Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
In re Cristina Gallegos Ortega
COA13
In this original proceeding, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals held that a Hidalgo County trial court improperly used temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA to order a child returned from Texas to Mexico. The father alleged the child had always lived in Mexico, that Mexican custody proceedings were already pending, and that concerns existed about the child’s tourist-visa status, school enrollment, the mother’s immigration status, and criminal allegations tied to the child’s removal from Mexico. The appellate court concluded those facts did not show abandonment, mistreatment, abuse, or an immediate threat to the child as required by Texas Family Code § 152.204. Because emergency jurisdiction cannot be used as a substitute for home-state jurisdiction or to accomplish a merits-based transfer of possession, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its emergency order and writ of attachment.
Litigation Takeaway
"UCCJEA emergency jurisdiction is narrow and requires evidence of a real, immediate danger to the child—not wrongful removal allegations, immigration concerns, or a desire to return the child to the home-state forum. In cross-border custody cases, Texas courts cannot use § 152.204 as a shortcut to decide possession when another country is the child’s home state and no actual emergency is proven."
In re G.M.
COA02
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Section 156.102 is triggered by the date a modification petition is filed, not the date the hearing occurs. Father filed within one year of the prior order and sought to change the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence, so he was required to file a sufficient supporting affidavit. After the trial court found the affidavit insufficient, Section 156.102(c) required it to deny the requested relief and refuse to proceed. By nevertheless conducting an evidentiary hearing and entering temporary orders, the trial court abused its discretion. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you seek to change primary residence within one year of the last order, the affidavit requirement is a hard gatekeeper. The key date is the filing date, and once a court finds the affidavit insufficient, it cannot simply go forward with a hearing anyway. For movants, draft a fact-specific affidavit that tracks the statute; for respondents, press for an early ruling and preserve error if the court proceeds despite an insufficiency finding."
Lartigue v. Farias
COA01
In Lartigue v. Farias, the First Court of Appeals held that a civil stalking claim under Chapter 85 was not subject to dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act. The dispute arose after Lartigue, in the context of separate unauthorized-practice litigation, sent repeated emails and placed repeated calls to attorney Farias that included abusive language, threats, and statements implying an in-person confrontation. Lartigue argued the communications were protected because they related to pending litigation and thus involved free speech and petitioning. The court rejected that framing and focused on the gravamen of the live claim: threatening, harassing, repeated conduct that allegedly caused fear and disrupted Farias’s work. Because the stalking claim was based on alleged intimidation rather than protected speech or petitioning activity, the TCPA did not apply at step one, so the court affirmed denial of the motion to dismiss without reaching prima facie proof or defenses.
Litigation Takeaway
"Not every communication connected to a lawsuit is TCPA-protected. When the real target of the claim is repeated threats, harassment, stalking, or intimidation, courts may stop the TCPA analysis at step one. In family-law cases, that makes pleading and framing critical: emphasize the coercive conduct, unwanted contacts, escalation, and safety impact—not just the fact that the parties were already in litigation."
Michael Colbert v. State of Texas
COA12
In Colbert v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals upheld an assault/family-violence conviction even though the complainant later recanted and signed an affidavit of non-prosecution. The defendant argued on appeal that trying the case the day after he elected to represent himself violated Article 1.051(e) and due process, but the court held that complaint was not preserved because he did not object, request a continuance, or otherwise raise the issue in the trial court; in fact, he stated he was ready to proceed. On the merits, the court applied the Jackson legal-sufficiency standard and deferred to the factfinder’s credibility determinations, concluding that the complainant’s 911 statements, her similar statements to the responding officer, and the defendant’s own admission that he may have hit her with the television were sufficient to support the finding of bodily injury despite her later recantation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Recantation does not erase family-violence evidence, and preservation matters. In family-law cases, judges may credit contemporaneous 911 calls, officer testimony, and party admissions over a later walk-back, so lawyers should gather and present that evidence early. And if notice or due-process problems arise in a rushed hearing, counsel must object, request specific relief, and make a record immediately or the complaint may be lost on appeal."
Harolyn Graves-Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this aggravated-assault family-violence appeal, the defendant argued the trial court wrongly excluded handwritten letters and prison messages allegedly sent by the complainant that she wanted to use to impeach him and to show the nature of their relationship under article 38.371. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion because the defense did not properly authenticate the communications and did not satisfy Texas Rule of Evidence 613 by confronting the complainant with the specific statements before offering the writings as extrinsic impeachment evidence. The court also explained that article 38.371 does not override ordinary evidentiary requirements, so unauthenticated and unsupported relationship evidence may still be excluded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texts, jail messages, emails, and letters can be powerful family-violence evidence, but only if counsel lays the foundation. Authenticate the communication, connect it to the witness, give context, and if using it for impeachment, confront the witness with the exact statement first. Article 38.371 and broad “relationship evidence” arguments will not rescue sloppy predicate work."
Vera v. State
COA03
In Vera v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals affirmed exclusion of a defense psychologist’s proposed testimony that stress-induced “fight-or-flight” physiology and alcohol effects reduced the defendant’s culpable mental state during a fatal bar fight. The court held the expert was qualified, but her opinions were too general and did not meaningfully connect the science to whether Vera intentionally or knowingly stabbed the victims; the testimony also risked confusing the jury by effectively smuggling voluntary-intoxication evidence in as a defense. The court further held that Vera was not entitled to a sudden-passion instruction because the escalating confrontation and intervening events did not amount to adequate cause that would render an ordinary person incapable of cool reflection.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases involving family violence, child abuse, or coercive conduct, expert testimony about trauma, dysregulation, or “fight-or-flight” must be tightly tied to a specific legal issue and the party-specific facts. Generalized psychology that merely reframes intentional conduct as reactive can be excluded as unhelpful, confusing, or an improper excuse narrative."
K.C. v. D.R.
COA02
In K.C. v. D.R., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a protective order entered against a father’s romantic partner after the child’s mother alleged threatening conduct, including an encounter involving a ski mask and baseball bat during a custody-related dispute. The court rejected the respondent’s argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction or misapplied Family Code Chapter 71, explaining that Section 71.0021 can cover violence or threats directed at a person because of that person’s dating relationship with a shared third party; the applicant and respondent do not have to have dated each other. The court also rejected complaints about due process, evidentiary rulings, defensive theories, and overbreadth because they were inadequately preserved, inadequately briefed, or unsupported by accurate authority and record citations. The court ultimately held that the protective order was properly issued and emphasized that pro se litigants must comply with the same appellate briefing and preservation rules as attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
"Chapter 71 protective orders can reach threats by a parent’s current partner against the other parent even when those two people never dated each other, so long as the conduct fits the statute’s third-party dating-violence language. For litigators, the bigger lesson is procedural: preserve every complaint, tie it to the record and the statute, and brief it accurately—Texas appellate courts will not rescue unsupported or sloppy arguments, even from pro se parties."
In the Interest of E.T., E.T., E.T., and E.D., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s rights to four children and the father’s rights to one child, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support best-interest findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court analyzed the Holley best-interest factors through the parents’ history of endangering conduct, emphasizing that the mother’s partial service-plan compliance did not outweigh a failed monitored return and cocaine-positive tests for both her and one child, and that the father’s federal drug conviction and incarceration supported findings of continuing instability and inability to parent. Giving deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the court held the trial judge could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas best-interest litigation, partial compliance with services is not enough if the larger record shows relapse, criminal conduct, poor judgment, or instability. A failed monitored return, positive drug tests during reunification, and incarceration for serious drug offenses can outweigh favorable evidence and are powerful predictors of future risk."
Jason Murray Davis and Davis & Santos, P.C. v. Graham Weston; Carowest Land Ltd.; Graham Weston as Trustee of Countyline Land Trust; and Kuehler Road, LLC f/k/a Kuehler Road, Ltd.
COA03
In this divorce-related crossover dispute, the Austin Court of Appeals held that former clients’ claims against their longtime lawyer and his firm for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud by nondisclosure could proceed despite a TCPA motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs alleged the lawyer had represented Graham Weston, related family entities, and other family interests over many years, then switched sides and represented Graham’s wife in the divorce while using trust and confidential information gained from those prior relationships. The court analyzed the case as a substantive conflict-and-loyalty dispute rather than merely an attack on protected petitioning or litigation conduct. Relying on the record, including prior disqualification findings that described the lawyer as effectively a family attorney with fiduciary duties to Graham, the court concluded the suit was not subject to TCPA dismissal on the record presented and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In entity-heavy divorces, a lawyer’s prior work for one spouse, family businesses, trusts, or the broader family enterprise can create fiduciary-duty exposure that survives early dismissal. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a strong record on the practical scope of prior representation and frame conflict claims as loyalty, confidentiality, and nondisclosure violations—not just complaints about litigation activity."
Dillon v. Bamford
COA03
In Dillon v. Bamford, the Austin Court of Appeals largely affirmed the trial court’s refusal to modify conservatorship, holding the father did not prove a material and substantial change in circumstances that would justify giving him the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence or broader tie-breaking authority. The court emphasized the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, the conflicting evidence about parental conflict and safety concerns, and the guardian ad litem’s testimony that both parents were active, both homes were generally safe, and the children wanted the schedule to remain the same. But the court reversed the enforcement ruling on the parties’ agreed tax-dependency provision, concluding the trial court improperly rewrote the decree by shifting the father’s right to claim the children from 2019 to 2026 instead of enforcing the unambiguous odd-year allocation as written. The court affirmed the denial of enforcement as to tax year 2021 because the father failed to present sufficient proof of that alleged violation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Modification cases need concrete proof of a material change affecting the children, not just evidence of coparenting conflict or isolated parenting problems. And in enforcement proceedings, courts must enforce unambiguous decree language as written—especially tax-allocation provisions—but the movant still has to prove the violation with competent evidence year by year."