Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
In the Interest of A.M., J.M., and K.W., Children
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to prove endangerment under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on the mother’s years-long course of conduct: repeatedly entering or returning to abusive relationships, exposing the children to domestic violence, leaving them with a known violent caregiver, and minimizing or concealing the abuse even after serious assaults, police involvement, and one child’s murder. The court reasoned that endangerment may be shown by a continuing pattern of conduct that jeopardizes a child’s physical or emotional well-being, even when the violence is directed primarily at the parent rather than the child. That same pattern, combined with the mother’s instability in housing, employment, legal compliance, and protective decision-making, supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"Domestic violence evidence is powerful not just when a child is directly assaulted, but when a parent repeatedly exposes children to violent partners, ignores warning signs, and minimizes the danger. In custody, modification, and termination cases, lawyers should build a timeline showing the parent’s knowledge of the abuse, continued contact with the abuser, child exposure, and lack of protective change over time."
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed the notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still not enough to invoke jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within that grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension in the appellate court that reasonably explains the delay. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion or equivalent filing until after the grace period expired, the late explanation could not cure the defect, and the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In accelerated family-law-related appeals, a late notice of appeal is not self-curing just because it lands within Rule 26.3’s grace period. If the notice is late, counsel must also file a Rule 26.3 extension motion in the appellate court within that same window, with a reasonable explanation. Do not wait for a clerk’s defect notice or assume a later response will save jurisdiction."
Bruno Gonzalez v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Gonzalez v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support a conviction for assault causing bodily injury—family violence. The defendant argued the State failed to prove the complainant’s identity because of a name discrepancy, failed to prove bodily injury because the complainant later minimized the assault and the bruises were not tied precisely to the charged date, and failed to prove the required mental state. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Texas variance law, the court held the complainant’s exact name was not a substantive element and the evidence showed the person named in the information and the person proved at trial were the same individual. The court further held the jury could credit the 911 outcry, officer testimony, photographs of bruising, and surrounding circumstances over later recantation-style statements, and could infer intent, knowledge, or recklessness from the assaultive conduct and knife-related intimidation. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Contemporaneous family-violence evidence—especially 911 calls, officer observations, photographs, and other corroborating records—can outweigh later recantation or minimization. In family-law cases, do not assume a changed story, name discrepancy, or imprecise injury timing defeats a violence finding; build or attack the case around corroboration, causation, and credibility."
In the Matter of D.M.M., a Juvenile
COA13
In this accelerated appeal from a juvenile transfer order, the appellant filed a notice of appeal after the 20-day deadline but within Rule 26.3’s 15-day grace period. The court held that this was still insufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction because Rule 26.3 requires two timely filings within the grace period: the notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time. Because the appellant did not file any extension motion until after the grace period had expired, the late explanation could not be construed to revive jurisdiction. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an appeal may be accelerated, treat Rule 26.3 as a two-step jurisdictional checklist: if the notice is late but still within the 15-day grace period, file both the notice of appeal and a motion for extension within that same window. A later explanation will not save the appeal."
In re Hoa Tran and Trang Tran
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that once defendants properly controverted a plaintiff’s medical-expense affidavit under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 18.001, they were entitled to nonparty discovery from the medical provider about how the charges were set and whether they were reasonable. The trial court had allowed only limited inquiry but barred broader topics concerning billing methodology, reimbursement history, referral relationships, and outsourced imaging arrangements. Relying on Texas’s broad discovery rules and cases such as In re North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co. and In re K&L Auto Crushers, LLC, the court concluded those topics were relevant to the live defense that the claimed medical expenses were unreasonable. Because the categorical restrictions prevented the defendants from developing that defense and could not be adequately remedied on appeal, the court found an abuse of discretion and granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the other side puts medical or treatment bills in issue, do not treat the invoice as untouchable. Once the charges are properly controverted, targeted discovery into the provider’s billing practices, reimbursement history, referral relationships, and third-party service arrangements may be available—and a blanket order blocking that discovery can justify mandamus."
Wood v. State
COA02
In Wood v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that a complainant could testify under Texas Rules of Evidence 701 and 602 about what the defendant meant in sexualized text messages when her interpretation was based on her firsthand experience with him, their relationship history, and the surrounding context of the messages. The court treated the issue as one of adequate foundation rather than improper speculation and concluded the testimony helped the factfinder understand ambiguous or coded communications. The court also held that the defendant waived his complaint that a detective gave improper outcry testimony under Article 38.072 because he failed to make a timely, specific objection at trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"Context matters, and preservation matters just as much. In family cases involving texts, emails, threats, grooming, or coercive control, a witness with personal knowledge of the relationship can often explain what ambiguous messages meant if you lay a proper Rule 701/602 foundation. But if you want to challenge outcry-like or hearsay testimony, you must object specifically and on time or lose the issue on appeal."
Othalon Shaw v. Omowunmi Shaw
COA02
In Shaw v. Shaw, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed a final family-violence protective order entered during the parties’ divorce. The wife testified to repeated threats, choking, physical assault, forced sex, and gun-related intimidation, while the husband denied the allegations and argued the evidence was inconsistent and insufficient without stronger corroboration. Applying legal- and factual-sufficiency standards for bench trials, the court held that the trial court was entitled to believe the wife’s testimony, disbelieve the husband’s denials, and infer both past family violence and likely future family violence under Texas Family Code sections 81.001 and 85.001(a). The court emphasized that credible testimony from the applicant alone can be enough to support a protective order and that appellate courts will not reweigh express trial-court credibility findings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Protective-order appeals usually rise or fall on credibility established at trial, not on re-arguing the facts on appeal. If you represent the applicant, build a clear, detailed record and seek express credibility findings; if you represent the respondent, general denials and lack-of-corroboration arguments usually will not overcome a trial court’s decision to believe the applicant."
In the Interest of B.A. and B.A., Children
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and on best interest. The record showed repeated domestic violence by the father, the mother’s knowledge of that violence, her repeated minimization and recantation of serious assaults, her continued facilitation of the father’s return after arrests, and her denial of drug-use concerns. The court analyzed subsection (D) as an endangering environment case and subsection (E) as an endangering course-of-conduct case, concluding that the mother’s failure to protect the children from recurring violence and instability supported both predicates. The same evidence also supported the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, minimization of domestic violence can be as damaging as the violence itself. A parent’s recantation, selective memory, denial of risk, and continued association with a violent partner can support findings on endangerment, credibility, protective capacity, and best interest across termination, custody, modification, and protective-order litigation."
Blair v. Blair
COA02
In Blair v. Blair, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a post-divorce order appointing a receiver to sell marital real property because the 2013 divorce decree expressly authorized either party to seek a receiver if the property was not sold by March 15, 2014. The court treated the receivership as a straightforward enforcement of the decree’s property-division terms rather than an extraordinary equitable remedy requiring separate proof of waste, imminent harm, or inadequate legal remedies. The court also rejected the appellant’s limitations, laches, dormancy, and due-process complaints because they were either not preserved in the trial court, not supported by the appellate record, or contradicted by record evidence showing notice. The court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in appointing the receiver.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree includes a clear receiver-on-default provision for sale of real property, enforcing that provision years later is much easier and more likely to survive appeal. For both sides, Blair is also a preservation case: defenses like limitations, laches, dormancy, and due process must be clearly raised, supported by evidence, and ruled on in the trial court, or they will likely fail on appeal."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Melissa A. Paredes v. Trini J. Paredes, Jr. and In the Interest of V.N.P. and T.J.P. III, Children
COA05
In Paredes v. Paredes, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed an enforcement judgment based on a divorce decree provision requiring the wife to pay the husband “twelve months’ worth of the proceeds” if she sold certain real property. After the wife sold the property, the husband asked the trial court to enforce the decree and relied on an email and his own calculation to argue the phrase meant one year’s worth of annualized net proceeds. The appellate court held that the decree’s operative language was not merely ambiguous but facially unintelligible, because proceeds cannot coherently be measured in units of time. Applying Texas law requiring judgments to be definite enough to be executed from their four corners, the court concluded the provision was a nullity and could not be enforced through extra-textual evidence or the parties’ claimed shared understanding. The court therefore reversed the damages award and the derivative attorney’s-fees awards and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree’s property language does not state a clear, mathematically coherent obligation on its face, it may be unenforceable altogether. Family-law litigators should draft future-sale and deferred-payment provisions with precise formulas, defined terms, and objective triggers, because emails, testimony, or course of dealing will not rescue a decree that is unintelligible as written."