Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of A.S.E. a/k/a A.E., a Child
COA01
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(E). The court reviewed the father’s conduct over time—not as isolated incidents—and focused on the child’s positive drug test at birth, the father’s repeated positive drug tests, numerous missed tests treated as positive, failed treatment efforts, failure to complete services, criminal charges and convictions, incarceration, domestic violence, and repeated violations of the Department’s safety plan. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and settled law that subsection (E) is proved through a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct that endangers a child’s physical or emotional well-being, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient. The court also upheld best interest, concluding that the father’s late improvement did not outweigh the child’s need for permanence and the stability of the relative placement that wished to adopt.
Litigation Takeaway
"Endangerment cases are won or lost on patterns, not excuses. Repeated drug use, missed tests, failed services, criminal trouble, and violations of safety measures can add up to a compelling course-of-conduct record, and late progress may not undo years of instability. In private custody cases, the same pattern evidence can justify restrictions, supervised possession, or limits on decision-making."
In the Matter of A.F. and I.M.A.F. v. The State of Texas
COA14
The State filed juvenile delinquency petitions against A.F. and I.M.A.F. and served their mother, but not their father, even though both parents’ identities and addresses were known. The juveniles argued that Texas Family Code § 53.04(d)(3) required service on both parents and moved to dismiss. Reviewing the statutory question de novo, the Fourteenth Court focused on the singular and disjunctive phrase “the parent, guardian, or custodian,” explaining that plural references to “names” and “residence addresses” do not create a requirement to serve every known parent. Similar language in § 53.06 and cases holding that summons to one parent is sufficient supported that interpretation. Section 53.04(d)(4) did not apply because the mother was known, located in Texas, and served. The court held that service on one parent satisfied the statutory notice requirement and affirmed the denial of the motions to dismiss and the resulting judgments.
Litigation Takeaway
"A statutory-notice challenge must rest on the precise text governing who must be served. Courts will not infer that every known parent or interested person must receive service merely from plural nouns when the operative provision identifies qualifying recipients in the singular and disjunctive. Counsel should distinguish between requirements to identify interested persons and requirements to serve them, preserve the exact alleged defect, and avoid relying on cases involving a complete failure to name or serve any parent."
In re Enriqueta Medina
COA14
In a divorce case, the trial court signed a final default divorce decree on September 30, 2024. The husband later claimed he never received notice of the decree and filed a motion for new trial months after the court’s plenary power expired. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(d), the trial court lost plenary power thirty days after signing the decree because no timely post-judgment motion extended that deadline. The court further explained that the clerk’s failure to send default-judgment notice under Rule 239a does not indefinitely extend the trial court’s power; any relief based on lack of notice must fit within the limited Rule 306a framework. Because the new-trial order was signed long after plenary power expired, it was void, and mandamus was the proper remedy to require the trial court to vacate it.
Litigation Takeaway
"Jurisdictional deadlines control, even when a party says they never got notice of a default decree. In family-law cases, lawyers must immediately analyze Rule 329b and Rule 306a deadlines after judgment; once plenary power expires, the trial court cannot grant an out-of-time new trial, and the available remedies shift to restricted appeal, bill of review, or mandamus against any void order."
Tina Thuy Truong and Tina 1960 Nails Salon, Inc. v. Hoa Hiep Hoang
COA01
In Truong v. Hoang, the spouses disputed how to treat value generated during marriage by the wife’s separate-property nail salon corporation. The trial court awarded the husband $384,307 as his share of a supposed community interest in salon income and entered judgment against both the wife and the corporation. The court of appeals held that community labor devoted to a spouse’s separate-property business does not create a direct ownership interest in the business or its income; instead, the proper theory is an equitable reimbursement claim under Texas Family Code section 3.402 for inadequate compensation to the community. Because reimbursement is resolved through reconstitution and just-and-right division between the spouses, and no independent basis for corporate liability was established, the judgment against the separate-property corporation was improper. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for the property division to be reconsidered under the proper reimbursement framework.
Litigation Takeaway
"If community labor enhanced one spouse’s separate business during marriage, plead and prove reimbursement—not ownership of the business profits. And if you want a judgment against the business entity itself, you need an independent theory like alter ego, fraud, or another entity-specific basis for liability."
Bisor v. State
COA05
In Bisor v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a general hearsay objection to an entire TDCJ prison pen packet did not preserve a narrower complaint that specific disciplinary entries contained inadmissible embedded hearsay. The court explained that when a composite exhibit contains both admissible and allegedly inadmissible material, the objecting party must identify the particular pages or statements being challenged so the trial court has a fair opportunity to rule. The court further indicated that, even if preserved, the pen packet was generally admissible as a self-authenticated public record and under the business-records exception, with the defendant’s own statements also admissible as party-opponent admissions. Finally, the court held that any assumed error was harmless because the punishment record already included a prior murder conviction, other misconduct evidence, and a 23-year sentence near the low end of the enhanced range.
Litigation Takeaway
"Blanket objections to mixed records usually are not enough. If only part of a composite exhibit is objectionable, identify the exact page, entry, or statement and state the precise basis—especially for embedded hearsay—so the issue is preserved for appeal. In family-law trials, this lesson applies directly to CPS files, medical records, school records, counseling records, police reports, and other multi-layered exhibits."
In Re Guardianship of S.M.D.
COA05
In this Texas guardianship case, the proposed ward’s cousin sought temporary and permanent guardianship and alleged that the ward’s agent under a power of attorney had used that authority for self-dealing, including creating a trust, naming himself trustee, and transferring assets. After the agent opposed guardianship and argued that less restrictive alternatives already existed, the probate court granted a motion under Estates Code § 1055.001, found his interests adverse to the proposed ward, and dismissed his contest for lack of standing. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of that standing ruling. Instead, applying Estates Code § 1022.001(c) and the probate-finality framework from De Ayala v. Mackie and Crowson, the court held the order was interlocutory because it did not dispose of a discrete phase of the proceeding: the permanent guardianship application remained pending and no permanent guardian had been appointed. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A major standing ruling in a guardianship case is not necessarily immediately appealable. If the probate court excludes your client from contesting guardianship under Estates Code § 1055.001 but the permanent guardianship phase is still pending, you likely must preserve error and wait for an appealable final probate order before seeking review."
The State of Texas for the Protection of M.D.J.
COA12
The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed a protective order against Nicholas McKay, holding that the appeal was not moot despite the order’s expiration because the family-violence finding carries collateral consequences in later family-law cases. On the merits, the court applied deferential legal- and factual-sufficiency review and concluded that the applicant’s testimony about repeated physical abuse, threats to kill her, a firearm threat, and a threat involving the child—corroborated by injury photographs and audio recordings—was more than sufficient to support findings that family violence occurred and was likely to occur in the future. The respondent’s contrary evidence, including the applicant’s prior assault arrest and ordinary text exchanges, created credibility conflicts for the trial court but did not render the findings unsupported or unjust. The court also rejected other appellate complaints as moot, inadequately briefed, or unpreserved.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas protective-order cases, credible testimony plus basic corroboration like photos and recordings can be enough to sustain a family-violence finding on appeal, even when the respondent offers competing narratives or impeachment evidence. Treat every protective-order hearing as a high-stakes record-building event because the resulting family-violence finding can continue to affect custody, possession, and divorce litigation long after the order expires."
Harris v. State
COA05
In Harris v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a 911 recording could be admitted through the business-records framework of Texas Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 902(10) based on a compliant records-custodian affidavit, even though neither the caller nor the dispatcher testified. The defendant challenged the recording on authentication, hearsay, and confrontation grounds. The court rejected the argument that 911 calls must be admitted, if at all, only as public records, and concluded that the affidavit sufficiently established the recording was kept in the regular course of business and that the offered copy was the original or an exact duplicate, making it self-authenticating. The court also held that the trial court properly addressed hearsay concerns by reviewing the audio, redacting objectionable portions, and admitting only the remainder, and that the caller’s statements during an ongoing emergency were non-testimonial under Davis v. Washington. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family lawyers, Harris is a practical roadmap for getting 911 audio into evidence without live testimony from the caller or dispatcher. A properly prepared Rule 902(10) affidavit can solve the authentication problem, but lawyers still must separately analyze the statements within the call for hearsay exceptions and be ready to propose targeted redactions rather than all-or-nothing admission."
Washington v. State
COA06
In Washington v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court had to continue trial after the State disclosed a recorded witness interview only days before trial in an assumed violation of Article 39.14. The trial court excluded the late-produced recording but allowed the previously identified witness to testify live. On appeal, the court focused on remedy and prejudice, holding that late disclosure alone does not require a continuance. Because the witness had long been known to the defense and the defendant did not explain with considerable specificity what additional investigation, impeachment, or trial preparation a continuance would have allowed, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the continuance. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that exclusion of the recording was an adequate remedy and that no concrete prejudice from proceeding to trial was shown.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a continuance based on late-produced evidence, do more than complain about timing. Make a specific record of what work still needs to be done, why a lesser remedy like exclusion is not enough, and exactly how going to trial now will cause concrete prejudice. In family law cases, that lesson applies directly to late-produced recordings, texts, business records, CPS materials, and witness statements."
In re Laci Kay Johnson a/k/a Laci Kay Bode
COA05
In this original proceeding, the relator sought mandamus relief from the trial court’s January 26, 2026 oral rulings denying a motion to dismiss and a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a Dallas family-law matter. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits. Instead, it applied laches under Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, emphasizing that an unexplained delay of four months or more can justify denial of mandamus. Because the relator waited more than five months to seek relief and gave no reasonable explanation for the delay—even considering an earlier defective Rule 52 filing—the court held laches barred mandamus and denied related emergency motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus is a diligence-driven remedy: if you intend to challenge an oral ruling in a family-law case, move quickly, comply with Rule 52, and explain any delay in the petition and record. Waiting four months or more without a solid explanation can forfeit extraordinary relief before the court ever considers the merits."