Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Paul O’Brien v. Tiffanie O’Brien
COA03
In a divorce appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 109.001 does not limit a trial court to only the precise temporary relief it granted within 60 days after the notice of appeal. Because the trial court had timely entered a valid temporary order pending appeal, it retained continuing jurisdiction under sections 109.001(b-3) and (b-4) to later modify that order after notice and hearing if circumstances had materially and substantially changed and the modification was equitable and necessary for the child’s safety and welfare. The court rejected the husband’s argument that any new relief requested after the 60-day window was jurisdictionally barred, distinguishing Morris v. Veilleux as a case where no timely temporary order had existed to modify. The court abated the appeal so the trial court could consider the requested modification under the correct legal standard.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you get a timely temporary order pending appeal, the trial court’s power is not frozen in place after 60 days. Lawyers should focus less on a blanket jurisdiction objection and more on building or attacking the statutory modification record: changed circumstances, equity, and a clear child-welfare connection."
Travarius Leon Dent v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Dent, the court affirmed admission of the father’s prior injury-to-a-child deferred-adjudication evidence after he testified that he was a strict but not physically abusive parent and suggested the child fabricated sexual-abuse allegations in retaliation for discipline. The court held that this testimony opened the door by creating a false impression about his parenting and made the prior child-injury evidence relevant for non-propensity purposes: rebutting that impression and undermining his retaliation/fabrication defense. The court also held that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403, because the State had a real need for rebuttal evidence tailored to the defense theme, and the limiting instruction properly restricted the jury’s use of the evidence without commenting on the weight of the evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, a parent who claims to be merely “strict” and blames allegations on retaliation or coaching may open the door to prior abuse evidence. Frame the evidence as rebuttal of a false parenting narrative and fabrication defense—not just bad-character proof—and seek a careful limiting instruction."
Curtis Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Curtis Johnson v. State, the Amarillo court held that a defendant complaining the State’s article 38.37 notice of extraneous sexual-offense evidence was too vague did not preserve error by objecting alone. The defense argued the notice lacked specifics about the number of incidents, precise conduct, and locations, but never requested a continuance, postponement, or other curative relief to address the claimed surprise. The court treated the complaint as a surprise-based notice issue, applied preservation rules requiring a request for time to prepare, and concluded the issue was waived. The court also found no harm because the defense had long-range notice of the general allegations, heard and cross-examined the witness at the pretrial hearing, and failed to show how more detail would have changed trial preparation or strategy.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your real complaint is trial surprise from vague or late notice of prejudicial conduct evidence, an objection is not enough—you must ask for a continuance, postponement, or other specific curative relief. In family-law cases, this preservation rule matters whenever abuse, bad acts, or misconduct evidence surfaces without enough detail to prepare."
Lorkovic v. Lorkovic
COA04
In Lorkovic v. Lorkovic, the Fourth Court of Appeals considered whether a final divorce decree improperly included permanent injunctions and a child-support amount that were not fully resolved at trial. The court held that most of the injunctions were valid because the wife had pleaded for harmful-contact relief and the trial evidence about abuse, safety concerns, communication problems, and interference with possession supported protective restrictions tied to the parent-child relationship. The court also concluded that the decree did not become reversible merely because its injunction language was more detailed than the trial court’s oral rendition. But the court reversed the child-support provision because the trial court never actually adjudicated the amount at trial; it only stated that the husband would owe support and later indicated the parties were expected to calculate the figure or return for a further hearing. Because the decree inserted $650 per month without a prior adjudication of that amount, the support award had to be reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Protective injunctions in a divorce decree can survive appeal if they are grounded in the pleadings, the evidence, and conservatorship-related concerns, even when the written decree is more detailed than the oral rendition. Child support is different: the exact amount must be actually decided by evidence, stipulation, or later hearing before it can appear in the final decree. Do not treat support numbers as decree-drafting details."
Bryant Pearl v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Bryant Pearl v. State of Texas, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for continuous sexual abuse of a young child where the child testified the abuse happened multiple times over more than thirty days, even though she could not give precise dates and the record included evidence that another person had also abused her. The court applied the usual sufficiency standard, deferred to the jury on credibility, and emphasized that exact dates are not required under Penal Code section 21.02 and that a child victim’s testimony alone can sustain the finding. The child’s account was further reinforced by SANE-history testimony describing repeated abuse and explaining why the absence of physical trauma did not negate abuse. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family-law cases involving abuse allegations, Pearl underscores that a factfinder may still credit a child’s core abuse narrative despite memory gaps, imprecise timing, no physical findings, and evidence of another possible abuser. The practical lesson is to build or attack the case around repetition, duration, attribution, and consistency of the core allegations—not around the expectation of date-perfect testimony."
In re Genevience Alexandrie Anthony
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus after a Bexar County trial court denied the mother’s jurisdictional challenge to the father’s SAPCR. The child was born in Mississippi and had lived there continuously with the mother since birth, while Texas had previously entered only a UIFSA support order establishing paternity and support. Applying the UCCJEA, the court held that Mississippi was the child’s home state under Family Code section 152.201(a)(1), so Texas lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination. The court rejected the father’s reliance on significant-connection jurisdiction because that basis applies only when no home state exists or the home state declines jurisdiction, and it also rejected use of the inconvenient-forum statute as an independent source of jurisdiction. The court further made clear that a prior Texas UIFSA support case does not create or support UCCJEA custody jurisdiction. Because improper assertion of custody jurisdiction is reviewable by mandamus, the court conditionally granted relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"In interstate custody cases, start with the child’s home state and keep UIFSA and UCCJEA analyses separate. A Texas support or paternity order does not give Texas power to decide conservatorship or possession if another state is the child’s home state. Before filing a Texas SAPCR, confirm that no other state has home-state jurisdiction or that the home state has expressly declined; otherwise the case is vulnerable to dismissal and mandamus."
In the Interest of E.M.M. Jr., N.M.M., N.J.M., I.A.M., M.S.R., A.L.M., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b). Mother challenged only best interest, so the court accepted the unchallenged predicate grounds as true and evaluated the record under the Holley factors and Family Code section 263.307. The court relied on evidence that Mother and a newborn tested positive for marijuana, the children reported domestic violence, the family lived in unsafe housing without electricity, Mother refused or failed to engage in services, and she went about 175 days without contacting the Department or visiting the children. Considering that pattern of conduct, the court held a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief that termination was in the children’s best interest and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, courts can infer future risk from a parent’s pattern of past conduct—especially when drug use, domestic violence, unsafe housing, and noncompliance all appear together. On appeal, leaving predicate findings unchallenged can be outcome-determinative because those findings will reinforce the best-interest analysis."
In re Lisa Marie Clontz
COA01
In In re Lisa Marie Clontz, the relator sought mandamus to force the family-law trial court to rule on a motion to transfer venue and a motion to reinstate. The First Court of Appeals held that filing motions with the clerk was not enough to prove the trial court had a ministerial duty to rule at that point. Applying settled mandamus law, the court distinguished between filing and presentment and required record proof that the motions were actually brought to the judge’s attention, that a ruling was requested, and that the court failed or refused to act within a reasonable time. Because the mandamus record showed only file-stamped motions and did not show presentment, a hearing or submission setting, or a filed demand for ruling, the court denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you may need mandamus based on a trial court’s failure to rule, do more than file the motion—create a record showing presentment, judicial awareness, and a clear request for a ruling. In family-law cases, preservation of the paper trail can determine whether appellate relief is available, regardless of the motion’s merits."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Brendan Potyondy and Meredith Potyondy and in the Interest of D.P., C.P., and B.P., Children
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision voiding the parties’ premarital agreement in their divorce. The trial court had found the agreement unconscionable based on the circumstances of signing—two days before the wedding, no separate counsel for the wife, and a perceived “double recovery” because the husband’s premarital assets were no longer traceable. The appellate court held that those reasons did not satisfy Texas Family Code section 4.006, emphasized that unconscionability in this context must be analyzed under the statute rather than general equitable concerns, and noted the absence of any finding that the wife signed involuntarily. Because the agreement’s equalization payment was part of the bargain the parties made, not an improper double recovery, the court reversed the property division and remanded for entry of a division consistent with the premarital agreement.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts cannot set aside a premarital agreement just because it seems unfair in hindsight or because the signing circumstances look imperfect. To defeat enforcement, the resisting spouse must prove a statutory ground under Family Code section 4.006 and obtain findings that match that theory. For trial lawyers, this case is a strong reminder to build the record around voluntariness and statutory disclosure issues—not generalized fairness, tracing complaints, or lack-of-counsel themes standing alone."
In the Interest of K.L.M., a Child
COA05
In this default SAPCR appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court exceeded the record in two respects. First, it reversed and rendered the child-surname change because Mother’s testimony—that the parents were unmarried and she wanted the child to bear her surname—did not establish the required good cause or show that the child’s substantial welfare and best interest required the change. Second, it reversed and remanded the retroactive child-support award because the record lacked sufficient evidence of Father’s net resources during the relevant period and the statutory factors required by Family Code sections 154.009 and 154.131. The court affirmed the remainder of the order, including the finding that Father had a history or pattern of family violence, concluding the evidence was sufficient on that issue.
Litigation Takeaway
"A default prove-up is not a shortcut around pleadings and proof. Even in uncontested SAPCRs, name changes and retroactive support require evidence tied to the governing statutes and factors; if the record is thin, the judgment is vulnerable on appeal. By contrast, targeted testimony that directly addresses the family-violence standard can be enough to sustain that finding."