Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
In the Interest of N.P., a Child
COA12
In In re N.P., the Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court analyzed whether the child’s environment and the father’s course of conduct endangered the child, focusing on the mother’s methamphetamine use during pregnancy, the newborn’s positive drug test, the parents’ homelessness, the father’s repeated domestic violence against the mother during pregnancy, and his resulting incarceration. The court held this evidence was legally and factually sufficient to show both endangering conditions or surroundings under subsection (D) and a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious endangering course of conduct under subsection (E), so it affirmed the termination judgment without reaching subsection (P).
Litigation Takeaway
"Prenatal violence, drug exposure at birth, homelessness, and criminal instability can combine to prove endangerment under both Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a unified safety narrative tying domestic violence, substance abuse, and instability directly to risk to the child."
In the Interest of K.D.S., a Child
COA05
In In re K.D.S., the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a father’s SAPCR modification suit, a $5,000 attorney’s-fee award, and an order requiring him to post a $5,000 bond before filing future modification pleadings in the case. The father tried to use the modification proceeding to collaterally attack the underlying 2021 SAPCR order based on alleged service defects and other jurisdictional theories, but the court held those complaints were waived by his prior appearance and answer and could not support a collateral attack on a non-void final order. The court also held that any complaint about the absence of findings of fact and conclusions of law was waived because none were requested. Most significantly, the court approved the prefiling bond as a sanctions measure for repeated frivolous filings, discovery abuse, failure to appear, and refusal to litigate within the rules, explaining that such relief may be imposed without a formal vexatious-litigant finding when supported by the record and tailored to secure costs and attorney’s fees. The father’s due-process, equal-protection, and access-to-courts objections were not preserved, so the sanctions and dismissal were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas family courts can use their sanctions power—not just the vexatious-litigant statute—to require a bond before future SAPCR modification filings when a party shows a pattern of frivolous pleadings, discovery abuse, and rule-defying conduct. For practitioners, the key is to build a detailed record, tie the bond to anticipated costs and fees, and preserve any constitutional objections with specificity in the trial court."
In re Ganga Thapa
COA03
In In re Ganga Thapa, the Third Court of Appeals held that a grandmother had standing under Texas Family Code section 102.004(a)(2) to seek managing conservatorship because the Department, which had been appointed managing conservator after termination of the parents’ rights, expressly consented to her suit. The trial court had sua sponte found she lacked standing and struck her intervention in the pending SAPCR. The appellate court treated the issue as a pure standing question, applied the rule that an intervenor in a SAPCR generally needs only the same standing required to file the claim as an original suit, and concluded that Thapa’s original-suit standing carried over to intervention. Because the trial court’s contrary legal conclusion was an abuse of discretion and denial of intervention in a SAPCR lacks an adequate appellate remedy, the court conditionally granted mandamus and ordered the trial court to vacate its standing ruling and order striking the intervention.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a grandparent’s standing depends on Family Code section 102.004(a)(2), get the managing conservator’s consent clearly into the record—preferably in a filed written consent tied expressly to the statute. Once that statutory gateway is satisfied, a trial court cannot deny intervention based on generalized discretion; the fight shifts from standing to the merits."
In the Interest of P.H.S. and E.K.S., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally insufficient to support endangerment findings against Father under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The Department proved serious concerns in Mother’s home, including unsanitary conditions, domestic violence concerns, a violated safety plan involving Mother’s paramour, and an unexplained injury to one child, but the court emphasized that subsections (D) and (E) require parent-specific proof. Applying the clear-and-convincing and legal-sufficiency standards, the court concluded the record did not show Father knowingly placed the children in endangering conditions, knowingly allowed them to remain there, personally engaged in a course of endangering conduct, or knowingly placed them with someone who did. The court therefore reversed and rendered the (D) and (E) findings as to Father, while affirming the termination order on other grounds.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment findings cannot rest on guilt by association. If you want a Family Code 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) finding against a particular parent, you need evidence tying that parent to knowledge, control, placement, permission, or a conscious course of dangerous conduct—not just proof that the child was in a bad situation with someone else."
In re Arturo Perez and Texas Materials Group, Inc.
COA04
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial after a defense take-nothing verdict based on two unsupported reasons: a conclusory factual-sufficiency finding and alleged "empty chair" gamesmanship involving an undesignated traffic flagger. Applying In re Toyota Motor Sales and related mandamus precedent, the court explained that a new-trial order must give legally proper, specific reasons that are actually supported by the record. The court found the trial judge improperly treated a stipulation about right of way as if it proved negligence and proximate cause, and also relied on misconduct findings that were unpreserved and contradicted by the record. Because the verdict winners had no adequate appellate remedy if forced to retry the case, mandamus issued to vacate the new-trial order.
Litigation Takeaway
"A trial court cannot order a do-over based on vague claims that a verdict was against the evidence or that one side engaged in "gamesmanship" unless those reasons are preserved, legally valid, and tied to actual record support. For family-law litigants, this is a strong mandamus blueprint for attacking unsupported new-trial, temporary, or post-judgment rulings that rely on broad fairness or best-interest language without specific evidence and preserved error."
Michael Ray Guajardo v. The State of Texas
COA09
In Michael Ray Guajardo v. The State of Texas, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that Article 38.37 allows the State to admit prior sexual acts against children even when the defendant committed those acts as a juvenile, so long as the statute’s notice and relevance requirements are met. The defendant argued the statute should be limited to adult conduct and that Rule 403 required exclusion because the evidence was unfairly prejudicial. The court rejected both arguments, reasoning that the statute contains no adulthood limitation and courts may not add one. It further held the extraneous-act evidence was highly probative of sexual interest in children, state of mind, and the propensity inference Article 38.37 expressly permits in child-sex-offense cases, and that this probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In child-related litigation, historical sexual misconduct involving children is not automatically irrelevant or inadmissible just because it occurred when the accused was a juvenile. For family-law cases involving conservatorship, possession, protective orders, or modification, Guajardo is a strong analogy for arguing that older or juvenile-age conduct can still be powerful evidence of present child-safety risk—while opponents should focus on relevance, reliability, remoteness, and Rule 403 fairness rather than a categorical age-based objection."
In the Interest of M.M.S., a Child
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in M.M.S.’s best interest under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). Applying the clear-and-convincing sufficiency standards from In re J.F.C. and In re J.O.A. and the Holley factors, the court focused on Mother’s continued drug use, inconsistent mental-health treatment, unstable housing, poor visitation history, and prior neglect-related concerns involving siblings. The court also relied on evidence that M.M.S. had lived her entire life in a stable foster placement with her brother, was bonded there, and was thriving. Considering the full record and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the appellate court held a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are built through patterns, not isolated facts. A layered record showing substance abuse, untreated mental-health issues, unstable housing, missed visitation, and a child’s success in a stable placement will usually carry the day on appeal; on the defense side, rehabilitation must be documented with concrete proof of sobriety, treatment compliance, stability, and consistent parenting over time."
In the Interest of T.W.B., a Child
COA05
In *In re T.W.B.*, a pro se father appealed a divorce and SAPCR decree challenging rulings on possession, child support, and property division. The Dallas Court of Appeals focused not on the underlying family-law complaints, but on whether the father’s brief complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1. After finding that the first twenty record citations it checked were inaccurate, the court held it was not required to search fifteen volumes of appellate record to locate support for his factual assertions or claimed error. Applying settled law that pro se litigants must follow the same procedural rules as represented parties, and noting that most issues were reviewed for abuse of discretion, the court concluded the father failed to demonstrate reversible error from the record and affirmed the trial court’s decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"On appeal, even potentially valid family-law complaints will fail if the brief does not accurately cite the record. Courts will not act as counsel, reconstruct arguments from a massive record, or relax briefing standards for pro se parties; if you cannot show the exact place where error was preserved and proved, affirmance is likely."
In Re Fort Bend Christian Academy
COA14
In *In re Fort Bend Christian Academy*, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that ecclesiastical abstention barred parents’ contract, promissory-estoppel, and DTPA claims against a private Christian school to the extent those claims required a court to interpret and evaluate the school’s internal policies on academic accommodations, bullying, harassment, and discipline. The court analyzed the dispute claim by claim, explaining that Texas courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction when resolving a claim would entangle the judiciary in a religious institution’s doctrine, mission, or internal governance. But the court distinguished concussion-related claims tied to TAPPS rules and concussion-management protocols, concluding those allegations could potentially be resolved through neutral principles of law because they involved external, secular safety standards rather than faith-based decision-making. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus in part, holding the protected internal-policy claims must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction while the neutral-principles concussion-related claims could proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family-law dispute touches a religious school, the key question is not the label on the claim but whether the court would have to second-guess the school’s faith-infused internal decisions. Claims based on internal discipline, accommodations, or student-governance policies may be jurisdictionally barred, while claims tied to objective outside standards or secular safety rules may still be litigated."
In the Interest of E.K.S., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, the mother challenged only the visitation language in a final order appointing DFPS permanent managing conservator and giving her supervised possession "at a date, time and location as arranged and agreed" with the Department. The court reviewed the order for abuse of discretion and focused on the child’s best interest, rejecting the argument that the Family Code always requires a fallback schedule with fixed dates and times. Because the record showed unresolved substance abuse, incomplete services, an eleven-month lapse in drug testing, inconsistent visitation, transportation problems, and an out-of-state placement requiring DFPS oversight, the court held the open-ended supervised-access provision was not arbitrary or unreasonable and affirmed the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"An "as arranged and agreed" visitation provision can survive appeal if the record shows why flexibility is necessary and tied to the child’s best interest. If you want to defend a non-specific supervised-access clause, build evidence of safety concerns, instability, logistics, and a reliable supervising conservator; if you want to attack one, preserve complaints that it is indefinite, unenforceable, or effectively delegates control over access without a workable minimum schedule."