Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Servello v. VillaSport LLC
COA14
In Servello v. VillaSport LLC, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered a temporary injunction entered in a business-disparagement and defamation suit ordering a former employee to remove a social-media video. Although the parties did not raise the issue, the court reviewed sua sponte whether the injunction complied with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. Rule 683 requires a temporary injunction order to set the cause for trial on the merits in the order itself. Because the injunction omitted a trial setting, the court held the order was void, reversed the temporary injunction, and remanded. The court also affirmed denial of the appellant’s TCPA motion to dismiss.
Litigation Takeaway
"When seeking or opposing temporary injunctive relief, do not treat Rule 683 as a technicality. The signed injunction order itself must include a merits trial setting, and appellate courts may reverse a temporary injunction for that omission even if no party raises it. In family-law cases, careful injunction drafting is as important as proving the injunction elements."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Sheetal Rane and Prasanth Marreddy
COA05
In this divorce appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court improperly included a Mumbai property in the marital estate and ordered it sold because the evidence showed Wife had gifted the property to her mother before the divorce. Under Texas Family Code section 7.001, a court may divide only property that is part of the marital estate, so once the property was transferred to a third party it was no longer divisible between the spouses. Because the erroneous inclusion of the Mumbai property affected the overall property division, the court reversed and remanded for a new division.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before asking a court to divide or sell an asset in divorce, prove the spouses actually owned it at the time of divorce. In foreign-property and informal-title cases especially, a completed pre-divorce transfer to a third party takes the asset outside the marital estate and can undo the entire property division on appeal."
Ex parte Warren McGee
COA01
In Ex parte Warren McGee, the First Court of Appeals addressed a habeas challenge to a criminal-contempt judgment after the underlying show-cause order broadly alleged that McGee had committed a crime or engaged in conduct leading to his arrest, but did not identify the specific offense or conduct. The court’s discussion emphasized that in criminal contempt proceedings, the show-cause order operates as the charging instrument and must give constitutionally adequate notice of the alleged offense under Ex parte Estevez and Jenkins v. State. The excerpted opinion notes that a show-cause order that fails to state an offense is void, and any contempt judgment based on it is likewise void. But because the supplied opinion text is truncated, the only clear case-specific disposition is that the court affirmed the habeas court’s denial of relief after considering whether the trial court had jurisdiction to later set aside the contempt judgment and dismiss the show-cause order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat every contempt show-cause order like a criminal charging instrument. In family-law enforcement and protective-order contempt practice, vague allegations can create a structural notice defect that may jeopardize the entire contempt proceeding, so plead the exact violated provision and the specific conduct with precision—and attack deficient notice early."
In the Interest of A.T., a Child
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR appeal, alleged paternal grandparents intervened seeking standing under former Texas Family Code sections 102.004(a)(2), 102.004(b), and 153.432. The court treated standing as a jurisdictional issue and applied the no-evidence framework for challenged jurisdictional facts. Although the parties disputed whether Brent Taylor was the child’s father, the court resolved the case on a narrower ground: the intervenors produced no evidence that they were Brent Taylor’s parents. Because every standing theory depended on proving that lineage link, pleadings and assumptions were not enough. The court held the Taylors failed to raise a fact issue on grandparent status, so dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction was proper.
Litigation Takeaway
"If standing depends on a family relationship, prove every link in the chain with actual evidence. In grandparent-access and conservatorship cases, allegations, shared surnames, or indirect references will not substitute for proof of lineage, and a missing jurisdictional link can end the case before the court ever reaches best interest."
In the Interest of N.A.T., a Child
COA05
In *In re N.A.T.*, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a father could not use Texas Family Code § 161.005 to undo a prior adjudication of paternity because his mistaken-paternity petition was filed too late. Although he claimed he first learned in December 2023 that he was not the child’s biological father, the record showed he had suspected nonpaternity for years, requested court-ordered genetic testing in the 2009 divorce, and attempted at-home DNA testing in 2012. The court treated the date of awareness as a fact issue for the trial court and deferred to the trial court’s implied finding that Father was aware of facts indicating nonpaternity well more than two years before filing suit in June 2024. Because limitations barred the petition, Father failed to establish the meritorious prima facie case required by § 161.005(f), so the trial court was not required to order genetic testing. The court also held Father did not preserve his due-process complaint and affirmed the support-modification order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mistaken-paternity claims can be lost on limitations before any DNA test is ever ordered. If a parent suspected nonpaternity years earlier, prior requests for testing, prior statements, or prior conduct can defeat a later § 161.005 petition at the prima facie stage. For family-law litigators, this case highlights the importance of building or attacking the limitations record early and preserving any procedural or due-process complaints clearly on the record."
Loyo v. Stephen
COA14
In Loyo v. Stephen, a tort creditor sought to execute on real property that had been community property during marriage but was later awarded to the nondebtor spouse in the divorce decree as her separate property. The court analyzed Texas Family Code § 3.202(d) using a plain-language approach and held that "all community property" remains subject to a spouse’s tort liability incurred during marriage. The court concluded that the debtor spouse’s liability was incurred, at the latest, when the arbitrator issued the fiduciary-duty award and the trial court confirmed it during the marriage, even though the confirmation order later merged into a final post-divorce judgment. The court also rejected the argument that the final judgment had to expressly restate the tort finding or attach the arbitration award. Because the liability arose during marriage, the former community property awarded to the nondebtor spouse remained reachable, and the judgment authorizing execution was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A divorce decree does not automatically shield former community property from a spouse’s tort creditors. Family lawyers must investigate pending tort and arbitration exposure before dividing property, because if liability was fixed during marriage, retitling an asset to the nondebtor spouse may not prevent later execution under Family Code § 3.202(d)."
In the Interest of S.K. and A.K., Children
COA02
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the mother did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence but instead argued that the jury charge improperly defined “endanger” and that her appointed counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge drug-test evidence. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the jury-charge complaint was waived because no objection was made in the trial court, and longstanding Texas Supreme Court precedent forecloses any due-process exception to ordinary preservation rules in termination cases. The court also rejected the ineffective-assistance claim because the criminal forensic licensing and accreditation statutes the mother relied on apply only in criminal cases, so counsel was not deficient for failing to make a meritless objection. The court affirmed the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination cases do not get a free pass on error preservation. If you want to complain about the jury charge on appeal, you must object clearly and on the record in the trial court. And ineffective-assistance arguments will fail if the omitted objection had no valid legal basis—especially when counsel tries to import criminal evidentiary rules into a civil family-law case."
In the Interest of R.R.D. and L.R.W., Children
COA05
In In re R.R.D., the parents tried to directly appeal temporary orders requiring them to participate in protective services under Texas Family Code § 264.203. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the issue as purely jurisdictional and held that because the challenged orders were temporary family-law orders, Family Code § 105.001(e) barred an interlocutory appeal. The court further concluded that § 264.203 did not create an independent right to immediate appellate review, and because the parents identified no other statute authorizing interlocutory jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a burdensome temporary family-law order can be appealed just because it has immediate consequences. Before filing a notice of appeal, confirm there is an express statutory basis for interlocutory review; otherwise, counsel should consider alternatives like mandamus, trial-court modification, and preserving error for appeal after a final order."
In re Aaron Nicholas Thomas
COA09
After a trial court entered a default protective order, it granted the respondent’s motion for new trial during its plenary-power period based on alleged defective service and lack of notice. The relator sought mandamus, arguing among other things that he did not receive notice of the new-trial hearing. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held mandamus was unavailable because this was a nonjury new-trial order entered while the trial court still had plenary power, so the relator had an adequate appellate remedy: he could seek reconsideration and reinstatement in the trial court and, if necessary, challenge the ruling on appeal from a final order. The court also concluded the complained-of notice problem did not create the extraordinary circumstances needed for mandamus relief, and the order was not void.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-court judge sets aside a default order in a bench proceeding while plenary power is still open, do not assume mandamus is the answer. First build your record in the trial court, move for reconsideration, and preserve any service or notice complaints for a later appeal; absent a void order or truly exceptional harm, appellate courts will expect you to use those ordinary remedies."
Balderas v. Balderas
COA09
In Balderas v. Balderas, the petitioner filed for divorce and made multiple attempts to serve the respondent, including citation, certified mail, substituted service, and publication-related efforts, but never perfected service as required by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. After the trial court twice issued notices of intent to dismiss for want of prosecution, the petitioner responded to the first but failed to file a timely motion to retain after the second notice. The Beaumont Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted within its discretion in dismissing the case because attempted service is not the same as perfected service, a substituted-service order does not complete service without a Rule 107-compliant return, and the petitioner failed to show the diligence and good cause required to retain the case on the docket.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, service efforts alone will not save a case from dismissal—service must actually be perfected, and any dismissal notice must be answered with a timely, rule-compliant motion to retain showing specific diligence and good cause."