Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Victoria Trading Company, LLC v. Gurnard
COA08
In a Reeves County mineral-title dispute, successors claiming through a wife argued that her 1920 direct deed conveying separate real property to her husband was void because Texas law supposedly required an intermediary strawman transfer. The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed former Article 1114 and the historical case law, especially Riley v. Wilson, and held that the governing law required only the husband’s joinder and the wife’s privy acknowledgment. Because the deed satisfied those statutory protections, and Riley did not create an extra-statutory strawman requirement, the direct interspousal deed was valid. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment upholding the deed and the title chain through the husband.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an old interspousal deed is under attack, start with the statute in effect when the deed was signed—not modern assumptions or overreadings of old cases. If the historical formalities were satisfied, courts are unlikely to invent extra requirements, which can make title and characterization issues suitable for summary judgment."
In the Interest of T.R.C.
COA09
In In re T.R.C., the Beaumont Court of Appeals considered whether the Department proved the statutory prerequisites for termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(f)(1). The case centered on a medically fragile child with Type 1 diabetes and the Department’s concerns about Mother’s care, but the court refused to rely on generalized safety concerns, voluminous medical records, or adverse impressions in place of element-specific proof. Applying the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, the court held the record did not legally suffice to show that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to Mother or that, despite those efforts, a continuing danger in the home prevented return. The court therefore reversed the termination order and rendered judgment denying termination, and it separately reversed the Department’s permanent managing conservatorship appointment because the trial court failed to make the finding required by Family Code section 153.002(c)(1).
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family-law remedy depends on specific statutory elements, the court cannot fill evidentiary gaps with a difficult record, broad safety narratives, or stacks of medical records. For termination under section 161.001(f)(1), the Department must prove actual reasonable reunification efforts and a continuing danger that still prevents return; for everyone else, the case is a reminder to force element-by-element proof and insist on required statutory findings."
Lydick v. Herrera
COA03
In Lydick v. Herrera, the applicant sought a final protective order after a dating-relationship altercation in which the respondent admitted striking and biting him. The trial court heard conflicting testimony about who started the fight, reviewed body-camera footage, 911 evidence, photos, and other exhibits, and found credible evidence that the applicant was the initial aggressor, that he punched and tried to pin down the respondent, and that her use of force was defensive and necessary to protect herself. Applying Texas Family Code sections 71.004, 81.001, and 85.001, the court of appeals held that defensive measures are excluded from the definition of family violence and that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the denial of the protective order. The appellate court therefore affirmed, emphasizing deference to the trial court’s credibility findings in contested protective-order cases.
Litigation Takeaway
"An admitted strike does not automatically equal family violence. In protective-order litigation, the winning issue may be who was the aggressor and whether the force used was reasonably defensive. Lawyers should build the sequence of events carefully, anchor self-defense or aggression theories in objective evidence like bodycam, 911 calls, and injury photos, and remember that trial-court credibility findings are hard to overturn on appeal."
Flores v. State
COA02
In Flores v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court improperly designated a forensic interviewer as the child’s Article 38.072 outcry witness in a child-sex-assault case. Rather than deciding whether the designation was wrong, the court assumed error and focused on harm. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), the court held any error was nonconstitutional and harmless because the challenged testimony was cumulative of the child complainant’s testimony and the SANE nurse’s similar testimony, including the allegedly important condom detail. The conviction was affirmed because the complained-of outcry evidence did not affect substantial rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, winning the evidentiary objection is only half the battle: if similar child-abuse evidence comes in through other witnesses, records, or the child, an appellate court may treat any error as harmless. Trial lawyers should not only object specifically and preserve error, but also build a record showing why the challenged testimony supplied a unique, outcome-moving fact rather than merely repeating other evidence."
Kelvin Williams v. Houston Housing Authority
COA14
In Williams v. Houston Housing Authority, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed a temporary injunction because the Housing Authority presented no competent evidence at the injunction hearing. Although the applicant referenced pleadings, summary-judgment materials, and counsel’s factual assertions, it offered no sworn testimony and no exhibits were admitted into evidence. Applying Texas temporary-injunction standards, the court held that the movant had to prove a probable right to recovery and a probable, imminent, irreparable injury with evidence actually introduced at the hearing. Attorney argument is not evidence, and affidavits or attachments in the court file do not count unless formally admitted or accepted by agreement. Because the record contained no evidentiary support for the required elements, the trial court abused its discretion. The court reversed, dissolved the injunction, and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"A temporary injunction is only as strong as the hearing record. In family-law cases, do not rely on pleadings, verified motions, affidavits sitting in the file, or lawyer argument alone—put on sworn testimony, offer exhibits, and get them admitted, or the order may be reversed on appeal."
In the Interest of A.S.L., a Child
COA05
In In re A.S.L., the mother challenged the divorce property division under Texas Family Code section 7.001, arguing the trial court failed to adequately account for about $44,000 in post-filing credit-card debt she said she incurred for living expenses and for the father’s alleged use of community funds to reduce roughly $52,000 of his own debt. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied abuse-of-discretion review and focused on whether the appellate record allowed it to measure the effect of the complained-of debt allocations on the overall just-and-right division. Because the decree did not assign values to most assets or liabilities, the record did not establish the value of the community estate as a whole, and no findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested, the court presumed the trial court resolved disputed facts in favor of the decree. The court held mother failed to show any alleged error materially affected the overall division and therefore failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to appeal a Texas divorce property division, testimony about unfair debt allocation is not enough. Build a full valuation record, quantify the estate and the claimed error’s effect on the net division, and request findings of fact and conclusions of law; otherwise, the abuse-of-discretion standard and implied findings will usually defeat the appeal."
Maria Sanchez v. Ysidro Hernandez
COA01
In Sanchez v. Hernandez, the First Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly characterized disputed bail-bond-related properties as each spouse’s separate property held 50/50 as tenants in common after a jury found the properties were not community property and found no fraud on the community. The court emphasized that property possessed during marriage is presumed community property under Texas Family Code section 3.003, and that presumption can be rebutted only by clear and convincing tracing evidence to a recognized separate-property source. Because no evidence showed either spouse acquired the properties as separate property, the trial court had no basis to impose its own separate-property characterization contrary to the verdict. The court reversed the decree and rendered judgment consistent with the jury’s findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas divorce cases, title and informal family explanations are not enough to prove separate property—if you want to overcome the community-property presumption, you need clear, disciplined tracing evidence. And once a jury answers the characterization questions submitted, the trial court cannot invent a new property characterization in the decree just to reach a perceived fair result."
In Re Jessica Acosta
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding arising from a divorce case, the trial court held Jessica Acosta in contempt for failing to make payments required by agreed temporary orders, including monthly business-account distributions and vehicle payments. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the contempt order was void to the extent it punished alleged violations that occurred before October 23, 2025, the date the temporary orders were actually signed. The court explained that contempt can enforce only a written, signed, and operative court order; retroactive due dates in a later-signed order do not create retroactive contempt exposure. Because the trial court imposed a single punishment for multiple alleged violations, most of which were based on pre-signing conduct, even the one post-signing allegation could not stand. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the contempt order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not plead contempt for conduct that occurred before the operative temporary order was signed, even if the order later recites earlier due dates. Separate pre-signing claims into non-contempt remedies, and avoid bundling valid and invalid contempt allegations into one undifferentiated punishment because one defective allegation can void the entire contempt order."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Meilyn Rutz Danski De Oliveira and Edrey Clarence Oliveira and in the Interest of S.L.D.O., a Child
COA13
In De Oliveira, the father challenged Texas’s authority to make the initial custody determination in a divorce/SAPCR, arguing the child had not lived in Texas during the six months before suit and that West Virginia, not Texas, was the proper forum. The court applied the UCCJEA’s home-state framework in Texas Family Code §§ 152.201(a)(1) and 152.102(7), focusing on the child’s long residence in Texas from birth until late 2022 and whether later stays in West Virginia, Florida, and Brazil were temporary absences. Because the evidence showed those moves were provisional, tied to family travel and attempted reconciliation, and did not establish a settled new home state, the court treated them as temporary absences included in the home-state calculation. The court held Texas had home-state jurisdiction within six months before filing, a parent continued to reside in Texas, unjustifiable-conduct arguments did not require Texas to decline jurisdiction, and the decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In UCCJEA fights, the winning issue is often not where the child was right before filing, but whether time away from Texas was only temporary. Build a precise timeline, prove whether any move was provisional or permanent, and make sure your pleadings on domicile and residence do not undermine your jurisdiction position."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Samantha RaeJon Downs and Ethan Sahen Downs and in the Interest of P.A.D. and Q.P.D., Children
COA06
In Downs, the Texarkana court of appeals held that when a December 11, 2025 final merits hearing functioned as the first trial setting in a contested divorce and child-custody case, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 required at least forty-five days’ notice. The record did not establish that an earlier June setting was actually received or remained operative, and Mother had objected in writing to the shortened setting. Relying on In re K.M.L. and Highsmith, the court treated Rule 245’s first-setting notice requirement as a constitutional due-process protection, not merely a procedural scheduling rule, and concluded that Mother did not waive the complaint by failing to file or properly present a continuance motion or by not appearing at trial. The court affirmed the divorce itself, but reversed the remaining challenged portions of the final decree and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a final hearing is the first real trial setting in a contested family-law case, forty-five days’ notice under Rule 245 is a due-process requirement. Actual notice, nonappearance, or defects in a continuance motion will not necessarily save the judgment; lawyers should make a clear Rule 245 record or risk reversal."