Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Glen Edward Williams v. Office of the Attorney General Child Support Division and Alycia Monet Kelley
COA03
In Williams, the Austin Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the father's bill of review challenging prior child-support-related orders because the appeal was jurisdictionally premature. Williams filed his bill of review in the same cause number as the underlying case, where a separate petition to terminate child-support withholding was still pending. Applying Lehmann and Bella Palma, the court analyzed finality by looking at the entire cause, not just the bill-of-review ruling, and held the order was not final because it neither disposed of the remaining withholding claim nor contained a clear and unequivocal statement that it disposed of all claims and all parties. Because no statute authorized an interlocutory appeal from that nonfinal order, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume an order denying a bill of review is immediately appealable in a family-law case. Before filing a notice of appeal, audit the entire cause number for any live pleadings and make sure the order either resolves every remaining claim or includes unmistakable finality language; otherwise, the appeal may be dismissed as premature."
In the Estate of Allie Marie Brock Fugler, Deceased
COA12
The Tyler Court of Appeals reversed a take-nothing summary judgment in an estate dispute arising from an allegedly invalid premarital agreement. The decedent’s child and grandchild sued the executor for breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, alleging he wrongly relied on and enforced a forged or invalid premarital agreement and mishandled estate assets. Another party filed a no-evidence motion asserting broadly that the claims depended on the agreement’s validity, but the motion did not identify which specific elements of the pleaded claims lacked evidence. The court held Rule 166a(i) requires a no-evidence motion to target actual claim elements, not just attack the opponent’s overall theory of the case. The court also held the trial court could not grant summary judgment for the executor because he never filed or joined the motion. Even if the motion were construed generously, the plaintiffs produced more than a scintilla of evidence through a handwriting expert affidavit raising a fact issue on the agreement’s authenticity. The court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"A no-evidence summary judgment motion must identify the exact elements that allegedly lack evidentiary support; attacking only the other side’s “central theory” is not enough. Also, a trial court cannot grant summary judgment to a party who did not move for it or join the motion."
In re Laci Kay Johnson a/k/a Laci Kay Bode
COA05
In this original proceeding, the relator sought mandamus relief from the trial court’s January 26, 2026 oral rulings denying a motion to dismiss and a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a Dallas family-law matter. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits. Instead, it applied laches under Rivercenter Assocs. v. Rivera, emphasizing that an unexplained delay of four months or more can justify denial of mandamus. Because the relator waited more than five months to seek relief and gave no reasonable explanation for the delay—even considering an earlier defective Rule 52 filing—the court held laches barred mandamus and denied related emergency motions as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus is a diligence-driven remedy: if you intend to challenge an oral ruling in a family-law case, move quickly, comply with Rule 52, and explain any delay in the petition and record. Waiting four months or more without a solid explanation can forfeit extraordinary relief before the court ever considers the merits."
Robert Link v. The State of Texas
COA12
The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed Robert Link’s conviction for repeated violation of a protective order. The key dispute was identity: Link argued the State failed to prove he sent the June 29 and July 11, 2023 texts and calls because the communications came from spoofed or changing phone numbers and no carrier records directly tied those numbers to him. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Texas circumstantial-evidence precedent, the court held the jury could rely on the cumulative force of the evidence, including the content of the messages, references to the parties’ DNA and protective-order disputes, Link’s prior pattern of unwanted contact, expert testimony explaining spoofing, and similar-transaction testimony from another former partner. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, that evidence allowed a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Link was the sender and that he repeatedly violated the protective order under Penal Code sections 25.072 and 25.07.
Litigation Takeaway
"Direct phone-company proof is helpful but not always necessary in protective-order enforcement cases. If anonymized texts, calls, or app messages contain details uniquely tied to the respondent and fit an established pattern of harassment, courts may find circumstantial evidence sufficient. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a narrative with preserved messages, context, timelines, corroborating witnesses, and pattern evidence rather than relying solely on digital subscriber records."
Gabriel Joshua Alonzo v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Gabriel Joshua Alonzo v. State of Texas, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that an ex-boyfriend’s prior access to a woman’s home did not defeat a burglary conviction where she had the greater present right to possession and had revoked consent for him to enter. The court focused on possession at the time of entry, relying on Penal Code section 1.07(a)(35)(A) and Morgan v. State, and found the evidence sufficient because the complainant leased and occupied the home, the relationship had ended, he was not on the lease, did not pay rent, and she testified he was no longer allowed inside. The court also held the evidence supported the assault and theft elements because he grabbed, shook, and shoved her causing pain, then took her phone during a 911 call and kept it for several days. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In breakup and separation cases, past access to a residence—keys, overnight stays, mail, or informal living arrangements—does not necessarily create a continuing right to enter. The winning record is built on present possessory facts: lease or title status, actual occupancy, payment history, clear revocation of consent, changed locks or codes, and contemporaneous objective evidence."
The State of Texas for the Protection of M.D.J.
COA12
The Tyler Court of Appeals affirmed a protective order against Nicholas McKay, holding that the appeal was not moot despite the order’s expiration because the family-violence finding carries collateral consequences in later family-law cases. On the merits, the court applied deferential legal- and factual-sufficiency review and concluded that the applicant’s testimony about repeated physical abuse, threats to kill her, a firearm threat, and a threat involving the child—corroborated by injury photographs and audio recordings—was more than sufficient to support findings that family violence occurred and was likely to occur in the future. The respondent’s contrary evidence, including the applicant’s prior assault arrest and ordinary text exchanges, created credibility conflicts for the trial court but did not render the findings unsupported or unjust. The court also rejected other appellate complaints as moot, inadequately briefed, or unpreserved.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas protective-order cases, credible testimony plus basic corroboration like photos and recordings can be enough to sustain a family-violence finding on appeal, even when the respondent offers competing narratives or impeachment evidence. Treat every protective-order hearing as a high-stakes record-building event because the resulting family-violence finding can continue to affect custody, possession, and divorce litigation long after the order expires."
Washington v. State
COA06
In Washington v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals considered whether a trial court had to continue trial after the State disclosed a recorded witness interview only days before trial in an assumed violation of Article 39.14. The trial court excluded the late-produced recording but allowed the previously identified witness to testify live. On appeal, the court focused on remedy and prejudice, holding that late disclosure alone does not require a continuance. Because the witness had long been known to the defense and the defendant did not explain with considerable specificity what additional investigation, impeachment, or trial preparation a continuance would have allowed, the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the continuance. The appellate court affirmed, concluding that exclusion of the recording was an adequate remedy and that no concrete prejudice from proceeding to trial was shown.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want a continuance based on late-produced evidence, do more than complain about timing. Make a specific record of what work still needs to be done, why a lesser remedy like exclusion is not enough, and exactly how going to trial now will cause concrete prejudice. In family law cases, that lesson applies directly to late-produced recordings, texts, business records, CPS materials, and witness statements."
Harris v. State
COA05
In Harris v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a 911 recording could be admitted through the business-records framework of Texas Rules of Evidence 803(6) and 902(10) based on a compliant records-custodian affidavit, even though neither the caller nor the dispatcher testified. The defendant challenged the recording on authentication, hearsay, and confrontation grounds. The court rejected the argument that 911 calls must be admitted, if at all, only as public records, and concluded that the affidavit sufficiently established the recording was kept in the regular course of business and that the offered copy was the original or an exact duplicate, making it self-authenticating. The court also held that the trial court properly addressed hearsay concerns by reviewing the audio, redacting objectionable portions, and admitting only the remainder, and that the caller’s statements during an ongoing emergency were non-testimonial under Davis v. Washington. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family lawyers, Harris is a practical roadmap for getting 911 audio into evidence without live testimony from the caller or dispatcher. A properly prepared Rule 902(10) affidavit can solve the authentication problem, but lawyers still must separately analyze the statements within the call for hearsay exceptions and be ready to propose targeted redactions rather than all-or-nothing admission."
Soma v. Winborne
COA12
In Soma v. Winborne, a husband sought restitution after he and his wife spent more than $200,000 building a home on the wife’s parents’ land, claiming they had been promised a parcel of the property. After a bench trial, the court found there was no contract, no oral promise to gift land, and no agreement to convey land. Applying Texas unjust-enrichment law, the appellate court held that a landowner’s receipt of a benefit is not enough; the plaintiff must prove the benefit was obtained by fraud, duress, or undue advantage. Because the expenditures were voluntary improvements to land the couple knew they did not own, and the factfinder rejected the alleged promise of future title, the court affirmed the take-nothing judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"If marital funds are used to improve land titled in parents, in-laws, or other third parties, do not rely on unjust enrichment as a fallback. In Texas, voluntary improvements to another’s land are not recoverable absent proof of wrongful conduct such as fraud, duress, or undue advantage, so family-law counsel should document ownership expectations and plead specific legal theories early."
Juan Fidel Lopez Antonio v. PNC Bank National Association
COA12
On restricted appeal from a default judgment, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a private process server’s return was not defective under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 107(e) merely because the unsworn declaration cited 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and stated it was made under penalty of perjury under federal law. The court analyzed Rule 107(e)’s requirement that the return be verified or signed under penalty of perjury in substantially the prescribed form, and concluded strict compliance does not require a talismanic reference to Texas law. Because the return included the server’s identifying information, execution details, signature, and a perjury-backed attestation, there was no error apparent on the face of the record, and the default judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you are defending a default judgment, a return of service is not automatically void just because the private server used federal unsworn-declaration language instead of expressly invoking Texas law. The key is whether the return still contains Rule 107’s essential service details and a signed attestation under penalty of perjury; attacks should focus on real omissions, not stylistic wording differences."