Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1229 opinions found
In the Matter of the Marriage of Melissa A. Paredes v. Trini J. Paredes, Jr. and In the Interest of V.N.P. and T.J.P. III, Children
COA05
In Paredes v. Paredes, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed an enforcement judgment based on a divorce decree provision requiring the wife to pay the husband “twelve months’ worth of the proceeds” if she sold certain real property. After the wife sold the property, the husband asked the trial court to enforce the decree and relied on an email and his own calculation to argue the phrase meant one year’s worth of annualized net proceeds. The appellate court held that the decree’s operative language was not merely ambiguous but facially unintelligible, because proceeds cannot coherently be measured in units of time. Applying Texas law requiring judgments to be definite enough to be executed from their four corners, the court concluded the provision was a nullity and could not be enforced through extra-textual evidence or the parties’ claimed shared understanding. The court therefore reversed the damages award and the derivative attorney’s-fees awards and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a divorce decree’s property language does not state a clear, mathematically coherent obligation on its face, it may be unenforceable altogether. Family-law litigators should draft future-sale and deferred-payment provisions with precise formulas, defined terms, and objective triggers, because emails, testimony, or course of dealing will not rescue a decree that is unintelligible as written."
Perricone v. Perricone
COA11
In Perricone v. Perricone, the Eastland Court of Appeals addressed a contested Rule 145 statement of inability to afford court costs in litigation arising from divorce and custody-related disputes. After a defendant challenged the indigency filing, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing and found the declarant’s financial statement contained material misrepresentations and omissions, including unsupported claims of means-tested benefits, undisclosed assets, and inaccurate income and valuation information. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f), the court held that once a contest is filed, the burden shifts to the declarant to prove inability to pay by a preponderance of the evidence. Reviewing for abuse of discretion, the appellate court deferred to the trial court’s credibility findings and concluded the record supported denial of indigency status. The court also held that the challenger’s unsworn declaration was sufficient because it substantially complied with Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 132.001 despite minor technical defects.
Litigation Takeaway
"A Rule 145 form is only the starting point. If the other side contests indigency, the party claiming inability to pay must back it up with credible, documented proof, and courts will closely examine omissions, inconsistencies, household support, and prior financial representations. For family-law litigators, Perricone is a roadmap both for attacking weak indigency claims and for preparing defensible ones."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Fred Garland Henson and Tiffanie Karon Henson and in the Interest of C.R.H., a Child
COA12
In Henson v. Henson, the Tyler Court of Appeals addressed whether a divorce decree could both restrict a father’s possession and require him to complete a battering intervention program, parenting classes, and negative drug tests before he could later seek modification of that no-contact order. The court held that the trial court acted within its broad authority under Chapter 153 to impose a no-contact possession restriction based on evidence of methamphetamine use, family violence, and danger to the child. But it also held that Chapter 156 exclusively governs when a party may seek modification, so the trial court could not add extra-statutory preconditions to filing a future modification action. The improper filing barriers were ordered deleted from the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Texas courts can impose very strict current possession restrictions to protect a child, but they cannot block a parent’s statutory right to file a future modification suit by adding decree-based prerequisites. When drafting protective orders, tie treatment, testing, or classes to possession or reunification—not to courthouse access."
In the Interest of A. A. S.
COA03
In a restricted appeal from a private termination suit, the Third Court of Appeals held that termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent had the ability to support the child during each month of the relevant twelve-month period. Although the grandmother proved the mother had been ordered to pay support and paid nothing, the court concluded that nonpayment and the existence of a prior support order do not establish actual ability to pay. Because the written termination order relied solely on subsection (F) and the record contained no evidence of the mother’s employment, income, assets, or other facts showing ability to support during the statutory period, the evidence was legally and factually insufficient. The court reversed the termination order and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you plead termination under § 161.001(b)(1)(F), arrearage evidence alone is not enough. You must build a month-by-month record showing the parent’s actual ability to support during the statutory period; if that proof is missing, subsection (F) is vulnerable on sufficiency review, including in a restricted appeal after a default prove-up."
In the Interest of J.J. III and D.R.L.J., Children
COA04
In this parental-rights termination appeal, the father challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court’s endangerment findings under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and he also challenged best interest. But he did not challenge the separate constructive-abandonment finding under subsection (N). The Fourth Court of Appeals applied the settled rule that one valid predicate ground under section 161.001(b)(1), coupled with a best-interest finding under section 161.001(b)(2), is enough to affirm termination. Because subsection (N) was an independent ground and was left unchallenged, the court treated it as established on appeal and affirmed the termination order without needing to decide the father’s attacks on subsections (D) and (E).
Litigation Takeaway
"In a termination appeal, you must challenge every independent predicate ground that can support the judgment. If even one statutory ground is left unchallenged, the court can affirm so long as the best-interest finding stands, making issue selection on appeal potentially case-dispositive."
Brennan Short v. Jamie Short
COA04
In Short v. Short, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that although a deed from one spouse to the other during marriage creates a presumption of gift, that presumption can be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence when the deed does not contain an express separate-property recital. Wife owned the Boerne home before marriage, later deeded Husband a one-half interest during a refinance intended to pay off other debt and lower monthly payments, and testified she did not intend a gift. Relying on In re J.Y.O., the court held parol evidence of her intent was admissible, found sufficient evidence that the transfer was a financing accommodation rather than a donative transfer, and affirmed the trial court’s characterization of the entire property as Wife’s separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
"An interspousal deed is powerful, but not always dispositive. In Texas property-characterization disputes, a spouse can defeat the gift presumption with clear and convincing evidence showing the transfer was made for refinancing or debt-service purposes rather than out of donative intent—especially when the deed lacks an express separate-property recital. Plead lack of donative intent and any fraud, duress, or mistake theories, and preserve objections if the other side tries unpleaded issues."
Bowles v. Bowles
COA04
In Bowles v. Bowles, the parties disputed whether Flea Away, LLC was community property because the LLC was formed during the marriage, or Simon Bowles’s separate property because it was merely the later legal form of a business he already owned before marriage. The Fourth Court of Appeals applied Texas Family Code sections 3.001 and 3.003, along with inception-of-title and tracing principles, and focused on whether the LLC was a new acquisition or simply a mutation of the preexisting sole proprietorship. Simon proved by clear and convincing evidence that the original Flea Away business had been awarded to him as his separate property in a prior California divorce, and the evidence showed continuity of the same enterprise after it began operating as an LLC. Because there was no admitted evidence of any transfer, conveyance, or issuance of ownership to Lilian, the court held the LLC remained Simon’s separate property and affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Forming an LLC during marriage does not automatically turn a separately owned business into community property. In a business-characterization fight, the winning strategy is to prove or disprove continuity: the spouse claiming separate property needs a clean tracing chain from the original asset to the new entity form, while the spouse challenging that claim must produce evidence of an actual transfer, capitalization, or new ownership event—not just testimony that the business changed or that the spouse worked in it."
Diaz-Perez v. State
COA04
In Diaz-Perez v. State, the defendant challenged his convictions for continuous sexual abuse of a child by arguing, among other things, that the trial court improperly admitted the mother’s outcry testimony because the State’s Article 38.072 written summary allegedly did not specifically disclose penile penetration. The Fourth Court of Appeals did not need to definitively decide whether the summary was too imprecise because any error was nonconstitutional and harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b). The court emphasized that the child later testified without objection to the same penetration detail, making the complained-of testimony cumulative and not outcome-determinative. The court also rejected ineffective-assistance claims tied to the failure to obtain a rebuttal expert because the appellate record did not show an available expert, proposed testimony, or resulting prejudice. The convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"In abuse-driven family-law cases, winning an evidentiary objection is not enough if the same fact comes in later through another witness or exhibit without objection. Preserve the issue across the full proof chain, because appellate courts are likely to treat notice or disclosure defects as harmless when the challenged allegation is later proved through cumulative evidence."
In re Bradley Welsh
COA02
In a child-support enforcement proceeding, the trial court orally found Bradley Welsh in contempt on April 8, 2026 and ordered him confined for sixty days, but did not sign the written contempt and commitment order until thirty-six days later. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that due process permits only a short and reasonable time between an oral contempt finding with confinement and the signed written order under Ex parte Calvillo Amaya. The court rejected arguments that later work-release discussions meant the contempt ruling was incomplete or that Welsh invited the delay, concluding the hearing had effectively ended and the postponement was caused by the court’s process. Because the delayed written order violated due process, the contempt and commitment order was void, and the court granted habeas relief and vacated the order.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Texas contempt practice, an oral confinement ruling is not enough. If a court orally finds contempt and orders jail time, the written contempt and commitment order must be prepared and signed almost immediately; otherwise the order may be void regardless of the underlying violation. Family-law lawyers should have proposed contempt orders ready at the hearing and, for respondents, should closely compare the oral ruling date to the signature date for a potential habeas challenge."
In the Matter of the Marriage of Caroline Brookshire and Trenton Brookshire and in the Interest of R.L.B., D.B.B. and H.A.B., Children
COA12
In this Texas family-law appeal arising from a contested divorce and SAPCR, the appellee argued the judgment should be affirmed because the appellate record was supposedly incomplete: although audio and video exhibits were admitted and included in the record, the court reporter did not identify the exact timestamps or clips played at trial. The Tyler Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and held that the incomplete-record presumption in Rule 34.6(c) applies only when an appellant elects to proceed on a partial reporter’s record. Because the appellant requested the complete reporter’s record and the admitted digital exhibits were actually included, the absence of clip-by-clip transcription or timestamp notation did not make the record incomplete. The court therefore rejected the appellee’s request for a presumption in favor of the judgment and allowed merits review to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you want appellate review of digital evidence, request the full reporter’s record and make sure the admitted audio/video exhibits are included. Brookshire also teaches trial lawyers not to rely on the court reporter to identify clips—state timestamps and excerpts on the record whenever possible—but an appellee cannot turn that imprecision alone into an automatic affirmance under Rule 34.6(c)."