COA14
In City of Houston v. Crumpton, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the City could not obtain reversal of an order denying its immunity-based summary-judgment motion because it failed to challenge an independent ground supporting that ruling: the plaintiff’s argument that the motion was premature due to incomplete discovery. The court applied the rule that when a trial court’s general order may rest on multiple independent grounds, the appellant must attack them all or affirmance is required. The court also held that the City’s effort to dismiss the Houston Airport System and George Bush Intercontinental Airport as non-jural entities was outside the scope of an interlocutory appeal under CPRC § 51.014(a)(8), because capacity or jural-existence complaints are collateral and non-jurisdictional, not immunity questions. The immunity ruling was affirmed, and the non-jural-entity portion of the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In any interlocutory immunity appeal, attack every possible basis for the trial court’s ruling—especially a discovery-prematurity argument—or you can lose without the court ever reaching the merits. And do not assume a non-jural-entity or capacity argument can ride along in an immunity appeal; those issues usually must be handled in the trial court and preserved for a later appeal.”
In the Interest of S.W., a Child
COA14
In In re S.W., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of parental rights after concluding legally and factually sufficient evidence showed endangerment under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E). The court focused on a continuing course of conduct, not a single event: Father’s coercive control over Mother, interference with her mental-health treatment, refusal to cooperate with the Department, obstruction of access to information and the home, and overall instability surrounding the newborn. Applying established endangerment standards, the court held the evidence permitted a firm conviction that the parents’ conduct jeopardized the child’s physical and emotional well-being even without proof of actual physical injury. The court also held that the same evidence supporting endangerment supported the best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2), so it did not need to reach the remaining predicate grounds, and Father lacked standing to challenge conservatorship after termination.
Litigation Takeaway
“Pattern evidence matters. A sustained record of coercive control, untreated mental-health issues, blocked medical care, refusal to cooperate, and household instability can support both endangerment and best interest, even without a single dramatic injury to the child. For practitioners, the case is a reminder to build or rebut a cohesive narrative tying adult conduct directly to child safety and parenting capacity.”
Garcia v. State
COA01
In Garcia v. State, the First Court of Appeals rejected two appellate complaints arising from a child-sexual-abuse trial: an ineffective-assistance claim tied to outcry-witness objections and a mistrial request after an alternate juror mistakenly joined guilt-innocence deliberations. On the outcry issue, the court applied Strickland and held the record did not show counsel performed deficiently by failing to renew objections at trial when the evidence allegedly diverged from the Article 38.072 pretrial ruling; without a developed record and a showing the objection would have been sustained, the claim failed. On the alternate-juror issue, the court treated the error as harm-based rather than structural. Because the trial court removed the alternate, reseated the proper juror, instructed the jury to begin deliberations anew, and the record showed no actual prejudice, denial of a mistrial was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Preservation and harm control appeals. If trial evidence shifts from the basis of a pretrial evidentiary ruling, counsel must object specifically and contemporaneously. And when a procedural irregularity occurs, reversal is not automatic—lawyers must build a concrete record showing why the error probably affected the outcome despite any curative steps.”
Staples v. State
COA01
In Staples v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that recorded jail calls were properly authenticated under Texas Rule of Evidence 901 even without testimony from a technical witness explaining the jail’s recording system. The State authenticated the calls through a detective’s voice identification, the caller’s self-identification, date and incarceration-related details, and other contextual facts tying the recordings to the defendant. The court emphasized that Rule 901 sets only a low threshold: the proponent must offer enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude the item is what it is claimed to be, while disputes about system mechanics or possible error go to weight rather than admissibility. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting the recordings.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want recorded statements admitted in family court, focus on building a practical Rule 901 foundation—voice recognition, self-identification, timing, and distinctive case-specific context—not on proving every technical detail of the recording system. Staples is a strong answer to overbroad authenticity objections in protective-order, custody, and abuse-related hearings.”
Warner v. State
COA03
In Warner v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals addressed whether Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.072 requires the State’s child-outcry notice to contain a standalone summary of the child’s allegations within the four corners of the notice itself. The State identified the child’s mother as the outcry witness and referenced police statements previously produced in discovery that substantially summarized the child’s abuse disclosures. Rejecting the defendant’s proposed four-corners rule, the court focused on the statute’s purpose—preventing unfair surprise—and held that timely notice is sufficient when it identifies the witness and directs the defense to written materials already produced that fairly summarize the expected testimony. Because the notice and incorporated police statements gave the defense adequate written notice more than 14 days before trial, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the outcry testimony.
Litigation Takeaway
“Substance beats format. When notice rules require a summary of abuse-related allegations, a court may accept a notice that specifically identifies the witness and clearly incorporates previously produced written materials, rather than repeating everything in one self-contained filing. For family lawyers, the best practice is still a clean standalone summary, but if you are challenging notice, focus on prejudice, timing, witness identification, and whether the incorporated documents actually disclose the expected testimony—not just the lack of a single four-corners notice.”
Paul Coleman v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Coleman, the defense tried to call a key witness who would testify that the defendant was never alone with the complainant and did not commit the charged acts. After a hearing outside the jury’s presence, the trial court found the witness had a legitimate Fifth Amendment privilege because she still faced possible prosecution arising from the same incident. When she refused on cross-examination to answer how the complainant got to the hotel—a non-collateral fact central to the same transaction—the court excluded her testimony entirely. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Texas law does not require a trial court to admit selective exculpatory testimony when meaningful cross-examination on the same events is blocked by a valid privilege claim, and that exclusion did not violate compulsory process or due process.
Litigation Takeaway
“A witness does not get to tell only the helpful part of the story and then invoke the Fifth to avoid cross-examination on the same transaction. In Texas family cases involving abuse allegations, hidden assets, fraud, or other parallel criminal exposure, Coleman is a strong tool to exclude a selective witness if the anticipated Fifth Amendment invocation will block meaningful cross on non-collateral facts.”
Paul Coleman v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Paul Coleman v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly excluded a defense witness after she gave exculpatory direct testimony but then invoked the Fifth Amendment on cross-examination about how the complainant got to the hotel and her own role in the same events. Applying Keller and Draper, the court reasoned that a witness cannot offer a favorable partial account of a transaction and then block meaningful cross-examination on non-collateral facts central to that same transaction. Because the trial court vetted the privilege claim outside the jury’s presence, found a legitimate risk of self-incrimination, and the blocked questions went to the heart of the case rather than mere credibility impeachment, exclusion was within the court’s discretion and did not violate compulsory-process or due-process rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a witness with potential criminal or fraud exposure wants to help one side with favorable testimony, that witness cannot tell only the safe part of the story and then invoke the Fifth Amendment when cross-examination reaches core facts. In family cases, this gives lawyers a strong basis to seek exclusion or striking of testimony from insider witnesses whose privilege claim would gut meaningful examination on the same transaction.”
In Re Dwayne Cardale McQueen
COA09
In this mandamus proceeding, McQueen asked the court of appeals to force the trial court to rule on post-judgment motions attacking a 2014 permanent injunction, arguing changed circumstances and successor-party issues made the injunction void or unenforceable. The Beaumont Court of Appeals acknowledged that Texas courts retain authority to modify or dissolve permanent injunctions when conditions materially change, but held that continuing jurisdiction does not eliminate the need for personal jurisdiction over the parties whose current rights would be affected. Because McQueen's own filings showed that different or successor interested parties were now implicated, his request for affirmative relief could not be properly pursued by motions filed in the old case alone. Without a new original petition and service of citation, absent voluntary appearance, the trial court had no ministerial duty to rule, so mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“If post-judgment relief from an injunction would affect current parties who were not already properly before the court, do not rely on motion practice in the old case. File a new pleading, obtain service, and establish personal jurisdiction first—or risk losing on procedure before the merits are ever reached.”
In the Interest of E.K.L., a Child
COA10
In In re E.K.L., the appellant tried to directly appeal a temporary order entered in a SAPCR. The Tenth Court of Appeals focused on the order’s character—not its specific terms—and held that because it was a temporary child-related order governed by Texas Family Code § 105.001, § 105.001(e) barred an interlocutory appeal. Relying on the statute, Little v. Daggett, and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a), the court concluded it lacked appellate jurisdiction, dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, and dismissed the pending emergency-relief motion as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume a harsh temporary custody or child-related order can be directly appealed. If the order is a temporary SAPCR order, Texas Family Code § 105.001(e) likely bars interlocutory appeal, so lawyers should instead preserve error, evaluate mandamus, and push the underlying case toward prompt merits resolution.”
Ting Jiang v. Michael Glenn Dawson
COA01
In this Texas divorce appeal, the wife argued that Oregon law should have governed characterization of two Oregon houses acquired during the marriage and that the jury should have received Oregon-law and additional inception-of-title instructions. The First Court of Appeals held that because the Texas divorce court had personal jurisdiction over both spouses, Texas law governed characterization of the marital estate for division purposes, even as to out-of-state real property. Applying Texas Family Code section 7.002 and related authority, the court concluded the requested Oregon-law instructions were not legally correct and that the wife failed to show the submitted charge misstated Texas law. The court therefore affirmed the refusal of the requested instructions and upheld the property-characterization framework used at trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a Texas divorce, the location of real estate does not usually determine which marital-property law controls. If both spouses are before the Texas court, practitioners should generally try characterization issues under Texas law, tailor jury-charge requests accordingly, and preserve any instruction complaints with precise, legally correct proposed language.”
In the Interest of J.A.E., III, J.R.E, J.A.E., J.E.E., and J.E.W.E., Children
COA14
In this Department conservatorship appeal, the mother argued the final order was void because the trial court signed it more than 90 days after trial allegedly commenced under Texas Family Code § 263.4011. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals rejected that argument. It held the trial court properly extended the Chapter 263 dismissal deadline based on extraordinary circumstances, and trial truly commenced before that deadline when the parties appeared, the court addressed preliminary matters, admitted an exhibit, and heard testimony from a sworn witness. The court then analyzed the statutory text and the Supreme Court’s guidance in In re G.X.H., emphasizing that § 263.401 expressly makes failure to timely commence trial jurisdictional, while § 263.4011 does not impose dismissal or loss of jurisdiction for failing to render a final order within 90 days. Because the Legislature provided mandamus as the remedy for a missed 90-day rendition deadline, the late final order was mandatory-error territory, not a jurisdictional defect. The court affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Not every mandatory deadline makes a judgment void. If trial timely commences under Chapter 263, a later failure to render a final order within 90 days under § 263.4011 should be challenged promptly by mandamus, not saved for a post-judgment argument that the court lost subject-matter jurisdiction. And if you are relying on a "commence and recess" setting, make a real trial record with appearances, rulings, admitted evidence, and sworn testimony.”
Varughese v. Varughese
COA02
In Varughese v. Varughese, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals dismissed a husband’s attempted appeal from a final divorce decree because he chose a restricted appeal even though the record showed he participated in the hearing that produced the decree and timely filed a motion for new trial. The court applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 30 and Ex parte E.H., which make those requirements jurisdictional: a restricted appeal is available only when the appellant did not participate in the dispositive hearing and did not timely file qualifying post-judgment motions. The court also rejected the husband’s effort to call his filing a 'writ of error,' explaining that writ-of-error practice has been replaced by restricted appeals, and held that a later written order denying the motion for new trial did not revive expired appellate deadlines after the motion had already been overruled by operation of law. Because the jurisdictional prerequisites for a restricted appeal were absent, the appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Pick the right appellate vehicle immediately after judgment. If your client participated in the final hearing or filed a timely motion for new trial, a restricted appeal is off the table, and mislabeling the filing as a writ of error will not save jurisdiction. In family-law cases, counsel must calendar ordinary appeal deadlines and Rule 329b dates right away or risk losing appellate review entirely.”
Bussey v. State
COA06
In Bussey v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals held that a domestic-violence complainant’s 9-1-1 call was admissible because it was nontestimonial under Crawford and Davis. The complainant called shortly after the assault, while the defendant had only recently fled and before officers had secured the scene. Although she later invoked the Fifth Amendment and did not testify, the court focused on the primary purpose of the call when made: obtaining immediate police help during an ongoing emergency, not creating evidence for trial. Because the emergency was still unresolved, admission of the recording did not violate the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause, and the conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When using 9-1-1 evidence in family-violence-related litigation, the key question is whether the caller was seeking immediate help during an ongoing emergency or simply narrating past events for later prosecution. Build or attack admissibility around timing, unresolved danger, recent flight, scene security, and whether the exchange stayed focused on emergency response rather than retrospective investigation.”
Joseph v. State
COA04
In Joseph v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals affirmed an aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction arising from a violent incident between unmarried dating partners who lived together. The defendant argued the evidence was insufficient, challenged authentication of exhibits, and claimed ineffective assistance. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court held the complainant’s testimony alone was enough for a rational jury to find that he used or exhibited a firearm while intentionally or knowingly threatening her with imminent bodily injury, and the jury was entitled to believe her over his denial. The court also rejected the authentication and new-trial complaints, leaving the conviction intact. For family-law crossover purposes, the opinion reinforces that cohabiting dating partners fit comfortably within a household/family-violence context and that one credible witness, supported by domestic-scene evidence, can sustain consequential violence findings.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, do not underestimate the power of one detailed, credible account of domestic violence—especially where the parties were dating and living together. Cohabitation can place the dispute squarely in a family-violence framework, and corroborating videos, property damage, officer observations, and firearm evidence can strongly influence protective orders, possession limits, and best-interest rulings even if some allegations are disputed or only partially proven.”
Recarido Antonio Terrell v. The State of Texas
COA09
In Terrell v. State, the Beaumont court affirmed an aggravated-assault-with-a-deadly-weapon conviction arising from a dating-violence shooting. The defendant challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence, but the court held that the record—combining the complainant’s on-scene identifications, a 911 call, body-camera footage, prior testimony from an unavailable officer, medical evidence of a gunshot wound and road-rash-type abrasions, and circumstantial evidence tying the defendant and his red vehicle to the timeline—was enough for a rational jury to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt under Jackson v. Virginia. The court emphasized that appellate review does not reweigh credibility disputes or inconsistencies where the jury could reasonably credit the State’s corroborated version of events. The court also upheld the admission of punishment-phase extraneous-offense evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law litigators, the case is a strong reminder that violence allegations do not rise or fall on perfect eyewitness testimony. Courts can credit a cumulative record built from emergency statements, responder observations, medical proof, recordings, and digital or physical corroboration—even when later testimony is incomplete or inconsistent. If you are proving family violence, build a layered evidentiary mosaic; if you are defending, attack foundation, attribution, and chronology rather than relying only on generalized credibility complaints.”
In the Matter of W.M., A Juvenile
COA05
In In the Matter of W.M., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order transferring a juvenile to criminal district court for murder and three aggravated-assault charges arising from an apartment-complex shooting. W.M. argued the evidence was insufficient to support the probable-cause finding required by Family Code section 54.02. The court rejected that challenge, explaining that a transfer hearing requires only evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the juvenile committed the charged offenses, not trial-level proof of guilt. Applying that standard, the court relied on Ring-camera footage showing W.M. arrive in and drive a black Acura, approach the complex with another suspect, and flee immediately after gunshots; eyewitness testimony that two masked men with guns were present before and after the shooting; ballistics showing two firearms were used; and evidence tying the Acura and related conduct to W.M. The court held that this direct and circumstantial evidence, including a law-of-parties theory, was enough to support probable cause and affirmed the transfer order.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a court is making a threshold safety or responsibility finding under the Family Code, a connected circumstantial record can be enough. Video, timing, access to a vehicle, association with a co-actor, and flight may collectively support a serious adverse ruling even without definitive proof of who pulled the trigger. Family lawyers should build—or dismantle—the full narrative, not just one piece of evidence.”
In the Interest of B.J.M., a Child
COA04
In this SAPCR appeal, the appellant tried to challenge a default final order more than eight months after it was signed, making any ordinary appeal untimely. The Fourth Court of Appeals considered whether the late filing could proceed as a restricted appeal and repeatedly gave the appellant chances to amend his notice to satisfy Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(d)(7). But the appellant never alleged or verified the key jurisdictional fact that he did not participate, in person or through counsel, in the hearing that produced the challenged judgment. Relying on Rule 25.1 and Ex parte E.H., the court held that nonparticipation is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a restricted appeal, not a mere technicality. Because the notice was too late for a regular appeal and the appellant failed to establish restricted-appeal jurisdiction, the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the normal appellate deadline has passed, a family-law appellant cannot save the case by simply calling it a restricted appeal. You must expressly and properly show the jurisdictional prerequisites—especially that the appellant did not participate in the hearing resulting in the judgment. Courts may forgive defective paperwork, but they will not infer missing jurisdictional facts.”
Juan Gasca v. Marcque Keller
COA05
In Gasca v. Keller, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6 required exclusion of exhibits Keller failed to timely disclose in the county-court case, even though some materials may have been produced in related eviction litigation. Keller added a security-deposit claim shortly before a bench trial and relied on late-produced evidence to prove it. The court emphasized that Rule 193.6 is a mandatory exclusion rule, that the proponent bears the burden to prove good cause or lack of unfair surprise or unfair prejudice, and that bench trials are not exempt from the rule. Because Keller did not carry that burden and the undisclosed evidence supported a late-added claim, the trial court’s admission of the evidence probably caused an improper judgment. The court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“Late-disclosed evidence can blow up a judgment—even in a bench trial. If an opponent tries to prove a newly added claim with documents or other proof that were not timely disclosed in the actual case, object under Rule 193.6 and force them to prove good cause or no unfair surprise/prejudice on the record. For family-law cases, this is a powerful tool against late-produced tracing, reimbursement, valuation, fee, support, or custody evidence.”
Xenia Pirogov v. Ilya Pirogov
COA04
In this divorce appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that a decree ordering the marital home sold and the net proceeds divided is a judgment for recovery of an interest in real property under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 24.2(a)(2). The trial court set a $15,000 supersedeas bond by looking to the home’s market value, mortgage balance, and estimated equity, but the appellate court said that was the wrong legal measure. Because Rule 24.2(a)(2) applies, the amount of security had to be based on the value of the property interest’s rent or revenue, not projected equity or a discretionary figure under Rule 24.2(a)(3). With no evidence of rent or revenue in the record, the trial court abused its discretion, so the court remanded for a new evidentiary hearing and for consideration of reduced or alternate security.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a divorce decree orders real property sold and the proceeds divided, treat supersedeas as a real-property-interest issue under Rule 24.2(a)(2). Lawyers should build the record around rent, rental value, or revenue from the property—not market value, debt, or estimated equity—or risk reversal of the bond order.”
Kyron Henderson v. The State of Texas
COA05
In *Kyron Henderson v. The State of Texas*, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Instagram evidence was properly authenticated under Texas Rule of Evidence 901 through circumstantial evidence rather than direct testimony from someone who personally saw the defendant use the account. The court relied on the account’s self-identifying posts, photos and videos depicting Henderson, direct messages discussing his bond and incarceration, jail-call references to the same account, and Instagram business records. Applying the liberal Rule 901 standard from *Butler*, *Fowler*, and *Tienda*, the court concluded the State only needed to present enough evidence for a reasonable factfinder to find the account was Henderson’s, not conclusive proof of ownership or exclusive control. Because the surrounding circumstances sufficiently tied the account and its contents to Henderson, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits, and the judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Social-media evidence can be authenticated with a circumstantial mosaic; you do not need an eyewitness who saw the other party type the post. In family cases, lawyers should connect screenshots, DMs, and videos to the party through self-identifiers, images, case-specific references, platform records, and outside corroboration, while challengers must attack the specific gaps in that linkage rather than relying on a generic 'anyone could have made the account' objection.”
Sells v. State
COA09
In Sells v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a child and held that testimony from another alleged victim was admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it was offered for a noncharacter purpose, including showing a pattern of access-based abuse, relationship dynamics, and rebutting fabrication rather than merely proving propensity. The court also held that the defendant could not obtain reversal based on the absence of a limiting instruction in the jury charge because he failed to request the instruction or object to its omission, and any unpreserved error did not amount to egregious harm under Almanza. Finally, the court found the evidence legally sufficient, relying on the complainant’s testimony and corroborating context from other witnesses.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law abuse cases, Sells is a strong roadmap for admitting other-victim evidence when you can tie it to a specific noncharacter theory like grooming pattern, opportunity, plan, credibility, or rebuttal of fabrication. It is also a preservation warning: if you want the factfinder instructed on the limited use of that evidence, you must request the instruction clearly and timely or appellate review becomes much harder.”
Quesada v. Bonilla
COA04
In Quesada v. Bonilla, a contractor and homeowners signed a mediated settlement agreement resolving a construction dispute, but before judgment was rendered the contractor filed a motion to set aside the agreement and expressly withdrew consent, claiming duress, coercion, and lack of understanding. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that this revocation barred the trial court from rendering an agreed judgment on the MSA under Padilla and Quintero. Although the homeowners’ motion to enforce was likely sufficient to plead a contract-enforcement theory, the trial court still could not decide the disputed enforceability issues through a bare motion hearing based only on argument and the agreement itself. Because the court enforced the MSA without a proper evidentiary or merits-based procedure, the judgment was reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“A signed settlement is not the same thing as consent to judgment. If a party revokes consent before rendition, the court generally cannot enforce the deal through a quick motion-to-enter hearing; the proponent must plead and prove contract enforcement through a proper merits process. For family lawyers, this is a strong procedural authority against shortcut enforcement of disputed non-statutory settlements and a reminder to preserve revocation in writing before judgment.”
Rosenda Lemus a/k/a Rosenda Hernandez v. Ivis Enrique Lopez
COA05
In Lemus v. Lopez, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a case dismissed for want of prosecution cannot be reinstated unless the party files a verified motion to reinstate within 30 days of the dismissal order under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(3). Here, the motion to reinstate was filed 43 days after the DWOP and was unverified. The court treated those defects as jurisdictional, concluded the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after dismissal, and held the later reinstatement order was void. Because the case was never validly reinstated, the final judgment entered years later was also void, so the court vacated the judgment and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“After a DWOP, reinstatement is not a clerical cleanup step. In Texas family cases, if the motion to reinstate is not both verified and filed within 30 days, the court loses plenary power and every later order may be void. Lawyers should immediately calendar the deadline, verify the motion, and audit any prior reinstatement before spending time and money on litigation.”
Branch v. State
COA06
In Branch v. State, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court improperly allowed a child witness’s father to remain in the courtroom as a support person without making the findings required by Article 38.074. But at trial, counsel objected only under Rule 614 sequestration grounds and never specifically complained that Article 38.074 required predicate findings or asked the court to make them. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that the appellate complaint did not comport with the trial objection, so the issue was waived under Rule 33.1(a). The court also held that complaints about the State’s references to other support persons were unpreserved because no contemporaneous objection was made.
Litigation Takeaway
“Specificity preserves error. In family cases involving child testimony, courtroom accommodations, sequestration exceptions, or trauma-informed procedures, a general objection will not preserve a narrower complaint that the court failed to follow a particular statute or make required findings. If you want appellate review, identify the exact authority, state the precise defect, request findings on the record, and obtain a ruling.”
Kian Motors, Inc. v. VBI Group, Inc.
COA05
In this restricted appeal from a no-answer default judgment, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that service through the Texas Secretary of State was defective because the record showed process was forwarded to the wrong address. VBI’s filings identified Kian Motors’ address as 1212 Commerce Drive, but the Whitney certificate showed the Secretary mailed citation to 1213 Commerce Drive. Applying Texas’s strict-compliance rules for default judgments and statutory service under Business Organizations Code §§ 5.251 and 5.253, the court rejected any presumption that the Whitney certificate cured the problem and concluded the face of the record affirmatively showed lack of proper service. Because personal jurisdiction was absent, the default judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“Default judgments live or die on exact service compliance. In family cases, even a one-digit address mismatch in substitute or statutory service can destroy a default on restricted appeal, so lawyers should audit the clerk’s record line by line before prove-up and immediately after any default is entered.”
Schubiner v. Julis
COA05
In Schubiner v. Julis, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a five-year Chapter 7B protective order after finding legally and factually sufficient evidence that the respondent engaged in stalking through a coordinated campaign of doxxing, mass emails and texts, social-media harassment, and use of third parties to confront the applicants in person. The court analyzed the conduct cumulatively rather than as isolated speech acts, emphasizing that publishing home addresses and family photos, urging public confrontations, contacting relatives and associates, and arranging in-person disruptions could reasonably be viewed as threatening, harassing, alarming, tormenting, or embarrassing conduct under Texas stalking law. The court also rejected vagueness, overbreadth, and prior-restraint challenges, holding in effect that an order tailored to proven, threat-facilitating harassment would stand.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas courts can treat digital harassment as stalking when the evidence shows a repeated, targeted campaign—not just offensive speech. For family-law cases, doxxing, mass messaging, posting locations, and using third parties to pressure or confront a spouse, co-parent, or family members can support protective relief if you build a record showing repetition, escalation, targeting, and real-world safety concerns.”