Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
In the Interest of N.E.S., a Child
COA14
In this SAPCR appeal, a mother challenged a judgment appointing the maternal grandmother sole managing conservator, ordering the mother to pay support, and awarding attorney’s fees. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused primarily on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i), holding that most of the mother’s 31 appellate complaints were waived because her pro se brief offered conclusory assertions without meaningful legal analysis, record citations, or supporting authority. The court also held that pro se litigants must comply with the same briefing rules as attorneys. Construing the brief liberally, the court addressed only limited categories of issues and rejected them, including recusal because no verified Rule 18a motion was filed and adverse rulings alone do not support recusal. The court affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Family-law appeals can be lost on briefing before the merits are ever reached. If you want reversal, each issue must be preserved, tied to the record, supported by authority, framed under the correct standard of review, and explained with actual analysis; pro se status does not excuse defective briefing."
In the Interest of J.B.B., a Child
COA13
In In re J.B.B., the mother argued the termination judgment was void because the trial court allegedly lost jurisdiction under Texas Family Code § 263.401 when it did not finish trial or sign a final order before the dismissal deadline. The court analyzed whether trial on the merits had commenced before that deadline and focused on the January 21, 2026 hearing, where the court heard sworn merits testimony about removal, placement, and adoption plans before recessing the case because Mother, who was in an Intermediate Sanction Facility and on suicide watch, could not participate. Relying on commencement-of-trial indicators and the text of § 263.401, the court held that the statute requires timely commencement, not completion, of trial. Because merits evidence was taken before the dismissal date, the later recess and March termination order did not divest the court of jurisdiction, and the judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a statute makes jurisdiction turn on whether trial has commenced, the record must clearly show that the merits hearing actually began before the deadline. Family lawyers should put on real merits evidence, not just call the case, and should make a precise record explaining any recess caused by a party’s inability to participate."
Emanuel Ochoa v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Emanuel Ochoa v. The State of Texas, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, on remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals, considered whether admitting a 14-year-old’s involuntary confession was harmless constitutional error. The court applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a), emphasizing that the question was not whether other evidence, including DNA evidence, could support the verdict, but whether the appellate court could say beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession did not contribute to conviction or punishment. Because the recorded confession was the State’s most powerful and complete narrative of guilt and likely shaped how the jury viewed all remaining evidence, the court held the error was harmful, reversed the convictions, and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"When one dramatic piece of improperly admitted evidence becomes the centerpiece of the case, harmless-error arguments become much harder to win on appeal. In family-law cases, preserve objections and build a record showing how the challenged evidence likely drove the factfinder’s decision, especially when it supplies the main narrative of alleged misconduct."
Gabriel v. State
COA13
In Gabriel v. State, a criminal child-sexual-abuse appeal with crossover value for family lawyers, the defendant challenged the admission of testimony from a second child victim describing similar abuse by the same household partner. The court held that article 38.37 permitted the evidence and that the trial court properly conducted Rule 403 balancing rather than excluding it categorically. The court reasoned that the second child’s testimony was not merely cumulative because it had independent probative value in showing a pattern of abuse, household dynamics, and context for the first child’s disclosures. It affirmed, concluding the evidence was highly probative and not unfairly prejudicial in a way that substantially outweighed its value.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family cases, patterned-conduct evidence involving other children in the household can be powerful if you tie it to a specific non-character relevance theory—such as safety, endangerment, household context, delayed disclosure, or credibility—and are prepared to win the Rule 403 fight. On the defense side, a bare ‘prejudicial and cumulative’ objection is usually too thin; force precision on relevance and show why the added testimony contributes little incremental value."
In re Nicholas Hassan
COA07
In In re Nicholas Hassan, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a party waived a Rule 3.08 lawyer-as-witness disqualification complaint by waiting too long after learning that opposing counsel had drafted the estate-planning documents at the center of the dispute. The movant had notice for months, filed the motion only shortly before trial, then continued litigating through discovery, motion practice, mediation, and amended pleadings without diligently seeking a prompt hearing or ruling. Applying Texas waiver-by-delay principles from cases like In re Nitla and Vaughan, the court emphasized that disqualification is an extraordinary remedy that can seriously prejudice a party by depriving them of counsel of choice. Because the movant’s delay and litigation conduct showed the request was not pursued with urgency, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering disqualification, and mandamus relief was proper.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to disqualify opposing counsel under Rule 3.08, act immediately and press for a prompt hearing. In Texas family-law and property-related cases, waiting months after learning the facts—while continuing to litigate the merits—can waive the complaint and make the motion look tactical rather than necessary."
Brown v. Brown
COA02
In Brown v. Brown, a post-divorce family-law dispute escalated from unresolved child-support and property-sale issues into enforcement, contempt, sanctions, and conservatorship relief after Wife denied Husband court-ordered possession and failed to comply with discovery. The trial court granted Husband broad relief and later signed orders that also included contingent appellate attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that most of Wife’s complaints were not preserved because she did not timely raise them in the trial court. But the court treated her objection at the decree-signing hearing as sufficient to preserve her complaint that the written orders added contingent appellate fees unsupported by the hearing record. Applying Texas preservation rules and the requirement that attorney’s fees, including conditional appellate fees, be supported by legally sufficient evidence that they are reasonable and necessary, the court concluded the record did not support the contingent appellate-fee award. It therefore reversed and remanded only the portion of the judgment awarding conditional appellate attorney’s fees and affirmed the remainder.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want contingent appellate attorney’s fees in a Texas family-law case, you must prove them with evidence—boilerplate decree language is not enough. And if a written decree adds appellate-fee relief not supported by the hearing record, a specific objection at the signing hearing can preserve error and set up reversal of that fee award."
Saenz v. Pechler
COA14
In this divorce appeal after a bench trial, the wife argued the trial court erred by failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law and by making an unjust property division and improper spousal-maintenance award. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that although she timely requested findings and timely filed a follow-up notice, she did not preserve any complaint about missing findings because her Rule 297 past-due notice omitted one of the rule’s required recitals: the date the findings were due. Applying Rules 296 and 297, along with Ad Villarai and Curtis, the court treated that omission as a preservation defect that forfeited appellate review of the no-findings issue. On the merits, the court reviewed the property division for abuse of discretion and concluded the unequal allocation was still just and right because the husband received more assets but also substantially more debt, leaving him with a net negative estate, and the trial court reasonably accepted the evidence on valuation and characterization of retirement assets, restricted stock, and related liabilities. The court affirmed the decree, including spousal maintenance.
Litigation Takeaway
"After any family-law bench trial, a Rule 296 request alone is not enough. If the court does not file findings, the Rule 297 past-due notice must strictly state both the date the original request was filed and the date findings were due, or the complaint is waived. Saenz is a strong reminder that post-judgment preservation in divorce cases should be handled with checklists and form notices, because losing findings often leaves an appellant stuck with implied findings and highly deferential review on property and maintenance issues."
L. P. v. The State of Texas
COA14
In L. P. v. The State of Texas, a juvenile challenged the legal sufficiency of a murder adjudication, arguing the evidence showed self-defense after the victim shot first. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that although juvenile delinquency proceedings are civil in form, legal-sufficiency review follows the criminal standard because the State must prove delinquent conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying that deferential standard, the court reviewed the surveillance footage, witness testimony, shell-casing locations, forensic evidence, flight, weapon disposal, and L.P.’s inconsistent statements, and concluded a rational jury could find murder and reject self-defense. The court affirmed because appellate courts do not reweigh credibility conflicts when the record supports the verdict.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case turns on competing violence narratives, the winner is usually the party with objective corroboration. In family-law cases involving abuse, self-defense, child endangerment, or juvenile conduct, trial counsel must build the record with surveillance, medical, forensic, and statement evidence because appellate courts will strongly defer to the trial factfinder’s credibility calls."
In Re Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by imposing severe spoliation sanctions against Securitas without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. The plaintiff claimed Securitas failed to preserve electronic records that could show whether a security guard was present at the time of a shooting, while Securitas disputed that any responsive evidence was destroyed, what data existed, and whether any loss caused prejudice. Applying Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, the court explained that before imposing spoliation remedies, the movant must prove a duty to preserve, a breach of that duty, and resulting prejudice. Because those predicate facts were contested, the trial court could not resolve them on written submissions alone or impose sanctions that effectively decided a merits-related issue and barred contrary proof. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief and held that an evidentiary hearing is required when spoliation predicates are factually disputed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a spoliation dispute turns on contested facts, treat it like a mini-trial. In family law cases involving deleted texts, missing financial records, app data, or surveillance footage, a court cannot impose adverse inferences or issue-limiting sanctions based on briefing alone; the movant must prove duty, breach, and prejudice through evidence, and the responding party should insist on an evidentiary hearing."
In re David Brown
COA09
In this original proceeding, David Brown sought mandamus relief from juvenile release-related orders entered after a detention hearing, asking the court of appeals to vacate the orders and grant broader relief. The Beaumont Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because Brown failed to provide the mandamus record required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7(a), including signed or certified copies of the challenged orders and a reporter’s record of the hearing. Applying the ordinary mandamus standards, the court held that without a competent record it could not determine whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion or whether Brown lacked an adequate appellate remedy. The court also declined to treat the filing as a habeas petition because the record did not show a contempt order or qualifying restraint of liberty. The petition and request for temporary relief were denied.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus is won on the record, not the briefing. If you want emergency appellate relief in a family-law-type dispute, you must file the signed or certified operative orders, the reporter’s record, and the key supporting materials; otherwise the court will likely deny relief without ever reaching the substance."