Weekly Digest
July 11 – July 17, 2026
23 opinions this week
Syed Ali v. Tailim Song d/b/a Tailim Song Law Firm
COA05
A law firm obtained summary judgment against a former client for unpaid fees by relying on allegedly deemed admissions and supporting affidavits. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that because the client timely served responses to the requests for admission, Rule 198.2(c) did not automatically deem the matters admitted, even if the responses were evasive or objection-based. Instead, the plaintiff had to obtain a Rule 215.4(a) order treating the responses as a failure to answer, and the record showed no express or implied order. The court further held that the affidavits were conclusory because they did not attach or explain the fee agreement, material terms, or calculation of the amount owed. The court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“Timely but evasive RFA responses are not automatic deemed admissions in Texas—you must move for and obtain a Rule 215.4 order before using them as conclusive proof. And if you seek summary judgment on fees or contract-based claims, do not rely on bare affidavit conclusions; attach the operative documents and prove the underlying facts and calculations element by element.”
Andrea Nago Bidmead v. Cassandra Ann Bidmead a/k/a Cassandra Ann Brunetto
COA08
In Bidmead v. Bidmead, a nonparty claimed an ownership interest in Amazon RSUs addressed in a final divorce decree and tried to intervene in the divorce case long after the decree became final. The El Paso Court of Appeals held that Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 60 allows intervention only in a pending suit, so a post-judgment plea in intervention is untimely unless the judgment has first been set aside. Because the divorce decree remained final and intact, the attempted intervention was ineffective, the would-be intervenor never became a party, and she lacked standing to appeal. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction without reaching the merits of the RSU dispute.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a divorce decree is final and no live case remains pending, a third party cannot use Rule 60 intervention to litigate a claimed property interest. In post-decree property disputes, procedure comes first: counsel must identify a valid procedural vehicle—such as a separate suit or other authorized remedy—because an improper post-judgment intervention can end the case before any merits review.”
Hazlett v. Hazlett
COA05
In Hazlett v. Hazlett, the Dallas Court of Appeals considered whether a default divorce decree awarding a disproportionate share of the community estate could stand when the prove-up record contained little competent evidence of asset values. The wife testified that it was 'reasonable to assume' the husband’s 401(k) had 'around $20,000 or more' and gave only a conclusory estimate that the marital home had 'a little shy of $8,000 in equity' after subtracting the mortgage and reimbursement amounts. Applying Family Code § 7.001 and default-divorce proof requirements, the court held that a trial court must still have sufficient, non-speculative valuation evidence to make a just-and-right division, even when the other spouse does not answer or appear. Because the testimony about the 401(k) was speculative and the home-equity testimony was conclusory and unsupported, the evidence was legally insufficient to support the property division and debt allocation. The court affirmed the divorce, but reversed and remanded the property and debt portions of the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“A default divorce does not excuse proof. If you want a disproportionate property division, you must present competent valuation evidence for major assets, debts, and any reimbursement claims; guesses, assumptions, and bare equity numbers can undo the economic terms of an otherwise final decree on appeal.”
Rodriguez v. Torres
COA13
After a divorce decree awarded Alma Rodriguez a $115,000 money judgment against Levi Medina, Rodriguez alleged Medina fraudulently transferred two Brownsville parcels to his daughter after Rodriguez recorded an abstract of judgment. The trial court granted summary judgment for Medina and the daughter, but the court of appeals reversed. Applying Texas Business and Commerce Code § 24.005(a)(1), the court held Rodriguez produced more than a scintilla of evidence of actual intent through multiple badges of fraud: transfer to an insider, transfer after the debt and judgment lien arose, transfer of substantially all reachable Texas assets, and a later no-compensation transfer to a church in Mexico. The court also held res judicata did not bar the suit because the fraudulent-transfer claims were based on post-decree conduct, not the divorce court’s original property adjudication.
Litigation Takeaway
“In post-divorce collection cases, direct proof of fraudulent intent is not required to defeat summary judgment. If a debtor spouse moves property to a relative after judgment or after an abstract is recorded, build the case around UFTA badges of fraud—timing, insider status, lack of consideration, and depletion of reachable assets—because those facts alone can create a triable issue.”
In the Interest of K.H. and D.H., Children
COA02
In this SAPCR appeal, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that the trial court could not deny Mother all possession and access to her children because no live pleading sought that relief at the time of trial. Although the Department’s earlier petition had included more severe allegations and requests, it expressly abandoned termination and instead asked that both parents be named possessory conservators, with Mother receiving supervised access. Applying Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 301 and cases holding that judgments must conform to live pleadings, the court concluded that a request to restrict or supervise access under Family Code section 153.193 is not the same as a request to eliminate access altogether, and abandoned claims could not support the final order. The court reversed and remanded the portions of the orders denying Mother access, but affirmed the conservatorship rulings because Mother did not show an abuse of discretion as to the trial court’s refusal to appoint her as a conservator.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want a Texas court to deny a parent all possession and access, you must plead that relief expressly and keep it live through trial. Requests for supervised, restricted, or limited visitation do not authorize a no-access order, and oral abandonment of broader relief can create reversible Rule 301 error if the final judgment goes beyond the live pleadings.”
Rogers v. State
COA14
In Rogers v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals upheld admission of extensive prior-abuse evidence in a child-injury prosecution arising from a mother’s alleged physical abuse of her son and daughter. The defendant argued the many prior incidents were overly prejudicial and cumulative under Rule 403, and also challenged admission of the daughter’s prior forensic-interview statement after accusing her in court of lying. The court held the prior incidents were admissible under Code of Criminal Procedure articles 38.37 and 38.371 because they involved the same child complainants and were probative of intent, state of mind, and the nature of the parent-child relationship, not just propensity. Applying the Rule 403 balancing test, the court concluded the evidence’s substantial contextual and credibility value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or cumulativeness. The court also held that the defendant’s in-court accusation of lying opened the door to admission of the daughter’s prior consistent statement to rebut fabrication and rehabilitate credibility.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases, repeated abuse or coercive incidents are most persuasive when framed as relationship-context evidence showing intent, state of mind, credibility, and household dynamics—not merely bad-character proof. And before accusing a child or parent of fabrication, counsel should consider whether that attack will open the door to prior consistent statements such as forensic interviews, school reports, or counselor disclosures.”
In the Matter of B.F.P.
COA11
In In the Matter of B.F.P., the Eastland Court of Appeals dismissed a juvenile appeal for want of jurisdiction because Texas Family Code section 56.01 allows an appeal from a disposition-modification order only if it is filed by or on behalf of the child. After the juvenile court modified B.F.P.’s disposition and placed her with her paternal grandfather, two adults filed a pro se notice of appeal alleging notice and due-process defects. But B.F.P.’s attorney informed the court that B.F.P. did not want to appeal and that the adults’ objectives conflicted with hers. Relying on the text of section 56.01 and prior juvenile cases, the court held that a parent or other adult cannot create appellate jurisdiction when the child, through counsel, does not desire an appeal. The adults’ later amended notice purporting to proceed on the child’s behalf was also ineffective, so the appeal was dismissed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Identify who actually owns the right to appeal before filing. When a statute makes appellate rights personal to the child, parents or other relatives cannot invoke appellate jurisdiction in their own names or override the child’s contrary position through counsel, even by framing the complaint as a due-process or voidness challenge.”
Robert v. State
COA10
In Robert v. State, the Tenth Court of Appeals held that a defendant accused of continuous sexual abuse of a child could not cross-examine the child complainant about an earlier accusation against her grandfather without first proving that earlier accusation was false. The defendant argued the prior allegation supported his theory that the child fabricated abuse claims when she got in trouble over cell-phone use, but the court applied Lopez v. State and concluded that suspicion, timing arguments, delayed reporting, omissions, and a good-faith belief in falsity do not satisfy the threshold requirement of proof of falsity. Because the prior accusation was not shown to be false, it was not probative impeachment evidence, and the trial court acted within its discretion in excluding it. The court also held that the defendant failed to preserve a separate Rule 613(b) complaint because that theory was not presented to the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to use a prior abuse allegation to show bias, fabrication, or motive in a family-law case, you need actual proof that the earlier allegation was false—not just inconsistencies, delay, or suspicion. Preserve every admissibility theory separately and be prepared to build the foundation outside the factfinder’s presence.”
In the Interest of G.H., a Child
COA02
In In re G.H., the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of parental rights after the Department proved both predicate grounds and the additional Family Code section 161.001(f)(1) requirement that, despite reasonable reunification efforts, a continuing danger in the home prevented the child’s return. The court focused on present, unresolved risk—not just past misconduct—and held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient where the parents continued using marijuana, missed drug tests, refused substance-abuse services, visited inconsistently, failed to remedy unsafe housing that included a convicted child sex offender, and showed ongoing instability. The court also held the same evidence, along with the child’s stability and bonding in foster placement, supported the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Courts want proof that danger has actually been fixed, not merely explained away. In termination and other custody-related cases, partial compliance, a few clean tests, or promises to improve will not overcome evidence of ongoing substance use, missed testing, unsafe household members, unstable living conditions, and inconsistent contact with the child.”
In the Interest of A.V. and B.L., Children
COA11
The Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed termination of the mother’s parental rights because the judgment was based on an unrevoked affidavit of voluntary relinquishment that complied with Texas Family Code section 161.103. Applying section 161.211(c), the court held appellate review was limited to whether the affidavit was procured by fraud, duress, or coercion. The affidavit was prima facie valid, and the mother’s pro se claims of fear, pressure, and false hope were unsupported by any developed evidentiary record, including the absence of a motion for new trial. Because she failed to prove fraud, duress, or coercion by a preponderance of the evidence, the court found no nonfrivolous appellate issue, affirmed the termination order, and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a termination order rests on a section 161.103-compliant, unrevoked relinquishment affidavit, appellate options narrow dramatically. If a party wants to undo the affidavit, counsel must build a trial-court record with specific evidence of fraud, duress, or coercion; regret, generalized pressure, or unsupported allegations will not suffice on appeal.”
Skidmore v. Skidmore
COA14
In Skidmore v. Skidmore, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a final divorce decree because the husband failed to preserve most of his appellate complaints and inadequately briefed others. He challenged witness exclusion, admission of allegedly unconstitutional evidence, property characterization, child-support calculations, credibility determinations, and cumulative error. The court analyzed the appeal primarily under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and 38.1, emphasizing that appellate complaints must be timely and specifically raised in the trial court, must match the complaint made on appeal, and must be supported by record citations and legal authority. Because the record did not show preserved objections or developed briefing—and one no-evidence issue attacked a finding not contained in the decree—the court declined to reach most merits issues and affirmed the decree in full.
Litigation Takeaway
“Family-law appeals are usually won or lost in the trial court record. If you want to complain on appeal about excluded witnesses, admitted evidence, property characterization, or child-support calculations, you must make a timely, specific objection, obtain a ruling, make an offer of proof when needed, and then brief the issue with precise record citations and authority. Otherwise, even potentially strong complaints will be waived.”
Bruce Horn v. Karla Horn
COA14
In Horn v. Horn, a brother challenged an intra-family transfer of a Houston home to his sister, alleging their elderly parents lacked capacity, that signatures were forged, and that the deed-related documents were defectively executed. After a bench trial with no findings of fact or conclusions of law requested, the trial court rendered a take-nothing judgment. On appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals presumed all findings necessary to support the judgment and held the appellant failed to show reversible error because his briefing did not adequately develop the legal arguments with supporting authority and record citations as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i). The court therefore treated key deed-invalidity and evidentiary complaints as waived and affirmed the judgment.
Litigation Takeaway
“Serious allegations like incapacity, forgery, and defective acknowledgment will not win on appeal without a trial record tied to the execution date, preserved objections, requested findings in a bench trial, and fully developed appellate briefing with authority, record cites, and harm analysis.”
Hoisington v. State
COA11
In Hoisington v. State, the Eastland Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient to support convictions for aggravated sexual assault of a child and indecency with a child by exposure. The defendant argued the proof failed because there was no DNA evidence, no recovered pornography, and no conclusive forensic findings. Applying Jackson v. Virginia, the court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and deferred to the jury’s credibility determinations. The child complainant gave age-appropriate, internally consistent testimony describing exposure, sexual contact, oral contact, and digital penetration that tracked the statutory elements. Her account was reinforced by consistent disclosures to a SANE nurse and forensic interviewer, medical findings consistent with her description, and corroboration of a specific detail about a pink sex toy. The court held that a child complainant’s testimony alone can sustain the findings if believed, and the absence of DNA or other definitive forensic proof did not render the evidence insufficient.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-driven family cases, do not let the case rise or fall on DNA or conclusive physical proof. A child’s specific, developmentally appropriate, and consistent disclosures—especially when supported by outcry, forensic interview, medical evidence, or corroborating details—can be enough to justify protective relief, while credibility attacks must focus on real inconsistencies or contamination concerns rather than generic claims of “no forensic evidence.””
Rogers v. State
COA14
In Rogers v. State, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed admission of extensive prior abuse evidence in an injury-to-a-child prosecution against a mother. The court held that repeated prior acts against the same children were highly probative of intent, state of mind, credibility, and the nature of the parent-child relationship under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 38.37 and 38.371, and that Rule 403 did not require exclusion because the probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or cumulativeness. The court also held that after the mother blurted out in front of the jury that her daughter was lying, the State could introduce the daughter’s earlier forensic-interview statement as a prior consistent statement to rebut the accusation of fabrication.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law cases involving abuse allegations, prior incidents within the same family relationship can be powerful context evidence when tied to endangerment, intent, credibility, or the parent-child dynamic, and generic Rule 403 objections usually will not be enough to keep them out. Lawyers should also be careful when accusing a child or other witness of fabrication, because that attack may open the door to otherwise inadmissible prior consistent statements.”
Dorsett v. State
COA05
In Dorsett v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld convictions for injury to a disabled individual and injury to a child under Penal Code § 22.04, rejecting arguments that conflicting and uncertain witness testimony made the evidence legally insufficient. The court applied Jackson v. Virginia and deferred to the trial court’s role as factfinder, holding that direct testimony from the victims and another child witness, combined with corroborating physical evidence, officer observations, and medical-style testimony about the injuries, allowed a rational factfinder to find bodily injury and identity beyond a reasonable doubt. The court further held that the existence of a custody dispute and inconsistencies in details did not negate otherwise probative abuse evidence when the record was viewed cumulatively and in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Litigation Takeaway
“In abuse-related family-law cases, inconsistency alone rarely defeats a claim. Trial courts may credit imperfect testimony when it is supported by photos, injuries, third-party observations, physical conditions in the home, timelines, or other corroborating evidence, and a custody-dispute motive defense will not overcome a well-built cumulative record by itself.”
In the Interest of P.J., a Child
COA14
In In the Interest of P.J., the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order appointing the Department as sole managing conservator after concluding the parental presumption in Texas Family Code section 153.131 was rebutted. The court analyzed the evidence cumulatively and held it was legally and factually sufficient to show that appointing Mother as managing conservator would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development. Key facts included Mother’s failure to protect the child from her boyfriend’s physical abuse, the child’s expressed fear of the boyfriend, Mother’s refusal of a safety plan, housing instability, inadequate supervision, food insecurity, and broader concerns about unmet medical and basic needs. The court also rejected Mother’s complaints about charge error, evidentiary rulings, child support, and possession restrictions.
Litigation Takeaway
“To overcome the parental presumption, build a cumulative significant-impairment record tied to concrete danger: tolerated third-party abuse, refusal to protect, instability, and unmet basic needs. For parents defending these claims, denial is not enough—document separation from unsafe partners, current stability, and a credible protective plan.”
Miller v. Boyd
COA14
In Miller v. Boyd, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment because the trial court effectively denied a verified continuance after the defendant’s attorney withdrew under Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 3.08 as a necessary witness. Applying Villegas v. Carter, the court held that when withdrawal is ethically required, the resulting gap in representation is generally not the client’s fault or negligence. The court reviewed the full procedural history, including substitute counsel’s appearance only one week before the summary-judgment hearing, the client’s documented health issues, the first-request status of the continuance, the finite sixty-day delay requested, and the lack of material prejudice to the opposing party. On that record, the court held the trial court abused its discretion by forcing the hearing forward without giving replacement counsel meaningful time to prepare, reversed the final summary judgment, and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“If counsel must withdraw because Rule 3.08 makes the lawyer a necessary witness, treat the continuance as a due-process issue, not a mere scheduling request. Build a verified record showing the withdrawal was ethically compelled, the client was not at fault, substitute counsel needs real preparation time, and a short delay will not materially prejudice the other side.”
Mulford v. 1st Service Solutions
COA06
In Mulford v. 1st Service Solutions, a former executive sued for more than $800,000 in unpaid commissions, but he never served mandatory initial disclosures, filed witness and exhibit lists less than 30 days before trial, and produced nearly 180 pages of documents only days before trial. The defendants moved to strike under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6. The Texarkana Court of Appeals treated the issue as a mandatory-exclusion question rather than a discretionary sanctions dispute, holding that once the record showed the evidence and witnesses were not timely disclosed, the burden shifted to the plaintiff to prove good cause or lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. Because he did not establish either exception, the trial court properly excluded the exhibits and witness testimony, and that exclusion left him unable to prove his claim. The court affirmed the take-nothing judgment and held any continuance complaint was waived.
Litigation Takeaway
“Rule 193.6 can win or lose a case before the merits are ever tried: if your documents, witnesses, or trial exhibits were not timely disclosed, the court must exclude them unless you prove good cause or no unfair surprise/prejudice. In family law, that can wipe out tracing claims, custody witnesses, valuation evidence, or fee proof, so build trial evidence through timely Rule 194 disclosures and prompt supplementation from the start.”
In Re Edward Scott Rubin
COA05
In In re Rubin, the relator sought habeas relief from contempt and incarceration orders entered in a Dallas County family-law case. The Dallas Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the contempt challenge because the relator failed to provide competent proof of present confinement, which is a threshold requirement for habeas relief from a contempt commitment. Relying on prior cases distinguishing inadequate indirect proof from reliable evidence such as a sheriff’s affidavit, the court held the filing did not establish current restraint on liberty. The court also struck the petition and appendix because they contained unredacted sensitive information about minor children in violation of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.9, and it denied habeas relief, rendering the emergency request for release moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a family-law contempt habeas, the merits do not matter unless you first prove the client is actually in custody with competent evidence such as jail records or a sheriff’s affidavit. And even in emergency filings, scrub every appendix for minors’ identifying information or risk having the filing struck.”
Estate of Lavon Matrick Frisby
COA12
In Estate of Frisby, the Tyler Court of Appeals held that a petitioner could not use a bill of review to attack an adverse summary judgment when she had an ordinary appellate remedy and failed to pursue it. The petitioner tried to revive fraud, notice, heirship, and probate-defect allegations through a bill of review after losing a 2025 state-court suit and not appealing that judgment. Relying on longstanding Texas bill-of-review doctrine, including Wembley and Caldwell, the court treated exhaustion of legal remedies as a threshold requirement and concluded that the missed direct appeal barred equitable relief as a matter of law. The court also concluded that complaints about the lack of an evidentiary hearing and dismissal before service were waived for inadequate briefing, while noting that a separate hearing is not always required at the prima facie stage.
Litigation Takeaway
“A bill of review is a last-resort remedy, not a backup plan for a missed appeal. In family-law cases involving divorce decrees, custody orders, property divisions, or enforcement judgments, the first question is whether the complaining party exhausted available post-judgment and appellate remedies; if not, the case may be defeated on that threshold ground before the court ever reaches allegations of fraud, lack of notice, or concealment.”
Russo v. State
COA04
In Russo v. State, the defendant argued that only the district court that originally placed him on deferred adjudication could later revoke supervision and adjudicate guilt unless the case was formally transferred under Code of Criminal Procedure articles 42A.151 and 42A.754. The Fourth Court of Appeals rejected that argument, explaining that no statutory transfer occurred at all; instead, another district judge in the same county, sitting in a court with concurrent jurisdiction, heard the revocation proceeding. Relying on Texas Government Code section 24.003, article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution, and Mata v. State, the court held that same-county district judges may hear and determine matters pending in another district court without a written transfer or bench-exchange order unless a contrary statute or rule requires one. The court therefore affirmed the revocation, adjudication, and sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
“Before attacking an order because a different same-county district judge heard the case, distinguish a true jurisdictional or mandatory-transfer defect from mere internal court assignment. If the courts share concurrent jurisdiction and no statute or local rule requires transfer, the absence of a written transfer or bench-exchange order likely will not make the order void.”
Mejia v. Bernal
COA01
In Mejia v. Bernal, the appellant tried to directly appeal a family-court order enforcing temporary orders and property division by contempt. The First Court of Appeals looked past the order’s title to its substance, noting the trial court expressly found Mejia in criminal contempt for violating prior orders. Applying settled Texas law that contempt adjudications are not reviewable by ordinary appeal, the court held it lacked appellate jurisdiction. Because contempt must be challenged through habeas corpus or mandamus, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume an enforcement order is appealable just because it concerns divorce, temporary orders, or property division. If the order actually adjudicates contempt, the proper review vehicle is usually habeas or mandamus—not a notice of appeal. In mixed enforcement orders, parse the contempt and non-contempt portions separately and act fast to preserve the right procedural remedy.”
In Re Johnny Joseph Chavez III
COA07
In In re Chavez, the Amarillo Court of Appeals denied habeas relief from a child-support contempt order because the relator’s petition was inadequately briefed under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3, especially Rule 52.3(i). Chavez raised multiple complaints, including lack of notice, denial of counsel, inability-to-pay findings, and other due-process defects, but the court did not reach the merits because he offered only conclusory assertions without developed legal analysis, controlling authority, or record citations. The court held that an original habeas petition may be denied outright when the relator fails to clearly explain why the alleged defects render the contempt order void or otherwise entitle him to relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law contempt habeas practice, even potentially strong due-process complaints can be lost if the petition is not built like a true appellate brief. Lead with the voidness theory, support each issue with controlling authority and precise record citations, and explain exactly why the defect justifies habeas relief—courts will not develop the argument for you.”