Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In re Environment Plus, Inc., R. Alexander Conant, and Joshua Eames-Cepero
COA03
In this mandamus proceeding, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a trial court in a garnishment case could not impose Rule 13 or Chapter 10 sanctions for allegedly sanctionable pleadings filed earlier in a separate contract case. The court analyzed sanctions jurisdiction as proceeding-specific, not dispute-specific, and concluded that once the original case was separate—and its sanctions request had already been dismissed after plenary power expired—the garnishment action could not be used to revive sanctions authority over filings from that prior cause. The portions of the sanctions order tied to the earlier contract suit were therefore void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and were vacated by conditional mandamus. The court denied mandamus as to sanctions based on conduct within the garnishment proceeding itself because those complaints were not jurisdictional and the relators failed to make the evidentiary showing required to prove that immediate payment would so impair litigation that appeal was inadequate.
Litigation Takeaway
"Sanctions under Rule 13 and Chapter 10 must be sought in the same cause number where the challenged filing occurred. In family-law practice, courts and lawyers cannot bundle conduct from a divorce, modification, enforcement, turnover, or garnishment matter into one later sanctions order just because the disputes involve the same parties. If a court sanctions conduct from a separate proceeding, that portion of the order is vulnerable as void and mandamus may be the fastest fix."
Williams v. Nunnally-Williams
COA04
In Williams v. Nunnally-Williams, the former wife sought to enforce a divorce decree awarding her part of the husband’s thrift savings plan after she discovered most of the funds had been withdrawn before transfer. The husband argued the suit was barred by Family Code section 9.003(a)’s two-year deadline and filed a plea to the jurisdiction. The court rejected that approach, holding section 9.003(a) is not jurisdictional because the statute contains no clear statement tying timely filing to the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Instead, it is a limitations defense that must be pleaded and proved as an affirmative defense. Even treating the husband’s plea as a summary-judgment motion under Rule 71, the court held he failed to conclusively prove that section 9.003(a) applied to the wife’s constructive-trust and breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims or that the property fit the statute’s scope. The court affirmed the judgment for the wife.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not use Family Code section 9.003 as a plea-to-the-jurisdiction shortcut in post-divorce property enforcement cases. If you want to rely on it, plead limitations, use the correct procedural vehicle, and bring evidence proving the statute applies to each claim and each type of property at issue."
M.B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In M.B. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the Third Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court order terminating a father’s parental rights to two children after appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no meritorious issues for appeal. The court independently reviewed the entire record, as required in Anders cases, and specifically examined the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) because those findings carry collateral consequences in future parent-child litigation. Finding no nonfrivolous issue as to the predicate grounds, best-interest finding, or any other aspect of the decree, the court affirmed. The court also denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding under In re P.M. that appointed counsel’s duties continue through any proceedings in the Supreme Court of Texas, including filing an Anders-compliant petition for review if requested by the client.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even when an appeal appears hopeless, Texas termination cases require careful record review and special attention to endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E), because those findings can affect future family-law cases. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to fully develop and preserve the record on child-endangerment allegations; for appointed appellate counsel, filing an Anders brief does not end the representation."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Kara Bagley and Jason Bagley and in the Interest of J.B. and K.B., Children
COA12
In Bagley, the Tyler Court of Appeals reversed a child-support award because the trial court set Jason Bagley’s net monthly resources at $7,237.18 without any evidence of his actual income. The record showed only that he was employed and paid certain expenses, but it did not include pay stubs, tax returns, employer records, or testimony quantifying wages or other income under Texas Family Code § 154.062. The court held that monthly expenses and isolated payments cannot be used to reverse-engineer net resources. It distinguished cases allowing expense evidence to impeach reported income when actual income evidence already exists, and concluded that using expenses as a substitute for statutory resource proof was an abuse of discretion. The child-support portion of the decree was reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not expect a court to infer child-support income from lifestyle or expense evidence alone. To support a guideline award, put actual § 154.062 resource evidence in the record—or expressly proceed under the minimum-wage presumption in § 154.068 if income proof is unavailable."
In the Interest of A.V.
COA04
In In the Interest of A.V., the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights. The dispute on appeal was whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination, especially under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E), which requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being. The court analyzed the father’s repeated domestic violence against the mother, failure to complete core court-ordered services, refusal or failure to submit to drug testing, inconsistent participation in intervention programs, and minimal visitation with the child as a single pattern of endangering conduct rather than isolated shortcomings. It held that this cumulative evidence, together with the child’s stability in a relative placement and the father’s weak bond with the child, was sufficient to support subsection (E), best interest, and the judgment terminating his parental rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pattern beats piecemeal explanations. In Texas family-law cases, repeated domestic violence, missed services, skipped drug tests, and weak parent-child contact can be woven into one persuasive endangerment narrative. Lawyers seeking restrictions or termination should present these facts cumulatively; lawyers defending against them must build documented compliance and engagement early, because courts will not excuse each problem in isolation when the overall record shows instability and disengagement."
Ronald White v. The State of Texas
COA07
In White v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a defendant who had preserved hearsay objections to a child’s recorded outcry lost those complaints by later telling the trial court “no objection” when the recording was formally offered before the jury. The court applied Texas preservation rules, especially Dean v. State and Thomas v. State, and concluded the record did not plainly show that counsel’s statement was merely procedural or not intended as abandonment. The court also held that a vague reference to “unfair prejudice” did not preserve a Rule 403 complaint and that an appellate challenge to outcry testimony failed because it did not match the objections made at trial. The court therefore rejected the evidentiary complaints on preservation grounds rather than reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Preservation can be lost at the moment evidence is admitted. In family law trials, if you object pretrial or outside the factfinder’s presence, do not later say “no objection” when the exhibit is offered unless you intend to waive the issue. Renew the objection, obtain a running objection, or clearly state the exhibit is admitted subject to your prior objection. Also, state Rule 403 specifically and make sure your appellate argument matches your trial objection."
In the Interest of B.R.M. and M.M.M., Children
COA07
In this SAPCR modification appeal after a jury trial, the mother challenged the evidence supporting an order naming the father sole managing conservator and awarding attorney’s fees against her. The Amarillo Court of Appeals focused first on preservation, explaining that after a jury trial a legal-sufficiency complaint must be preserved through a recognized vehicle such as a directed-verdict motion, JNOV, charge objection, motion to disregard, or a motion for new trial specifically raising no-evidence grounds. Although the mother filed a post-judgment motion for reconsideration, the court held that even if treated as a motion for new trial, it was too general and did not specifically assert legal insufficiency, so the complaint was not preserved. The court also held she failed to show harmful error regarding juror questions and alleged inattentiveness, and that her factual-sufficiency and attorney’s-fee complaints were inadequately briefed. The modification order and fee award were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-law case is tried to a jury, do not assume you can raise a no-evidence complaint for the first time on appeal. Preserve legal sufficiency with a specific directed-verdict motion, charge objection, JNOV, motion to disregard, or motion for new trial that clearly identifies the challenged finding and says why the evidence is legally insufficient; a generic motion to reconsider will not do the job."
Price v. Clayborn
COA01
In Price v. Clayborn, a former husband filed a pleading labeled as a bill of review to attack post-divorce enforcement and receivership orders involving the former marital residence. The court looked past the title of the filing and analyzed its substance, concluding it was not a true bill of review because it did not seek to set aside the final divorce decree; instead, it sought only to undo later post-judgment orders allegedly inconsistent with the decree and MSA. Once characterized as a motion to set aside post-judgment orders, the appeal failed because denial of that type of motion is not independently appealable, and any direct appeal from the June 4, 2024 receiver and enforcement orders was untimely. The First Court of Appeals dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In post-divorce property cases, the label on your pleading does not control—the relief you actually seek does. If you are challenging an enforcement or receivership order rather than the divorce decree itself, use the correct procedural vehicle and meet the appellate deadline tied to that order, or you may lose the case on jurisdiction before the court ever reaches the merits."
In the Estate of Victoria B. Kubiak, Deceased
COA01
In a probate will contest, the court held that the contestant had “possession, custody, or control” of the decedent’s medical and pharmacy records because Texas statutes gave him a legal right to obtain them from the providers, even though the records were physically held by third parties. The First Court of Appeals analyzed Rule 192.7(b) together with Estates Code sections 55.101 and 55.102 and Occupations Code section 159.003(a)(8), concluding that legal access is enough to create a production duty. The court also found that the contestant waived any contrary objection by not timely asserting lack of control and that pending third-party subpoenas did not excuse nonproduction. It affirmed the trial court’s $7,727 attorney’s-fee sanction for repeated failure to comply with discovery requests and court orders.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party has a legal right to obtain records, Texas discovery law may treat those records as within that party’s control even when a third party physically holds them. In family-law cases, do not assume subpoenas replace party-production duties, and raise any true lack-of-control objection specifically and on time or risk waiver and sanctions."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Michelle DeJean and Robert Dean DeJean, Jr.
COA05
In this Dallas divorce appeal, the husband challenged several parts of the decree, including an award of contingent appellate attorney’s fees to the wife. The court affirmed the trial court’s property division, waste findings, and treatment of trial-level fees, but it separately analyzed whether the evidence supported conditional appellate fees. Applying Rohrmoos and Yowell, the court held that testimony giving only bottom-line amounts for an unsuccessful appeal and Supreme Court review was conclusory because it did not explain the expected appellate work, hours, rates, or other Arthur Andersen reasonableness factors. Because the evidence was legally insufficient, the court reversed the contingent appellate fee award and rendered a take-nothing judgment on those fees while otherwise affirming the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want contingent appellate fees in a family-law judgment, do not offer only a lump-sum number. Build a record with opinion testimony showing the anticipated appellate tasks, projected hours, rates, and why each stage-specific fee is reasonable and necessary under Arthur Andersen, or the fee award is vulnerable to reversal and rendition."