Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Chang Qing Tan v. Michelle Moore
COA05
In Tan v. Moore, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a defendant’s special appearance because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a requires strict compliance: the special appearance must be sworn or properly verified. The defendant argued he lived in China and lacked sufficient Texas contacts, and he later attached his daughter’s affidavit describing his move and lack of Texas ties. But neither the original nor supplemental special appearance was sworn, and the affidavit did not verify that the allegations in the special appearance were true and correct. Relying on Dawson-Austin and Dallas precedent, the court held the defect was fatal and affirmed without reaching the underlying personal-jurisdiction analysis.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge personal jurisdiction in Texas, get the Rule 120a mechanics exactly right. An unsworn special appearance is ineffective, and even strong no-contacts evidence will not matter unless the motion itself is sworn or expressly verified by an affidavit or declaration adopting its allegations as true and correct. For family lawyers, this is a procedural knockout tool in interstate and international divorce, custody, modification, and enforcement cases."
Hernandez v. State
COA04
In Hernandez v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support aggravated sexual assault of a child despite some inconsistencies in the child’s statements and a largely nonspecific SANE exam. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Texas authority on penetration, the court concluded the jury could credit the child’s reports that Hernandez touched “inside” her vagina, that it hurt, and that the contact occurred inside her underwear, which was enough to support the penetration element. The court also held any Confrontation Clause complaint about limits on cross-examination of the mother was not preserved because counsel did not make a clear constitutional objection or offer of proof. Finally, the court reversed and remanded Count II for a new punishment hearing because the 35-year sentence for indecency with a child by contact exceeded the lawful second-degree felony range of 2 to 20 years.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-abuse-driven custody or protective-order litigation, imperfect child outcry testimony and a normal or equivocal SANE exam do not automatically defeat the allegation; those issues usually go to weight and credibility. But if you want to challenge alternative-causation limits or other evidentiary restrictions on appeal, preserve error precisely with specific objections and an offer of proof."
Stowe v. State
COA09
In Stowe v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that article 38.371 allowed the State to introduce evidence of the abusive nature of the relationship between Stowe and the complainant, including prior assaultive conduct and a prior no-contact order, in a family-violence prosecution. The defense argued the evidence was improper Rule 404(b) propensity evidence, but the court concluded it served a noncharacter purpose because it explained the complainant’s fear, recantation, affidavit of nonprosecution, and inconsistent statements after the defense attacked her credibility. The court affirmed, holding that admission of the relationship-history evidence was not reversible error on this record.
Litigation Takeaway
"When recantation, resumed contact, or inconsistent statements are at issue, prior abuse and no-contact-order evidence can be admissible as contextual proof of fear, coercion, and relationship dynamics—not just as bad-acts evidence. Family-law litigators should tie the evidence to a specific noncharacter purpose and, if opposing it, press for Rule 403 balancing, narrowing, and limiting instructions rather than relying on a generic 404(b) objection."
American Zurich Insurance Company v. Mark Carrera
COA04
In American Zurich Insurance Company v. Carrera, the claimant tried to expand an accepted workplace injury from a wrist and lumbar fracture to include a hip fracture, closed head injury, traumatic brain injury, hallucinations, and lifetime benefits based on alleged incurable insanity. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that these were medically complex conditions requiring competent expert medical testimony on diagnosis, causation, and disability. The claimant’s proof—family-member observations, temporal proximity, and two unsupported doctor letters—was legally insufficient, and the letters were also treated as hearsay. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and rendered judgment affirming the agency decision denying the expanded injury findings and lifetime income benefits.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party wants a Texas court to make findings about complex medical or psychiatric conditions, lay testimony and generic doctor letters are not enough. In family cases involving TBI, PTSD, psychosis, abuse-related diagnoses, incapacity, or inability to work, Carrera is a strong gatekeeping case for requiring qualified expert testimony that actually connects diagnosis, causation, and functional impact."
In the Interest of W.J.G.G., a Child
COA04
In In re W.J.G.G., the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a termination order could not stand where the evidence was factually insufficient on best interest, even though unchallenged predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N) and (P) remained valid. The court analyzed Father’s single positive methamphetamine test, which occurred before the child was conceived, along with his incarceration, service participation, and efforts to maintain contact, and concluded the evidence was legally insufficient to prove endangerment under subsection (E). More importantly, after reviewing the full record under the clear-and-convincing standard, the court held the best-interest evidence was too thin to support a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest. The court affirmed the surviving predicate grounds, reversed the best-interest finding, and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Predicate grounds do not win a termination case by themselves. If you want termination upheld, you must build a separate, child-focused best-interest record showing why termination—not a less restrictive alternative—serves the child’s present and future needs. For parents appealing termination, best interest can remain a strong point even when some predicate grounds survive."
In the Matter of B.F.
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring a 15-year-old charged with capital murder to criminal district court. The court rejected the argument that Family Code § 54.02(a)(3) required findings on both the seriousness of the offense and the child’s background because the statute is disjunctive: transfer may be based on either ground. It also held that the State’s conjunctive pleading did not increase its burden, and that the evidence on the § 54.02(f) factors—including the double homicide, evidence of planning and concealment, B.F.’s sophistication and maturity, and expert testimony that rehabilitation within the juvenile system was unlikely before age nineteen—supported the transfer decision.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a Family Code statute is written in the disjunctive, proving one statutory ground may be enough even if the pleading alleges multiple grounds. For family lawyers, this case is a reminder to track statutory text closely, frame appeals around required statutory elements rather than pleading form, and build a record supporting at least one independently sufficient basis for a discretionary ruling—especially in expert-driven cases where appellate courts defer heavily to the trial court’s credibility calls."
Jaka Janaka v. Rina Sefrin Hutagaol
COA01
In Janaka v. Hutagaol, the father sought to modify the mother’s possession terms only months after a divorce decree based on a mediated settlement agreement, alleging a false CPS report, possession-schedule violations, and interference with the children’s activities. The First Court of Appeals held that Family Code section 156.101(a)(1) requires proof of a threshold material and substantial change in circumstances since the earlier of the prior order or the underlying MSA, and that disputed evidence of post-decree conflict did not require the trial court to find such a change. Because the trial court was entitled to credit the mother’s explanation for contacting CPS and to treat the parties’ disputes as ordinary continuing conflict rather than a new substantial development, the appellate court affirmed the denial of modification and the attorney’s-fees award based on a finding that the suit was frivolous or designed to harass.
Litigation Takeaway
"A possession modification is not a do-over for co-parenting conflict. If you file soon after an agreed decree, you need concrete, corroborated proof of a genuinely new and material change tied to the statutory baseline date—not just allegations of interference, CPS involvement, or bad motives—or you risk losing and paying the other side’s fees."
McCulloch v. McCulloch
COA03
In McCulloch, the obligor sought to reduce child support and terminate or reduce spousal maintenance based on alleged disability, unemployment, and worsening finances after the divorce decree. The Austin Court of Appeals held that modification under Texas Family Code sections 156.401(a)(1) and 8.057(c) requires proof of a material and substantial change in circumstances since the prior order, and that the movant failed to meet that burden because much of his evidence predated the decree, had already been litigated in earlier proceedings, or did not conclusively prove a post-decree loss of earning capacity. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings and intentional-unemployment finding, the court affirmed the denial of modification, rejected the guideline-support complaint, upheld the denial of continuance, and affirmed the judgment in full.
Litigation Takeaway
"A modification case is not a retrial of the divorce. To change child support or spousal maintenance, the movant must present a clean before-and-after record proving a post-order material and substantial change, backed by objective evidence such as medical records and reliable financial proof. SSA disability findings, client testimony, and general financial strain will not carry the day if the same issues existed before the decree or the trial court doubts credibility."
Patricia Faith Dickinson v. Joshua Thomas Dickinson
COA03
In this SAPCR appeal, the mother argued that the appellate record filed in the court of appeals was incomplete and potentially misleading because important materials had been omitted despite her repeated efforts to obtain them. The Third Court of Appeals did not decide for itself whether the materials existed or belonged in the record. Instead, applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(e)(3), it held that once a post-filing dispute arises over the accuracy or completeness of the record, the proper course is to abate the appeal and remand to the trial court to determine whether the disputed materials exist, are relevant to the appeal, and should be included through supplementation. The court therefore abated and remanded for those factual determinations.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the appellate record in a family-law case is missing key hearings, exhibits, filings, or rulings, do not just complain around the problem. Build a paper trail, file a verified motion, and ask for a TRAP 34.6(e)(3) abatement so the trial court can decide whether the missing items exist, matter, and must be added to the record."
Gonzalez v. State
COA01
In Gonzalez v. State, the First Court of Appeals affirmed admission of a friend’s testimony recounting the complainants’ earlier disclosures of abuse. The defense argued hearsay, but the State invoked Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(1)(B), contending that the defense had implied through voir dire, cross-examination, and closing that the complainants had recently embellished or fabricated their allegations for trial. The court held the complaint was not preserved because the defense did not specifically challenge the rule’s elements after the State identified the basis for admission. On the merits, the court concluded that, under Hammons, the trial court could consider the totality of the defense presentation and reasonably find an implied charge of recent fabrication. Because the prior statements to the friend were made years before the alleged motive to falsify arose, the premotive requirement was satisfied, and the testimony was properly admitted as prior consistent statements.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases involving abuse allegations or litigation-driven credibility fights, be careful when implying that a witness recently tailored testimony for custody, possession, or divorce advantage. That strategy can open the door to earlier consistent statements that would otherwise stay out. If you want to admit such statements, identify the exact motive alleged by the opponent and prove the statement predates it; if you want to exclude them, preserve element-specific objections and avoid turning a reliability attack into an accusation of calculated fabrication."