Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Richard Pasillas v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Pasillas v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether admitting muted body-camera footage showing a non-testifying complainant crying, gesturing, and displaying injuries violated the Confrontation Clause. Rather than deciding that constitutional question, the court assumed error and analyzed harm under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a) and the Langham factors. The court held any assumed error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the video was cumulative of other evidence admitted without objection, including officer observations, photographs of injuries, EMT testimony recounting the complainant’s description of the assault, and Pasillas’s separate admission establishing the second predicate assault. The conviction for continuous violence against the family was therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A good evidentiary objection may not win on appeal if the same fact came in elsewhere without objection. In family-violence-related litigation, lawyers must preserve error across every parallel evidence source, while proponents should build redundancy so the judgment can survive harmless-error review even if one item is later excluded."
In the Interest of S.M.T. and S.J.T., Children
COA14
In this post-divorce SAPCR modification case, the father tried to undo an in-court Rule 11 settlement after the trial court accepted the agreement and stated the orders were effective that day. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused on the key procedural question: whether consent still existed at rendition. Applying Texas Rule 11 principles and S&A Restaurant Corp. v. Leal, the court held that consent may be withdrawn only before rendition, not after. Because the settlement terms were recited in open court, father personally agreed to them, and the trial court rendered judgment before father attempted to back away, his later refusal to sign and later objections did not prevent entry of a conforming written order. The appellate court also rejected father's complaint that the written order improperly changed the children's primary residence, concluding the record supported the trial court's view that the rendered agreement imposed a Clear Creek ISD-based framework rather than designating father's address as the primary residence.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you settle a family-law case on the record, the moment that matters is rendition, not the later signature. Once the court accepts the Rule 11 agreement and renders it effective, buyer's remorse usually cannot undo the deal; from then on, the real fight is whether the written order truly conforms to what was recited in court."
Chelby Thrasher v. Jessica Thrasher
COA11
In this divorce appeal, Chelby Thrasher challenged the denial of reimbursement, the characterization of certain assets as Jessica Thrasher’s separate property, the overall just-and-right property division, and an attorney’s-fees award. The court held that reimbursement was waived because Chelby did not plead it as an affirmative claim and, without the reporter’s record, the court could not determine whether the issue was tried by consent or otherwise preserved. As to property characterization, property division, and attorney’s fees, the court explained that each complaint depended on the evidence presented at the final hearing. Because Chelby failed to provide the reporter’s record required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6, the appellate court was required to presume the omitted evidence supported the divorce decree and therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge a divorce decree on appeal, you must bring a complete reporter’s record for any issue that depends on trial evidence. Also, reimbursement must be affirmatively pleaded or clearly tried by consent; otherwise the claim is likely waived."
In the Interest of M.R.L.
COA04
In a contested SAPCR, the trial court entered a default final order after the mother failed to appear, even though no reporter’s record was made and the order recited that the parties waived the record. The court of appeals held that Family Code § 105.003(c) imposes an affirmative duty on the trial court to ensure a record is made in any contested SAPCR final hearing unless all parties validly waive it with the court’s consent. Because the pleadings showed an active dispute over conservatorship and residence restrictions, the case remained contested despite the mother’s absence. And because the mother was absent and unrepresented at trial, she could not waive the reporter’s record. The absence of a record was error apparent on the face of the record and harmful because it prevented meaningful appellate review, so the court reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not treat a default prove-up on parent-child issues like an ordinary civil default. If the pleadings make the SAPCR contested, get a court reporter and make a record; an absent, unrepresented party cannot waive it, and skipping the record can make the default order easy to reverse on appeal."
David Cortez v. Alicia Cortez
COA04
In a default-divorce appeal, the parties settled during the appeal and asked the court of appeals to render an agreed judgment adopting their mediated parenting plan and child-support terms. The court held it could not do so because Texas Family Code § 153.007 requires the trial court to approve any agreed parenting plan involving conservatorship, possession, or support based on a best-interest finding, and appellate courts cannot make that factual determination in the first instance. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.1(a)(2)(B), the court set aside the judgment and remanded the case so the trial court could consider the agreement and, if appropriate, render judgment consistent with it after making the required best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a family-law appeal settles on child-related issues, do not ask the court of appeals to simply render the agreement. Structure the disposition as vacatur and remand, because only the trial court can approve a parenting plan under § 153.007 after finding it is in the child’s best interest."
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA01
The State sought to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer A.M. to criminal district court on three aggravated-assault allegations and a murder allegation arising from multiple shootings. Applying Texas Family Code §§ 54.02(a) and (f), the First Court of Appeals concluded that surveillance footage, witness testimony, and officer identifications supplied probable cause and supported the finding that the seriousness of the person-directed offenses and the need to protect the community required criminal proceedings. For the murder allegation, the State did not have to identify whose bullet killed the victim at the transfer stage; evidence that A.M. fired repeatedly into the occupied vehicle during the fatal shooting supported probable cause under felony-murder or party-liability principles. Although A.M. presented evidence of cognitive limitations, low intellectual functioning, impulsivity, and mental-health concerns, the juvenile court could reasonably give greater weight to the repeated firearm violence, post-release conduct, and public-safety risks. The appellate court therefore held that the transfer findings were supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence and affirmed the waiver orders as within the juvenile court’s discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"At a juvenile-transfer hearing, probable cause is a preliminary screening standard, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence of coordinated violent conduct may support transfer under felony-murder or party-liability theories even when the State cannot identify who fired the fatal shot. Cognitive or mental-health mitigation will not necessarily overcome repeated, person-directed violence; counsel seeking rehabilitation-focused relief should present a concrete, credible plan for treatment, supervision, placement, and public safety rather than relying on diagnoses alone."
Wilson v. State
COA05
In Wilson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed an aggravated-assault-by-threat conviction arising from a domestic-violence fire set inside an occupied apartment. Wilson poured gasoline on his girlfriend, ignited it, and fled while her teenage son, NF, was asleep in the home. On appeal, Wilson argued there was no evidence he intentionally or knowingly threatened NF because he made no express threat to the child and the child was not his primary target. The court rejected that argument, holding that circumstantial evidence was enough: Wilson knew NF was home, intentionally started a fire in the residence, fled through NF’s window, and created an immediate life-threatening condition that caused NF to believe he would die and to jump from a second-story window to escape. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court held a rational jury could find an intentional or knowing threat of imminent bodily injury and could also find use of a deadly weapon, because fire and the means used to ignite it were inherently dangerous. The court affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child does not have to be the direct target of household violence for the conduct to support serious safety findings. In family-law cases, circumstantial evidence that a parent knowingly created an immediately dangerous condition in an occupied home can strongly support family-violence allegations, endangerment findings, protective orders, and restrictions on conservatorship or possession."
In the Interest of J.J.C., a Child
COA05
In In re J.J.C., the Dallas Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from an order denying post-judgment motions filed more than twelve years after a 2013 child-support order. The appellant argued the earlier order was void for jurisdictional reasons, but the court focused on procedure rather than the underlying voidness claim. It held that motions filed in the original family-law case under the same cause number were not a true collateral attack; under Texas law, a collateral attack on an allegedly void judgment must be brought as a new proceeding under a different cause number. Because the 2025 motions were merely untimely post-judgment motions in the old case, the denial order was neither a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order, and any effort to challenge the 2013 order directly was untimely. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Calling an old family-law order “void” does not make a later denial order appealable. If deadlines for a direct attack have expired, a party seeking to challenge a judgment as void must use the correct procedural vehicle—typically a new collateral proceeding under a new cause number—or risk having the case dismissed before any court reaches the merits."
In the Matter of A.M.
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring A.M. to criminal district court under Texas Family Code section 54.02(a). The State alleged three aggravated assaults with a deadly weapon and one murder arising from multiple shootings, including one incident in which A.M. allegedly fired nine rounds into an occupied vehicle and a passenger was killed. On appeal, A.M. argued the evidence was insufficient on probable cause and the welfare-of-the-community finding, and emphasized his extremely low intellectual functioning and mental-health history. The court applied the section 54.02(a) transfer requirements and the nonexclusive section 54.02(f) factors, held the violent, repeated offenses against persons and the failure of prior interventions supported transfer, and concluded the juvenile court was entitled to weigh public-safety concerns more heavily than the evidence favoring treatment in juvenile court. The court also held probable cause existed on the murder allegation even though the investigator could not identify which shooter fired the fatal bullet, and it affirmed the denial of a fitness-to-proceed evidentiary hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a case involves youth violence, courts tend to focus on structured statutory factors and will defer heavily to the trial judge’s weighing of conflicting evidence. In family-law litigation, repeated violent conduct, firearm use, surveillance evidence, and failed prior interventions can strongly support emergency relief, possession restrictions, and conservatorship limits; mental-health or cognitive-deficit evidence is most persuasive when tied to a concrete treatment, supervision, and safety plan."
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA01
In In the Matter of A.M., the First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring A.M. to criminal district court under Texas Family Code section 54.02. The State presented surveillance footage, witness testimony, and officer identification tying A.M. to three aggravated assaults and to a shooting in which Faridah Davis was killed. A.M. argued that his low IQ, cognitive limitations, mental-health history, and prior fitness concerns weighed against transfer, but the court held that the juvenile court could reasonably give greater weight to the seriousness and repeated nature of the violent offenses, the recency of the conduct after release from detention, and community-safety concerns. The court also held probable cause existed on the murder allegation even though the State could not yet prove which shooter fired the fatal bullet, because evidence showed A.M. fired multiple rounds into the occupied vehicle and acted in concert with another shooter. The transfer order was therefore supported by sufficient evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a record shows serious, repeated violence supported by objective evidence like video, witnesses, and law-enforcement testimony, Texas courts may prioritize safety over mitigating evidence of mental-health or cognitive impairment. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to connect impairment evidence to actual risk, parenting capacity, and workable safeguards—or expect the court to focus on dangerous conduct and public protection."