Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Rullman v. Rullman
COA02
In Rullman v. Rullman, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a Tarrant County divorce because neither spouse satisfied Texas Family Code § 6.301 when suit was filed. The dispute centered on whether the wife’s stays at a Fort Worth house owned by the parties amounted to Texas domicile for six months and Tarrant County residence for ninety days, despite the couple’s longstanding life in Colorado and evidence that her time in Texas was intermittent, temporary, and tied to marital turmoil and travel. Applying settled law that domicile requires both physical presence and intent to make Texas a fixed and permanent home, and that county residence likewise requires actual living in the county with good-faith intent to remain, the court deferred to the trial court’s fact findings. It held that ownership of Texas property, repeated stays, and family connections were not enough to prove the required intent or continuity, so dismissal of the divorce action was proper.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat Family Code § 6.301 as a threshold proof issue, not a pleading formality: before filing in Texas, confirm the full six-month domicile and ninety-day county residence periods with objective evidence showing an actual, permanent move, because temporary stays, second homes, and frequent travel can get a divorce case dismissed after significant litigation."
In the Interest of B.K.M. and J.J.M.S., Minor Children
COA08
In In re B.K.M., the father filed a modification suit after a prior child-support order naming the maternal grandmother as sole managing conservator was declared void. He sought to recover alleged support overpayments and damages tied to that void order, but the court held that a modification case under the Texas Family Code is limited to changing conservatorship, possession, and support prospectively, not awarding reimbursement or damages for payments made under prior orders unless a separate, properly pleaded cognizable claim supports that relief. The court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to award overpayment reimbursement, and it also upheld the modification order addressing current conservatorship, possession, and child support based on best-interest evidence, the children’s in-camera interview, and the father’s incomplete income proof.
Litigation Takeaway
"Pick the right procedural vehicle and plead the right remedy. A Texas modification suit can fix conservatorship, possession, and support going forward, and may allow arrears recalculation, but it is not a catch-all way to claw back prior child-support payments or seek damages from a void order without an independent, properly pleaded claim."
In re Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA02
In this original proceeding, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could extend a CPS dismissal deadline after a monitored return to a parent failed. DFPS filed a Chapter 262 case, the court later ordered a monitored return under Family Code Section 263.403, and after the return failed, the trial court set a new dismissal date under Section 263.403(c). The trial court then later purported to extend that deadline under Section 263.401(b) and reset trial beyond the Section 263.403(c) date. The appellate court analyzed the statutory scheme and held that once a monitored return is ordered and later revoked, Section 263.403(c) controls the operative dismissal deadline. Because Section 263.403 creates its own deadline framework, Section 263.401(b) cannot be used to add another extension after the post-removal deadline has been set. The court conditionally granted mandamus, holding that the extension order was an abuse of discretion and that appeal was inadequate because jurisdiction would be lost automatically if trial did not begin by the Section 263.403(c) deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"In CPS cases, and in family cases that intersect with them, statutory dismissal deadlines are jurisdictional and cannot be stretched by agreement or routine continuance practice. Once a monitored return fails, immediately recalculate the deadline under Section 263.403(c) and make sure trial starts by that date; if the court sets trial beyond it, preserve the issue and consider mandamus quickly."
Kamel v. Zacharko
COA05
In Kamel v. Zacharko, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a one-year protective order under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 7B.003 after finding sufficient evidence that the respondent stalked his former dating partner. The record showed a continuing course of unwanted electronic conduct after the relationship ended, including repeated texts at odd hours, dozens of rapid-fire messages, threats to disclose intimate information and alleged photos or videos to the applicant’s family and children, direct messages to the applicant’s minor child about personal matters, and a false HIV message intended to alarm her. The court distinguished an earlier appeal involving a dissolved temporary injunction under Rule 683, explaining that Chapter 7B protective-order relief is a separate statutory remedy. Applying the abuse-of-discretion standard and Penal Code section 42.072’s stalking elements, the court held the trial court had reasonable grounds to believe stalking occurred and that the final protective order was properly issued. It also rejected procedural complaints about the temporary ex parte order because the final hearing cured those issues and the evidence independently supported the final order.
Litigation Takeaway
"When post-breakup conduct consists of repeated unwanted digital contact, threats to expose intimate information, or alarming communications involving children, family lawyers should evaluate Chapter 7B stalking-based protective-order relief instead of relying only on temporary-injunction practice. Build the record around the statutory stalking elements: a course of conduct, the applicant’s actual reaction, the objective reasonable-person standard, and why future conduct is likely without court intervention."
In the Interest of K.J.L., a Child
COA14
In In re K.J.L., the Department shifted mid-trial from seeking termination to seeking appointment of the child’s maternal grandparents as sole managing conservators. The written SAPCR mediated settlement agreement listed the grandparents as parties, but neither grandparent signed or initialed it. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the grandparents had standing to appeal because the decree aggrieved them by imposing conservatorship on them, and it analyzed Texas Family Code section 153.0071(d) strictly: an MSA is binding only if each party to the agreement signs it. Because the trial court rendered judgment on an MSA that expressly included nonsigning parties, the MSA was not binding as a matter of law. The court reversed the conservatorship decree and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not ask a court to render on a family-law MSA until every person identified as a party to the agreement has signed it. If a grandparent, intervenor, or other nonparent is named in the MSA, that signature is not a technicality—it is a statutory requirement for a binding agreement under section 153.0071(d)."
In the Interest of M.A. Jr. and N.A., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Family Code section 161.001(f) requires more than a boilerplate finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return children to their parents before termination. Although the court reviewed and largely upheld the underlying termination-related findings on endangerment and best interest, it distinguished between evidentiary sufficiency and statutory compliance in the written order. Because the termination order contained only a conclusory reasonable-efforts recital and did not specifically state what reunification efforts the Department made, the order failed to satisfy the statute. The court therefore affirmed the remaining supported findings in part, but reversed and remanded in part for entry of a statutorily compliant order.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a statute requires specific findings, generic order language is not enough. In termination cases and beyond, family-law practitioners should draft and review final orders line by line to ensure the judgment itself contains the particularized findings the statute requires, because a defective order can create reversible error even if the evidence otherwise supports the result."
In re Makayla Montoya-Frazier and Buckle Bunnies Fund
COA02
In this Fort Worth mandamus proceeding, Zach Maxwell sought presuit discovery under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 202 from Makayla Montoya-Frazier and Buckle Bunnies Fund, claiming he needed a deposition and documents to investigate potential claims and avoid a failure or delay of justice. The court held that Rule 202.4’s required findings cannot rest on a verified petition, attachments, or attorney argument alone; the petitioner must present admissible evidence showing either that the likely benefit of the requested discovery outweighs its burden or expense, or that the discovery is needed to prevent a failure or delay of justice. Because Maxwell failed to provide competent evidence supporting either pathway, the trial court abused its discretion by granting the petition. The court dismissed the attempted appeal for lack of jurisdiction, treated the matter as mandamus because the targets were anticipated defendants, and conditionally granted mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the Rule 202 order and deny the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 202 is an extraordinary presuit tool, not a shortcut to ordinary discovery. If you want presuit discovery, build a real evidentiary record with admissible proof of necessity and burden-benefit; if you oppose it, attack unsupported allegations, hearsay attachments, and attorney argument, and be prepared to pursue mandamus when the order targets an anticipated defendant."
Mitchell v. State
COA14
In Mitchell v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the trial court properly barred cross-examination of the State’s key eyewitness about prior diagnoses of bipolar disorder, ADHD, and major depression because the defense did not show those conditions affected the witness’s perception, memory, or truthfulness at the time of the events. The court treated the issue as one of relevance and evidentiary foundation, not automatic impeachment or unlimited confrontation. Relying on Texas impeachment and confrontation authorities, the court explained that mental-health diagnoses alone do not create admissible credibility evidence; the proponent must establish a concrete nexus between the condition and testimonial reliability. Because the offer of proof showed only diagnostic history, with no demonstrated impact on the witness’s ability to perceive, recall, or testify truthfully, the exclusion was within the trial court’s discretion and did not violate confrontation rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, a mental-health diagnosis by itself is not fair game for impeachment. If you want to use a witness’s depression, bipolar disorder, ADHD, or similar condition to attack credibility, you need evidence tying that condition to perception, memory, narration, or truthfulness at the relevant time; otherwise, expect a relevance and Rule 403 objection to stick."
In the Interest of K.K., a Child
COA10
In *In the Interest of K.K.*, the Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Mother argued the danger to the child was primarily caused by Father, her brother, and other adults, not by her own conduct. The court rejected that framing and held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient because Mother knowingly exposed K.K. to domestic violence, intoxicated and aggressive adults, unstable housing, and unsafe caregiving conditions, while also becoming severely intoxicated herself and lacking any meaningful safety or housing plan. Applying the clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards from *In re J.F.C.* and *In re C.H.*, the court emphasized that endangerment does not require actual injury and may be shown through a parent’s acts, omissions, and failure to remove the child from known danger. The court held that Mother’s pattern of poor protective choices supported termination under both subsections (D) and (E).
Litigation Takeaway
"A parent cannot avoid endangerment findings by blaming a violent partner, relative, or roommate if the evidence shows the parent knowingly kept the child in that dangerous environment or failed to act. For family-law litigators, the case underscores that pattern evidence—domestic violence exposure, substance abuse, unstable housing, and tolerance of unsafe third parties—can drive not only termination cases but also conservatorship restrictions, supervised access, and emergency custody relief."
Daniel Rincones v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Rincones v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld admission of evidence that the defendant allegedly forced sexual acts on his wife during the same episode as the charged family-violence assault. The defense argued the sexual-assault allegations were uncharged extraneous misconduct and too prejudicial under Texas Rule of Evidence 403. The court treated the evidence as same-transaction contextual evidence because it was intertwined with the assaultive conduct and helped the jury understand the full course of violence, the complainant’s emotional state, and the medical history given for treatment. Applying Rule 403, the court held the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, especially because the State did not overemphasize the sexual allegations and the trial court gave a limiting instruction. The conviction for assault causing bodily injury was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When sexual coercion or other inflammatory misconduct is part of the same violent episode, courts may admit it if it genuinely helps explain the event rather than simply attacking character. For family-law litigators, the key fight is Rule 403: proponents should frame the evidence as necessary context tied to a live issue like family violence, fear, or danger, while opponents should push for redaction, narrower alternatives, and a record showing the evidence is being used mainly for emotional impact."