Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
In the Interest of D.J., a Child
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights to D.J. As to Mother, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), a prior endangerment-based termination finding under subsection (M), and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on a pattern of evidence, including Mother’s prior endangerment termination history, the child’s positive drug test, Mother’s own positive hair-follicle test, missed testing, instability in housing and supervision, failure to know the child’s whereabouts, and inconsistent visitation. The court also rejected Mother’s argument that an earlier letter ruling controlled over the final judgment, reiterating that the signed order governs. As to Father, the court accepted appointed counsel’s Anders brief, conducted an independent review, found no nonfrivolous appellate issue, and affirmed termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family courts decide endangerment and best-interest disputes by looking at the whole pattern, not isolated recent improvements. Positive drug tests, missed tests, instability, prior CPS history, and inconsistent contact can combine to support severe relief, while informal letter rulings or oral pronouncements do not override the signed order."
Harolyn Graves-Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA14
In this aggravated-assault family-violence appeal, the defendant argued the trial court wrongly excluded handwritten letters and prison messages allegedly sent by the complainant that she wanted to use to impeach him and to show the nature of their relationship under article 38.371. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion because the defense did not properly authenticate the communications and did not satisfy Texas Rule of Evidence 613 by confronting the complainant with the specific statements before offering the writings as extrinsic impeachment evidence. The court also explained that article 38.371 does not override ordinary evidentiary requirements, so unauthenticated and unsupported relationship evidence may still be excluded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texts, jail messages, emails, and letters can be powerful family-violence evidence, but only if counsel lays the foundation. Authenticate the communication, connect it to the witness, give context, and if using it for impeachment, confront the witness with the exact statement first. Article 38.371 and broad “relationship evidence” arguments will not rescue sloppy predicate work."
In re O.L.M., a Child
COA01
In In re O.L.M., a Child, the mother tried to directly appeal temporary orders entered in a suit to modify the parent-child relationship. The First Court of Appeals treated the issue as purely jurisdictional and explained that Texas appellate courts may review interlocutory orders only when a statute expressly permits it. Relying on Texas Family Code section 105.001(e), Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 51.014, and prior cases, the court held that temporary SAPCR modification orders are not subject to interlocutory appeal. Because the mother used a notice of appeal instead of the proper potential vehicle of mandamus, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the merits.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume an urgent temporary custody or SAPCR modification order can be appealed immediately. In Texas, temporary modification orders are generally not directly appealable, so lawyers should analyze appellate jurisdiction first, preserve a mandamus-ready record, and move quickly on mandamus if immediate review is truly necessary."
Dillon v. Bamford
COA03
In Dillon v. Bamford, the Austin Court of Appeals largely affirmed the trial court’s refusal to modify conservatorship, holding the father did not prove a material and substantial change in circumstances that would justify giving him the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence or broader tie-breaking authority. The court emphasized the deferential abuse-of-discretion standard, the conflicting evidence about parental conflict and safety concerns, and the guardian ad litem’s testimony that both parents were active, both homes were generally safe, and the children wanted the schedule to remain the same. But the court reversed the enforcement ruling on the parties’ agreed tax-dependency provision, concluding the trial court improperly rewrote the decree by shifting the father’s right to claim the children from 2019 to 2026 instead of enforcing the unambiguous odd-year allocation as written. The court affirmed the denial of enforcement as to tax year 2021 because the father failed to present sufficient proof of that alleged violation.
Litigation Takeaway
"Modification cases need concrete proof of a material change affecting the children, not just evidence of coparenting conflict or isolated parenting problems. And in enforcement proceedings, courts must enforce unambiguous decree language as written—especially tax-allocation provisions—but the movant still has to prove the violation with competent evidence year by year."
In the Interest of M.H.E., a Child
COA02
In a pending SAPCR, Mother tried to appeal a trial court order requiring mediation and dispute resolution. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the order was appealable under Texas jurisdictional rules, explaining that direct appeals generally lie only from final judgments or from interlocutory orders made appealable by statute. Because the mediation order did not dispose of all parties and claims, the SAPCR remained pending, and no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal from this type of case-management order, the court held it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don’t assume an unfavorable family-law procedure order can be appealed right away. Mediation and other case-management orders are usually not appealable unless they are part of a final judgment or a statute expressly allows interlocutory review; if immediate relief is necessary, mandamus—not direct appeal—is often the proper vehicle."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Jesus Gregorio Lopez and Isela Flores Richardson
COA13
In this divorce appeal, the wife argued she lacked notice that a May 7 hearing would serve as the final trial and complained that the court ruled on disputed property issues without live testimony, based instead on attorney proffer and documents. The Thirteenth Court rejected those arguments because the record showed the case was orally set for trial on May 7, wife’s counsel acknowledged that understanding at the hearing, and the parties expressly agreed to proceed by proffer with documentary review. The court also found no reversible error regarding alleged post-hearing exhibits, a late-filed amended pleading, relief awarded in the decree, or findings and conclusions, and it affirmed the divorce decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you agree on the record to try a divorce case by proffer, stipulation, and documents, you usually cannot wait until the judge seems unconvinced and then demand a full evidentiary hearing. Family-law lawyers should clarify whether a setting is final, object clearly to any late amendments or procedure they oppose, and preserve the record before agreeing to an informal trial format."
In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B.
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights after an independent Anders review found no nonfrivolous appellate issues. The court nevertheless specifically analyzed Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) under In re N.G., relying on evidence of severe abuse in the home, the father’s failure to accept responsibility, unresolved safety concerns despite service completion, and the absence of any therapeutic support for reunification. The court also held that appointed counsel in a parental-rights appeal may not withdraw merely because an Anders brief was filed; under In re P.M., counsel must show independent good cause to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination appeals, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) will get specific appellate review even in an Anders case, so trial counsel must build a record on abuse, exposure, accountability, and actual remediation—not just service completion. Appointed appellate counsel should also expect to remain on the case through any petition-for-review stage unless they can show good cause beyond filing an Anders brief."
In the Interest of E.T., E.T., E.T., and E.D., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s rights to four children and the father’s rights to one child, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support best-interest findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court analyzed the Holley best-interest factors through the parents’ history of endangering conduct, emphasizing that the mother’s partial service-plan compliance did not outweigh a failed monitored return and cocaine-positive tests for both her and one child, and that the father’s federal drug conviction and incarceration supported findings of continuing instability and inability to parent. Giving deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the court held the trial judge could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas best-interest litigation, partial compliance with services is not enough if the larger record shows relapse, criminal conduct, poor judgment, or instability. A failed monitored return, positive drug tests during reunification, and incarceration for serious drug offenses can outweigh favorable evidence and are powerful predictors of future risk."
Khandria v. Al-Muslim
COA14
In Khandria v. Al-Muslim, the father sought to modify a prior SAPCR/divorce decree that gave him no specific possession or access, arguing the original decree effectively gave the mother unchecked control and that circumstances had materially changed because she was now somewhat open to reunification. The Fourteenth Court first held that this argument was an improper collateral attack on the original decree: any defect in the decree was non-jurisdictional, making the decree at most voidable and subject to direct appeal, not later repair through modification. On the merits, the court held the evidence did not require findings of a material and substantial change or present best interest under Family Code section 156.101. The mother’s testimony showed only cautious, therapy-based openness while continuing to express concerns about the child’s loss of trust, and the father’s reluctance to commit to therapeutic recommendations undercut his request for immediate access. The court also affirmed denial of the father’s request to reduce child support because the record showed assets and earning capacity despite his claimed setbacks.
Litigation Takeaway
"A modification case is not a do-over for errors in the original decree. If the real complaint is that the prior order was legally defective, that issue usually must be raised by direct appeal. And in access-modification cases, vague evidence that a parent’s attitude has softened is not enough—lawyers need concrete proof of post-decree change and a child-centered reunification plan, especially when the relationship has been fractured for years."
In the Interest of C.F., a Child
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights, concluding legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the child’s best interest under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that the parents used methamphetamine while caring for the infant, the child himself tested positive for methamphetamine, there were domestic-violence concerns, the home environment was unstable and unsafe, and the father later violated community supervision, was incarcerated, failed to complete services, and offered only a speculative post-release plan. Applying the Holley best-interest framework and sufficiency standards, the court held the trial court could reasonably infer ongoing danger and lack of stability from the father’s past and present conduct.
Litigation Takeaway
"Courts give heavy weight to concrete evidence of child endangerment—especially drug exposure, domestic violence, criminal instability, unsafe housing, and failure to complete services—and they may use past conduct to predict future risk. In any custody or termination case, promises of future improvement usually will not overcome a documented record of recent instability unless backed by credible, verifiable proof of rehabilitation, housing, employment, and safety."