Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Treadway v. State
COA12
In Treadway v. State, the Tyler Court of Appeals considered whether evidence that the defendant engaged in similar sexual misconduct with another child could be admitted after the defense argued the complainant fabricated her allegations. The court held the evidence was admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b) because it was offered for a non-character purpose—to rebut the fabrication defense—rather than to show propensity. The court also held the trial court acted within its discretion under Rule 403 because, in a credibility-driven child-abuse case, the evidence was highly probative and its value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you make fabrication, coaching, mistake, or accident a central theory, you may open the door to otherwise excluded other-acts evidence. In family cases involving child allegations, courts may admit similar prior-act evidence for a non-propensity purpose if it directly rebuts that theory and survives Rule 403 balancing."
In the Interest of H.F., a Child
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals independently reviewed the entire record, counsel’s brief, and Mother’s pro se response, which raised fairness concerns, recent sobriety efforts, and explanations for missed services and drug tests. The court held those arguments did not reveal an arguable appellate issue, especially where they relied on matters outside the trial record or were contradicted by evidence showing repeated positive drug tests, missed tests, homelessness, unemployment, and noncompliance with services. The court affirmed the termination order under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (b)(2), and denied counsel’s motion to withdraw because under In re P.M., a belief that the appeal is frivolous is not by itself good cause to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
"Appeals are won on preserved error and the trial record, not on post-judgment explanations or extra-record documents. In termination and other family-law cases, lawyers must build the evidentiary record before judgment and, for appointed appellate counsel, remember that Anders affirmance does not automatically end representation."
In the Interest of B.L.H., M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., D.R.D.S., Children
COA10
In In re B.L.H., the Waco Court of Appeals held that a mother whose parental rights were terminated could not appeal only the order appointing DFPS as managing conservator while leaving the termination judgment unchallenged. Mother argued DFPS failed to overcome the parental presumption under Texas Family Code section 153.131(a), but the court explained that once termination stands, section 161.206(b) divests the parent of all legal rights and duties, including the ability to invoke rights available only to a legal parent. Relying on In re J.D.G., the court treated DFPS’s conservatorship appointment as a consequence of the unchallenged termination rather than a separate issue Mother had standing to contest. The court therefore rejected her appeal on standing grounds without reaching the sufficiency of the conservatorship evidence. The court also affirmed Father’s termination under Anders review and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a parent wants to challenge DFPS conservatorship on appeal, counsel usually must also challenge the termination ruling that extinguishes parental status. Once termination is left intact, the parent generally loses standing to rely on the parental presumption or attack conservatorship as if still a legal parent."
Gregory Jack v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Jack v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed adjudication and revocation of deferred-adjudication community supervision because the State proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Gregory Jack failed to report as directed. Although Jack argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove a separate alleged new-law violation involving discharge of a firearm, the court applied settled revocation law holding that one proven supervision violation is enough to sustain revocation. The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, noted the supervision officer’s testimony that Jack had notice and failed to appear, and emphasized that Jack neither challenged that finding on appeal nor developed any due-diligence defense. Because the unchallenged reporting violation independently supported the judgment, the court affirmed without needing to resolve the attacked new-offense ground.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a trial court’s order rests on multiple independent grounds, an appeal can fail unless every ground is challenged. For family-law litigators, even a so-called “technical” violation—like failing to report, attend, exchange, notify, or complete services—can independently carry the ruling if it is pleaded, proved, and left unanswered."
Richard Pasillas v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Pasillas v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether admitting muted body-camera footage showing a non-testifying complainant crying, gesturing, and displaying injuries violated the Confrontation Clause. Rather than deciding that constitutional question, the court assumed error and analyzed harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) and the Langham factors. The court held any assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the video was cumulative of other evidence admitted without objection, including officer observations, photographs of injuries, EMT testimony recounting the complainant’s description of the assault, and Pasillas’s separate admission establishing the second predicate assault. The conviction for continuous violence against the family was therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A good evidentiary objection may not win on appeal if the same fact came in elsewhere without objection. In family-violence-related litigation, lawyers must preserve error across every parallel evidence source, while proponents should build redundancy so the judgment can survive harmless-error review even if one item is later excluded."
Graeme v. Graeme
COA03
In Graeme v. Graeme, the Third Court of Appeals treated a dispute over a Mediator’s Proposal as a straightforward contract-construction case. The agreement required Brian to repay $625,000 to the trust, required Paul to repay $75,000, and provided that upon those payments and reimbursement of expenses, the remaining trust assets would be divided equally among the three siblings. Brian argued that a later clause allowing the parties to “account for and net out” the repayment amounts let him simply reduce his distribution instead of paying first. Reading the agreement as a whole, the court held that the payment language in Paragraphs 1 and 6 created an express payment-first sequence and condition precedent to final distribution. Paragraph 7 was only a permissive administrative mechanism and did not give Brian a unilateral right to offset his debt against his share. The court therefore affirmed enforcement of the agreement requiring repayment before distribution.
Litigation Takeaway
"If an MSA or property-settlement agreement says a party must pay, reimburse, or contribute funds before distribution, a later general “net out” or accounting clause usually will not override that sequencing unless the agreement says so clearly. Draft offsets and equalization provisions with precision, especially whether offset is optional, unilateral, and a substitute for payment or merely an accounting tool."
In re Office of the Attorney General of Texas
COA03
In this mandamus proceeding, the Texas Office of the Attorney General challenged a trial court order transferring an entire SAPCR from Texas to Arizona, including the child-support portion of the case. The court held that even if custody-related issues could be transferred under UCCJEA-type principles, child support is governed separately by UIFSA. Because Texas issued the support order and Father still lived in Texas, Texas retained continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over support under Family Code section 159.205(a). The court also concluded that Family Code section 155.301 authorizes only intrastate transfers, not interstate transfer of support jurisdiction. Because the transfer order was interlocutory and not immediately appealable, mandamus was the proper remedy. The court further rejected the argument that the support-transfer language was merely a clerical error correctable by nunc pro tunc, holding the mistake was judicial. Mandamus was conditionally granted to vacate the order insofar as it transferred child support to Arizona.
Litigation Takeaway
"Custody jurisdiction and support jurisdiction do not automatically travel together. Even when another state may become the proper forum for conservatorship or possession issues, Texas keeps child-support jurisdiction under UIFSA so long as the obligor, obligee, or child still resides here, absent a statutory exception. Family lawyers should draft transfer motions and orders with precision, carve out support expressly, and treat an improper interstate support transfer as a mandamus issue."
Suarez v. State
COA13
In Suarez v. State, the defendant challenged whether a prior deferred-adjudication disposition for continuous violence against the family could satisfy the prior-conviction element needed to elevate a new family-violence assault to a felony under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(A). The court applied the legal-sufficiency standard and focused on the statute’s text, especially § 22.01(f)(1), which expressly defines “previously convicted” to include a guilty or nolo contendere plea that resulted in deferred adjudication, whether or not sentence was ever later imposed. Because the State introduced certified records showing Suarez’s guilty plea and deferred adjudication for a qualifying family-violence offense, the court held the evidence was legally sufficient and that no later adjudication of guilt was required during guilt-innocence. The court also modified the judgment to reflect the jury’s repeat-offender enhancement finding that had been omitted from the written judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not make blanket arguments that deferred adjudication is “not a conviction.” In Texas family-law and family-violence litigation, the controlling statute may give a deferred-adjudication plea real legal effect. Read the exact statutory definition, and use certified plea papers and orders—not summaries—to prove or challenge the prior proceeding."
Chelby Thrasher v. Jessica Thrasher
COA11
In this divorce appeal, Chelby Thrasher challenged the denial of reimbursement, the characterization of certain assets as Jessica Thrasher’s separate property, the overall just-and-right property division, and an attorney’s-fees award. The court held that reimbursement was waived because Chelby did not plead it as an affirmative claim and, without the reporter’s record, the court could not determine whether the issue was tried by consent or otherwise preserved. As to property characterization, property division, and attorney’s fees, the court explained that each complaint depended on the evidence presented at the final hearing. Because Chelby failed to provide the reporter’s record required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6, the appellate court was required to presume the omitted evidence supported the divorce decree and therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge a divorce decree on appeal, you must bring a complete reporter’s record for any issue that depends on trial evidence. Also, reimbursement must be affirmatively pleaded or clearly tried by consent; otherwise the claim is likely waived."
Stapleton v. Prather
COA03
In Stapleton v. Prather, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a 2005 divorce decree requiring the parents to fund their children’s 529 plans as “additional child support” did not actually divide ownership of those accounts. The court analyzed the decree under ordinary decree-construction principles and Texas Family Code §§ 9.201 and 9.203, emphasizing the difference between imposing support obligations and expressly awarding or divesting property interests. Because the decree referenced the children’s 529 accounts and their educational purpose but never stated who owned the accounts or who was awarded the spouses’ interests, the court concluded the accounts were omitted property subject to a later just-and-right division. The court also rejected res judicata and judicial-admission defenses at the summary-judgment stage, reversed the associated fee award, and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree is supposed to transfer, confirm, or extinguish a spouse’s interest in a financial account, it must say so expressly. Support language about funding an account does not substitute for property-division language, and vague references to a child’s account can leave the asset open to later omitted-property litigation under Family Code § 9.203."