Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
In the Interest of E.K.S., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, the mother challenged only the visitation language in a final order appointing DFPS permanent managing conservator and giving her supervised possession "at a date, time and location as arranged and agreed" with the Department. The court reviewed the order for abuse of discretion and focused on the child’s best interest, rejecting the argument that the Family Code always requires a fallback schedule with fixed dates and times. Because the record showed unresolved substance abuse, incomplete services, an eleven-month lapse in drug testing, inconsistent visitation, transportation problems, and an out-of-state placement requiring DFPS oversight, the court held the open-ended supervised-access provision was not arbitrary or unreasonable and affirmed the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"An "as arranged and agreed" visitation provision can survive appeal if the record shows why flexibility is necessary and tied to the child’s best interest. If you want to defend a non-specific supervised-access clause, build evidence of safety concerns, instability, logistics, and a reliable supervising conservator; if you want to attack one, preserve complaints that it is indefinite, unenforceable, or effectively delegates control over access without a workable minimum schedule."
In re Lugenbuhl, Wheaton, Peck, Rankin, & Hubbard and Todd Crawford
COA01
In this mandamus proceeding, the First Court of Appeals reviewed sanctions imposed after out-of-state defense counsel accepted and used an opposing party’s sensitive personal records supplied by his former fiancé outside formal discovery. The trial court responded with sweeping relief, including disqualification, a large monetary sanction, revocation of pro hac vice status, disciplinary referrals, and a requirement that the attorneys disclose the sanctions order in any future Texas pro hac vice application for ten years. Applying TransAmerican’s just-sanctions framework, the court held that while trial courts have broad authority to punish serious litigation misconduct, non-monetary sanctions must be directly related to the misconduct and no more severe than necessary. The ten-year disclosure requirement failed that test because it operated as a reputational penalty affecting unrelated future cases rather than a case-specific remedy tied to the handling of the records. The court therefore conditionally granted mandamus to vacate that disclosure requirement and denied relief on the remaining challenged rulings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Sensitive records obtained through spouses, ex-partners, or other third parties can expose counsel to disqualification and serious sanctions, but trial courts still cannot impose creative non-monetary sanctions that reach beyond the case and function as long-term professional punishment. In family-law litigation, use this case both to attack improper handling of private records and to challenge sanctions that are not tightly tethered to the actual misconduct."
In the Interest of S.W.R. and H.G.R., Children
COA05
In this Dallas child-support modification case, the parents’ 2020 agreed divorce decree set support at an amount that differed from the Chapter 154 guidelines. Father sought modification in February 2023, arguing both that circumstances had materially and substantially changed and that the agreed amount did not substantially comply with the guidelines. Mother moved for summary judgment on the ground that no material and substantial change had occurred. The court held that because the original support order was an agreed order that deviated from the guidelines, Texas Family Code section 156.401(a-1) controlled and required proof of a material and substantial change in the circumstances of the child or a person affected by the order. Father could not rely on section 156.401(a)(2)’s 20%/$100 guideline-difference test because three years had not yet elapsed, and he conceded that point. Because Father did not respond to the summary-judgment motion with evidence creating a fact issue and did not effectively challenge the no-material-change ground on appeal, the court affirmed summary judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"If an agreed child-support order departs from guideline support, a parent seeking modification before three years have passed must prove a material and substantial change in circumstances. A simple argument that the agreed amount is above or below the guidelines is not enough, and failing to directly attack a no-change summary-judgment ground can end the case on appeal."
Thompson v. State
COA05
In Thompson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a police officer’s testimony that she found the complainant credible required reversal of an assault-family-violence conviction. The court assumed, without deciding, that admitting the credibility-vouching testimony was error, then applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b)’s nonconstitutional harmless-error standard. Looking at the full record, the court emphasized that the testimony was brief, not repeated, and not featured in closing argument, while other evidence independently supported the verdict, including visible injuries, expert strangulation testimony, and jail-call evidence suggesting an admission. The court held that any error did not affect the defendant’s substantial rights and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Improper credibility-vouching is not automatic reversible error. In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, the appellate fight will usually turn on harm: whether the opinion testimony was emphasized, whether the case lacked corroboration, and whether the challenged statement likely affected the outcome. Build your record with objective evidence, and if you are preserving error, also preserve prejudice."
David Rojas Sanchez v. The State of Texas
COA05
In David Rojas Sanchez v. The State of Texas, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that Sanchez waived his complaint about the admission of Article 38.37 extraneous-offense testimony because he did not preserve error. Although defense counsel objected at the pretrial hearing when the witness could not identify Sanchez in the courtroom, the trial judge responded that she would 'wait and see,' which the appellate court treated as a deferral rather than an express or implicit ruling. Counsel did not press for a definitive ruling, did not object to the court’s failure to rule, and did not renew the objection when the testimony came in before the jury. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and preservation authorities including Dobbs and Darty, the court held that an objection alone is not enough without an adverse ruling or an objection to the refusal to rule. Because no preserved ruling existed, the court did not reach the merits of the Article 38.37 challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the court says 'wait and see,' you do not yet have a ruling. In family-law trials and hearings, lawyers must press objections to a clear ruling, renew them when the evidence is offered, and object on the record if the court refuses or fails to rule. Otherwise, even strong evidentiary complaints may be lost on appeal."
In the Interest of J.D.H., a Child
SCOTX
In this parental-rights termination case, the mother’s notice of appeal was filed after the 20-day deadline for accelerated appeals because counsel apparently believed a motion for new trial extended the deadline. The Texas Supreme Court agreed the notice was untimely under Rule 26.1(b) and existing precedent, but held that termination cases are different from ordinary civil cases because the statutory right to counsel includes effective assistance, including counsel’s duty to timely perfect an appeal. Applying Strickland principles and drawing on criminal lost-appeal cases, the Court held that a parent may seek an out-of-time appeal when ineffective assistance caused the missed deadline. Rather than automatically accepting the late notice or dismissing outright, the proper remedy is to reverse the dismissal and remand so the court of appeals can abate the case for an evidentiary hearing in the trial court on deficient performance and prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas termination cases, a missed accelerated appellate deadline is not always the end of the case if counsel’s ineffective assistance caused it. Lawyers must separately calendar the 20-day notice-of-appeal deadline and should seek abatement and remand for a Strickland hearing—not equitable forgiveness of the deadline—when a lost appeal stems from attorney error."
Perry v. Perry
COA09
In Perry v. Perry, the husband tried to use a bill of review to set aside a final divorce decree, arguing he was denied a fair chance to seek a larger share of the marital estate, a jury trial, and relief from allegedly unfair binding arbitration. The court affirmed summary judgment against him because a bill of review is an equitable remedy that is unavailable when an adequate legal remedy existed. Here, the record showed he had already filed a direct appeal from the same final decree and then voluntarily dismissed it. Because those complaints could have been raised on direct appeal, and in fact were pursued through that route, the bill of review could not be used to relitigate the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"A bill of review is not a fallback option for issues that could have been raised on direct appeal. In family-law cases, if a party challenges a divorce decree on matters like property division, arbitration, or jury-trial complaints, counsel must treat the direct appeal as the primary vehicle. Once that appellate remedy exists—and especially if it is actually invoked—a later bill of review is likely barred."
Flatt v. Tornow
COA01
In Flatt v. Tornow, a third party sued a wife involved in a divorce, alleging she accessed private communications and disclosed intimate photos and private information to others. The wife sought dismissal under the Texas Citizens Participation Act, arguing the suit was based on her petitioning activity in the divorce and her speech about the marriage and affair. The First Court of Appeals rejected that framing, focusing on the gravamen of the pleaded claims: private disclosure conduct, not protected litigation activity or speech on a matter of public concern. Because the wife failed to meet her threshold burden to show the TCPA applied, the court held the analysis ended at step one and affirmed denial of the TCPA motion to dismiss.
Litigation Takeaway
"A pending divorce does not automatically turn related misconduct into protected TCPA activity. In privacy-based tort cases involving alleged disclosure of intimate images or private communications, courts will look to the actual pleaded injury and conduct, not the broader litigation backdrop. Family-law litigators should not assume subpoenas, depositions, or affair-related communications create TCPA protection."
Grant Hanson v. Tara Louise Nugent
COA03
In this SAPCR appeal, the father challenged a final order appointing the mother sole managing conservator, restricting his possession through a tiered supervised schedule tied to negative drug tests, and excluding evidence he said showed a disability, medication-assisted recovery, and a lawful THC prescription. The court reiterated that conservatorship and possession rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with sufficiency complaints folded into that review. But the excerpted opinion expressly resolved only the evidentiary complaint, holding it was forfeited because the father’s briefing failed to clearly identify the excluded evidence, address the trial objections, or provide supporting legal authority and analysis. The court affirmed the final SAPCR order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In custody appeals, preservation and briefing matter as much as the merits. If you want to complain about excluded evidence, identify the exact testimony or exhibit, make sure it is in the record, address the objection and ruling, and explain with authority why it was admissible. More broadly, trial courts can support sole managing conservatorship and stepped possession restrictions when the record ties a parent’s substance use to the child’s specific best-interest needs."
In the Interest of A.D., S.R., and K.A., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights to three children after she challenged only the sufficiency of the best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court restated the clear-and-convincing standard, the Holley best-interest factors, and the rule that evidence supporting endangerment grounds may also support best interest. The opinion highlighted evidence of methamphetamine use, a meth-possession conviction, domestic violence, a child born testing positive for methamphetamine and marihuana, prior Department involvement, and the mother’s failure to complete services and demonstrate stable, drug-free living. Applying those standards, the court held the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, past drug use, instability, CPS history, and incomplete services can strongly support a best-interest finding because courts may infer future risk from past conduct. For trial lawyers, the lesson is to build a clear timeline connecting substance abuse, criminal history, safety concerns, and service-plan performance to the child’s present and future needs."