Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
Christopher Matthew Vickers v. Lena Cherie Chaisson-Munoz
COA13
In Vickers v. Chaisson-Munoz, the father tried to immediately appeal protective orders entered after the trial court heard two protective-order applications together with a pending SAPCR modification involving the parties’ child. The court of appeals focused on Texas Family Code § 81.009(c), which delays appeal of a protective order rendered against a party in a SAPCR until there is a final, appealable order addressing child support, possession, or access. Even though the protective-order applications had separate cause numbers, the court held they were procedurally intertwined with the SAPCR because they were transferred to the SAPCR court, heard together, and reflected in an order referencing all related cases. Because no final SAPCR order had yet been signed, the protective orders were interlocutory, and the appeals were dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Separate cause numbers do not guarantee an immediate appeal of a protective order when the case is functionally merged with a SAPCR. Family-law litigators should think carefully before agreeing to combined hearings, transfers, or consolidation, because once protective-order issues are heard as part of a child-possession or access dispute, appellate review may be deferred until the final SAPCR order."
In the Interest of D.K.L., D.C.L., and R.R.M., Children
COA13
In this SAPCR-related appeal, the appellant tried to challenge a final order signed on October 14, 2025, by filing notices of appeal in July 2026. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and held that the notice of appeal was untimely under either the 30-day deadline or the 90-day deadline that would have applied even if a qualifying post-judgment motion had been filed. Relying on Mitschke v. Borromeo, the court explained that a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite. It also rejected the appellant’s argument that the final order was void and therefore could be attacked at any time, holding that an allegedly void order still cannot be reviewed through an untimely direct appeal. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family cases, appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if the notice of appeal is late, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction, and calling the order “void” will not save a direct appeal. Lawyers must calendar the Rule 26.1 deadline from the date the order is signed and quickly evaluate other remedies if that deadline is missed."
Mora v. Morales
COA13
In Mora v. Morales, the appellant tried to use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a to extend post-judgment and appellate deadlines after claiming late notice of a final judgment. The court held the Rule 306a(5) motion was defective because its sworn allegations referred only to one lawyer as “counsel” and failed to negate timely notice or actual knowledge as to the client and another attorney of record. Without a proper Rule 306a showing, plenary power expired 30 days after the original judgment, making the later amended judgment void. The court also held that even if Rule 306a had applied, the notice of appeal was still untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the alleged date of first actual knowledge. The amended judgment was vacated and the appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you are relying on Rule 306a to revive deadlines in a family-law case, your sworn motion must specifically address the client and every attorney of record—not just one lawyer or “counsel” generally. And even with a valid Rule 306a motion, you must immediately recalculate and protect the new appellate deadlines."
Deola T. Ali v. Discover Bank
COA14
After Discover Bank obtained a money judgment, it sought a post-judgment receiver based largely on alleged deemed admissions from unanswered requests for admissions. The court held that Ali’s filed Rule 21a certificate of service created a presumption that his discovery responses were timely served, and Discover’s unsworn motion claiming nonreceipt was not competent evidence to rebut that presumption. Because the requests were not deemed admitted and Discover offered no other competent evidence that the judgment remained unpaid or that Ali owned non-exempt property subject to turnover, the trial court abused its discretion in appointing a receiver. The receivership order was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In post-judgment enforcement, especially turnover or receivership proceedings, do not rely on unsworn assertions to establish discovery default or statutory elements. A Rule 21a certificate of service can defeat deemed admissions unless rebutted with competent evidence, so family-law litigators must build the record with affidavits, testimony, payment proof, and evidence of non-exempt property."
The State of Texas v. Frankie Lee Hines
COA08
In Hines, the State repeatedly dismissed and reindicted child-sexual-abuse charges arising from the same underlying allegations while the defendant remained incarcerated for more than two years. The Eighth Court of Appeals applied the Barker v. Wingo speedy-trial factors across the entire prosecution timeline, holding the clock did not restart with each new indictment because all charges stemmed from the same factual nucleus. The court found the extraordinary delay, the State’s trial-readiness and charging-theory problems, Hines’s repeated assertion of his speedy-trial right, and resulting prejudice from prolonged incarceration and evidentiary drift supported dismissal with prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
"Changing pleadings or legal theories does not erase delay when the case is still built on the same core facts. In family-law cases involving evolving abuse allegations, lawyers should preserve a unified chronology, force clarification of what actually changed, and show concrete prejudice from repeated resets, fading witness memories, and ongoing temporary restrictions."
In the Interest of T.L.F.
COA09
In In the Interest of T.L.F., the Beaumont Court of Appeals reviewed a mother’s appeal from an order terminating her parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (L), along with a best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). Appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal and moved to withdraw. The court independently reviewed the entire record, confirmed counsel’s no-merit assessment, and found no arguable ground for reversal. The court therefore affirmed the termination order. But relying on Texas Family Code §§ 107.013 and 107.016 and In re P.M., the court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding that appointed counsel in termination appeals generally must continue representation through further appellate proceedings unless additional good cause for withdrawal is shown.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas parental-termination appeals, a strong trial record can leave little room for reversal, and an Anders affirmance will stand if the appellate court finds no arguable issue after its own review. Just as important, appointed counsel cannot assume that filing an Anders brief ends the representation; absent good cause, counsel must stay on through the completion or waiver of further appellate review."
WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio
COA11
In WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio, a limited partner sought access to partnership books and records after seeing apparent disparities in distributions and unexplained accounting related to partnership assets. The partnership refused, arguing Fenoglio may have transferred his interest in an earlier divorce, that the records could be used in collateral litigation, and that he had to sign a unilateral confidentiality agreement before inspection. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Fenoglio’s stated purpose—determining whether partnership assets were properly managed and whether revenues and expenses were properly accounted for and allocated—was a proper purpose under Texas Business Organizations Code section 153.552. The court further held that speculation about other litigation, an unresolved allegation that his interest had been transferred in the divorce, and reliance on a general prudence clause in the partnership agreement did not defeat his contractual and statutory inspection rights. It affirmed summary judgment enforcing inspection and the award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a family-law dispute involves an entity interest, frame any records demand around valuation, accounting, distributions, tracing, and management review. This case shows that a proper-purpose inspection right cannot be defeated by speculation about divorce-related litigation, unsupported claims that the ownership interest changed hands in the divorce, or extra-contractual confidentiality conditions."
Khaled Mohammad Ikhlas v. Farzana Rasooli
COA14
In Ikhlas v. Rasooli, the appellant tried to appeal an order denying his Texas Family Code section 85.025(b) motion to review, modify, or dissolve an existing protective order. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed section 81.009(a), which allows appeals from a protective order rendered under Subtitle B, and held that a denial of post-judgment review under section 85.025(b) is not a new protective order and does not independently create appellate jurisdiction. The court also refused to treat the attempted appeal as a mandamus proceeding because the appellant’s complaints were fact-bound and challenged evidentiary sufficiency rather than presenting a pure legal issue. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not treat a section 85.025(b) review hearing as a second chance to appeal a protective order. If you may need appellate review, build the record and calendar deadlines from the original protective order; later denials of review or dissolution are likely not appealable, and mandamus will usually require a clear legal error rather than a fact-based attack on the evidence."
In the Interest of J.G.S., a Child
COA01
In In re J.G.S., the First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights and held that her complaint that the Department failed to provide ADA accommodations in her service plan was waived because she never raised it in the trial court. Mother argued the court should overlook preservation because termination implicates fundamental rights and because Family Code section 161.001(f) and (g) require the Department to prove reasonable efforts to return the child. The court rejected both arguments, reaffirmed In re C.M., and concluded that an ADA-based challenge to reunification services remains an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved below. The court also held that Mother’s request for more time, based only on scheduling and technical problems, did not preserve a disability-accommodation complaint, and it affirmed the termination order on the challenged predicate grounds and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"If disability affects a parent’s ability to complete services or participate in a family-law case, do not assume the court or opposing party’s awareness preserves the issue. Make a specific ADA or accommodation request on the record, tie it to the client’s actual limitations, seek a ruling, and connect any continuance or extension request to that accommodation need. In Texas family cases, even in termination appeals, unpreserved accommodation complaints are likely waived."
Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina
COA09
In Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina, the Beaumont Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the parties had an informal marriage under Texas Family Code section 2.401. Medina sought to prove a common-law marriage as part of her divorce and property-division case, while Lara argued the evidence was insufficient because the parties filed separate taxes, lacked joint financial accounts, and did not consistently use traditional marital markers. The court analyzed the totality of the evidence under the three statutory elements—agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others as married—and emphasized that, in a bench trial without findings of fact, implied findings favor the judgment if supported by the record. Crediting testimony that the parties lived together as husband and wife, introduced each other as spouses, celebrated their marriage, and were described in at least one property-related document as husband and wife, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the informal-marriage finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"Informal-marriage cases are usually decided on credibility and record-building, not on whether the couple checked every traditional marriage box. If there is some evidence of agreement, cohabitation as spouses, and holding out, appellate courts will heavily defer to the trial judge—especially when no findings of fact are requested. For lawyers, that means the real battle is at trial: build corroboration if you are proving the marriage, and do more than point to separate finances or tax filings if you are trying to defeat it."