Weekly Digest
July 4 – July 10, 2026
34 opinions this week
Motton v. State
COA11
In Motton v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that revocation of deferred-adjudication community supervision was supported because the defendant pleaded “true” to one alleged supervision violation. The State had alleged multiple violations, but the court applied settled Texas law that proof of a single violation is enough to support revocation and adjudication, and that a plea of true alone is sufficient proof. In its Anders review, the court found no non-frivolous appellate issue because the plea of true independently supported the trial court’s order, so it affirmed the judgment and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a client in a family-law case has related criminal exposure, even a limited plea of “true” in a revocation proceeding can create a final, damaging record that may later be used in custody, family-violence, credibility, and possession disputes. Family and criminal counsel should coordinate before any admissions are made, because one admitted violation can be enough to sustain revocation and sharply limit appellate options.”
In re Laci Kay Johnson s/k/a Laci Kay Bode
COA05
In this mandamus proceeding, the relator challenged two family-law-related oral rulings: the trial court’s denial of a habeas petition and denial of a motion to dismiss. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the relator failed to provide a sufficient mandamus record. Applying Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3(l)(1)(B) and 52.7(a), along with settled mandamus law, the court explained that mandamus relief requires either a signed written order or a reporter’s record showing that an oral ruling was clear, specific, and enforceable. Because the relator provided neither a written order nor hearing transcripts, the court could not determine what the trial court actually ordered and denied mandamus and the related emergency motions.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you may need mandamus review of a bench ruling, build the record immediately: get a court reporter, obtain the transcript, and push for a signed written order. In family-law emergency practice, an oral ruling without a transcript is usually a dead end on mandamus.”
In re Rise Title, LLC d/b/a Rise Title of Texas
COA03
In In re Rise Title, the Austin Court of Appeals held that a probate court could enforce a sale decree by civil contempt against a nonparty title company that had actual notice of the decree. The decree required that sale proceeds from estate property “shall be placed into the Court Registry,” but Rise Title instead wired the funds to the estate’s credit-union account at the administrator’s direction. On mandamus, Rise argued it could not be held in contempt because it was not a party and was not named in the decree. The court rejected that argument, reasoning that civil contempt may reach a nonparty who has actual notice of a clear, specific, and unambiguous court order that applies to the conduct at issue. The court emphasized that the decree imposed an operative command regarding a specific fund, that Rise undisputedly reviewed the decree and acted with notice, and that the probate court’s in rem authority over the property and proceeds supported enforcement. Because the contempt order was coercive rather than punitive and simply required Rise to deposit the funds into the registry, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Mandamus relief was denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a nonparty controls money or property covered by a court order, actual notice can be enough to expose that nonparty to civil contempt—even if the order does not name them. For family-law lawyers, the lesson is to draft asset-control orders with precise mandatory language, give direct notice to title companies, banks, plan administrators, and other stakeholders, and treat third-party compliance as an enforcement issue from the start.”
In the Interest of I.C. and K.C., Children
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights, holding that legally sufficient evidence supported endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and the best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). The court analyzed Father’s conduct as a continuing pattern of endangerment, relying on evidence of repeated positive drug tests, multiple missed tests treated as presumed positives, incarceration, pending criminal charges, instability, and near-total failure to maintain contact with the child. Although Father completed some services, the court held that partial compliance did not overcome unresolved substance-abuse and stability concerns. The court also emphasized that the child was thriving in a safe, stable, adoptive placement, which supported the best-interest determination.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas child-related litigation, courts focus on patterns, not isolated incidents: ongoing drug use, missed tests, incarceration, criminal instability, and lack of contact can outweigh partial service-plan compliance and strongly support findings of endangerment and best interest. For practitioners, the case underscores the importance of building a record that pairs parental instability with evidence of the child’s need for safety, permanence, and a stable placement.”
Webb v. Ramirez
COA03
In Webb v. Ramirez, the Third Court of Appeals affirmed denial of a bill of review attacking a default parentage order. Webb argued he lacked notice of the final hearing, but at the bill-of-review hearing he offered no testimony, affidavit, or documents to explain his failure to appear or to rebut the court file. The trial court judicially noticed its file, which showed personal service and a signed February 2023 order setting the April final hearing and bearing Webb’s signature. Relying on Valdez, Katy Venture, and Drewery, the court held that even when a petitioner frames the challenge as a due-process notice defect, he is excused only from proving the first two traditional bill-of-review elements—not from proving that his own fault or negligence did not contribute to the default. Because Webb presented no competent evidence negating negligence and the file affirmatively showed notice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“A bill of review based on alleged lack of notice is an evidence problem, not just a legal argument. If the court file shows service or a signed setting order, the petitioner must come forward with real evidence explaining the missed hearing and negating his own negligence; otherwise, the file itself may defeat the attack.”
In the Interest of J.M., a Child
COA06
The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that evidence was legally insufficient to support termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) when the mother was incarcerated at the child’s birth and the record did not show she created, controlled, selected, or knowingly allowed the child to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings. Applying In re N.G., the court reviewed the challenged subsection (D) finding despite other unchallenged predicate grounds, distinguished environmental endangerment from general parental instability or incarceration, deleted the unsupported (D) finding, and otherwise affirmed termination based on other grounds and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“Don’t treat incarceration, instability, or absence as automatic proof of environmental endangerment. If you are pursuing a subsection (D) theory, you need evidence tying the parent to the child’s actual surroundings through knowledge and control; if you are defending, challenge any attempt to blur subsection (D) with subsection (E) and always appeal adverse (D) or (E) findings because of their future collateral consequences.”
In the Interest of C.J.C., O.C.C. and V.A.R.C., Children
COA08
The El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and for best interest. The court relied on a pattern of endangerment shown by domestic violence in the home, conflicting explanations for one child’s facial injuries, neglect of an infant’s serious medical needs, and unsafe, unstable living conditions. Although Mother completed some services, the court concluded partial compliance did not outweigh the ongoing safety concerns, lack of credibility, and failure to adequately protect the children.
Litigation Takeaway
“Courts view domestic violence, suspicious or inconsistently explained injuries, medical neglect, and unsafe housing cumulatively as powerful endangerment evidence. For parents, partial service compliance is not enough if the core safety issues remain unresolved; for petitioners, the strongest case ties these facts together into a continuing pattern of danger and poor parental judgment.”
In the Interest of G.H., a Child
COA11
In In re G.H., the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of both parents’ rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(2). The court examined a record showing both parents’ ongoing substance abuse, criminal history, prior endangering conduct, instability, and continued problems even after Department involvement and safety measures were put in place. Applying the clear-and-convincing standard and the Holley best-interest framework, the court emphasized that the same evidence supporting endangerment can also support best interest, and that a factfinder may infer future danger from a parent’s past conduct. The parents’ service-plan compliance and supervised visitation did not outweigh the broader evidence of recurring risk, so the termination order was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Best-interest cases are won or lost on patterns, not box-checking. Evidence of repeated drug use, criminal instability, and unsafe conduct—especially after CPS or court intervention—can outweigh service-plan completion and recent improvement because courts may infer future risk from past behavior.”
Natividad Gutierrez Rodriguez v. The State of Texas
COA11
In Rodriguez v. State, the Eastland Court of Appeals held that revocation of community supervision was supported because Rodriguez pleaded “true” to the remaining alleged violations after the State abandoned one allegation. Applying settled Texas law, the court explained that a plea of true alone is sufficient evidence to support revocation and that proof of a single violation is enough to uphold the order. In the Anders posture, the court independently reviewed the record, found no nonfrivolous issue for appeal, affirmed the revocation, and granted counsel’s motion to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law litigators, a revocation judgment based on a plea of “true” can be potent evidence in related divorce, custody, modification, and protective-order cases. But use it carefully: the plea establishes at least one admitted violation sufficient for revocation, not necessarily every factual allegation in the motion to revoke.”
Steven Benedict and Rayma Benedict v. Tonya Hill and Charles Edward Hill, Jr.
COA03
In Benedict v. Hill, grandparents filed a SAPCR modification seeking conservatorship of their granddaughter, and the trial court dismissed for lack of standing under Texas Family Code section 102.003(a)(9). The Austin Court of Appeals held that, under the pre-September 2025 version of the statute, a nonparent grandparent did not have to prove exclusive care, exclusive possession, or total parental abandonment to establish standing. Instead, the court analyzed whether Rayma Benedict had actually exercised care, control, and possession in a parent-like role during the required six-month period ending within 90 days before filing. Because the evidence showed shared residence on the family property, substantial day-to-day caregiving, transportation, schooling support, financial support, and involvement in the child’s routine and welfare, the court concluded the trial court applied too restrictive a standard and reversed the dismissal as to Rayma. The court affirmed dismissal as to Steven Benedict, holding that a step-grandparent not related within the third degree of consanguinity did not qualify for standing under this theory, and it also rejected the argument that a grandparent-access affidavit defect defeated the separate section 102.003(a)(9) claim.
Litigation Takeaway
“For grandparent-standing cases, the key question is functional parenting during the statutory window—not whether the parent disappeared from the child’s life. Build or attack standing with specific proof about the child’s residence, daily care, decision-making, and continuity during the six-month period, and make sure each petitioner independently fits the statute.”
In the Interest of J.B.B., a Child
COA13
In In re J.B.B., the mother argued the termination judgment was void because the trial court allegedly lost jurisdiction under Texas Family Code § 263.401 when it did not finish trial or sign a final order before the dismissal deadline. The court analyzed whether trial on the merits had commenced before that deadline and focused on the January 21, 2026 hearing, where the court heard sworn merits testimony about removal, placement, and adoption plans before recessing the case because Mother, who was in an Intermediate Sanction Facility and on suicide watch, could not participate. Relying on commencement-of-trial indicators and the text of § 263.401, the court held that the statute requires timely commencement, not completion, of trial. Because merits evidence was taken before the dismissal date, the later recess and March termination order did not divest the court of jurisdiction, and the judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a statute makes jurisdiction turn on whether trial has commenced, the record must clearly show that the merits hearing actually began before the deadline. Family lawyers should put on real merits evidence, not just call the case, and should make a precise record explaining any recess caused by a party’s inability to participate.”
Brown v. Brown
COA02
In Brown v. Brown, a post-divorce family-law dispute escalated from unresolved child-support and property-sale issues into enforcement, contempt, sanctions, and conservatorship relief after Wife denied Husband court-ordered possession and failed to comply with discovery. The trial court granted Husband broad relief and later signed orders that also included contingent appellate attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that most of Wife’s complaints were not preserved because she did not timely raise them in the trial court. But the court treated her objection at the decree-signing hearing as sufficient to preserve her complaint that the written orders added contingent appellate fees unsupported by the hearing record. Applying Texas preservation rules and the requirement that attorney’s fees, including conditional appellate fees, be supported by legally sufficient evidence that they are reasonable and necessary, the court concluded the record did not support the contingent appellate-fee award. It therefore reversed and remanded only the portion of the judgment awarding conditional appellate attorney’s fees and affirmed the remainder.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want contingent appellate attorney’s fees in a Texas family-law case, you must prove them with evidence—boilerplate decree language is not enough. And if a written decree adds appellate-fee relief not supported by the hearing record, a specific objection at the signing hearing can preserve error and set up reversal of that fee award.”
In re Nicholas Hassan
COA07
In In re Nicholas Hassan, the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a party waived a Rule 3.08 lawyer-as-witness disqualification complaint by waiting too long after learning that opposing counsel had drafted the estate-planning documents at the center of the dispute. The movant had notice for months, filed the motion only shortly before trial, then continued litigating through discovery, motion practice, mediation, and amended pleadings without diligently seeking a prompt hearing or ruling. Applying Texas waiver-by-delay principles from cases like In re Nitla and Vaughan, the court emphasized that disqualification is an extraordinary remedy that can seriously prejudice a party by depriving them of counsel of choice. Because the movant’s delay and litigation conduct showed the request was not pursued with urgency, the trial court abused its discretion by ordering disqualification, and mandamus relief was proper.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to disqualify opposing counsel under Rule 3.08, act immediately and press for a prompt hearing. In Texas family-law and property-related cases, waiting months after learning the facts—while continuing to litigate the merits—can waive the complaint and make the motion look tactical rather than necessary.”
In Re Securitas Security Services USA, Inc.
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that a trial court abused its discretion by imposing severe spoliation sanctions against Securitas without first conducting an evidentiary hearing. The plaintiff claimed Securitas failed to preserve electronic records that could show whether a security guard was present at the time of a shooting, while Securitas disputed that any responsive evidence was destroyed, what data existed, and whether any loss caused prejudice. Applying Brookshire Bros., Ltd. v. Aldridge, the court explained that before imposing spoliation remedies, the movant must prove a duty to preserve, a breach of that duty, and resulting prejudice. Because those predicate facts were contested, the trial court could not resolve them on written submissions alone or impose sanctions that effectively decided a merits-related issue and barred contrary proof. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief and held that an evidentiary hearing is required when spoliation predicates are factually disputed.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a spoliation dispute turns on contested facts, treat it like a mini-trial. In family law cases involving deleted texts, missing financial records, app data, or surveillance footage, a court cannot impose adverse inferences or issue-limiting sanctions based on briefing alone; the movant must prove duty, breach, and prejudice through evidence, and the responding party should insist on an evidentiary hearing.”
Gabriel v. State
COA13
In Gabriel v. State, a criminal child-sexual-abuse appeal with crossover value for family lawyers, the defendant challenged the admission of testimony from a second child victim describing similar abuse by the same household partner. The court held that article 38.37 permitted the evidence and that the trial court properly conducted Rule 403 balancing rather than excluding it categorically. The court reasoned that the second child’s testimony was not merely cumulative because it had independent probative value in showing a pattern of abuse, household dynamics, and context for the first child’s disclosures. It affirmed, concluding the evidence was highly probative and not unfairly prejudicial in a way that substantially outweighed its value.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven family cases, patterned-conduct evidence involving other children in the household can be powerful if you tie it to a specific non-character relevance theory—such as safety, endangerment, household context, delayed disclosure, or credibility—and are prepared to win the Rule 403 fight. On the defense side, a bare ‘prejudicial and cumulative’ objection is usually too thin; force precision on relevance and show why the added testimony contributes little incremental value.”
Sammica Cash v. Kimberly Cash
COA14
In Cash v. Cash, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a five-year stalking protective order entered after one former spouse repeatedly used social media and electronic communications to publish the other spouse’s private and humiliating information, including location data, intimate images, therapy-related recordings, and medical information. The court analyzed the case under Code of Criminal Procedure chapter 7B and Penal Code sections 42.072 and 42.07, holding that repeated online disclosures can constitute the harassment predicate for stalking when they are part of the same course of conduct directed at the applicant. The court further held that legally sufficient evidence showed both that Kimberly was actually harassed, alarmed, abused, tormented, embarrassed, or offended, and that a reasonable person would react the same way. Because stalking is a felony-level offense, the five-year order was permissible, and the evidence was sufficient even though the record relied heavily on testimony and selected exhibits rather than a complete social-media archive.
Litigation Takeaway
“Repeated online retaliation in a family-law dispute can support a stalking-based protective order even without explicit threats of bodily injury. If a party repeatedly posts private information, location details, recordings, or humiliating content about the other party, that digital conduct may establish harassment, stalking, and grounds for multi-year protective relief—especially when counsel presents a clear course-of-conduct narrative supported by testimony and targeted exhibits.”
In the Interest of Q.C. and P.C., Children
COA02
In this SAPCR modification appeal, the mother challenged numerous trial-court rulings arising from a long-running dispute over conservatorship, possession, and child support. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals focused primarily on appellate procedure, holding that Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1 applies with full force in family-law modification cases. Because the mother’s original opening brief contained only minimal legal analysis, no record citations, and inadequate authority, the court held that the complaints carried in that brief were waived. The court further held that she could not cure those defects or expand the appeal by raising new dispositive issues later in an amended brief, reply brief, or serial motions. Even considering the later-added complaints, the court concluded they would not warrant reversal. The modification order was therefore affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family-law appeals, preserving error in the trial court is not enough—you must also preserve it in a compliant opening brief. A bare-bones appellant’s brief can waive otherwise viable complaints, and you generally cannot fix that later by adding new issues in an amended brief or reply brief.”
L. P. v. The State of Texas
COA14
In L. P. v. The State of Texas, a juvenile challenged the legal sufficiency of a murder adjudication, arguing the evidence showed self-defense after the victim shot first. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that although juvenile delinquency proceedings are civil in form, legal-sufficiency review follows the criminal standard because the State must prove delinquent conduct beyond a reasonable doubt. Applying that deferential standard, the court reviewed the surveillance footage, witness testimony, shell-casing locations, forensic evidence, flight, weapon disposal, and L.P.’s inconsistent statements, and concluded a rational jury could find murder and reject self-defense. The court affirmed because appellate courts do not reweigh credibility conflicts when the record supports the verdict.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a case turns on competing violence narratives, the winner is usually the party with objective corroboration. In family-law cases involving abuse, self-defense, child endangerment, or juvenile conduct, trial counsel must build the record with surveillance, medical, forensic, and statement evidence because appellate courts will strongly defer to the trial factfinder’s credibility calls.”
Saenz v. Pechler
COA14
In this divorce appeal after a bench trial, the wife argued the trial court erred by failing to file findings of fact and conclusions of law and by making an unjust property division and improper spousal-maintenance award. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that although she timely requested findings and timely filed a follow-up notice, she did not preserve any complaint about missing findings because her Rule 297 past-due notice omitted one of the rule’s required recitals: the date the findings were due. Applying Rules 296 and 297, along with Ad Villarai and Curtis, the court treated that omission as a preservation defect that forfeited appellate review of the no-findings issue. On the merits, the court reviewed the property division for abuse of discretion and concluded the unequal allocation was still just and right because the husband received more assets but also substantially more debt, leaving him with a net negative estate, and the trial court reasonably accepted the evidence on valuation and characterization of retirement assets, restricted stock, and related liabilities. The court affirmed the decree, including spousal maintenance.
Litigation Takeaway
“After any family-law bench trial, a Rule 296 request alone is not enough. If the court does not file findings, the Rule 297 past-due notice must strictly state both the date the original request was filed and the date findings were due, or the complaint is waived. Saenz is a strong reminder that post-judgment preservation in divorce cases should be handled with checklists and form notices, because losing findings often leaves an appellant stuck with implied findings and highly deferential review on property and maintenance issues.”
Emanuel Ochoa v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Emanuel Ochoa v. The State of Texas, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, on remand from the Court of Criminal Appeals, considered whether admitting a 14-year-old’s involuntary confession was harmless constitutional error. The court applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(a), emphasizing that the question was not whether other evidence, including DNA evidence, could support the verdict, but whether the appellate court could say beyond a reasonable doubt that the confession did not contribute to conviction or punishment. Because the recorded confession was the State’s most powerful and complete narrative of guilt and likely shaped how the jury viewed all remaining evidence, the court held the error was harmful, reversed the convictions, and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“When one dramatic piece of improperly admitted evidence becomes the centerpiece of the case, harmless-error arguments become much harder to win on appeal. In family-law cases, preserve objections and build a record showing how the challenged evidence likely drove the factfinder’s decision, especially when it supplies the main narrative of alleged misconduct.”
In re David Brown
COA09
In this original proceeding, David Brown sought mandamus relief from juvenile release-related orders entered after a detention hearing, asking the court of appeals to vacate the orders and grant broader relief. The Beaumont Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because Brown failed to provide the mandamus record required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.7(a), including signed or certified copies of the challenged orders and a reporter’s record of the hearing. Applying the ordinary mandamus standards, the court held that without a competent record it could not determine whether the trial court clearly abused its discretion or whether Brown lacked an adequate appellate remedy. The court also declined to treat the filing as a habeas petition because the record did not show a contempt order or qualifying restraint of liberty. The petition and request for temporary relief were denied.
Litigation Takeaway
“Mandamus is won on the record, not the briefing. If you want emergency appellate relief in a family-law-type dispute, you must file the signed or certified operative orders, the reporter’s record, and the key supporting materials; otherwise the court will likely deny relief without ever reaching the substance.”
In the Interest of N.E.S., a Child
COA14
In this SAPCR appeal, a mother challenged a judgment appointing the maternal grandmother sole managing conservator, ordering the mother to pay support, and awarding attorney’s fees. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused primarily on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i), holding that most of the mother’s 31 appellate complaints were waived because her pro se brief offered conclusory assertions without meaningful legal analysis, record citations, or supporting authority. The court also held that pro se litigants must comply with the same briefing rules as attorneys. Construing the brief liberally, the court addressed only limited categories of issues and rejected them, including recusal because no verified Rule 18a motion was filed and adverse rulings alone do not support recusal. The court affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Family-law appeals can be lost on briefing before the merits are ever reached. If you want reversal, each issue must be preserved, tied to the record, supported by authority, framed under the correct standard of review, and explained with actual analysis; pro se status does not excuse defective briefing.”
In the Interest of J.A.V. and J.B.V.
COA04
In a termination-by-modification case, the mother argued the termination order was defective because it omitted the findings required by Texas Family Code § 161.001(f) and (g). The Fourth Court of Appeals treated the omission as a formal drafting defect rather than a failure to make the findings, because the trial court later signed supplemental findings satisfying the statute. The court held it could modify the judgment to incorporate those supplemental findings, rejected the argument that the omission alone required reversal, and affirmed the termination judgment as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
“Not every missing statutory finding in a family-law judgment requires reversal. If the trial court actually made the required findings and the record contains signed supplemental findings, the court of appeals may treat the omission as clerical or formal and modify the order to conform to the record. Trial lawyers should scrub final orders for mandatory findings before signature, and appellate lawyers should evaluate whether a facial defect is truly substantive or can be cured by modification.”
GoodLeap, LLC v. Preston McGrew
COA12
In GoodLeap, LLC v. McGrew, the Tyler Court of Appeals reversed a default judgment on restricted appeal because the face of the record did not show strict compliance with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 107. The plaintiff had obtained a no-answer default after purported certified-mail service, but the return of service omitted required information, including the process server’s name and other mandatory formalities such as signature, verification, or compliant Rule 107(e) declaration language. Applying the settled rule that no presumptions favor valid service in a restricted appeal, the court mechanically reviewed the record, held the defective return meant service was invalid and personal jurisdiction never attached, and remanded the case for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before taking or enforcing any default judgment—especially in divorce, SAPCR, modification, or enforcement cases—do a line-by-line Rule 107 audit of the filed return. Actual notice will not save a defective return, and even a seemingly final default judgment can be undone on restricted appeal if the face of the record does not strictly show valid service.”
In re Feliciano Sanchez and Leticia Sanchez
COA04
In this original proceeding, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that parties could not use a new injunction and declaratory-judgment suit in Medina County to stop enforcement of an Atascosa County foreclosure order by arguing the property was protected homestead. The Atascosa court had already decided the exemption issue and had jurisdiction over the parties, the case, and the foreclosure remedy. The appellate court explained that even if the foreclosure court got the homestead question wrong, that would make the order merely erroneous or voidable, not void. Because only void judgments may be collaterally attacked, the Medina County suit was an impermissible collateral attack, the temporary injunction was void, and mandamus relief was proper to require the trial court to dissolve the injunction and dismiss the later-filed suit.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a court with jurisdiction has already ruled that property may be sold or foreclosed despite a homestead claim, the remedy is direct attack in that case—not a new lawsuit in another county. In family-law enforcement disputes involving residences, owelty liens, equalization liens, or other real-property remedies, preserve the homestead issue in the original court and pursue appeal, mandamus, bill of review, or other recognized direct remedies rather than trying to relitigate the issue through a collateral injunction suit.”
Schwarz v. Schwarz Webb Holdings, Ltd.
COA04
In Schwarz, siblings who co-owned an approximately 8,000-acre ranch reached a Rule 11 settlement in open court partitioning the property, with the agreement tied to a marked exhibit and detailed on the record by share number, acreage, frontage adjustments, access rights, and transfer of an undivided test-track interest. After one sibling refused to proceed, the others sought specific performance. The Fourth Court of Appeals held the agreement satisfied the statute of frauds because the transcript and incorporated exhibit together supplied the means to identify the land with reasonable certainty, even though a later survey was needed to prepare metes-and-bounds descriptions. The court also rejected indefiniteness and ambiguity challenges, concluding the material terms were fixed and the later survey was merely implementation, so the trial court properly enforced the settlement and entered final partition judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a Rule 11 settlement involving land clearly ties the deal to an exhibit and states the key property terms on the record—who gets which tract, acreage, boundary swaps, access, and any undivided interests—a later statute-of-frauds or ambiguity attack is unlikely to succeed. In family-law property cases, build a complete record at the time of settlement because a survey can fill in technical legal descriptions later, but it cannot rescue missing essential terms.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Chadwick Lyle Soma and Valerie Lynn Soma
COA12
In Soma v. Soma, the husband sought reimbursement in the divorce for community funds used to build a house on land owned by the wife’s parents. The court held that proof of money spent was not enough. Because the house was built on third-party land, the husband had to prove the marital estate actually owned a legally cognizable reimbursement claim and provide competent evidence of its value. The evidence was disputed on whether the in-laws had promised to convey acreage, whether the house was part of the realty, and whether any reimbursement claim could be reliably valued. Deferring to the trial court’s credibility and valuation determinations, the Tyler Court of Appeals held the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying reimbursement and affirmed the overall property division.
Litigation Takeaway
“If spouses improve land owned by parents or in-laws, do not assume the divorce court will reimburse the money spent. To recover, you must prove the marital estate owns an enforceable claim, not just that community funds were used, and you must present clear title, fixture, and valuation evidence. Informal family promises, tax filings, and receipts alone may not be enough.”
In re T.A.S.D.
COA04
In In re T.A.S.D., the relator sought mandamus relief arguing a Jim Wells County trial court’s initial custody order was void because Texas lacked UCCJEA home-state jurisdiction. The Fourth Court of Appeals compared the relator’s proof to Family Code section 152.201(a)(1), which asks whether Texas was the child’s home state within six months before the SAPCR was filed, not simply whether the child lived in Texas during the immediately preceding months. Because the mandamus record did not establish that Texas lacked home-state jurisdiction under that six-month lookback, the relator failed to show the order was void or that mandamus relief was warranted. The court denied mandamus, denied temporary relief as moot, and struck the petition and record for failing to redact a minor’s identifying information.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to attack a Texas custody order as void under the UCCJEA, you need a precise residence timeline and a mandamus record that disproves Texas home-state jurisdiction under the statute’s six-month lookback. Showing only that the child was out of Texas for several months before filing is not enough, and sloppy appellate redaction can create additional problems.”
Victoria Trading Company, LLC v. Gurnard
COA08
In a Reeves County mineral-title dispute, successors claiming through a wife argued that her 1920 direct deed conveying separate real property to her husband was void because Texas law supposedly required an intermediary strawman transfer. The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed former Article 1114 and the historical case law, especially Riley v. Wilson, and held that the governing law required only the husband’s joinder and the wife’s privy acknowledgment. Because the deed satisfied those statutory protections, and Riley did not create an extra-statutory strawman requirement, the direct interspousal deed was valid. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment upholding the deed and the title chain through the husband.
Litigation Takeaway
“When an old interspousal deed is under attack, start with the statute in effect when the deed was signed—not modern assumptions or overreadings of old cases. If the historical formalities were satisfied, courts are unlikely to invent extra requirements, which can make title and characterization issues suitable for summary judgment.”
Wilma Elder and Timothy Elder v. Korinthia Monique Miller
COA14
In a malpractice suit, the trial court granted a TCPA motion dismissing the defendant’s counterclaims and later signed an order awarding the plaintiffs $8,775 in mandatory TCPA attorney’s fees. Although that order called itself a “final judgment” as to the fee award, the plaintiffs’ own malpractice claim remained pending. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals applied Lehmann and held the fee order was still interlocutory because it neither actually disposed of all claims and all parties nor clearly and unequivocally stated that it did so. As a result, Rule 329b’s plenary-power deadlines never started, the trial court retained jurisdiction, and it erred by denying a later summary-judgment motion for lack of jurisdiction. The court reversed and remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family cases, a fee or sanctions order is not truly final just because it uses the words “final judgment.” If live claims remain, the order is usually interlocutory unless it disposes of all parties and claims or contains unmistakable Lehmann-finality language. Do not assume plenary power has expired after a piecemeal ruling; check for unresolved issues, and use severance or precise drafting if true finality is intended.”
In re Dollar Tree Stores, Inc.
COA14
In this mandamus proceeding, Dollar Tree challenged discovery orders requiring statewide and nationwide documents and corporate-representative testimony about allegedly similar incidents, understaffing, shrink, and security practices at other stores. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held the requests were facially overbroad under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 192.3 and 192.4 because they were not properly limited to substantially similar incidents within a reasonable temporal, geographic, and operational scope, and the trial court’s “similarly situated” label did not cure the defect. The court also held Rule 199.2(b)(1) does not allow a party to obtain the same overbroad information through corporate-representative deposition topics. Because the harm from compelled overbroad discovery cannot be adequately remedied on appeal, the court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“If discovery asks for 'all similar incidents,' 'all complaints,' or records from multiple locations without a tight tie to the pleaded issues, a defined time frame, and a reasonable geographic or operational limit, it is vulnerable to objection and mandamus. In family-law cases, this opinion is a strong roadmap both for defeating fishing-expedition discovery and for drafting narrower comparator requests that are more likely to survive challenge.”
In Re The Commitment of Gerald Lee Ricks
COA01
In this Texas SVP commitment appeal, the dispute was whether Gerald Ricks had a statutory “behavioral abnormality” making him likely to commit future predatory sexual violence, not whether he was a repeat sexually violent offender. The First Court of Appeals held the evidence was sufficient because the State tied Ricks’s repeated child-sex offenses, relapse while on supervision and in treatment, continued attraction to female children, minimization, and inconsistent testimony to a forensic psychiatrist’s opinion that he remained high risk. The court also rejected Ricks’s complaint that he was barred from questioning the State’s expert about the State’s withdrawal of another expert, holding the issue was not preserved and, even if preserved, no reversible error was shown.
Litigation Takeaway
“For family-law cases involving abuse or child-safety concerns, past misconduct can support present-risk restrictions when it is paired with relapse, treatment failure, minimization, ongoing deviant interests, and qualified expert testimony connecting those facts to future danger. Just as important, if a court limits cross-examination of an opposing expert, make a precise record and offer of proof or the complaint may be lost on appeal.”
In Re Ka C. Wong, M.D.
COA08
After a defense jury verdict in a medical-negligence case, the trial court granted the plaintiff’s amended motion for new trial through a bare one-page order that gave no reason beyond stating it had considered the motion, response, and argument of counsel. The El Paso Court of Appeals applied In re Columbia, In re United Scaffolding, and related Texas Supreme Court authority requiring post-verdict new-trial orders to state an understandable, reasonably specific, legally valid, and case-specific reason. Because the order identified no legal standard and no specific defect in the verdict, it failed facial review at step one, so the court did not reach the merits of any alleged contradiction or insufficiency in the verdict. The court held the trial court abused its discretion and conditionally granted mandamus directing the trial court to vacate the deficient new-trial order.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a Texas trial court sets aside a jury verdict and grants a new trial, the order itself must explain why with a legally recognized, case-specific reason. In family-law jury cases, a conclusory new-trial order is an immediate mandamus target before the case is retried.”
In the Interest of T.R.C.
COA09
In In re T.R.C., the Beaumont Court of Appeals considered whether the Department proved the statutory prerequisites for termination under Texas Family Code section 161.001(f)(1). The case centered on a medically fragile child with Type 1 diabetes and the Department’s concerns about Mother’s care, but the court refused to rely on generalized safety concerns, voluminous medical records, or adverse impressions in place of element-specific proof. Applying the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, the court held the record did not legally suffice to show that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to Mother or that, despite those efforts, a continuing danger in the home prevented return. The court therefore reversed the termination order and rendered judgment denying termination, and it separately reversed the Department’s permanent managing conservatorship appointment because the trial court failed to make the finding required by Family Code section 153.002(c)(1).
Litigation Takeaway
“When a family-law remedy depends on specific statutory elements, the court cannot fill evidentiary gaps with a difficult record, broad safety narratives, or stacks of medical records. For termination under section 161.001(f)(1), the Department must prove actual reasonable reunification efforts and a continuing danger that still prevents return; for everyone else, the case is a reminder to force element-by-element proof and insist on required statutory findings.”