Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of V.R., A.R., and M.R., Children
COA02
In In re V.R., the father appealed an order dismissing his child-support enforcement-related motions, arguing the Office of the Attorney General lacked authority to continue withholding and garnishing income and that various procedural defects required reversal. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the dispositive associate-judge hearing was not included in the appellate reporter’s record. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and Christiansen v. Prezelski, the court presumed the missing hearing record supported the trial court’s ruling and held that, without that record, the father could not show reversible error. The court also rejected attempts to rely on materials not admitted below and noted that new complaints raised for the first time in a reply brief were not properly before the court.
Litigation Takeaway
"If your appeal depends on what happened at the hearing, you must bring the reporter’s record. In Texas family-law cases, an incomplete appellate record usually means the court will presume the missing evidence supports the judgment, which can doom challenges to enforcement, modification, custody, and other post-judgment rulings before the merits are ever reached."
Foster v. Wise
COA01
In Foster v. Wise, the respondent challenged a default protective order by restricted appeal, arguing the record did not show the notice and service required by Family Code sections 82.041 and 82.043. The court examined only whether error was apparent on the face of the record and held the citation itself functioned as the required notice because it included the hearing setting and default warning. It further held that a citation bearing the court’s seal and a deputy clerk’s typed name satisfied the statutory signature requirement in a nonelectronic-service context, that the return sufficiently showed personal service, and that service of an amended application was unnecessary because the amendment did not seek a more onerous judgment. The court therefore affirmed the default lifetime protective order.
Litigation Takeaway
"Default orders in family cases usually survive restricted appeal when the clerk’s record and return facially show strict compliance with statutory notice and service requirements. Substance matters more than labels, a typed clerk signature on a sealed nonelectronic citation may be enough, and amended pleadings do not require re-service unless they seek more onerous relief."
In Re Jessica Coronado
COA11
In this mandamus proceeding arising from temporary orders in a divorce and SAPCR, the mother challenged the trial court’s appointment of both parents as temporary joint managing conservators and a travel-exchange provision after evidence showed the father physically abused her son from a prior relationship. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 153.004(b) is a mandatory bar to joint managing conservatorship when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse against a child, spouse, or the other parent. The court relied on the mother’s testimony about two bruising incidents, photographs, text messages, and permissible adverse inferences from the father’s repeated Fifth Amendment invocations to conclude the abuse evidence was credible. It also held the travel requirement was an abuse of discretion because the trial court expressly imposed it to burden the mother for moving, not to protect the child’s safety and welfare. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If credible abuse evidence is in the record, § 153.004(b) does more than weigh against joint conservatorship—it forbids it, even in temporary orders and even when the abuse was directed at a stepchild rather than the subject child. For litigators, the case underscores the importance of building a corroborated abuse record and preserving any punitive, child-untethered temporary-order rulings for mandamus."
Krueger v. Krueger
COA02
In Krueger v. Krueger, the wife tried to amend her divorce counterpetition ten days before trial to add new fault-based theories—including cruelty, family violence, adultery, and waste—and to seek a disproportionate share of the community estate. The trial court struck the late amendments and excluded related business records, affidavits, and supplemental discovery because those theories had not been timely pleaded or disclosed and would unfairly surprise the husband after discovery had already proceeded on different claims. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Rule 63 allowed the trial court to deny the late amendments as prejudicial and that Rule 193.6 supported exclusion of the late-produced supporting evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to pursue fault-based property arguments in a Texas divorce, plead them early and disclose the supporting evidence on time. Waiting until the eve of trial to add disproportionate-division theories can get both the claims and the evidence thrown out as unfair surprise."
Waleski v. State
COA11
In Waleski v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that a revocation judgment may be reformed when the written judgment incorrectly states the pleas made in open court. Waleski pleaded true to only one alleged supervision violation and not true to the other two, but the written revocation judgments recited that he pleaded true to all three. The court concluded revocation was still proper because one proven violation is enough to support revocation, and Waleski’s plea of true plus supporting evidence established at least one violation. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) and Bigley v. State, the court modified the judgments to accurately reflect the actual pleas and affirmed them as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not ignore inaccurate recitals in a signed order just because the judgment itself is likely to stand. If the written order does not match what happened in court, ask the trial or appellate court to correct it so the record “speaks the truth,” especially where those inaccuracies could affect future enforcement, modification, protective-order, or credibility disputes."
McFarland v. Bouyer
COA11
In McFarland v. Bouyer, the husband appealed a divorce decree awarding the wife the marital residence and argued he was not given a meaningful chance to present evidence. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code section 7.001 and emphasized that a property division is reversible only if it is manifestly unjust and unfair. Because the husband failed to provide the reporter’s record from the final hearing, the appellate court presumed the missing evidence supported the trial court’s decree. The court also rejected his due-process complaint, concluding the record showed he had opportunities to cross-examine, object, testify, and offer evidence, and that his failure to understand how to present electronic evidence was a preparation problem, not trial-court error. The court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want to challenge a divorce property division on appeal, you need a full record and proof that the overall division—not just one asset award—was manifestly unfair. This case also shows that courts will not reverse simply because a pro se party failed to prepare or did not understand how to admit evidence when the record shows the party was given a fair opportunity to participate."
Ryan Keith Markowski v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Markowski v. State, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for violating a family-violence bond condition under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A). The court rejected his attempt to treat the case like a protective-order prosecution, explaining that the charging instrument alleged violation of a bond condition, not a protective order, so the State did not need to prove the statutory pedigree of a protective order. Applying the legal-sufficiency standard, the court held the evidence was enough because the bond-condition order was admitted, it prohibited the defendant from coming within 200 yards of the protected person’s residence, officers testified the underlying criminal case was still pending, and officers observed him within the prohibited zone. The court further held that the lack of an express expiration date did not make the bond condition unenforceable while the underlying criminal case remained unresolved.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not assume a family-violence bond condition expires just because the order omits an end date. In parallel family and criminal cases, lawyers should obtain the actual bond paperwork, confirm whether the criminal case is still pending, and make sure temporary orders, residence access, and exchange plans do not require conduct that would violate a still-active criminal stay-away condition."
Waleski v. State
COA11
In Waleski v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed revocation of community supervision after Michael Waleski admitted he drank alcohol in violation of a supervision condition in cases involving continuous family violence and protective-order violations. The court applied settled Texas revocation law: the State need prove only one supervision violation by a preponderance of the evidence, and a plea of true alone can support revocation. Because Waleski pleaded true to the alcohol-use allegation, disputes about the other alleged violations did not matter. The court also held that he could not use the revocation appeal to challenge the reasonableness of conditions imposed in the original community-supervision order. It modified the judgments only to correct clerical errors misstating his pleas and otherwise affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"A single admitted supervision violation can decide the whole case. For family-law litigators, if a party is on supervision tied to family violence or protective-order conduct, even a 'technical' violation like alcohol use may become powerful evidence on credibility, safety, conservatorship, and possession restrictions. Get the revocation records early, identify any plea of true, and do not assume disputed allegations matter once one violation is proven."
Gonzales v. State
COA04
In Gonzales v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed whether a juvenile-transfer order under Texas Family Code section 54.02 could be challenged through a later criminal appeal after conviction. The juvenile court had signed a November 1, 2024 order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring Gonzales for adult criminal prosecution, but Gonzales did not file a notice of appeal in the juvenile court within 20 days. Instead, he filed a notice of appeal in the criminal case after his April 2, 2026 conviction. The court analyzed sections 54.02 and 56.01 of the Family Code together with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and held that a transfer order is directly appealable, the appeal is accelerated, and the notice of appeal must be filed in the juvenile court within 20 days after the transfer order is signed. Because Gonzales filed only an untimely post-conviction notice in the criminal case, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"When a Family Code order is immediately appealable, lawyers must identify the correct order, file in the correct court, and meet the statute-driven deadline. A later judgment, trial-court certification, or notice filed in a related case will not revive a missed appeal deadline or create appellate jurisdiction."
Gonzales v. State
COA04
In Gonzales v. State, the appellant tried to challenge a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring him for criminal prosecution as an adult only after he was later convicted in criminal court. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code sections 54.02 and 56.01 together with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and held that a juvenile transfer order is directly appealable as an accelerated appeal. That means the notice of appeal had to be filed in the juvenile court within 20 days after the transfer order was signed. Because the transfer order was signed on November 1, 2024, and the only notice of appeal was filed in the criminal case on April 6, 2026, the notice was both untimely and filed in the wrong court. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and did not reach the merits of the transfer challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
"When the Family Code creates a direct, accelerated appeal, lawyers must act immediately, file in the correct court, and not assume the issue can be preserved for review after a later final judgment in a related case. A trial-court certification or later criminal judgment cannot cure a missed statutory appellate deadline."