Weekly Digest
June 27 – July 3, 2026
34 opinions this week
Lydick v. Herrera
COA03
In Lydick v. Herrera, the applicant sought a final protective order after a dating-relationship altercation in which the respondent admitted striking and biting him. The trial court heard conflicting testimony about who started the fight, reviewed body-camera footage, 911 evidence, photos, and other exhibits, and found credible evidence that the applicant was the initial aggressor, that he punched and tried to pin down the respondent, and that her use of force was defensive and necessary to protect herself. Applying Texas Family Code sections 71.004, 81.001, and 85.001, the court of appeals held that defensive measures are excluded from the definition of family violence and that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the denial of the protective order. The appellate court therefore affirmed, emphasizing deference to the trial court’s credibility findings in contested protective-order cases.
Litigation Takeaway
“An admitted strike does not automatically equal family violence. In protective-order litigation, the winning issue may be who was the aggressor and whether the force used was reasonably defensive. Lawyers should build the sequence of events carefully, anchor self-defense or aggression theories in objective evidence like bodycam, 911 calls, and injury photos, and remember that trial-court credibility findings are hard to overturn on appeal.”
Kelvin Williams v. Houston Housing Authority
COA14
In Williams v. Houston Housing Authority, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed a temporary injunction because the Housing Authority presented no competent evidence at the injunction hearing. Although the applicant referenced pleadings, summary-judgment materials, and counsel’s factual assertions, it offered no sworn testimony and no exhibits were admitted into evidence. Applying Texas temporary-injunction standards, the court held that the movant had to prove a probable right to recovery and a probable, imminent, irreparable injury with evidence actually introduced at the hearing. Attorney argument is not evidence, and affidavits or attachments in the court file do not count unless formally admitted or accepted by agreement. Because the record contained no evidentiary support for the required elements, the trial court abused its discretion. The court reversed, dissolved the injunction, and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“A temporary injunction is only as strong as the hearing record. In family-law cases, do not rely on pleadings, verified motions, affidavits sitting in the file, or lawyer argument alone—put on sworn testimony, offer exhibits, and get them admitted, or the order may be reversed on appeal.”
In the Interest of A.S.L., a Child
COA05
In In re A.S.L., the mother challenged the divorce property division under Texas Family Code section 7.001, arguing the trial court failed to adequately account for about $44,000 in post-filing credit-card debt she said she incurred for living expenses and for the father’s alleged use of community funds to reduce roughly $52,000 of his own debt. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied abuse-of-discretion review and focused on whether the appellate record allowed it to measure the effect of the complained-of debt allocations on the overall just-and-right division. Because the decree did not assign values to most assets or liabilities, the record did not establish the value of the community estate as a whole, and no findings of fact or conclusions of law were requested, the court presumed the trial court resolved disputed facts in favor of the decree. The court held mother failed to show any alleged error materially affected the overall division and therefore failed to establish an abuse of discretion.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to appeal a Texas divorce property division, testimony about unfair debt allocation is not enough. Build a full valuation record, quantify the estate and the claimed error’s effect on the net division, and request findings of fact and conclusions of law; otherwise, the abuse-of-discretion standard and implied findings will usually defeat the appeal.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Meilyn Rutz Danski De Oliveira and Edrey Clarence Oliveira and in the Interest of S.L.D.O., a Child
COA13
In De Oliveira, the father challenged Texas’s authority to make the initial custody determination in a divorce/SAPCR, arguing the child had not lived in Texas during the six months before suit and that West Virginia, not Texas, was the proper forum. The court applied the UCCJEA’s home-state framework in Texas Family Code §§ 152.201(a)(1) and 152.102(7), focusing on the child’s long residence in Texas from birth until late 2022 and whether later stays in West Virginia, Florida, and Brazil were temporary absences. Because the evidence showed those moves were provisional, tied to family travel and attempted reconciliation, and did not establish a settled new home state, the court treated them as temporary absences included in the home-state calculation. The court held Texas had home-state jurisdiction within six months before filing, a parent continued to reside in Texas, unjustifiable-conduct arguments did not require Texas to decline jurisdiction, and the decree was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In UCCJEA fights, the winning issue is often not where the child was right before filing, but whether time away from Texas was only temporary. Build a precise timeline, prove whether any move was provisional or permanent, and make sure your pleadings on domicile and residence do not undermine your jurisdiction position.”
Flores v. State
COA02
In Flores v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals considered whether the trial court improperly designated a forensic interviewer as the child’s Article 38.072 outcry witness in a child-sex-assault case. Rather than deciding whether the designation was wrong, the court assumed error and focused on harm. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), the court held any error was nonconstitutional and harmless because the challenged testimony was cumulative of the child complainant’s testimony and the SANE nurse’s similar testimony, including the allegedly important condom detail. The conviction was affirmed because the complained-of outcry evidence did not affect substantial rights.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven family cases, winning the evidentiary objection is only half the battle: if similar child-abuse evidence comes in through other witnesses, records, or the child, an appellate court may treat any error as harmless. Trial lawyers should not only object specifically and preserve error, but also build a record showing why the challenged testimony supplied a unique, outcome-moving fact rather than merely repeating other evidence.”
In Re Jessica Acosta
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding arising from a divorce case, the trial court held Jessica Acosta in contempt for failing to make payments required by agreed temporary orders, including monthly business-account distributions and vehicle payments. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the contempt order was void to the extent it punished alleged violations that occurred before October 23, 2025, the date the temporary orders were actually signed. The court explained that contempt can enforce only a written, signed, and operative court order; retroactive due dates in a later-signed order do not create retroactive contempt exposure. Because the trial court imposed a single punishment for multiple alleged violations, most of which were based on pre-signing conduct, even the one post-signing allegation could not stand. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate the contempt order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not plead contempt for conduct that occurred before the operative temporary order was signed, even if the order later recites earlier due dates. Separate pre-signing claims into non-contempt remedies, and avoid bundling valid and invalid contempt allegations into one undifferentiated punishment because one defective allegation can void the entire contempt order.”
Maria Sanchez v. Ysidro Hernandez
COA01
In Sanchez v. Hernandez, the First Court of Appeals held that the trial court improperly characterized disputed bail-bond-related properties as each spouse’s separate property held 50/50 as tenants in common after a jury found the properties were not community property and found no fraud on the community. The court emphasized that property possessed during marriage is presumed community property under Texas Family Code section 3.003, and that presumption can be rebutted only by clear and convincing tracing evidence to a recognized separate-property source. Because no evidence showed either spouse acquired the properties as separate property, the trial court had no basis to impose its own separate-property characterization contrary to the verdict. The court reversed the decree and rendered judgment consistent with the jury’s findings.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas divorce cases, title and informal family explanations are not enough to prove separate property—if you want to overcome the community-property presumption, you need clear, disciplined tracing evidence. And once a jury answers the characterization questions submitted, the trial court cannot invent a new property characterization in the decree just to reach a perceived fair result.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Samantha RaeJon Downs and Ethan Sahen Downs and in the Interest of P.A.D. and Q.P.D., Children
COA06
In Downs, the Texarkana court of appeals held that when a December 11, 2025 final merits hearing functioned as the first trial setting in a contested divorce and child-custody case, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 245 required at least forty-five days’ notice. The record did not establish that an earlier June setting was actually received or remained operative, and Mother had objected in writing to the shortened setting. Relying on In re K.M.L. and Highsmith, the court treated Rule 245’s first-setting notice requirement as a constitutional due-process protection, not merely a procedural scheduling rule, and concluded that Mother did not waive the complaint by failing to file or properly present a continuance motion or by not appearing at trial. The court affirmed the divorce itself, but reversed the remaining challenged portions of the final decree and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a final hearing is the first real trial setting in a contested family-law case, forty-five days’ notice under Rule 245 is a due-process requirement. Actual notice, nonappearance, or defects in a continuance motion will not necessarily save the judgment; lawyers should make a clear Rule 245 record or risk reversal.”
Chang Qing Tan v. Michelle Moore
COA05
In Tan v. Moore, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a defendant’s special appearance because Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 120a requires strict compliance: the special appearance must be sworn or properly verified. The defendant argued he lived in China and lacked sufficient Texas contacts, and he later attached his daughter’s affidavit describing his move and lack of Texas ties. But neither the original nor supplemental special appearance was sworn, and the affidavit did not verify that the allegations in the special appearance were true and correct. Relying on Dawson-Austin and Dallas precedent, the court held the defect was fatal and affirmed without reaching the underlying personal-jurisdiction analysis.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to challenge personal jurisdiction in Texas, get the Rule 120a mechanics exactly right. An unsworn special appearance is ineffective, and even strong no-contacts evidence will not matter unless the motion itself is sworn or expressly verified by an affidavit or declaration adopting its allegations as true and correct. For family lawyers, this is a procedural knockout tool in interstate and international divorce, custody, modification, and enforcement cases.”
Hernandez v. State
COA04
In Hernandez v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support aggravated sexual assault of a child despite some inconsistencies in the child’s statements and a largely nonspecific SANE exam. Applying Jackson v. Virginia and Texas authority on penetration, the court concluded the jury could credit the child’s reports that Hernandez touched “inside” her vagina, that it hurt, and that the contact occurred inside her underwear, which was enough to support the penetration element. The court also held any Confrontation Clause complaint about limits on cross-examination of the mother was not preserved because counsel did not make a clear constitutional objection or offer of proof. Finally, the court reversed and remanded Count II for a new punishment hearing because the 35-year sentence for indecency with a child by contact exceeded the lawful second-degree felony range of 2 to 20 years.
Litigation Takeaway
“In child-abuse-driven custody or protective-order litigation, imperfect child outcry testimony and a normal or equivocal SANE exam do not automatically defeat the allegation; those issues usually go to weight and credibility. But if you want to challenge alternative-causation limits or other evidentiary restrictions on appeal, preserve error precisely with specific objections and an offer of proof.”
Stowe v. State
COA09
In Stowe v. State, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that article 38.371 allowed the State to introduce evidence of the abusive nature of the relationship between Stowe and the complainant, including prior assaultive conduct and a prior no-contact order, in a family-violence prosecution. The defense argued the evidence was improper Rule 404(b) propensity evidence, but the court concluded it served a noncharacter purpose because it explained the complainant’s fear, recantation, affidavit of nonprosecution, and inconsistent statements after the defense attacked her credibility. The court affirmed, holding that admission of the relationship-history evidence was not reversible error on this record.
Litigation Takeaway
“When recantation, resumed contact, or inconsistent statements are at issue, prior abuse and no-contact-order evidence can be admissible as contextual proof of fear, coercion, and relationship dynamics—not just as bad-acts evidence. Family-law litigators should tie the evidence to a specific noncharacter purpose and, if opposing it, press for Rule 403 balancing, narrowing, and limiting instructions rather than relying on a generic 404(b) objection.”
American Zurich Insurance Company v. Mark Carrera
COA04
In American Zurich Insurance Company v. Carrera, the claimant tried to expand an accepted workplace injury from a wrist and lumbar fracture to include a hip fracture, closed head injury, traumatic brain injury, hallucinations, and lifetime benefits based on alleged incurable insanity. The Fourth Court of Appeals held that these were medically complex conditions requiring competent expert medical testimony on diagnosis, causation, and disability. The claimant’s proof—family-member observations, temporal proximity, and two unsupported doctor letters—was legally insufficient, and the letters were also treated as hearsay. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and rendered judgment affirming the agency decision denying the expanded injury findings and lifetime income benefits.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a party wants a Texas court to make findings about complex medical or psychiatric conditions, lay testimony and generic doctor letters are not enough. In family cases involving TBI, PTSD, psychosis, abuse-related diagnoses, incapacity, or inability to work, Carrera is a strong gatekeeping case for requiring qualified expert testimony that actually connects diagnosis, causation, and functional impact.”
In the Interest of W.J.G.G., a Child
COA04
In In re W.J.G.G., the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a termination order could not stand where the evidence was factually insufficient on best interest, even though unchallenged predicate grounds under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N) and (P) remained valid. The court analyzed Father’s single positive methamphetamine test, which occurred before the child was conceived, along with his incarceration, service participation, and efforts to maintain contact, and concluded the evidence was legally insufficient to prove endangerment under subsection (E). More importantly, after reviewing the full record under the clear-and-convincing standard, the court held the best-interest evidence was too thin to support a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the child’s best interest. The court affirmed the surviving predicate grounds, reversed the best-interest finding, and remanded for a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“Predicate grounds do not win a termination case by themselves. If you want termination upheld, you must build a separate, child-focused best-interest record showing why termination—not a less restrictive alternative—serves the child’s present and future needs. For parents appealing termination, best interest can remain a strong point even when some predicate grounds survive.”
Journey v. State
COA06
In Journey v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed revocation of deferred adjudication after the State alleged Journey violated supervision by committing a new family-violence assault and by failing to complete community service. Although the complainant recanted at the revocation hearing and claimed she had lied about the assault, the court held the trial court could still credit the contemporaneous 9-1-1 call, the responding officer’s testimony, and photographs showing facial injuries. Applying the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations, the appellate court concluded the State proved at least one violation. Because one proven violation is enough to support revocation, the court did not need to address the separate community-service ground.
Litigation Takeaway
“A recantation does not automatically defeat a family-violence allegation when contemporaneous evidence supports it. In family-law cases, judges may rely on 9-1-1 recordings, officer observations, photos, medical records, and other corroboration over a later walk-back, so lawyers should build or attack the case around that objective evidence—not just the witness’s live testimony.”
Payne v. Cocoroiu
COA14
In Payne v. Cocoroiu, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a SAPCR modification order after the father challenged personal jurisdiction, service, venue, and the evidentiary basis for the judgment. The court held that by filing a pro se answer before filing a Rule 120a special appearance, the father made a general appearance and waived any objection to personal jurisdiction; that same appearance also cured any service defects under Rules 120 and 124. The court further held that Harris County had continuing exclusive jurisdiction because of the earlier final parentage order, defeating the venue challenge. Finally, because the father failed to provide the reporter’s record, the appellate court presumed the missing evidence supported the modification findings and rejected unpreserved complaints.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family cases, a respondent who files an answer before a special appearance likely waives personal-jurisdiction and service complaints. Family litigators should assess jurisdiction immediately, carefully sequence pleadings, and make sure the appellate record is complete—especially in modification cases where most complaints depend on the hearing evidence.”
In the Interest of D.A., A.A., K.A., & G.A., Children
COA12
In In re D.A., the Tyler Court of Appeals considered whether the Department’s endangerment proof was sufficient to terminate a father’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) when the evidence was largely circumstantial rather than direct. Father argued the absence of medical testimony, expert testimony, photographs, and eyewitnesses made the evidence legally and factually insufficient. The court rejected that argument, explaining that Texas law does not require direct evidence of endangerment and that circumstantial evidence may support a firm belief or conviction if the total record reasonably shows the parent knowingly allowed endangering conditions or engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct. Applying the J.F.C./C.H. sufficiency standards and relying on In re Lipsky, the court deferred to the trial court’s credibility determinations and held the cumulative force of the record was sufficient to support termination under subsections (D) and (E), affirming the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“You do not need a “smoking gun” witness or expert to prove or defeat endangerment. In Texas family cases, a well-developed pattern of indirect evidence can be enough—so the key fight is usually over the strength of the inferences, not the mere lack of direct proof.”
Bernadette Cagney-Reeves v. Eric Michael Reeves
COA14
In Cagney-Reeves v. Reeves, the ex-wife asked the court to “enforce” a divorce decree by voiding a deed from a completed post-divorce home sale and putting title back in her name, claiming forgery, coercion, incapacity, and broker noncompliance. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code Chapter 9 allows only implementation or clarification of the property division actually made in the decree, not a new division of property. Because the decree required the home to be sold and the proceeds divided 60/40, an order undoing the sale and revesting title in one spouse would impermissibly alter the decree under section 9.007. The court also noted the movant failed to present competent evidence supporting forgery or any unmet decree term requiring enforcement, and it held her evidentiary and discovery complaints were not preserved for appeal. The denial of the enforcement motion was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Post-divorce enforcement is remedy-driven: if the relief sought would unwind a sale, restore title, or otherwise change the decree’s economic outcome, Chapter 9 is likely the wrong vehicle. Family-law litigants must tie enforcement requests to a specific unperformed decree obligation and support serious allegations like forgery or coercion with competent, preserved evidence.”
A. M. and J. D. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services
COA03
In this DFPS parental-rights appeal, the parent argued the trial court improperly revisited indigence on its own and orally discharged appointed appellate counsel under Family Code § 107.013(e) without any authorized motion. The Third Court did not decide whether the discharge was unlawful because the appellate record lacked both a signed discharge order and the reporter’s record from the hearing. Instead, relying on the parent’s continuing right to counsel through appeal and ordinary record-preservation requirements, the court held that merits relief was premature and abated the appeal so the trial court could sign an order, include any supporting findings or conclusions, and supplement the record.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even strong statutory error arguments can fail temporarily if the record is incomplete. If a trial court orally changes indigence status, discharges appointed counsel, or enters any ruling affecting appellate rights, family lawyers should immediately secure a signed written order, obtain the hearing transcript, and seek abatement and record supplementation before asking the appellate court for substantive relief.”
McCulloch v. McCulloch
COA03
In McCulloch, the obligor sought to reduce child support and terminate or reduce spousal maintenance based on alleged disability, unemployment, and worsening finances after the divorce decree. The Austin Court of Appeals held that modification under Texas Family Code sections 156.401(a)(1) and 8.057(c) requires proof of a material and substantial change in circumstances since the prior order, and that the movant failed to meet that burden because much of his evidence predated the decree, had already been litigated in earlier proceedings, or did not conclusively prove a post-decree loss of earning capacity. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility findings and intentional-unemployment finding, the court affirmed the denial of modification, rejected the guideline-support complaint, upheld the denial of continuance, and affirmed the judgment in full.
Litigation Takeaway
“A modification case is not a retrial of the divorce. To change child support or spousal maintenance, the movant must present a clean before-and-after record proving a post-order material and substantial change, backed by objective evidence such as medical records and reliable financial proof. SSA disability findings, client testimony, and general financial strain will not carry the day if the same issues existed before the decree or the trial court doubts credibility.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Danielle Lauren Henry & Johnathon Hall
COA12
In this divorce appeal, the wife argued that her due-process rights were violated because she was not admitted into a January 3, 2025 Zoom hearing where the court granted a continuance and the parties agreed that the husband would not pay February spousal support. The Tyler Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of that constitutional complaint because the wife waited until the May 7, 2025 judgment hearing—after the final trial had already occurred—to raise it. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1, the court held that even constitutional due-process complaints must be raised through a timely, specific objection, motion, or request at a point when the trial court can still cure the problem. Because the complaint was raised months too late, the issue was not preserved for appellate review.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume calling something a due-process violation preserves it automatically. In family-law cases—especially Zoom hearings, temporary-orders settings, and continuance hearings—counsel must object immediately, request a concrete cure, and make a record while the trial court can still fix the problem, or the complaint will likely be waived on appeal.”
In the Matter of B.F.
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring a 15-year-old charged with capital murder to criminal district court. The court rejected the argument that Family Code § 54.02(a)(3) required findings on both the seriousness of the offense and the child’s background because the statute is disjunctive: transfer may be based on either ground. It also held that the State’s conjunctive pleading did not increase its burden, and that the evidence on the § 54.02(f) factors—including the double homicide, evidence of planning and concealment, B.F.’s sophistication and maturity, and expert testimony that rehabilitation within the juvenile system was unlikely before age nineteen—supported the transfer decision.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a Family Code statute is written in the disjunctive, proving one statutory ground may be enough even if the pleading alleges multiple grounds. For family lawyers, this case is a reminder to track statutory text closely, frame appeals around required statutory elements rather than pleading form, and build a record supporting at least one independently sufficient basis for a discretionary ruling—especially in expert-driven cases where appellate courts defer heavily to the trial court’s credibility calls.”
Patricia Faith Dickinson v. Joshua Thomas Dickinson
COA03
In this SAPCR appeal, the mother argued that the appellate record filed in the court of appeals was incomplete and potentially misleading because important materials had been omitted despite her repeated efforts to obtain them. The Third Court of Appeals did not decide for itself whether the materials existed or belonged in the record. Instead, applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(e)(3), it held that once a post-filing dispute arises over the accuracy or completeness of the record, the proper course is to abate the appeal and remand to the trial court to determine whether the disputed materials exist, are relevant to the appeal, and should be included through supplementation. The court therefore abated and remanded for those factual determinations.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the appellate record in a family-law case is missing key hearings, exhibits, filings, or rulings, do not just complain around the problem. Build a paper trail, file a verified motion, and ask for a TRAP 34.6(e)(3) abatement so the trial court can decide whether the missing items exist, matter, and must be added to the record.”
Sam Alam v. Randy Reimer, CPA and RMH CPA, PLLC
COA14
In Alam v. Reimer, the plaintiff amended his petition before the Rule 91a hearing to add several new causes of action after the defendants had already filed a Rule 91a motion attacking only the original claims. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that Rule 91a is claim-specific: a motion may dismiss only the causes of action it actually identifies and challenges. Applying Rules 91a.1, 91a.2, and 91a.5, the court concluded that the original motion still reached the claims first pleaded in the original petition and re-alleged in the amended petition, but it did not automatically expand to newly added claims simply because the defendants chose to stand on it. The trial court therefore erred by dismissing the new, unchallenged claims, requiring reversal and remand as to those claims, while affirming dismissal of the previously challenged claims against Reimer individually.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a live amended petition adds new claims, an earlier Rule 91a motion does not automatically knock them out. In family-law cases where pleadings change quickly, the movant must amend the Rule 91a motion to specifically identify each new cause of action, and the non-movant should object to any blanket dismissal that goes beyond the claims actually challenged.”
Mary G. Mauldin and Carl Adams v. James C. Nix, III, as Co-Trustee and on Behalf of the Nix Family Trust
COA05
In Mauldin v. Nix, a trust beneficiary sued his sister over alleged mismanagement of a family trust after years of discovery disputes that began in a Rule 202 presuit proceeding and continued after merits claims were filed. The trial court repeatedly ordered discovery, found ongoing noncompliance and delayed disclosure that financial records had been shredded, and ultimately struck the sister’s pleadings as a sanction. On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s procedural handling of the Rule 202-to-merits transition and sustained the severe discovery sanctions, concluding the record showed persistent discovery abuse rather than a mere scope dispute. But the court reversed the $125,000 breach-of-fiduciary-duty damages award because legally sufficient evidence did not connect the alleged fiduciary breach to a compensable loss. The court rendered a take-nothing judgment on that damages claim, remanded attorney’s fees tied to that recovery, and otherwise left the conversion and sanctions-related rulings intact.
Litigation Takeaway
“Bad conduct and bad optics are not enough to win money damages. In family-law crossover cases involving hidden assets, waste, reimbursement, or fiduciary-duty theories, you still need proof that the alleged misconduct caused a measurable loss. At the same time, parties who keep resisting discovery after repeated court orders risk pleadings-striking sanctions, and Rule 202 is not a shield once full merits litigation is underway.”
Gonzalez v. State
COA01
In Gonzalez v. State, the First Court of Appeals affirmed admission of a friend’s testimony recounting the complainants’ earlier disclosures of abuse. The defense argued hearsay, but the State invoked Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(1)(B), contending that the defense had implied through voir dire, cross-examination, and closing that the complainants had recently embellished or fabricated their allegations for trial. The court held the complaint was not preserved because the defense did not specifically challenge the rule’s elements after the State identified the basis for admission. On the merits, the court concluded that, under Hammons, the trial court could consider the totality of the defense presentation and reasonably find an implied charge of recent fabrication. Because the prior statements to the friend were made years before the alleged motive to falsify arose, the premotive requirement was satisfied, and the testimony was properly admitted as prior consistent statements.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family cases involving abuse allegations or litigation-driven credibility fights, be careful when implying that a witness recently tailored testimony for custody, possession, or divorce advantage. That strategy can open the door to earlier consistent statements that would otherwise stay out. If you want to admit such statements, identify the exact motive alleged by the opponent and prove the statement predates it; if you want to exclude them, preserve element-specific objections and avoid turning a reliability attack into an accusation of calculated fabrication.”
In re José Garza
COA03
In In re José Garza, the Austin Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 264.408(d-1) required the trial court to deny a criminal defendant’s request to have CAC forensic interview videos transcribed once the State had already made the recordings reasonably available for review under Code of Criminal Procedure article 39.15(d). Relying on its prior decision in Tharp, the court concluded that a verbatim transcript is a prohibited copy or reproduction of the recording, regardless of protective-order limits or neutral court-reporter procedures. Because the statute left the trial court with no discretion, the order authorizing transcription exceeded the court’s authority, and mandamus relief was conditionally granted.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a statute tightly limits access to CAC forensic interviews, lawyers cannot get around that limit by asking for a transcript or other derivative version of the recording. In family cases involving abuse allegations, build your strategy around lawful review access, note-taking, and expert inspection protocols—not reproduction requests that invite statutory objections and possible mandamus.”
Tremayne Edward Johnson v. The State of Texas
COA14
In Johnson v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals considered whether admitting a child complainant’s CAC forensic interview required reversal after the defendant was convicted of sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child. The court held that although defense counsel initially said “no objection,” a later objection made before the video was published to the jury was timely enough to preserve some complaint because the trial court could still stop the jury from seeing it. But the court limited preservation to the specific trial objections actually made—bolstering and prejudice—not broader hearsay or Rule 403 theories raised on appeal. Assuming without deciding that admitting the CAC video was error, the court found the error harmless under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) because the same abuse allegations had already come in through the forensic interviewer’s testimony and through the child’s own live testimony in greater detail. Since the video was cumulative and there was no showing it substantially influenced the verdict, the convictions were affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven family cases, preserving an objection is only half the battle—counsel must also build a record showing why a CAC interview or child recording is uniquely harmful and not just cumulative of other testimony. If the same allegations are already before the factfinder through the child, an outcry witness, or a counselor, an appellate court may treat any error in admitting an additional recording as harmless.”
Jaka Janaka v. Rina Sefrin Hutagaol
COA01
In Janaka v. Hutagaol, the father sought to modify the mother’s possession terms only months after a divorce decree based on a mediated settlement agreement, alleging a false CPS report, possession-schedule violations, and interference with the children’s activities. The First Court of Appeals held that Family Code section 156.101(a)(1) requires proof of a threshold material and substantial change in circumstances since the earlier of the prior order or the underlying MSA, and that disputed evidence of post-decree conflict did not require the trial court to find such a change. Because the trial court was entitled to credit the mother’s explanation for contacting CPS and to treat the parties’ disputes as ordinary continuing conflict rather than a new substantial development, the appellate court affirmed the denial of modification and the attorney’s-fees award based on a finding that the suit was frivolous or designed to harass.
Litigation Takeaway
“A possession modification is not a do-over for co-parenting conflict. If you file soon after an agreed decree, you need concrete, corroborated proof of a genuinely new and material change tied to the statutory baseline date—not just allegations of interference, CPS involvement, or bad motives—or you risk losing and paying the other side’s fees.”
Keith Richard Nemcek v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Richard v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that a family-violence fine imposed under article 42.504 could not stand because the written criminal judgment did not include the required affirmative deadly-weapon finding. Although the defendant was convicted of aggravated sexual assault with a deadly weapon and the evidence described severe abuse within an intimate relationship, the court distinguished between the elements of the offense and the separate formal finding required in the judgment to authorize the fine. The court modified the judgment to delete the fine and otherwise affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume a criminal offense label proves every fact or finding you want to use in family court. Check the signed judgment for the exact findings it contains, because collateral consequences often turn on formal written findings, not just the indictment, testimony, or offense title.”
Venson v. State
COA06
In Venson v. State, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child by contact after the defendant argued that inconsistencies between the child’s trial testimony and prior forensic-interview statements made the evidence legally insufficient. The court applied the Jackson v. Virginia sufficiency standard, measured the evidence against a hypothetically correct jury charge, and held that credibility conflicts and evolving details in a child’s disclosures are matters for the jury, not grounds for appellate reversal. The court also upheld the trial court’s designation of the forensic interviewer as the outcry witness because the mother received only a brief, nonspecific disclosure, while the interviewer obtained the first detailed account of the abuse. The conviction was affirmed in full.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, do not assume that inconsistencies alone destroy a child’s credibility or the legal force of the disclosure. Venson is strong crossover authority for the point that incremental or imperfectly consistent disclosures may still support protective relief, and that the key outcry question is who first received a sufficiently detailed description of the alleged conduct.”
Darwin Deason v. Barbara D'Amato
COA05
In Deason v. D'Amato, the former wife filed a post-divorce suit seeking ownership or the value of five pieces of jewelry, claiming the divorce papers had not actually resolved rights to those items. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that res judicata barred the claim because the jewelry had already been specifically identified as the husband’s separate property in both the premarital agreement and the Agreement Incident to Divorce, which was approved in the divorce decree. The court rejected the argument that a general reservation of a potential future claim preserved later litigation over the jewelry, explaining that property expressly allocated in the divorce documents is not “undivided property” under Family Code chapter 9. The court also clarified that chapter 9 is not jurisdictional, but reversed and vacated the $2.73 million jewelry award and reversed related fees and interest because the later suit was an impermissible relitigation of property already awarded.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a divorce decree or incorporated agreements specifically identify and award property, a later suit cannot repackage that dispute as an omitted-property or chapter 9 claim. Generic reservation language will not override a detailed property allocation, so lawyers must draft any true carve-out with precision and make sure the asset is not otherwise awarded elsewhere in the decree package.”
In the Interest of A.F., a child; In the Interest of M.M. and M.M., children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence that Mother sold fentanyl while the children were present, left them with an apparently intoxicated boyfriend, had an existing neglectful-supervision case, admitted using fentanyl and methadone while caring for the children, and was incarcerated on drug-related sentences that prevented her from caring for or visiting them. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest factors, the court emphasized present and future danger, parental incapacity, and the children’s stable placement with a paternal aunt. Because the record supported a firm belief or conviction that termination was in the children’s best interest, the judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest cases are won by connecting misconduct to concrete parenting danger. Evidence of drug trafficking, active substance abuse, impaired supervision, incarceration, and prior Department involvement becomes especially powerful when paired with proof of a stable alternative placement. On appeal, unchallenged predicate findings can strongly reinforce a best-interest affirmance.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Albert Ray Garcia and Patricia Murguia Garcia
COA07
In this Texas divorce appeal, the Amarillo Court of Appeals upheld a decree awarding the husband all of a premarital house titled in both parties’ names and a disproportionate share of a joint bank account. The court held that because the house was acquired before marriage, each party’s interest was separate property under the inception-of-title rule, and the deed’s presumption of equal ownership was rebutted by evidence that the husband alone paid the purchase price and did not intend a gift to the wife. Framed as a partition issue rather than a just-and-right division of community property, the trial court permissibly determined the parties’ true ownership interests and awarded the entire property to the husband. The court also rejected the wife’s challenge to the bank-account award because she attacked only one asset instead of showing that the overall community division was unjust.
Litigation Takeaway
“Joint title on premarital real estate does not guarantee a 50/50 result in divorce. If the property was acquired before marriage, lawyers should plead partition, trace the acquisition funds, and build evidence on ownership percentages and gift intent; on appeal, challenges to property division must address the overall estate, not just one account or asset.”
In the Interest of A.F., a child; In the Interest of M.M. and M.M., children
COA07
The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination was in the children’s best interest under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The court focused on Mother’s fentanyl trafficking while the children were present, her leaving them with an impaired boyfriend, her admissions that she used fentanyl and methadone while caring for them and was high during the incident, her ongoing incarceration and delayed parole eligibility, prior Department involvement for neglectful supervision, and the children’s stable placement with a paternal aunt. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and Holley best-interest factors, the court concluded the record allowed the factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that termination served the children’s need for safety, stability, and permanence.
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest cases get much stronger when misconduct is tied to concrete danger to the child, parental unavailability, and a stable alternative placement. In custody and modification disputes, this case is a strong reminder that substance abuse, criminal conduct, unsafe third-party caregivers, and incarceration can heavily influence child-centered rulings even outside termination cases.”