Weekly Digest
July 18 – July 24, 2026
32 opinions this week
Christopher Matthew Vickers v. Lena Cherie Chaisson-Munoz
COA13
In Vickers v. Chaisson-Munoz, the father tried to immediately appeal protective orders entered after the trial court heard two protective-order applications together with a pending SAPCR modification involving the parties’ child. The court of appeals focused on Texas Family Code § 81.009(c), which delays appeal of a protective order rendered against a party in a SAPCR until there is a final, appealable order addressing child support, possession, or access. Even though the protective-order applications had separate cause numbers, the court held they were procedurally intertwined with the SAPCR because they were transferred to the SAPCR court, heard together, and reflected in an order referencing all related cases. Because no final SAPCR order had yet been signed, the protective orders were interlocutory, and the appeals were dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Separate cause numbers do not guarantee an immediate appeal of a protective order when the case is functionally merged with a SAPCR. Family-law litigators should think carefully before agreeing to combined hearings, transfers, or consolidation, because once protective-order issues are heard as part of a child-possession or access dispute, appellate review may be deferred until the final SAPCR order.”
In the Interest of S.P. and K.D.C.L., Children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Father’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(2). Father argued the case was based only on his incarceration, but the court analyzed the full Holley-factor record and emphasized that incarceration alone is not enough; here, the surrounding facts included domestic violence against pregnant Mother while Father was holding a child, instability, lack of contact with the children, failure to complete services, no viable interim or post-release care plan, and the children’s significant need for safety, medical care, and permanence. Because the children were thriving in a stable foster placement and the record showed ongoing danger and no realistic reunification plan, the court upheld termination.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not treat incarceration as the key fact in a best-interest case. What persuades courts is the conduct behind the incarceration, its effect on the child, the parent’s history of violence or instability, the absence of a workable caregiving plan, and the child’s concrete need for safety and permanence.”
Christopher Matthew Vickers v. Lena Cherie Chaisson-Munoz
COA13
In Vickers v. Chaisson-Munoz, the father tried to immediately appeal protective orders entered after the mother filed two protective-order applications while a SAPCR modification between the same parents was pending. Although the protective-order cases began under separate cause numbers, they were transferred to the SAPCR court and heard together with the modification case. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals focused on the functional reality of that consolidation, not the separate filings, and applied Texas Family Code § 81.009(c), which delays appeal of a protective order rendered against a party in a SAPCR until there is a final, appealable order on support, possession, or access. Because the modification case remained pending and no final SAPCR order existed, the court held the protective orders were interlocutory and dismissed the appeals for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A separate protective-order cause number does not guarantee an immediate appeal. If a protective-order case is transferred into, coordinated with, or jointly tried alongside a SAPCR, the order may become interlocutory under Family Code § 81.009(c). Family lawyers should be deliberate about consolidation language, joint hearings, transfer strategy, and preservation of alternative remedies like mandamus when immediate review matters.”
Tozee Construction, Inc. v. BNG Management Group, LLC
COA05
In a construction dispute, the plaintiff perfected the jury right by filing a timely jury demand and paying the jury fee, then later tried to withdraw that demand and obtain a bench trial. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that under Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 216 and 220, a perfected jury demand benefits the entire case, so the opposing party could rely on it without filing a separate demand. Because the defendant objected before trial and the trial court nevertheless conducted a bench trial, the court held the trial court abused its discretion, reversed the judgment, and remanded for further proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Once any party properly demands a jury and pays the fee, that jury setting becomes a shared procedural right. In family law cases, if the other side later tries to withdraw the jury demand, preserve the issue immediately with a clear written and oral objection; the court cannot force a bench trial over that objection.”
In Re Jessica Coronado
COA11
In this mandamus proceeding arising from temporary orders in a divorce and SAPCR, the mother challenged the trial court’s appointment of both parents as temporary joint managing conservators and a travel-exchange provision after evidence showed the father physically abused her son from a prior relationship. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code § 153.004(b) is a mandatory bar to joint managing conservatorship when credible evidence shows a history or pattern of physical abuse against a child, spouse, or the other parent. The court relied on the mother’s testimony about two bruising incidents, photographs, text messages, and permissible adverse inferences from the father’s repeated Fifth Amendment invocations to conclude the abuse evidence was credible. It also held the travel requirement was an abuse of discretion because the trial court expressly imposed it to burden the mother for moving, not to protect the child’s safety and welfare. The court conditionally granted mandamus relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“If credible abuse evidence is in the record, § 153.004(b) does more than weigh against joint conservatorship—it forbids it, even in temporary orders and even when the abuse was directed at a stepchild rather than the subject child. For litigators, the case underscores the importance of building a corroborated abuse record and preserving any punitive, child-untethered temporary-order rulings for mandamus.”
In the Interest of V.R., A.R., and M.R., Children
COA02
In In re V.R., the father appealed an order dismissing his child-support enforcement-related motions, arguing the Office of the Attorney General lacked authority to continue withholding and garnishing income and that various procedural defects required reversal. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits because the dispositive associate-judge hearing was not included in the appellate reporter’s record. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6 and Christiansen v. Prezelski, the court presumed the missing hearing record supported the trial court’s ruling and held that, without that record, the father could not show reversible error. The court also rejected attempts to rely on materials not admitted below and noted that new complaints raised for the first time in a reply brief were not properly before the court.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your appeal depends on what happened at the hearing, you must bring the reporter’s record. In Texas family-law cases, an incomplete appellate record usually means the court will presume the missing evidence supports the judgment, which can doom challenges to enforcement, modification, custody, and other post-judgment rulings before the merits are ever reached.”
Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina
COA09
In Jose Luis Martinez Lara v. San Juanita Medina, the Beaumont Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s finding that the parties had an informal marriage under Texas Family Code section 2.401. Medina sought to prove a common-law marriage as part of her divorce and property-division case, while Lara argued the evidence was insufficient because the parties filed separate taxes, lacked joint financial accounts, and did not consistently use traditional marital markers. The court analyzed the totality of the evidence under the three statutory elements—agreement to be married, cohabitation in Texas as spouses, and holding out to others as married—and emphasized that, in a bench trial without findings of fact, implied findings favor the judgment if supported by the record. Crediting testimony that the parties lived together as husband and wife, introduced each other as spouses, celebrated their marriage, and were described in at least one property-related document as husband and wife, the court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the informal-marriage finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Informal-marriage cases are usually decided on credibility and record-building, not on whether the couple checked every traditional marriage box. If there is some evidence of agreement, cohabitation as spouses, and holding out, appellate courts will heavily defer to the trial judge—especially when no findings of fact are requested. For lawyers, that means the real battle is at trial: build corroboration if you are proving the marriage, and do more than point to separate finances or tax filings if you are trying to defeat it.”
In the Interest of J.G.S., a Child
COA01
In In re J.G.S., the First Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights and held that her complaint that the Department failed to provide ADA accommodations in her service plan was waived because she never raised it in the trial court. Mother argued the court should overlook preservation because termination implicates fundamental rights and because Family Code section 161.001(f) and (g) require the Department to prove reasonable efforts to return the child. The court rejected both arguments, reaffirmed In re C.M., and concluded that an ADA-based challenge to reunification services remains an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved below. The court also held that Mother’s request for more time, based only on scheduling and technical problems, did not preserve a disability-accommodation complaint, and it affirmed the termination order on the challenged predicate grounds and best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“If disability affects a parent’s ability to complete services or participate in a family-law case, do not assume the court or opposing party’s awareness preserves the issue. Make a specific ADA or accommodation request on the record, tie it to the client’s actual limitations, seek a ruling, and connect any continuance or extension request to that accommodation need. In Texas family cases, even in termination appeals, unpreserved accommodation complaints are likely waived.”
WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio
COA11
In WP Liquidating, Ltd. v. Fenoglio, a limited partner sought access to partnership books and records after seeing apparent disparities in distributions and unexplained accounting related to partnership assets. The partnership refused, arguing Fenoglio may have transferred his interest in an earlier divorce, that the records could be used in collateral litigation, and that he had to sign a unilateral confidentiality agreement before inspection. The Eleventh Court of Appeals held that Fenoglio’s stated purpose—determining whether partnership assets were properly managed and whether revenues and expenses were properly accounted for and allocated—was a proper purpose under Texas Business Organizations Code section 153.552. The court further held that speculation about other litigation, an unresolved allegation that his interest had been transferred in the divorce, and reliance on a general prudence clause in the partnership agreement did not defeat his contractual and statutory inspection rights. It affirmed summary judgment enforcing inspection and the award of attorney’s fees and costs.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a family-law dispute involves an entity interest, frame any records demand around valuation, accounting, distributions, tracing, and management review. This case shows that a proper-purpose inspection right cannot be defeated by speculation about divorce-related litigation, unsupported claims that the ownership interest changed hands in the divorce, or extra-contractual confidentiality conditions.”
Deola T. Ali v. Discover Bank
COA14
After Discover Bank obtained a money judgment, it sought a post-judgment receiver based largely on alleged deemed admissions from unanswered requests for admissions. The court held that Ali’s filed Rule 21a certificate of service created a presumption that his discovery responses were timely served, and Discover’s unsworn motion claiming nonreceipt was not competent evidence to rebut that presumption. Because the requests were not deemed admitted and Discover offered no other competent evidence that the judgment remained unpaid or that Ali owned non-exempt property subject to turnover, the trial court abused its discretion in appointing a receiver. The receivership order was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
“In post-judgment enforcement, especially turnover or receivership proceedings, do not rely on unsworn assertions to establish discovery default or statutory elements. A Rule 21a certificate of service can defeat deemed admissions unless rebutted with competent evidence, so family-law litigators must build the record with affidavits, testimony, payment proof, and evidence of non-exempt property.”
Mora v. Morales
COA13
In Mora v. Morales, the appellant tried to use Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a to extend post-judgment and appellate deadlines after claiming late notice of a final judgment. The court held the Rule 306a(5) motion was defective because its sworn allegations referred only to one lawyer as “counsel” and failed to negate timely notice or actual knowledge as to the client and another attorney of record. Without a proper Rule 306a showing, plenary power expired 30 days after the original judgment, making the later amended judgment void. The court also held that even if Rule 306a had applied, the notice of appeal was still untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the alleged date of first actual knowledge. The amended judgment was vacated and the appeal dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you are relying on Rule 306a to revive deadlines in a family-law case, your sworn motion must specifically address the client and every attorney of record—not just one lawyer or “counsel” generally. And even with a valid Rule 306a motion, you must immediately recalculate and protect the new appellate deadlines.”
In the Interest of D.K.L., D.C.L., and R.R.M., Children
COA13
In this SAPCR-related appeal, the appellant tried to challenge a final order signed on October 14, 2025, by filing notices of appeal in July 2026. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and held that the notice of appeal was untimely under either the 30-day deadline or the 90-day deadline that would have applied even if a qualifying post-judgment motion had been filed. Relying on Mitschke v. Borromeo, the court explained that a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite. It also rejected the appellant’s argument that the final order was void and therefore could be attacked at any time, holding that an allegedly void order still cannot be reviewed through an untimely direct appeal. The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family cases, appellate deadlines are unforgiving: if the notice of appeal is late, the court of appeals has no jurisdiction, and calling the order “void” will not save a direct appeal. Lawyers must calendar the Rule 26.1 deadline from the date the order is signed and quickly evaluate other remedies if that deadline is missed.”
Khaled Mohammad Ikhlas v. Farzana Rasooli
COA14
In Ikhlas v. Rasooli, the appellant tried to appeal an order denying his Texas Family Code section 85.025(b) motion to review, modify, or dissolve an existing protective order. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed section 81.009(a), which allows appeals from a protective order rendered under Subtitle B, and held that a denial of post-judgment review under section 85.025(b) is not a new protective order and does not independently create appellate jurisdiction. The court also refused to treat the attempted appeal as a mandamus proceeding because the appellant’s complaints were fact-bound and challenged evidentiary sufficiency rather than presenting a pure legal issue. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not treat a section 85.025(b) review hearing as a second chance to appeal a protective order. If you may need appellate review, build the record and calendar deadlines from the original protective order; later denials of review or dissolution are likely not appealable, and mandamus will usually require a clear legal error rather than a fact-based attack on the evidence.”
McFarland v. Bouyer
COA11
In McFarland v. Bouyer, the husband appealed a divorce decree awarding the wife the marital residence and argued he was not given a meaningful chance to present evidence. The court applied the abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code section 7.001 and emphasized that a property division is reversible only if it is manifestly unjust and unfair. Because the husband failed to provide the reporter’s record from the final hearing, the appellate court presumed the missing evidence supported the trial court’s decree. The court also rejected his due-process complaint, concluding the record showed he had opportunities to cross-examine, object, testify, and offer evidence, and that his failure to understand how to present electronic evidence was a preparation problem, not trial-court error. The court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to challenge a divorce property division on appeal, you need a full record and proof that the overall division—not just one asset award—was manifestly unfair. This case also shows that courts will not reverse simply because a pro se party failed to prepare or did not understand how to admit evidence when the record shows the party was given a fair opportunity to participate.”
Waleski v. State
COA11
In Waleski v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals affirmed revocation of community supervision after Michael Waleski admitted he drank alcohol in violation of a supervision condition in cases involving continuous family violence and protective-order violations. The court applied settled Texas revocation law: the State need prove only one supervision violation by a preponderance of the evidence, and a plea of true alone can support revocation. Because Waleski pleaded true to the alcohol-use allegation, disputes about the other alleged violations did not matter. The court also held that he could not use the revocation appeal to challenge the reasonableness of conditions imposed in the original community-supervision order. It modified the judgments only to correct clerical errors misstating his pleas and otherwise affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“A single admitted supervision violation can decide the whole case. For family-law litigators, if a party is on supervision tied to family violence or protective-order conduct, even a 'technical' violation like alcohol use may become powerful evidence on credibility, safety, conservatorship, and possession restrictions. Get the revocation records early, identify any plea of true, and do not assume disputed allegations matter once one violation is proven.”
Ryan Keith Markowski v. The State of Texas
COA13
In Markowski v. State, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for violating a family-violence bond condition under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A). The court rejected his attempt to treat the case like a protective-order prosecution, explaining that the charging instrument alleged violation of a bond condition, not a protective order, so the State did not need to prove the statutory pedigree of a protective order. Applying the legal-sufficiency standard, the court held the evidence was enough because the bond-condition order was admitted, it prohibited the defendant from coming within 200 yards of the protected person’s residence, officers testified the underlying criminal case was still pending, and officers observed him within the prohibited zone. The court further held that the lack of an express expiration date did not make the bond condition unenforceable while the underlying criminal case remained unresolved.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not assume a family-violence bond condition expires just because the order omits an end date. In parallel family and criminal cases, lawyers should obtain the actual bond paperwork, confirm whether the criminal case is still pending, and make sure temporary orders, residence access, and exchange plans do not require conduct that would violate a still-active criminal stay-away condition.”
Krueger v. Krueger
COA02
In Krueger v. Krueger, the wife tried to amend her divorce counterpetition ten days before trial to add new fault-based theories—including cruelty, family violence, adultery, and waste—and to seek a disproportionate share of the community estate. The trial court struck the late amendments and excluded related business records, affidavits, and supplemental discovery because those theories had not been timely pleaded or disclosed and would unfairly surprise the husband after discovery had already proceeded on different claims. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that Rule 63 allowed the trial court to deny the late amendments as prejudicial and that Rule 193.6 supported exclusion of the late-produced supporting evidence.
Litigation Takeaway
“If you want to pursue fault-based property arguments in a Texas divorce, plead them early and disclose the supporting evidence on time. Waiting until the eve of trial to add disproportionate-division theories can get both the claims and the evidence thrown out as unfair surprise.”
Waleski v. State
COA11
In Waleski v. State, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that a revocation judgment may be reformed when the written judgment incorrectly states the pleas made in open court. Waleski pleaded true to only one alleged supervision violation and not true to the other two, but the written revocation judgments recited that he pleaded true to all three. The court concluded revocation was still proper because one proven violation is enough to support revocation, and Waleski’s plea of true plus supporting evidence established at least one violation. Applying Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b) and Bigley v. State, the court modified the judgments to accurately reflect the actual pleas and affirmed them as modified.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not ignore inaccurate recitals in a signed order just because the judgment itself is likely to stand. If the written order does not match what happened in court, ask the trial or appellate court to correct it so the record “speaks the truth,” especially where those inaccuracies could affect future enforcement, modification, protective-order, or credibility disputes.”
In the Interest of T.L.F.
COA09
In In the Interest of T.L.F., the Beaumont Court of Appeals reviewed a mother’s appeal from an order terminating her parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (L), along with a best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). Appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief stating there were no nonfrivolous issues for appeal and moved to withdraw. The court independently reviewed the entire record, confirmed counsel’s no-merit assessment, and found no arguable ground for reversal. The court therefore affirmed the termination order. But relying on Texas Family Code §§ 107.013 and 107.016 and In re P.M., the court denied counsel’s motion to withdraw, holding that appointed counsel in termination appeals generally must continue representation through further appellate proceedings unless additional good cause for withdrawal is shown.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas parental-termination appeals, a strong trial record can leave little room for reversal, and an Anders affirmance will stand if the appellate court finds no arguable issue after its own review. Just as important, appointed counsel cannot assume that filing an Anders brief ends the representation; absent good cause, counsel must stay on through the completion or waiver of further appellate review.”
Foster v. Wise
COA01
In Foster v. Wise, the respondent challenged a default protective order by restricted appeal, arguing the record did not show the notice and service required by Family Code sections 82.041 and 82.043. The court examined only whether error was apparent on the face of the record and held the citation itself functioned as the required notice because it included the hearing setting and default warning. It further held that a citation bearing the court’s seal and a deputy clerk’s typed name satisfied the statutory signature requirement in a nonelectronic-service context, that the return sufficiently showed personal service, and that service of an amended application was unnecessary because the amendment did not seek a more onerous judgment. The court therefore affirmed the default lifetime protective order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Default orders in family cases usually survive restricted appeal when the clerk’s record and return facially show strict compliance with statutory notice and service requirements. Substance matters more than labels, a typed clerk signature on a sealed nonelectronic citation may be enough, and amended pleadings do not require re-service unless they seek more onerous relief.”
The State of Texas v. Frankie Lee Hines
COA08
In Hines, the State repeatedly dismissed and reindicted child-sexual-abuse charges arising from the same underlying allegations while the defendant remained incarcerated for more than two years. The Eighth Court of Appeals applied the Barker v. Wingo speedy-trial factors across the entire prosecution timeline, holding the clock did not restart with each new indictment because all charges stemmed from the same factual nucleus. The court found the extraordinary delay, the State’s trial-readiness and charging-theory problems, Hines’s repeated assertion of his speedy-trial right, and resulting prejudice from prolonged incarceration and evidentiary drift supported dismissal with prejudice.
Litigation Takeaway
“Changing pleadings or legal theories does not erase delay when the case is still built on the same core facts. In family-law cases involving evolving abuse allegations, lawyers should preserve a unified chronology, force clarification of what actually changed, and show concrete prejudice from repeated resets, fading witness memories, and ongoing temporary restrictions.”
Gonzales v. State
COA04
In Gonzales v. State, the appellant tried to challenge a juvenile court’s order waiving jurisdiction and transferring him for criminal prosecution as an adult only after he was later convicted in criminal court. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code sections 54.02 and 56.01 together with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and held that a juvenile transfer order is directly appealable as an accelerated appeal. That means the notice of appeal had to be filed in the juvenile court within 20 days after the transfer order was signed. Because the transfer order was signed on November 1, 2024, and the only notice of appeal was filed in the criminal case on April 6, 2026, the notice was both untimely and filed in the wrong court. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and did not reach the merits of the transfer challenge.
Litigation Takeaway
“When the Family Code creates a direct, accelerated appeal, lawyers must act immediately, file in the correct court, and not assume the issue can be preserved for review after a later final judgment in a related case. A trial-court certification or later criminal judgment cannot cure a missed statutory appellate deadline.”
In the Interest of C.S., a Child
COA04
In this private termination-and-stepfather-adoption case, the father appealed an order terminating his parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(L) based on his Georgia statutory-rape conviction. The key dispute was whether the Georgia offense qualified as a conviction under a foreign law with elements substantially similar to a listed Texas offense. The Fourth Court of Appeals compared the elements of Georgia Code section 16-6-3 to Texas Penal Code section 21.11 and held that sexual intercourse with a person under sixteen necessarily includes sexual contact with a child under seventeen, making the statutes substantially similar for subsection (L) purposes. The court also held the conviction itself, together with the statutory comparison, was legally and factually sufficient to support termination and affirmed the best-interest finding.
Litigation Takeaway
“Out-of-state sex-offense convictions can support termination in Texas even if the foreign crime has a different name. For family-law litigators, the winning approach is an element-by-element comparison backed by certified conviction records and the text of both statutes; for respondents, the best defense is to show the foreign statute is broader than the Texas comparator, not merely to argue the offense titles differ.”
In the Interest of T.S.L., a Child
COA04
In In re T.S.L., the Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of an alleged father’s rights because the trial court’s judgment rested on an independent ground under Texas Family Code § 161.002(b)(3): the child was under one year old when the case was filed, and the father neither registered with the paternity registry nor otherwise acknowledged or adjudicated paternity. On appeal, the father challenged only best interest and the denial of his oral continuance, but he did not attack the § 161.002(b)(3) finding. The court held that an unchallenged independent ground requires affirmance and reiterated that termination under § 161.002(b)(3) does not require a separate best-interest finding. The court also held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the father’s oral motion for continuance because it was not written or verified under Rule 251 and the case was near the statutory dismissal deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
“For fathers and their counsel, paternity status is not a side issue—if a client remains only an alleged father and does not register, acknowledge, or adjudicate paternity, § 161.002(b)(3) can become a stand-alone path to termination. For appellate lawyers, the case is a blunt reminder that every independent ground in the judgment must be challenged or the appeal can be lost automatically.”
In the Interest of J.W.H. and T.L.H., Children
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals held that the paternal grandparents lacked standing to bring an original SAPCR under Texas Family Code § 102.004(a)(1) because they did not prove, by a preponderance of the evidence as of the filing date, that Mother’s specific conduct would probably cause significant impairment to the children’s physical health or emotional development. The court analyzed the grandparents’ allegations about marijuana use, leaving a child unattended, educational problems, and cohabitation through the required filing-date lens and concluded the evidence showed only generalized concerns, stale events, or post-filing developments—not present circumstances meeting the statute’s high threshold. Because standing is jurisdictional, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, so the court reversed and rendered judgment dismissing the suit.
Litigation Takeaway
“In third-party custody cases, standing is a jurisdictional hurdle that must be proven with date-specific evidence at the time of filing. Nonparents cannot rely on sympathy, family conflict, lifestyle criticism, old incidents, or proof they could provide a better home; they must tie a parent’s identifiable conduct to probable significant impairment. For parents’ counsel, this case is a strong blueprint for an early plea to the jurisdiction.”
Gonzales v. State
COA04
In Gonzales v. State, the San Antonio Court of Appeals addressed whether a juvenile-transfer order under Texas Family Code section 54.02 could be challenged through a later criminal appeal after conviction. The juvenile court had signed a November 1, 2024 order waiving juvenile jurisdiction and transferring Gonzales for adult criminal prosecution, but Gonzales did not file a notice of appeal in the juvenile court within 20 days. Instead, he filed a notice of appeal in the criminal case after his April 2, 2026 conviction. The court analyzed sections 54.02 and 56.01 of the Family Code together with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1(b) and held that a transfer order is directly appealable, the appeal is accelerated, and the notice of appeal must be filed in the juvenile court within 20 days after the transfer order is signed. Because Gonzales filed only an untimely post-conviction notice in the criminal case, the court lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a Family Code order is immediately appealable, lawyers must identify the correct order, file in the correct court, and meet the statute-driven deadline. A later judgment, trial-court certification, or notice filed in a related case will not revive a missed appeal deadline or create appellate jurisdiction.”
Vu Quoc Huynh v. Tri Cao and Vu Tran
COA14
In a business dispute with family-law crossover implications, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that an agreed temporary injunction was void because the order did not comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683. Although the injunction listed the acts restrained, it only recited that “immediate and irreparable injury will occur” and failed to identify the specific injury or explain how the restrained conduct would cause irreparable harm absent relief. The court emphasized that Rule 683 requires the order itself to state the reasons for issuance with a direct link between the conduct enjoined and the irreparable injury to be prevented, and that party agreement does not cure a defective injunction. The court reversed the temporary injunction and remanded, while noting that one challenged provision barring participation in day-to-day operations was not impermissibly vague.
Litigation Takeaway
“Boilerplate will not save a temporary injunction. In Texas, even an agreed injunction is vulnerable on appeal if the order does not specifically explain the irreparable injury and tie that harm to the conduct being restrained. Family-law lawyers drafting temporary injunctive relief should treat the findings section as carefully as the operative restraints.”
In the Interest of C.E.R. and H.C.R., Children
COA05
In this Dallas SAPCR modification appeal, Mother initially sought to reduce child support, while Father countered with requests aimed at the children’s safety, therapy, and decision-making structure. After hearing from both parents and multiple mental-health professionals, the trial court found a material and substantial change in circumstances since the divorce decree, including escalating violence involving the children, worsening conflict between Mother and the children, increased sibling aggression, declining parental cooperation on education and healthcare, and Mother’s failure to comply with court-ordered therapy. Applying Texas Family Code section 156.101, the court of appeals held that this evidence was legally sufficient to support modification of conservatorship-related rights, therapy provisions, and related terms because the prior decree’s co-parenting and therapeutic framework had broken down and the modified order was supported by the children’s best interest. The court also rejected Mother’s pleading and procedural complaints and affirmed the order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Material-and-substantial-change evidence in a modification case does not require one dramatic event; a documented pattern of worsening conflict, child aggression, therapy noncompliance, and co-parenting failure can be enough to shift exclusive rights and add stabilizing measures. For litigants, the key is comparative proof showing why the original decree no longer works and how the requested modification protects the children’s best interest.”
Williams v. Hickman
COA01
In Williams v. Hickman, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a modification order that removed a maternal grandmother as sole managing conservator, appointed the child’s mother as sole managing conservator, and ended the grandmother’s possession and access. The court applied Texas Family Code § 156.101 and held that modification required proof of both a material and substantial change in circumstances since the March 2020 controlling order and that the requested change was in the child’s best interest. Reviewing the case under the abuse-of-discretion standard with implied findings, the court concluded the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support both elements. The court also held that the grandmother waived her complaint that the judgment exceeded the pleadings by failing to preserve it in the trial court, and it upheld the denial of her attorney’s fees request.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a Texas custody modification, the winning proof must compare circumstances at the time of the last controlling order with circumstances at trial; stale history alone will not do. If you want to challenge relief as beyond the pleadings, preserve that complaint in the trial court or lose it on appeal.”
Staten v. State
COA01
In Staten v. State, the First Court of Appeals held that the defendant did not preserve complaints that a 911 recording contained irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, and improper extraneous-offense evidence because, when the exhibit was offered, counsel objected only on hearsay grounds. The court explained that appellate complaints must comport with the specific trial objection, and a hearsay objection does not preserve Rule 401, 403, or 404(b) complaints. The court also held that later objections raised only after the recording had been admitted and partially played to the jury were untimely under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a). Finally, the court affirmed the denial of mistrial because the trial court withdrew the exhibit, instructed the jury to disregard, the record was unclear about what the jury heard, and any prejudice was not so incurable as to require mistrial.
Litigation Takeaway
“In family-law trials, preservation can decide the appeal before the merits are ever reached: object before the evidence is admitted, state every specific ground you may need later, and do not rely on a hearsay objection or motion in limine to preserve relevance, Rule 403, extraneous-conduct, or constitutional complaints. If a recording, text chain, police report, or third-party narrative contains inflammatory prior-act allegations, demand redaction and a ruling before publication.”
Ekomobong Etuk v. Felix Julian Edema
COA14
In this SAPCR modification appeal, the mother challenged evidentiary rulings, witness exclusions, a sanctions order, alleged omissions in the final modification order, and the denial of her motion for new trial after the trial court shifted the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence to the father and ordered child support. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals focused primarily on appellate preservation and briefing sufficiency under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) and 33.1(a), holding that many complaints were waived because the brief lacked coherent legal analysis, record citations, or preserved objections. The court also held there was no reversible evidentiary exclusion where evidence was never actually offered, refused to consider an authenticity complaint raised for the first time on appeal, and rejected the sanctions issue because the complained-of order was not in the appellate record. The court affirmed the modification order in full.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appeals are won or lost on preservation, record-building, and briefing discipline. In family-law modification cases, you must make the trial objection, obtain a ruling, ensure the challenged order and relevant transcripts are in the appellate record, and then tie each appellate issue to specific record cites and legal authority—or the complaint will likely be waived.”
In the Interest of C.K.J.-S., a Child
COA01
After an earlier suit left the Department as sole managing conservator but did not terminate Mother’s rights, the Department later filed a modification seeking termination and relied on both old and new evidence. The First Court of Appeals held that Family Code section 161.001(d) bars using evidence presented before the earlier conservatorship order as the basis for later endangerment findings under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E). But the court treated the statute as a limited use restriction, not a blanket exclusion rule, so the same earlier evidence could still be considered for other pleaded grounds, including subsection (O), as well as best interest and material-and-substantial-change issues. Because termination was independently supported by subsection (O) and best interest, any error tied to the (D) and (E) findings did not require reversal, and the termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a prior case ended with conservatorship but not termination, lawyers must separate what prior evidence can prove from what it cannot. Pre-order evidence cannot be recycled to support later endangerment predicates under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E), but it may still be useful for best interest, modification issues, and other pleaded grounds. Plead alternative predicates, build a post-order record for (D) and (E), and make targeted section 161.001(d) objections rather than broad admissibility complaints.”