Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Leonard v. Wooten and Ellison
COA05
In Leonard v. Wooten and Ellison, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a defamation suit based on statements in an affidavit filed to obtain a TRO in a child-custody proceeding arose from protected petitioning activity under the TCPA. The court focused on the plaintiffs’ own allegations, which showed the challenged statements were made in a sworn filing submitted to a court for judicial relief. It then held that the judicial-proceedings privilege independently barred the defamation claim because statements in affidavits and other court-filed papers that bear some relation to the proceeding are absolutely privileged, even if alleged to be false or malicious. Because Leonard established that defense as a matter of law, the court reversed the TCPA denial by operation of law and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family cases, allegations made in affidavits or other filings submitted to obtain court relief—especially emergency custody relief—may be both TCPA-protected petitioning activity and absolutely privileged against later defamation claims. The practical lesson is to challenge allegedly false statements inside the family case when possible, and to draft emergency affidavits carefully so they stay tied to the relief requested and the issues before the court."
Arellano v. Arrellano
COA04
After a decedent’s children sued to void a lien on family property, the surviving spouse intervened claiming homestead rights. The trial court struck her intervention for lack of a justiciable interest, then later entered a final judgment declaring she had no homestead interest and assessed attorney’s fees against her. The San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the order striking the intervention was interlocutory, so it did not start plenary-power deadlines and instead merged into the final judgment, leaving the struck intervenor bound by and able to appeal the final judgment. But because the strike was based on a jurisdictional lack of justiciable interest, the trial court could not then adjudicate the merits of the intervenor’s homestead claim. The appellate court therefore vacated the homestead merits declaration, affirmed the interlocutory-jurisdiction/plenary-power ruling, and remanded for further proceedings on attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you successfully strike an intervention, do not overreach in the final judgment. A struck intervenor is still bound until final judgment and can appeal, but once the court rules the intervenor lacks a justiciable interest, it cannot also decide that person’s substantive property, homestead, custody, or possession claims without an independent jurisdictional basis."
White v. White
COA12
In White v. White, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that divorce-decree payments labeled as “spousal maintenance” were not true Chapter 8 maintenance because, in substance, they were installment payments for the wife’s equity in the marital home and community business interests. The court looked past the decree’s labels and contempt language and focused on the obligation’s actual purpose under the parties’ mediated settlement agreement. Because the $175,000 obligation functioned as a property-division buyout under Family Code section 7.006 rather than periodic support from future income under Chapter 8, the trial court properly refused contempt enforcement. The wife could still recover arrearages and a money judgment, but contempt was unavailable.
Litigation Takeaway
"Labels do not control enforcement. If a payment stream is really a deferred property buyout, calling it “spousal maintenance” will not make it contempt-enforceable. Texas family lawyers should clearly separate true Chapter 8 maintenance from property-equalization payments at the drafting stage and should evaluate the substance of the obligation before filing or resisting contempt."
In the Interest of K.D.M. and S.I.L.
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights to two children after concluding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and 161.003, as well as on best interest and conservatorship. The court focused on evidence of endangering surroundings and conditions, including domestic violence, unstable care arrangements, and the prior death of an infant sibling in Mother’s care that the Department linked to medical neglect. It also relied on Mother’s significant cognitive limitations and her inability to present a coherent, realistic plan for housing, childcare, schooling, therapies, supervision, and emergency response. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard, the court held that Mother’s limitations were not merely abstract diagnoses but functionally prevented her from meeting the children’s present and future needs, and that termination and appointment of the Department as sole managing conservator were in the children’s best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law cases, courts look beyond a parent’s good intentions and focus on functional parenting capacity: who will care for the child, where the child will live, how needs will be met, and how safety risks will be managed. Where cognitive limitations, domestic violence, instability, or poor safety planning affect day-to-day care, lawyers must build a concrete record with specific facts, corroboration, and workable caregiving plans."
In the Interest of Z.A.A., a Child
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the father’s parental rights to Z.A.A. after DFPS proved constructive abandonment and best interest by clear and convincing evidence. The court held DFPS made reasonable efforts to reunify by creating and discussing a family service plan and repeatedly trying to locate and contact father through phone numbers, relatives, social media, prior addresses, and his parole officer. It also found father failed to maintain significant contact, failed to support the child, and showed an inability to provide a safe environment, especially because he had substantial periods out of jail but still did not visit or engage. On best interest, the court emphasized the child’s stability and improvement in the maternal great-grandfather’s home, the adoption plan and backup caregiver plan, and contrasted that with father’s drug- and domestic-violence-related criminal history, repeated incarceration, nonparticipation in services, and ongoing absence.
Litigation Takeaway
"In constructive-abandonment cases, DFPS wins on appeal when it builds a detailed record of specific reunification efforts and the parent’s missed opportunities during periods of freedom. For family-law litigators generally, the case reinforces that stability, consistent contact, support, and a concrete permanency plan can outweigh a parent’s bare biological connection when best interest is at issue."
Ortego v. State
COA01
In Ortego v. State, a husband sought to suppress incriminating text messages discovered on his cell phone by his wife, arguing the search was unconstitutional and violated Texas computer security laws. The First Court of Appeals analyzed the search under the Fourth Amendment and Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.23, which excludes evidence obtained in violation of the law. The court held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to private individuals acting without government involvement. Furthermore, because the husband had provided his wife with a written "Commitment to You" note granting her permission to look at his phone "for any reasons" if she had concerns, she had "effective consent." This consent defeated claims of illegal access, making the evidence admissible.
Litigation Takeaway
"Documented consent is the ultimate "kill switch" for digital privacy objections. In family law disputes, evidence found via "digital self-help" is likely admissible if there is a written agreement, a reconciliation memo, or a proven course of conduct involving password sharing and mutual device access. To protect or attack such evidence, practitioners must focus on the specific scope, duration, and potential revocation of that consent rather than general privacy rights."
Gurrola v. State
COA03
In Gurrola v. State, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the defendant waived any appellate complaint that a trauma therapist’s guilt-innocence testimony was improper victim-impact evidence. Although defense counsel objected at the outset to the witness generally on relevance, prejudice, bolstering, and victimization grounds, counsel did not obtain a running objection and did not renew those objections when the specific testimony about therapy, PTSD, trauma symptoms, and emotional effects was actually elicited. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and preservation cases such as Martinez and Fuller, the court concluded that an initial global objection and a granted motion in limine were not enough to preserve error. Because the complaint was not preserved, the court did not reach the admissibility merits and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-law trials, one opening objection to a therapist, counselor, or expert is not enough. If damaging testimony keeps coming in, you must keep objecting or secure a clear running objection; and a motion in limine never substitutes for a trial objection. Appellate issues are often lost on preservation, not merit."
Nicholas Allen White v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Nicholas Allen White v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to prove lack of consent for indecent assault even though the complainant never verbally said “no” during the touching. The court rejected the appellant’s argument that indecent assault requires the force-based “without consent” definition from the sexual-assault statute, and instead applied the Penal Code’s general definition of consent as “assent in fact, whether express or implied.” Using that framework, the court concluded a rational jury could infer nonconsent from circumstantial evidence: the complainant had declined related advances, testified that White forced his hand down her pants, froze in fear, resisted being pulled into the men’s restroom, and immediately returned to friends crying and reported what happened. The conviction for indecent assault was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas family-law cases, the absence of a spoken “no” does not equal consent. White is useful authority for arguing that courts may infer nonconsent from context, trauma responses like freezing, physical resistance, immediate outcry, and surrounding circumstances, even when the parties were previously friendly or flirtatious. That makes the case especially helpful in custody, protective-order, and fault-based divorce litigation involving allegations of sexual coercion or boundary violations."
In re Lillian Gonzalez
COA14
In In re Lillian Gonzalez, the relator asked the Fourteenth Court of Appeals to order the Texas Office of the Attorney General, Child Support Division, to release child-support funds. The court did not reach the merits of whether she was entitled to the money. Instead, it analyzed its mandamus jurisdiction under Texas Government Code section 22.221 and held that courts of appeals may issue mandamus against certain judges and associate judges, but not against the OAG Child Support Division. The court also held that Gonzalez did not show the writ was necessary to protect or enforce the court’s appellate jurisdiction under section 22.221(a). Because neither basis for mandamus jurisdiction applied, the court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Before filing mandamus in a child-support payment dispute, identify the correct respondent and the source of the complained-of conduct. Even a strong complaint about withheld support funds will be dismissed if the petition is directed at a non-judicial actor like the OAG and does not show why extraordinary relief is necessary to protect the court of appeals’ jurisdiction."
Martinez v. State
COA07
In Martinez v. State, the Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether a defendant on community supervision could refuse a treatment-required instant-offense polygraph by invoking the Fifth Amendment after his conviction for indecency with a child was already final on direct appeal. The court focused on the narrow scope of the polygraph, which was limited to the adjudicated offense and did not reach other potentially chargeable conduct. Relying on Fifth Amendment principles discussed in Ex parte Dangelo and In re Medina, the court held that the privilege against self-incrimination does not extend to questioning about an offense that can no longer expose the defendant to future criminal liability because direct appeals are exhausted. On that basis, the court concluded the refusal to participate supported revocation of community supervision. The court also modified the judgment and bill of costs to remove language suggesting future appointed-attorney’s fees could be assessed despite an indigency finding and no evidence of changed financial circumstances.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Fifth Amendment objection is not a blanket shield when the questioning is tightly limited to a finalized criminal offense. In family-law cases, lawyers should frame discovery, evaluations, and examinations with precision: if the inquiry concerns only an adjudicated offense with no remaining criminal exposure, a broad privilege claim may fail and noncooperation can carry real litigation consequences."