Suarez v. State

Suarez v. State, 13-25-00105-CR, July 30, 2026.

On appeal from 347th District Court of Nueces County, Texas

Synopsis

Under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(f)(1), the State may prove the prior-conviction element of felony family-violence assault with certified records showing that the defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere and received deferred adjudication for a qualifying family-violence offense. A later adjudication of guilt is not required during the guilt-innocence phase to establish that the defendant was “previously convicted” for purposes of § 22.01(b)(2)(A).

Relevance to Family Law

Although Suarez is a criminal case, it matters in family-law practice because deferred-adjudication family-violence records often surface in SAPCRs, custody modification suits, protective-order proceedings, and divorce cases involving conservatorship or possession restrictions. The opinion reinforces that Texas statutes may assign operative legal effect to a deferred-adjudication plea even when it is “not a conviction for most purposes,” which means family-law litigators should scrutinize the precise statutory definition in play before arguing that deferred adjudication is legally irrelevant. In practical terms, a deferred-adjudication disposition for a family-violence offense may materially affect best-interest evidence, family-violence findings, access restrictions, firearm-related consequences, and credibility determinations about risk and household safety.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Antonio Suarez III was tried for assault on a family member enhanced to a third-degree felony under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(A). The State alleged not only the underlying assault against his then-girlfriend, but also a qualifying prior family-violence conviction. To prove that prior-conviction element during guilt-innocence, the State introduced a certified order of deferred adjudication from April 7, 2011, in cause number 11-CR-0655-F, showing that Suarez had pleaded guilty to continuous violence against the family and received ten years’ deferred-adjudication community supervision. The State also offered the accompanying plea agreement reflecting that deferred adjudication was granted in exchange for Suarez’s guilty plea. Suarez did not materially dispute identity, did not dispute that continuous violence against the family is among the listed predicate offenses, and did not dispute the dating-relationship element in the new case. His sufficiency challenge was narrower: he argued that deferred adjudication alone did not establish that he had been “previously convicted” for purposes of the felony enhancement and that only later punishment-phase proof of adjudication of guilt after revocation could satisfy that element.

Issues Decided

• Whether the evidence was legally sufficient to prove the prior-conviction element of felony family-violence assault under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(A) when the State’s guilt-innocence proof showed only that the defendant pleaded guilty and received deferred adjudication for continuous violence against the family.
• Whether Texas Penal Code § 22.01(f)(1) defines “previously convicted” broadly enough to include a plea of guilty or nolo contendere that resulted in deferred adjudication, regardless of whether sentence was later imposed.
• Whether the court of appeals could modify the judgment sua sponte to correct the omission of the jury’s repeat-offender enhancement finding.

Rules Applied

The court applied the standard Jackson sufficiency framework, as stated through Texas authorities such as Laster v. State, Stahmann v. State, and Zuniga v. State: the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, and the question is whether a rational factfinder could have found each essential element beyond a reasonable doubt. The court also measured sufficiency against the hypothetically correct jury charge under Malik v. State. Substantively, the court focused on these authorities:

• Texas Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(A), which elevates certain family-violence assaults to a third-degree felony when the defendant has been “previously convicted” of a qualifying offense.
• Texas Penal Code § 22.01(f)(1), which expressly defines “previously convicted” to include a defendant who entered a guilty or nolo contendere plea in return for deferred adjudication, regardless of whether sentence was ever imposed.
• Texas Penal Code § 25.11, identifying continuous violence against the family as a qualifying predicate offense.
• Holoman v. State, holding that the prior conviction under § 22.01(b)(2)(A) is an elemental fact that must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt during guilt-innocence.
• Middleton v. State, recognizing that deferred adjudication is not a conviction for most purposes, while leaving room for statutes that expressly provide otherwise.

On the judgment-modification point, the court relied on its authority to make the record speak the truth, citing appellate authority recognizing that a court of appeals may sua sponte correct a clerical omission in the judgment, particularly where the written judgment fails to reflect a jury finding that affects the lawful punishment range.

Application

The court’s analysis was notably direct because the statutory text did most of the work. Suarez’s argument depended on the general proposition that deferred adjudication is not a conviction for most purposes. That proposition is often sound, but it failed here because § 22.01(f)(1) supplies its own definition of “previously convicted,” and that definition expressly includes a plea resulting in deferred adjudication. From there, the evidentiary path was straightforward. The certified deferred-adjudication order established that Suarez pleaded guilty to continuous violence against the family. The plea agreement corroborated that the plea was entered in exchange for a grant of deferred adjudication. Because the statute says that such a plea counts as a prior conviction “regardless of whether the sentence for the offense was ever imposed,” the State did not need to prove, during guilt-innocence, that Suarez was later adjudicated guilty after revocation. In other words, the later adjudication may have existed in the record by punishment, but it was legally unnecessary to establish the element already satisfied by the deferred-adjudication plea materials. The court also took up a separate judgment issue on its own motion. The jury found the repeat-felony-offender enhancement true, which raised the punishment range. But the written judgment omitted that finding, creating the appearance of a sixteen-year sentence for an unenhanced third-degree felony. To avoid a facially illegal sentence on paper, the court modified the judgment to reflect the enhancement and the jury’s true finding.

Holding

The Thirteenth Court held that, for purposes of felony assault on a family member under Texas Penal Code § 22.01(b)(2)(A), a defendant is “previously convicted” when he entered a guilty or nolo contendere plea in exchange for deferred adjudication for a qualifying family-violence offense. A later adjudication of guilt is not required to prove that elemental prior-conviction fact during the guilt-innocence phase. The court further held that the certified order of deferred adjudication and the accompanying plea agreement were legally sufficient evidence to prove the prior-conviction element beyond a reasonable doubt under § 22.01(f)(1). Separately, the court modified the judgment to reflect the jury’s repeat-offender finding and the enhanced degree of offense so that the written judgment accurately matched the verdict and lawful punishment range.

Practical Application

For Texas family-law litigators, Suarez is a reminder to separate colloquial descriptions of deferred adjudication from statute-specific legal consequences. In family cases, lawyers regularly confront criminal-history evidence in temporary-orders hearings, final SAPCR trials, modification proceedings, and protective-order cases. When a statute or procedural framework turns on whether a person has been “convicted,” “placed on deferred adjudication,” “subject to family violence,” or has pleaded guilty to a specified offense, the precise statutory wording will control. This case is especially useful when criminal records are being marshaled to support or oppose restrictions on possession, supervised visitation, exchange protocols, injunctive relief, geographic limitations, or findings relevant to the child’s best interest. If the underlying criminal matter involved a family-violence plea and deferred adjudication, counsel should obtain the certified order and plea papers, not merely a criminal-history printout or docket notation. Those source documents may supply a legally operative fact even when no final adjudication was entered at that stage. The opinion also has briefing value. When opposing counsel argues broadly that deferred adjudication “is not a conviction,” Suarez provides a disciplined response: that is true only “for most purposes,” and not where the Legislature has supplied a narrower, controlling definition. That mode of analysis translates well to family-law disputes involving firearm restrictions, protective-order eligibility, evidentiary relevance, parenting-plan restrictions, and collateral consequences tied to family violence. Finally, Suarez underscores a record-making point that matters in both criminal and family appeals: if a ruling depends on the legal effect of a prior case, the record should contain certified, specific documents showing exactly what occurred procedurally. Labels alone are often insufficient; the operative language of the order and the plea documents may decide the issue.

Checklists

Using Deferred-Adjudication Family-Violence Records in Family Litigation

• Obtain certified copies of the charging instrument, plea paperwork, and order of deferred adjudication.
• Confirm the exact offense of conviction or plea-based disposition, including whether it is a family-violence offense named in a relevant statute.
• Identify whether the statute at issue defines “conviction,” “previously convicted,” or related terms.
• Distinguish between a general background assertion about deferred adjudication and the specific legal consequence created by statute.
• Tie the criminal record to the precise family-law issue in dispute, such as conservatorship restrictions, possession terms, supervised access, or protective relief.

Challenging Overstatements About Deferred Adjudication

• Do not assume deferred adjudication always counts as a conviction.
• Read the controlling statute before making a categorical argument.
• Check whether the statute expressly includes guilty or nolo pleas resulting in deferred adjudication.
• Examine whether a final adjudication of guilt is actually required for the issue being litigated.
• Preserve statutory-construction arguments clearly in the trial court and on appeal.

Building a Strong Evidentiary Record

• Use certified records rather than summaries, criminal-history compilations, or unsworn database extracts where possible.
• Include plea agreements if the legal issue turns on whether the plea was entered in exchange for deferred adjudication.
• Prove identity carefully when connecting the opposing party to the prior case.
• Make sure exhibits are admitted and clearly referenced in testimony.
• If the procedural posture of the prior case matters, include revocation and adjudication orders as separate exhibits rather than assuming the court will infer them.

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Party’s Problem

• Do not rely on the general rule that deferred adjudication is not a conviction without addressing statute-specific definitions.
• Do not postpone analysis of the prior-offense element until a later phase if the law makes it an element to be proved earlier.
• Do not assume a later adjudication of guilt is necessary where the statute says otherwise.
• Do not frame a sufficiency challenge without confronting the statutory text that expressly answers the question.
• Do not overlook whether the appellate record already contains all documents necessary to establish the element.

Judgment and Order Review Before Appeal

• Compare the written judgment or final order against the verdict or findings.
• Confirm that enhancement findings, family-violence findings, and degree/range designations are accurately reflected.
• Look for clerical omissions that could create the appearance of an unauthorized result.
• Raise correction issues early, but remember appellate courts may sometimes modify clerical errors sua sponte.
• In family cases, review final orders for omitted statutory findings that affect enforcement or collateral consequences.

Family Law Crossover

The procedural rule illustrated by Suarez is that a statute can define a prior plea-and-deferred-adjudication disposition as the functional equivalent of a prior conviction for a specific legal purpose, and that the proponent may prove that point with certified court records and plea documents without waiting for a later adjudication of guilt. In family-law litigation, that same mechanism can arise whenever a party’s prior criminal disposition bears on a statutory threshold, an evidentiary predicate, or a required finding tied to family violence. The practical lesson is procedural rather than rhetorical: identify the exact statutory term at issue, determine whether the Legislature has supplied a special definition, and prove the prior proceeding through primary-source records that establish the plea, the disposition, and the offense involved.

Citation

Suarez v. State, No. 13-25-00105-CR, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here ~~a9b3b8a2-8f9b-4f39-822d-2e9e0d21d363~~