Weekly Digest
July 4 – July 10, 2026
4 opinions this week
In Re The Commitment of Gerald Lee Ricks
COA01
In this Texas SVP commitment appeal, the dispute was whether Gerald Ricks had a statutory “behavioral abnormality” making him likely to commit future predatory sexual violence, not whether he was a repeat sexually violent offender. The First Court of Appeals held the evidence was sufficient because the State tied Ricks’s repeated child-sex offenses, relapse while on supervision and in treatment, continued attraction to female children, minimization, and inconsistent testimony to a forensic psychiatrist’s opinion that he remained high risk. The court also rejected Ricks’s complaint that he was barred from questioning the State’s expert about the State’s withdrawal of another expert, holding the issue was not preserved and, even if preserved, no reversible error was shown.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law cases involving abuse or child-safety concerns, past misconduct can support present-risk restrictions when it is paired with relapse, treatment failure, minimization, ongoing deviant interests, and qualified expert testimony connecting those facts to future danger. Just as important, if a court limits cross-examination of an opposing expert, make a precise record and offer of proof or the complaint may be lost on appeal.”
In re Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, Dollar Tree challenged discovery orders requiring statewide and nationwide documents and corporate-representative testimony about allegedly similar incidents, understaffing, shrink, and security practices at other stores. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the requests were facially overbroad under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 192.3 and 192.4 because they were not properly limited to substantially similar incidents within a reasonable temporal, geographic, and operational scope, and the trial court’s “similarly situated” label did not cure the defect. The court also held Rule 199.2(b)(1) does not allow a party to obtain the same overbroad information through corporate-representative deposition topics. Because the harm from compelled overbroad discovery cannot be adequately remedied on appeal, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“If discovery asks for 'all similar incidents,' 'all complaints,' or records from multiple locations without a tight tie to the pleaded issues, a defined time frame, and a reasonable geographic or operational limit, it is vulnerable to objection and mandamus. In family-law cases, this opinion is a strong roadmap both for defeating fishing-expedition discovery and for drafting narrower comparator requests that are more likely to survive challenge.”
Wilma Elder and Timothy Elder v. Korinthia Monique Miller
COA14
In a malpractice suit, the trial court granted a TCPA motion dismissing the defendant’s counterclaims and later signed an order awarding the plaintiffs $8,775 in mandatory TCPA attorney’s fees. Although that order called itself a “final judgment” as to the fee award, the plaintiffs’ own malpractice claim remained pending. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied Lehmann and held the fee order was still interlocutory because it neither actually disposed of all claims and all parties nor clearly and unequivocally stated that it did so. As a result, Rule 329b’s plenary-power deadlines never started, the trial court retained jurisdiction, and it erred by denying a later summary-judgment motion for lack of jurisdiction. The court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family cases, a fee or sanctions order is not truly final just because it uses the words “final judgment.” If live claims remain, the order is usually interlocutory unless it disposes of all parties and claims or contains unmistakable Lehmann-finality language. Do not assume plenary power has expired after a piecemeal ruling; check for unresolved issues, and use severance or precise drafting if true finality is intended.”
In the Interest of T.R.C.
COA09
In In re T.R.C., the Beaumont Court of Appeals considered whether the Department proved the statutory prerequisites for termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(f)(1). The case centered on a medically fragile child with Type 1 diabetes and the Department’s concerns about Mother’s care, but the court refused to rely on generalized safety concerns, voluminous medical records, or adverse impressions in place of element-specific proof. Applying the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, the court held the record did not legally suffice to show that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to Mother or that, despite those efforts, a continuing danger in the home prevented return. The court therefore reversed the termination order and rendered judgment denying termination, and it separately reversed the Department’s permanent managing conservatorship appointment because the trial court failed to make the finding required by Family Code section 153.002(c)(1).
Litigation Takeaway
“When a family-law remedy depends on specific statutory elements, the court cannot fill evidentiary gaps with a difficult record, broad safety narratives, or stacks of medical records. For termination under section 161.001(f)(1), the Department must prove actual reasonable reunification efforts and a continuing danger that still prevents return; for everyone else, the case is a reminder to force element-by-element proof and insist on required statutory findings.”