Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Nicholas Field v. Brandi Pinsker
COA03
In Field v. Pinsker, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed a modification order requiring above-guideline support for an adult disabled child under Texas Family Code § 154.306. The dispute centered on whether post-majority support for Eric, a severely autistic young adult with significant behavioral and functional limitations, could exceed ordinary guideline child support. The court analyzed the statute through an abuse-of-discretion lens and held that § 154.306 allows trial courts to consider the child’s proven disability-related needs, including constant one-on-one supervision, structured care, caregiver scarcity, and safety-related expenses, rather than limiting support to guideline amounts. Because the evidence showed Eric was incapable of self-support, required substantial ongoing care, and Field had the ability to pay more, the trial court acted within its discretion in ordering above-guideline support.
Litigation Takeaway
"Section 154.306 cases turn on detailed proof of functional incapacity and real-world care costs, not diagnosis alone. If you want above-guideline adult disabled child support, build a concrete record showing supervision needs, safety risks, caregiver costs, and the obligor’s ability to pay; if you oppose it, attack the specificity, necessity, and reasonableness of those claimed expenses rather than relying on a simple guideline-cap argument."
In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt
COA05
In re Schmidt held that stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are civil protective-order judgments and are final and appealable when they dispose of all parties and issues in the application. The Dallas Court of Appeals analyzed Chapter 7B’s incorporation of Title 4 Family Code procedures, relied on Texas authority treating these proceedings as civil, and applied ordinary mandamus principles requiring no adequate appellate remedy. Because the relators could have challenged the orders by direct appeal, and because a missed appellate deadline does not make mandamus available absent true voidness, the court denied mandamus relief and denied the requested stays as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat every completed protective-order case—including a Chapter 7B stalking order—as a stand-alone final judgment. Calendar appellate deadlines immediately, build and preserve the record at the hearing, and do not assume mandamus can rescue a missed appeal unless the order is truly void."
In the Interest of J.Z.A., a Child
SCOTX
In In re J.Z.A., the Supreme Court of Texas held that former Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(O) allowed termination only for violating a court order that specifically stated the actions required for reunification. The Department relied on service-plan language requiring Mother to “follow through with all recommendations” from providers and to “actively participate” and “utilize learned skills” during visits. The Court concluded those directives were too vague and open-ended to satisfy the statute, especially where the later recommendation to take antipsychotic medication was never incorporated into an amended court order. Because the evidence showed, at most, noncompliance with generalized expectations rather than a specific court-ordered act, the Court reversed and vacated the termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party’s rights depend on compliance with an order, the order must say exactly what must be done. Vague directives like “follow recommendations” or “actively participate” are poor enforcement language and may not support termination, sanctions, or other serious consequences without specific, court-ordered terms."
Moore v. State
COA05
In Moore v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old murder defendant for adult prosecution under Texas Family Code § 54.02. Moore argued the transfer was unsupported because the investigation was not “full,” given that some forensic and electronic-device testing was still pending, and because the evidence did not sufficiently show he could not be rehabilitated in the juvenile system. The court rejected those arguments, explaining that a § 54.02 transfer hearing is not a trial on the merits and does not require every investigative thread to be finished so long as the juvenile court had a sufficiently developed record to assess probable cause and community welfare. Because the juvenile court ordered and reviewed a diagnostic study, social evaluation, psychological material, and a full investigation, and because the record supported findings of probable cause, violent and willful conduct, use of a deadly weapon, and serious doubt about rehabilitation through juvenile services, the appellate court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient and that the transfer order was not an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a statute requires the trial court to consider specific factors and court-ordered evaluations, appellate courts usually focus on whether the existing record gave the judge a legally sufficient basis to make the required findings—not on whether every possible piece of evidence had been gathered. To challenge a discretionary ruling successfully, tie any missing evidence to a specific statutory finding and show why the current record cannot support that finding."
In re Kurtis Schmidt and In re Ashley Lynn Schmidt
COA05
In this original proceeding, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that stalking protective orders issued under Chapter 7B of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure are final, appealable orders when they dispose of all parties and all issues in the protective-order case. The relators tried to attack the orders by mandamus, but the court applied ordinary mandamus principles, relied on Cooke’s finality analysis for protective orders, and extended that reasoning to Chapter 7B proceedings because they are civil in nature and procedurally governed through Title 4 of the Family Code. Because the relators had an adequate remedy by direct appeal, and did not show the orders were void, mandamus was unavailable even though they missed the appellate deadline. The court denied mandamus relief and denied the requested stays as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat every final protective order—including Chapter 7B stalking orders—as immediately appealable. In family-law cases, do not assume mandamus can rescue a missed appeal; unless the order is truly void, direct appeal is the required path."
In the Interest of H.J.L. a/k/a H.J.H., a Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of a father’s parental rights after evidence showed he repeatedly sexually abused his child over several years. The court focused on Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), holding that the multi-year abuse constituted a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangered the child’s physical and emotional well-being. The court relied on the child’s outcry, therapist testimony about grooming, coercion, escalation, and trauma, and evidence of PTSD, depression, self-harm, and a suicide attempt. The same evidence, along with the child’s wish for no contact, progress in foster care, lack of safe family placement, and the ad litem’s recommendation, also supported the best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2).
Litigation Takeaway
"Sexual abuse evidence is powerful endangerment evidence in Texas family cases, not just CPS cases. When the record shows a sustained pattern of abuse, grooming, coercion, and resulting trauma, courts will support strong protective rulings—including termination, no-contact orders, supervised access, and sole conservatorship—even without a criminal conviction. Build the record through outcry, therapist, placement, and trauma evidence; noncooperation by the accused parent can further strengthen the endangerment and best-interest case."
Gray v. Beck
COA03
In Gray v. Beck, an heirship dispute turned on whether Jane Gray was Robert Beck’s informal spouse under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2). Gray offered evidence that they lived together in Texas and may have privately considered themselves married, but Matthew Beck moved for no-evidence summary judgment arguing there was insufficient proof of the required elements. The Third Court of Appeals held that an informal-marriage claim requires legally sufficient evidence of agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others in Texas as married. The court concluded the record lacked more than a scintilla of evidence on the key holding-out element, and it also rejected Gray’s notice complaint because the amended summary-judgment motion merely clarified existing grounds rather than adding new ones. The court affirmed summary judgment and the heirship judgment declaring Robert unmarried at death.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your case depends on proving an informal marriage, evidence of living together and a private commitment is not enough. You need concrete proof that the couple publicly represented themselves in Texas as married—through witnesses, documents, or consistent public conduct—or the claim may be defeated on no-evidence summary judgment."
Roland Joseph Seymour v. Sharee Walker
COA14
In Seymour v. Walker, the father appealed the denial of his Chapter 157 enforcement motion seeking contempt, make-up possession, sanctions, and fees for alleged violations of a possession order. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction over the contempt portion because contempt rulings are not reviewable by direct appeal. It further held that the request for additional possession under Family Code section 157.168 became moot when the child turned eighteen during the appeal, leaving no live controversy over possession or access. The court also rejected the argument that a fee request under section 157.167 preserved jurisdiction, explaining that the statute mandates fees only after a finding of noncompliance, which Seymour never obtained before mootness attached. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a possession-enforcement case is approaching a child’s eighteenth birthday, move fast: make-up possession claims can become moot on appeal once the child turns eighteen. And a bare request for fees under Family Code section 157.167 will not keep the case alive unless the movant already obtained a finding of noncompliance. Also, denial of contempt relief generally cannot be challenged by direct appeal."
John Martin Charles Bailey v. The State of Texas
COA10
In Bailey, the appellant challenged a revocation order based on an alleged due-process problem tied to testimony about one contested violation, but he did not challenge his pleas of true to five other alleged violations. The court applied the rule that any single independent ground can support revocation and that a plea of true alone is sufficient. Because Bailey’s admitted violations were independent of the complained-of testimony and unaffected by the alleged error, the court held the revocation order had to be affirmed. The court also noted that once supervision is revoked, the trial court may impose the original suspended sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a trial court’s ruling rests on multiple independent grounds, an appeal that attacks only one ground may fail even if that complaint has merit. In family law cases involving enforcement, modification, protective orders, or overlapping findings, lawyers must preserve error and challenge every independent basis that could support the order."
Jean Michel Szabuniewicz, Individually and in His Capacity as Former Trustee of the Oak Lawn Investment Trust; Oak Lawn General, Inc.; Oak Lawn Holdings I, L.P.; Texas Urban Properties, Ltd.; Texas Urban GP, Inc.; Oak Lawn Medical Properties, L.P.; Willow Park Construction, Inc.; and Guaranty Finance Company v. Todd May, in His Capacity as Trustee of the Beverly Trust
COA02
In this restricted appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed a no-answer default judgment because the face of the record showed multiple service defects under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 99 and 107. The plaintiff obtained default relief against an individual and several entities, but the returns of service were never separately filed with the clerk before judgment and appeared only as attachments to the default motion. The court also found strict-compliance problems because the petition, citations, and returns did not match as to the registered agent, the person actually served, and the service addresses. Applying the rule that no presumptions favor valid service in a restricted appeal and that actual notice does not cure defective service, the court held the record did not affirmatively establish proper service. The default judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you plan to take a default judgment, build the service record for appellate review. In Texas family cases, even small mismatches in names, capacities, agents, or addresses—or a return that is not actually filed with the clerk—can undo a default on restricted appeal, regardless of actual notice."