Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
Genevieve Saulter v. Robert Saulter
COA03
In Saulter v. Saulter, the Austin Court of Appeals upheld a family-violence protective order entered for Robert Saulter against Genevieve Saulter. The main dispute was whether evidence of Genevieve’s post-separation harassment and hostile conduct was relevant in a protective-order case based on earlier assault allegations. The court held that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting that evidence because it helped explain the parties’ relationship, assisted the court in evaluating credibility in a bench trial, and supported the required finding that family violence was likely to occur in the future. The court also affirmed denial of Genevieve’s motion for new trial, concluding that the alleged newly discovered evidence merely impeached Robert on a collateral point and was not likely to change the outcome.
Litigation Takeaway
"Post-separation conduct can matter a great deal in family-violence protective-order cases. Even if later behavior is not itself the pleaded assault, Texas courts may consider it as context for the relationship, credibility, and future-danger findings. For trial lawyers, that means building or attacking the record with targeted relevance and Rule 403 arguments—not relying on a blanket claim that the evidence belongs only in a stalking case. It also reinforces how hard it is to win a new trial based on newly discovered impeachment evidence."
In the Interest of E.J.S., a Child
COA04
In this parental-rights termination case, the mother tried to use a restricted appeal after the trial court terminated her rights in her absence. The Fourth Court of Appeals held restricted appeal was unavailable because Rule 30 requires non-participation in the decision-making event that produced the judgment, and the mother had already participated by filing a verified pleading expressly consenting to termination, acknowledging its consequences, and asking the court to terminate her rights at the scheduled hearing without her appearance. The court focused on the substance of that filing—not whether it was labeled a pleading instead of a statutory relinquishment affidavit—and concluded it made the termination judgment possible. Because the non-participation requirement is jurisdictional, the court dismissed the restricted appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Nonappearance alone does not preserve a restricted appeal. If a party files a signed document that affirmatively asks the court to grant relief—even if the party plans not to attend the hearing—that filing may count as participation in the decision-making event and destroy Rule 30 restricted-appeal jurisdiction. Family lawyers should draft consents, waivers, stipulations, and prove-up papers with extreme care."
In re Tempus Holdings, Inc. d/b/a The Lodge Card Club, and Locus Enterprises, LLC
COA04
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion by denying an out-of-state lawyer’s Rule 19 pro hac vice application without evidence supporting any permissible ground under Rule 19(d). The opponent argued unauthorized practice, ethical concerns, and generalized “good cause,” based on the lawyer’s name appearing on pleadings signed by Texas counsel, attendance at a deposition, and speculation that he might be a witness. Relying on AutoZoners, Verhalen, Rule 19, Government Code section 81.101, and Rule 3.08 authorities, the court concluded those objections were unsupported and legally insufficient. Because the denial deprived the client of chosen counsel and could not be adequately remedied on appeal, the court granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to block pro hac vice admission in Texas, you need evidence tied to Rule 19(d)—not suspicion, rhetoric, or tactical complaints about duplication, expense, or a possible witness issue. For family lawyers, this case is a strong mandamus tool when a trial court excludes qualified out-of-state counsel without a record-based reason."
In Re Maj. Christina I. Leake
COA07
In this mandamus proceeding arising from a long-running SAPCR, the relator argued that filing written objections under Texas Family Code section 201.015 automatically stripped the associate judge of authority to receive filings, send hearing communications, and continue handling the case. The Amarillo Court of Appeals rejected that reading, holding that section 201.015 creates a mechanism for de novo review by the referring court after an associate judge’s order, but does not revoke the authority granted to associate judges under section 201.007. Because the relator did not show that the associate judge acted outside the powers authorized by statute, and also failed to establish other mandamus prerequisites such as presentment, unreasonable delay, and a precise record, the court denied mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"A section 201.015 objection is not a pause button on an associate judge’s authority. If you want mandamus relief, you must identify a specific act outside section 201.007, build a clean record showing presentment and delay where relevant, and act quickly—especially when challenging temporary orders or case-administration issues."
In the Interest of M.S., M.J.S., and N.E.S., Children
COA04
The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights because clear and convincing evidence supported Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(O) and best interest. The record showed the father used methamphetamine daily, including in the home and around the children, and that his drug use was tied to domestic violence, threats with firearms, neglect, financial instability, and unsafe living conditions. The court relied on current subsection (O), as informed by In re R.R.A., to analyze drug use in context rather than in isolation, concluding the father’s controlled-substance use endangered the children’s health or safety and that he failed to complete court-ordered substance-abuse treatment. Because one predicate ground plus best interest is enough to affirm, the court did not need to reach the father’s challenge to an additional predicate ground under subsection (N).
Litigation Takeaway
"Drug-use evidence is strongest when it is connected to real-world parenting danger. To prove endangerment, build a record showing not just substance use, but how it impaired parenting, fueled violence, destabilized the home, exposed children to risk, and remained unresolved through failure to complete treatment. For parents defending these cases, appearing at trial, documenting treatment compliance and sobriety, and breaking the link between use and child endangerment are critical."
Ware v. State
COA06
In Ware v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals considered whether admitting a community supervision officer’s testimony about a police officer’s allegations concerning GPS-monitor tampering violated the Confrontation Clause or due process. Rather than decide the broader constitutional question, the court assumed error and conducted a harm analysis. It held any error was harmless because Ware himself admitted two independent violations of his deferred-adjudication conditions: removing the GPS monitor and failing to report when directed. Because Texas law permits revocation or adjudication based on proof of just one violation, those admissions independently supported the trial court’s judgment. The court also held Ware failed to preserve any complaint about the denial of his continuance motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any enforcement-style hearing, evidentiary objections may not matter on appeal if your client’s own testimony proves an independent violation. Preserve error, but also build or defend the record with harmless-error analysis in mind: one admitted breach can be enough to sustain the ruling."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Jerry Bracken and Cristina Bracken and in the Interest of H.L.B., a Child
COA07
In this Texas divorce and SAPCR appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed a post-answer default divorce decree because the mother, who had filed an answer, did not appear at final trial and the record did not show she received notice of the final trial setting. The court rejected arguments that notice could be inferred from docket entries, withdrawal papers, or counsel’s representations, especially where former counsel had withdrawn and the withdrawal order required specific methods of future service that the record did not show were followed. Applying Mathis v. Lockwood and Highsmith v. Highsmith, the court held that a party who has appeared is entitled to due-process notice of trial, and when notice is lacking, the first Craddock element is established as a matter of law without needing to prove the remaining prongs. The trial court therefore abused its discretion by letting the post-answer default stand, and the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other side has answered, you cannot safely take a final family-law default unless the record affirmatively proves notice of the trial setting to the party herself—especially after counsel withdraws. Docket references, vague service records, and lawyer argument are not enough. For challengers, lack of trial-setting notice is often the cleanest path to reversal because it satisfies Craddock’s first prong automatically and can require a new trial without litigating the merits."
In the Interest of H.S., B.S., and M.S., Children
SCOTX
In In re H.S., the Supreme Court of Texas held the evidence was legally insufficient to support termination of Mother’s parental rights because the Department proved troubling circumstances, but not by clear and convincing evidence that termination itself was in the children’s best interest. The record showed Mother’s trauma history, delayed service-plan compliance, drug use, and ongoing connection to an abusive Father, but it also showed a strong parent-child bond, Mother’s reporting of Father’s violence, and evidence that the children deteriorated after removal and suspension of visitation. The Court emphasized that best interest is an independent requirement under Family Code section 161.001, that preserving the parent-child relationship is strongly presumed to be in the child’s best interest, and that termination is a last resort rather than a default response to family dysfunction. The Court affirmed termination as to Father, but reversed and rendered judgment denying termination as to Mother.
Litigation Takeaway
"Evidence that justifies intervention, restrictions, or supervised contact does not automatically justify termination. In any case involving abuse, trauma, drug use, or poor parental choices, lawyers must build a record explaining why the requested remedy is proportionate; if the goal is termination, the proof must show by clear and convincing evidence why lesser alternatives are inadequate and why permanent severance truly serves the child’s best interest."
Porter v. State
COA08
In Porter v. State, the El Paso Court of Appeals rejected a challenge to a criminal defendant’s jury-trial waiver because the appellant failed to provide the reporter’s record from the hearing where the waiver occurred. The court held that under article 1.13 and ordinary appellate principles, the appellant bears the burden to present a record affirmatively showing error; when the record is silent or incomplete, a signed written waiver and judgment recitations support the presumption of regularity and defeat the complaint. The opinion also approved admission of an eyewitness’s near-immediate description of a violent assault as an excited utterance, offering a useful evidentiary framework for admitting prompt family-violence statements in civil family-law cases.
Litigation Takeaway
"Two practical lessons: first, appeals attacking a waiver, stipulation, or procedure usually fail without a complete record of the operative hearing, so preserve and order every relevant transcript. Second, in family-violence cases, early stress-driven statements to officers or other witnesses can often come in as excited utterances if timing, stress, and connection to the event are well developed."
Headrick v. State
COA05
In Headrick v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defendant waived any complaint that the State’s motion to adjudicate was too vague because he never filed a motion to quash in the trial court. The State alleged only that Headrick had made contact with his daughter in violation of a no-contact condition of deferred adjudication, and on appeal he argued that the pleading lacked enough detail to give adequate notice. The court did not reach the merits of that notice argument, instead applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and longstanding revocation precedent requiring a timely motion to quash to preserve pleading-specificity complaints. The court also upheld the adjudication on the merits, concluding the daughter’s testimony and surrounding circumstances were sufficient to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Headrick made the prohibited contact, and it rejected the disproportionality challenge to the within-range sentences.
Litigation Takeaway
"If an enforcement, contempt, modification, or other family-law pleading is too vague to let your client prepare a defense, do not save that complaint for appeal. File a specific motion to quash, special exception, or other targeted objection in the trial court and get a ruling, because notice defects that could have been cured will usually be treated as waived."