Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA01
The State sought to waive juvenile jurisdiction and transfer A.M. to criminal district court on three aggravated-assault allegations and a murder allegation arising from multiple shootings. Applying Texas Family Code §§ 54.02(a) and (f), the First Court of Appeals concluded that surveillance footage, witness testimony, and officer identifications supplied probable cause and supported the finding that the seriousness of the person-directed offenses and the need to protect the community required criminal proceedings. For the murder allegation, the State did not have to identify whose bullet killed the victim at the transfer stage; evidence that A.M. fired repeatedly into the occupied vehicle during the fatal shooting supported probable cause under felony-murder or party-liability principles. Although A.M. presented evidence of cognitive limitations, low intellectual functioning, impulsivity, and mental-health concerns, the juvenile court could reasonably give greater weight to the repeated firearm violence, post-release conduct, and public-safety risks. The appellate court therefore held that the transfer findings were supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence and affirmed the waiver orders as within the juvenile court’s discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"At a juvenile-transfer hearing, probable cause is a preliminary screening standard, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Evidence of coordinated violent conduct may support transfer under felony-murder or party-liability theories even when the State cannot identify who fired the fatal shot. Cognitive or mental-health mitigation will not necessarily overcome repeated, person-directed violence; counsel seeking rehabilitation-focused relief should present a concrete, credible plan for treatment, supervision, placement, and public safety rather than relying on diagnoses alone."
Shaikh v. Rodriguez
COA01
In Shaikh v. Rodriguez, a diabetic patient sued her rheumatologist, alleging negligent prednisone treatment because the doctor failed to ensure glucose monitoring, warn about steroid-related risks, and coordinate diabetic care, which allegedly contributed to serious vision complications. On interlocutory appeal from the denial of dismissal under Chapter 74, the defendant argued the plaintiff’s experts were unqualified because they were not rheumatologists. The First Court of Appeals rejected that specialty-matching argument and held the qualification inquiry is issue-specific: whether the expert has knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education regarding the precise medical questions at issue. Because the ophthalmologist and the internal-medicine/critical-care physician tied their experience to prednisone use in diabetic patients, glucose monitoring, risk disclosure, and coordinated care, the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the reports sufficient and denying dismissal.
Litigation Takeaway
"When defending or attacking an expert, focus on the exact issue in dispute—not job titles or subspecialty labels. An expert need not share the opposing party’s specialty if the expert can show real, issue-specific experience with the standard of care, risk, monitoring duty, or methodology actually at issue."
Wilson v. State
COA05
In Wilson v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed an aggravated-assault-by-threat conviction arising from a domestic-violence fire set inside an occupied apartment. Wilson poured gasoline on his girlfriend, ignited it, and fled while her teenage son, NF, was asleep in the home. On appeal, Wilson argued there was no evidence he intentionally or knowingly threatened NF because he made no express threat to the child and the child was not his primary target. The court rejected that argument, holding that circumstantial evidence was enough: Wilson knew NF was home, intentionally started a fire in the residence, fled through NF’s window, and created an immediate life-threatening condition that caused NF to believe he would die and to jump from a second-story window to escape. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, the court held a rational jury could find an intentional or knowing threat of imminent bodily injury and could also find use of a deadly weapon, because fire and the means used to ignite it were inherently dangerous. The court affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
"A child does not have to be the direct target of household violence for the conduct to support serious safety findings. In family-law cases, circumstantial evidence that a parent knowingly created an immediately dangerous condition in an occupied home can strongly support family-violence allegations, endangerment findings, protective orders, and restrictions on conservatorship or possession."
In the Matter of A.M., a Juvenile
COA01
In In the Matter of A.M., the First Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring A.M. to criminal district court under Texas Family Code section 54.02. The State presented surveillance footage, witness testimony, and officer identification tying A.M. to three aggravated assaults and to a shooting in which Faridah Davis was killed. A.M. argued that his low IQ, cognitive limitations, mental-health history, and prior fitness concerns weighed against transfer, but the court held that the juvenile court could reasonably give greater weight to the seriousness and repeated nature of the violent offenses, the recency of the conduct after release from detention, and community-safety concerns. The court also held probable cause existed on the murder allegation even though the State could not yet prove which shooter fired the fatal bullet, because evidence showed A.M. fired multiple rounds into the occupied vehicle and acted in concert with another shooter. The transfer order was therefore supported by sufficient evidence and was not an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a record shows serious, repeated violence supported by objective evidence like video, witnesses, and law-enforcement testimony, Texas courts may prioritize safety over mitigating evidence of mental-health or cognitive impairment. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to connect impairment evidence to actual risk, parenting capacity, and workable safeguards—or expect the court to focus on dangerous conduct and public protection."
In re U. L.
COA14
In re U. L. involved a party who sought emergency mandamus relief after a regional presiding judge denied her motion to recuse in a pending Harris County case. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18a(j) controls and makes a denial of recusal reviewable only for abuse of discretion on appeal from a final judgment, which forecloses interlocutory mandamus review of the denial itself. The court also analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and concluded it lacked authority to order the regional presiding judge to vacate the recusal denial or conduct further proceedings absent a specific statutory grant. The court therefore denied the mandamus petitions.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a recusal motion is denied in a family-law case, do not count on emergency mandamus to fix it. Build a complete Rule 18a record, preserve objections and harm, and prepare to challenge the denial only after final judgment."
Jose Agosto v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Jose Agosto v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether testimony from a forensic interviewer and a police sergeant improperly vouched for a child complainant’s credibility in a child-sex-offense trial. The interviewer testified she had no concerns during the interview that required referral to a detective, and the sergeant testified the child’s forensic interview was consistent with the earlier outcry. The court analyzed the objections as turning not on the label 'bolstering' alone, but on whether the testimony actually expressed an opinion that the complainant was truthful. Relying on Texas cases distinguishing factual consistency and process-based observations from direct credibility endorsements, the court held that testimony about an absence of concerns and consistency across disclosures was admissible because neither witness expressly stated the child was truthful, credible, or believable. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by overruling the objections.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-allegation cases, professionals can usually testify that a child’s statements were consistent or that they observed no concerns requiring further action, so long as they do not cross the line into saying they believed the child or that the child was truthful. For family-law litigators, the key is careful question framing: descriptive and process-based testimony is more likely admissible, while explicit credibility-vouching remains vulnerable to objection."
Willie Silliman v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Silliman v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a trial court could exclude late-produced April 2024 police and recording materials as a discovery sanction under article 39.14 yet still admit testimony about that same prior family-violence incident under article 38.371. The complainant recanted at trial, and the court treated the discovery-sanction issue and the admissibility of relationship evidence as separate questions, concluding that independently admissible testimony was not automatically tainted by exclusion of related exhibits. The court also held that using the excluded materials outside the jury’s presence to refresh recollection did not make the testimony inadmissible because the excluded items themselves were never shown to the jury, and that a timely disclosed May body-camera video referencing the April incident was admissible because its probative value in evaluating recantation and relationship context was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403.
Litigation Takeaway
"Excluding a late-produced exhibit does not automatically exclude live testimony about the underlying conduct. In family-law cases involving violence, recantation, or coercive control, lawyers should separate excluded documents from admissible personal-knowledge testimony and focus objections or responses on relevance, Rule 403, and whether the other side is using testimony as a backdoor way to publish excluded material."
Christopher Matthew Vickers v. Lena Cherie Chaisson-Munoz
COA13
In Vickers v. Chaisson-Munoz, the father tried to immediately appeal protective orders entered after the mother filed two protective-order applications while a SAPCR modification between the same parents was pending. Although the protective-order cases began under separate cause numbers, they were transferred to the SAPCR court and heard together with the modification case. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals focused on the functional reality of that consolidation, not the separate filings, and applied Texas Family Code § 81.009(c), which delays appeal of a protective order rendered against a party in a SAPCR until there is a final, appealable order on support, possession, or access. Because the modification case remained pending and no final SAPCR order existed, the court held the protective orders were interlocutory and dismissed the appeals for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"A separate protective-order cause number does not guarantee an immediate appeal. If a protective-order case is transferred into, coordinated with, or jointly tried alongside a SAPCR, the order may become interlocutory under Family Code § 81.009(c). Family lawyers should be deliberate about consolidation language, joint hearings, transfer strategy, and preservation of alternative remedies like mandamus when immediate review matters."
In the Interest of S.P. and K.D.C.L., Children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). Father argued the case was based only on his incarceration, but the court analyzed the full Holley-factor record and emphasized that incarceration alone is not enough; here, the surrounding facts included domestic violence against pregnant Mother while Father was holding a child, instability, lack of contact with the children, failure to complete services, no viable interim or post-release care plan, and the children’s significant need for safety, medical care, and permanence. Because the children were thriving in a stable foster placement and the record showed ongoing danger and no realistic reunification plan, the court upheld termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not treat incarceration as the key fact in a best-interest case. What persuades courts is the conduct behind the incarceration, its effect on the child, the parent’s history of violence or instability, the absence of a workable caregiving plan, and the child’s concrete need for safety and permanence."
Tozee Construction, Inc. v. BNG Management Group, LLC
COA05
In a construction dispute, the plaintiff perfected the jury right by filing a timely jury demand and paying the jury fee, then later tried to withdraw that demand and obtain a bench trial. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 216 and 220, a perfected jury demand benefits the entire case, so the opposing party could rely on it without filing a separate demand. Because the defendant objected before trial and the trial court nevertheless conducted a bench trial, the court held the trial court abused its discretion, reversed the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Once any party properly demands a jury and pays the fee, that jury setting becomes a shared procedural right. In family law cases, if the other side later tries to withdraw the jury demand, preserve the issue immediately with a clear written and oral objection; the court cannot force a bench trial over that objection."