Weekly Digest
January 24 – January 30, 2026
84 opinions this week
In re Hector Hernandez
COA08
After obtaining a writ of execution to recover property, Hector Hernandez filed a petition for writ of mandamus directly with the El Paso Court of Appeals because the County Sheriff refused to enforce the writ. The Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Government Code § 22.221(b), which limits its original mandamus jurisdiction to actions against specific judges, not executive officials like sheriffs. The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to compel a sheriff to act unless such an order was necessary to protect the court's own jurisdiction. Because Hernandez had not first filed a mandamus action against the sheriff in a district court, the appellate court dismissed the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“You cannot "leapfrog" the trial court when a sheriff or constable refuses to execute a writ. To compel a county official to perform a ministerial duty, you must first file a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court; filing directly in the court of appeals will result in a jurisdictional dismissal.”
Morrison v. Morrison
Supreme Court of Texas
In Morrison v. Morrison, a former wife sought to enforce a divorce decree after her ex-husband allegedly damaged their marital home and failed to return various items of personal property. Although the original decree split the home sale proceeds 50/50, the trial court awarded the wife 100% of the proceeds as damages without making specific findings regarding the fair market value (FMV) of the losses. The Supreme Court of Texas analyzed the distinction between the power to 'enforce' a decree under Family Code Chapter 9 and the prohibition against 'modifying' a substantive property division. The Court held that while trial courts can award money judgments for breaches, they impermissibly modify a decree when they reallocate community assets without a direct evidentiary link to the proven fair market value of the damaged or missing property.
Litigation Takeaway
“To successfully recover damages for damaged or missing assets after a divorce, you must provide specific evidence of fair market value; a court cannot simply reallocate property interests as a penalty for bad behavior without a dollar-for-dollar evidentiary accounting.”
Richardson v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Richardson v. State, the defendant challenged (among other issues) the court costs assessed after his convictions, arguing that the district clerk’s bill of costs conflicted with the trial court’s oral pronouncement that costs would not be payable until his release from TDCJ confinement. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected Richardson’s ineffective-assistance claims under Strickland, but addressed the costs dispute by applying the rule that when a written judgment or ministerial clerk cost bill conflicts with the trial court’s oral pronouncement made in the defendant’s presence, the oral pronouncement controls. The court also reviewed the bill of costs for record support and found a $55 subpoena service fee was unsupported. The court affirmed the convictions, modified the judgment to delete the unsupported subpoena fee, and further modified the judgment/bill of costs to state that court costs are not payable until Richardson is released from confinement, consistent with the trial court’s oral ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
“In enforcement and contempt cases—especially when someone is jailed—don’t let boilerplate orders or an auto-generated clerk bill of costs undo what the judge said on the record. If the court orally waives or defers fees/costs, ensure the written order and commitment match; otherwise move to correct/modify because the oral pronouncement controls and unsupported cost items can be struck.”
EDWARD GENE MOODY JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS
COA02
In Moody v. State, the defendant challenged a felony DWI conviction, arguing (1) the search-warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause for a compelled blood draw and (2) the State failed to prove the two prior DWI convictions (“jurisdictional priors”) required to elevate the offense to a felony. Applying the highly deferential totality-of-the-circumstances review and the “four corners” rule, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held the magistrate had a substantial basis to find probable cause where the affidavit described a vehicle accident, witness reports that the defendant smelled of alcohol and threw beer cans into a ditch, the officer’s own odor-of-alcohol observation, failed field sobriety tests, and the defendant’s admission he drank two 24-ounce beers. The court also held the evidence was legally sufficient to link Moody to the 1995 and 2022 DWI judgments for enhancement purposes; remoteness did not undermine the priors’ validity, and the State provided documentation and corroborating testimony connecting Moody to those convictions. The court affirmed the felony DWI conviction and sentence.
Litigation Takeaway
“In custody and SAPCR cases, don’t dismiss “old” alcohol-related convictions or a parent’s calm demeanor during an incident. Build an endangerment narrative using (1) certified priors (even decades old) and (2) contemporaneous, concrete “four corners” facts from police/fire/witness reports (accident details, odor, discarded containers, refusals, admissions) to support testing requests and restrictions like supervised visitation.”
In the Interest of M.L.L., A.M.L., and B.F.L., Children
COA07
In a parental termination proceeding, a mother sought to introduce evidence of events occurring prior to a 2018 divorce decree. The trial court excluded this evidence, citing res judicata. On appeal, the mother argued this exclusion was improper. The Seventh Court of Appeals analyzed the case under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1 and Texas Rule of Evidence 103(a), which require a party to preserve error by making an "offer of proof" when evidence is excluded. The court held that because the mother failed to make an offer of proof regarding what the excluded testimony would have shown, the appellate court could not conduct a harm analysis. Consequently, the mother waived her right to challenge the exclusion, and the termination of her parental rights was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a trial court excludes evidence, simply objecting is not enough; you must make a formal or informal 'offer of proof' for the record to show the appellate court exactly what that evidence would have been and why its exclusion was harmful.”
IN THE INTEREST OF D.J., A CHILD, Appellant
COA05
After losing his job, a father sought to terminate his child support obligation but refused to produce discovery documents regarding his retirement accounts and foreign property interests. The trial court granted a directed verdict against him, denying the modification and imposing a $4,800 discovery sanction. The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the modification, holding that a party seeking to change support must provide full financial transparency to allow the court to calculate "net resources." However, the court reversed the monetary sanction because the trial record lacked specific evidence, such as attorney fee invoices or testimony, to justify the $4,800 amount.
Litigation Takeaway
“Transparency is mandatory in support modification cases; losing your primary income does not excuse you from disclosing your broader financial estate. Additionally, any party seeking discovery sanctions must ensure the record contains specific evidentiary proof linking the amount of the sanction to the actual costs or fees incurred.”
Brandon Keith Anderson v. The State of Texas
COA12
In this case, a witness provided surprise testimony during a hearing involving prejudicial information that had not been disclosed during discovery. Although the defendant successfully moved the trial court to disregard the testimony, he did not specifically move for a mistrial. On appeal, the Twelfth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and the 'preservation ladder,' which generally requires a party to object, request an instruction to disregard, and move for a mistrial to preserve error. The court held that because the appellant received the exact relief he requested (disregarding the testimony) and failed to seek a mistrial or obtain an adverse ruling, the complaint was waived.
Litigation Takeaway
“Winning a motion to strike or disregard surprise testimony is a 'trap' if the evidence is truly 'incurable.' In Texas courts, if a witness drops a 'bombshell' that poisons the well, you must move for a mistrial and secure an adverse ruling to preserve the issue for appeal. Merely asking the judge to disregard the statement is considered a 'win' at trial that results in a procedural default on appeal, leaving you with no recourse if the judge is ultimately influenced by the excluded evidence.”
In the Matter of B.T.
COA02
In In the Matter of B.T., the Second Court of Appeals reviewed a juvenile court's order transferring a young man to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice to finish an eighteen-year murder sentence. While the court found that the transfer was required by law because the respondent could not complete his minimum confinement before turning nineteen, it identified an error regarding court costs. The appellate court held that because the respondent had been declared indigent, that status was presumed to continue through the appeal. Consequently, the court affirmed the prison transfer but modified the judgment to strike all assessed court costs.
Litigation Takeaway
“Once a party's indigent status is established under the Family Code, it is legally presumed to continue throughout the litigation; attorneys should always audit final judgments and bills of costs to ensure clerks do not improperly assess fees against indigent clients.”
In re Juan Pardo
COA13
In this mandamus proceeding, Relator Juan Pardo sought to vacate trial court orders for his arrest via ex parte writs of attachment. Although Pardo was represented by two attorneys of record, he filed the petition pro se. The Real Party in Interest moved to dismiss, arguing that Texas law prohibits 'hybrid representation.' The Thirteenth Court of Appeals agreed, holding that a party in a civil case cannot represent themselves while concurrently being represented by counsel. Because the petition was procedurally improper, the court dismissed it without prejudice and lifted a previously granted emergency stay, effectively exposing the Relator to the trial court's enforcement orders.
Litigation Takeaway
“Pro se filings made by a party who is still represented by counsel of record are considered a procedural nullity. Clients must formalize the termination of their legal representation before attempting to file original proceedings independently, or they risk immediate dismissal and the loss of emergency stays.”
IN THE INTEREST OF T.F., A CHILD
COA02
In this case, a father appealed the termination of his parental rights. His court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, stating that after a thorough review of the record, there were no valid legal grounds for an appeal, and simultaneously moved to withdraw as counsel. The Second Court of Appeals performed its own independent review of the record and agreed that the appeal was frivolous, affirming the trial court's termination order. However, the court denied the attorney's motion to withdraw. Applying the Texas Supreme Court's standard from In re P.M., the court held that an appointed attorney’s duty in a termination case continues through the filing of a petition for review with the Texas Supreme Court, and the mere fact that an appeal is frivolous does not constitute 'good cause' to allow an attorney to withdraw.
Litigation Takeaway
“In parental termination cases, an appointed attorney’s obligation to their client is extensive; filing an Anders brief due to a lack of merit does not automatically permit the attorney to withdraw. Counsel must remain on the case through the Texas Supreme Court stage unless they can demonstrate specific 'good cause'—such as a conflict of interest—that is independent of the appeal's lack of merit.”
RANCHO DE LOS ARBOLES LLC AND ELLEN EAKIN v. TOWN OF CROSS ROADS, TX
COA02
Rancho De Los Arboles LLC and its principal sued the Town of Cross Roads after the Town began enforcing zoning ordinances to shut down their long-running short‑term rental use. Rancho sought declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging Texas-constitutional property violations (including takings/due course of law theories) and asserting ultra vires conduct. The Town filed a plea to the jurisdiction based on governmental immunity, and the trial court dismissed all claims with prejudice. Applying the Miranda plea-to-the-jurisdiction framework, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals explained that a dismissal with prejudice is proper only when the pleadings or record affirmatively negate jurisdiction as a matter of law (i.e., the defect is incurable). Where the problem is merely insufficient pleading of jurisdictional facts that could be cured by amendment—such as failing to plead takings elements with specificity or failing to name the proper officials for an ultra vires claim—the plaintiff must be given a chance to replead. The court affirmed dismissal of those claims that were jurisdictionally barred on the record, but held the trial court reversibly erred by dismissing the remainder with prejudice without allowing Rancho an opportunity to amend. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the potentially curable constitutional and ultra vires theories.
Litigation Takeaway
“A plea to the jurisdiction is not automatically a “case killer.” If governmental immunity is raised and your petition is merely thin—not incurably barred—push hard for the right to amend. Preserve error by requesting leave to replead and objecting to any “with prejudice” dismissal, especially when asserting constitutional property/takings or ultra vires claims tied to real estate value in a divorce-related crossover dispute.”
Opinion by Justice Triana
COA03
In this case, a grandfather sought sole managing conservatorship of his three grandchildren following the death of their father, citing the mother's extreme and abusive disciplinary measures. The mother argued that her 'strict' parenting was protected by the legal 'parental presumption,' which usually favors keeping children with their parents. However, the court analyzed evidence showing the mother forced the children to stay outdoors overnight in freezing temperatures and neglected their medical and psychological needs, leading to fainting spells and suicidal ideation. The Third Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling, holding that the grandfather successfully rebutted the parental presumption because the mother’s conduct posed a significant threat to the children’s physical health and emotional development.
Litigation Takeaway
“The 'parental presumption' is not absolute; a non-parent can win custody by documenting a clear pattern of extreme disciplinary tactics, medical neglect, and the resulting psychological trauma to the children.”
In the matter of D.P.
COA02
In this juvenile law matter, the Second Court of Appeals reviewed a trial court's decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer a 16-year-old, D.P., to adult criminal court for prosecution of capital murder and aggravated robbery. D.P. challenged the sufficiency of the evidence establishing probable cause and argued that the trial court improperly weighed his maturity and sophistication. The appellate court affirmed the transfer, holding that the State met its burden through detective testimony and physical evidence. Furthermore, the court determined that the trial court acted within its discretion under Texas Family Code § 54.02 by identifying D.P.'s 'level of planning' and premeditation as clear indicators of adult-like sophistication, which outweighed his lack of a prior criminal record.
Litigation Takeaway
“When litigating a minor’s maturity or capacity—whether in juvenile transfer hearings or high-conflict custody disputes involving delinquent behavior—Texas courts prioritize evidence of 'planning' and 'organization' over a lack of prior history to determine if a child should be held to adult-level standards of accountability.”
P. J. S., Appellant v. K. S. S., Appellee
COA03
In P. J. S. v. K. S. S., a former husband challenged a summary judgment requiring him to pay a 'Guaranteed Amount' shortfall to his ex-wife as outlined in their Partition Agreement Incident to Divorce (PAID). The husband argued that because his payments were 'subject to' and secondary to a bank's priority debt, he was not obligated to pay if business profits were insufficient. The Third Court of Appeals disagreed, analyzing the contract language to find that 'subject to' established an order of distribution (who gets paid first) rather than a condition precedent (whether he has to pay at all). Because the agreement lacked specific conditional wording like 'if and only if,' the court held the husband was personally liable for the shortfall regardless of the business's net profits.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas, 'subject to' language in a settlement agreement typically establishes payment priority rather than excusing the debt entirely; if a payor intends to limit their liability to available business profits, the agreement must use express conditional language or explicitly disclaim personal liability for shortfalls.”
Richardson v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Richardson v. State, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reviewed a defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim and challenges to court costs. The appellant argued trial counsel made specific mistakes (e.g., failing to object or pursue certain defensive theories), but the court analyzed counsel’s performance under Strickland by looking at the “totality of representation” rather than isolated alleged errors. Because the record reflected an active, strategic defense—particularly cross-examination emphasizing the lack of recovered stolen property and gaps in the State’s physical evidence—the appellant failed to show deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Separately, the court audited the bill of costs and held that clerk-assessed fees must be supported by the record; it struck an unsupported $55 subpoena service fee where no return of service or evidence justified it. The court also held that an administrative bill of costs cannot override the trial court’s judgment on timing of payment; because the judgment made costs payable upon release, the appellant was not required to pay while confined. The convictions were affirmed, and the bill of costs was modified to delete the unsupported fee.
Litigation Takeaway
“IAC claims are hard to win when the record shows counsel was “in the fight”—courts evaluate the whole trial, not a checklist of alleged missteps. In family cases (especially termination), build a record reflecting active advocacy and strategy to blunt Strickland attacks. Also, don’t accept boilerplate costs at face value: line-item audit bills of cost and move to strike fees not supported by the record, and enforce decree/judgment language on when costs are actually payable (e.g., not until release from confinement).”
RCIS ENTERPRISES, LLC, Appellant v. HOUSER FABRICATION, LLC, Appellee
COA06
RCIS Enterprises, LLC appealed a bench-trial judgment in favor of Houser Fabrication, LLC for breach of contract that awarded $78,491.10 in damages, prompt-payment interest, and attorney’s fees. The Texarkana Court of Appeals applied the City of Keller legal-sufficiency standard. It upheld the trial court’s finding that a binding contract existed, reasoning that the parties’ testimony and course of performance supplied the essential terms with reasonable certainty and supported a meeting of the minds. But the court concluded the evidence did not provide a legally sufficient evidentiary bridge between the admitted invoices/testimony and the exact dollar amount awarded, so the specific damages figure could not stand. It also held the record did not establish the statutory predicates for Texas Prompt Payment Act interest, requiring that interest award to be reversed. Because the principal recovery and interest were altered on appeal, the prevailing-party posture and “results obtained” changed, so the attorney-fee award was reversed and remanded for redetermination and recalculation consistent with the modified recovery.
Litigation Takeaway
“In a bench trial, findings of fact won’t save a money judgment if the record doesn’t support the exact numbers. Tie every damages/valuation line item to specific exhibits and testimony, and build evidence for statutory interest predicates. If the recovery may be reduced on appeal, preserve the fee award by developing Arthur Andersen evidence (and segregation where needed), because changes to the “bottom line” often force a fee remand.”
HIGH RISK PREGNANCY DOCTORS, PLLC AND VIOLETTA LOZOVYY, Appellants v. LINCOLN PROPERTY COMPANY D/B/A LINCOLN HARRIS CSG AND DOUGLAS MACLAY III, Appellees
COA02
In High Risk Pregnancy Doctors, PLLC and Dr. Violetta Lozovyy’s dispute with a leasing agent and landlord, the plaintiffs claimed they were induced to sign a commercial lease by an oral promise that the lease would be “ineffective” or otherwise “dealt with” if Dr. Lozovyy failed to obtain hospital staff privileges within 120 days. The written lease, however, unambiguously required those privileges and contained no contingency or “escape hatch.” The Fort Worth Court of Appeals, applying the Rule 91a standard, held the fraud claim failed as a matter of law because “justifiable reliance” cannot be based on an oral representation that is directly contradicted by the clear terms of the signed contract. The court also held the DTPA claim was time-barred: the two-year limitations period was not tolled by the discovery rule because the alleged injury—the contradictory contract language—was discoverable at signing, and failing to read the contract is a lack of reasonable diligence. The court affirmed dismissal of all claims.
Litigation Takeaway
“If the written agreement says one thing and an alleged oral promise says another, Texas courts treat reliance on the oral promise as legally unjustifiable—making fraud-based attempts to unwind a signed deal vulnerable to early dismissal. In family cases, this is strong authority to defeat “side-deal” or “work-around” claims attacking MSAs/Rule 11 agreements and to resist late-filed fraud/DTPA-style claims where the complaining party could have discovered the issue by reading what they signed.”
In the Interest of I.H., A Child
COA02
A father challenged the termination of his parental rights, arguing that he was denied due process because he was not transported from jail for his trial and that the evidence was insufficient to support the termination. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the father's history of substance abuse and his repeated refusal to submit to court-ordered drug testing, concluding that such refusals create a legal inference of ongoing drug use. The court held that this "presumption of use," combined with the child's drug exposure at birth, supported an endangerment finding. Additionally, the court held that because the father's attorney did not explicitly raise a constitutional objection to the father's absence during the trial, those due process claims were waived for appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Refusing a court-ordered drug test is not a neutral act; Texas courts treat a refusal as substantive evidence of illegal drug use and child endangerment. Furthermore, if a parent is unable to attend a hearing, counsel must explicitly cite constitutional due process grounds on the record to preserve the right to appeal that absence.”
In the Matter of J.S.R., A Child
COA07
The Amarillo Court of Appeals considered whether a juvenile’s voluntary motion to dismiss an appeal was valid when it involved a waiver of statutory rights. While typical civil dismissals require only a signature from an attorney, the Court emphasized that Texas Family Code Section 51.09 imposes stricter "belt and suspenders" requirements for minors. The Court analyzed the motion and found that it correctly included signatures from both the juvenile and his attorney, as required by law. Consequently, the Court held the waiver was effective and granted the dismissal, highlighting that specific statutory protections for children take precedence over general appellate procedural rules.
Litigation Takeaway
“In any legal proceeding involving a minor’s rights—whether in juvenile delinquency or high-stakes family litigation—a standard signature from counsel is insufficient for a waiver. Under Texas Family Code Section 51.09, any waiver of a child's constitutional or statutory rights must be signed by both the minor and their attorney. To ensure the finality of a dismissal or settlement involving a minor, practitioners must strictly adhere to this dual-signature requirement.”
Jonathan Humber v. City of Palestine
COA12
In Humber v. City of Palestine, the appellant filed a motion for new trial 32 days after the trial court signed the final judgment. The appellant later filed a notice of appeal nearly three months after the judgment, assuming the post-judgment motion had extended the appellate deadline. The Twelfth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1, which requires a "timely" post-judgment motion to extend the filing deadline for a notice of appeal from 30 to 90 days. The court held that an untimely motion for new trial is a nullity for purposes of the appellate timetable and does not extend the court's jurisdiction, leading to the dismissal of the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“A motion for new trial must be filed within 30 days of the date the judge signs the order to extend the appellate deadline; filing even one day late means your notice of appeal remains due 30 days from the judgment, potentially terminating your right to appeal.”
Dennis Maurice Jones v. The State of Texas
COA02
In Jones v. State, the defendant sought to introduce his mother’s testimony about his mental-health history during an aggravated-assault trial. When the State objected on relevance, defense counsel expressly told the trial court the testimony was offered only to support an insanity defense and “not attempting to get any sort of lesser included reckless charge.” The trial court excluded the testimony. On appeal, Jones argued the exclusion was error because the evidence would have supported a lesser-included offense instruction. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(a) and the “matching” preservation doctrine (Clark v. State), holding the appellate complaint did not match what was requested at trial. Because counsel affirmatively disclaimed the lesser-included theory, the trial court was never asked to rule on admissibility for that purpose and there was no preserved error to review. The court affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not “narrow-proffer” yourself into an appellate waiver. If evidence is relevant to multiple theories (e.g., best interest, statutory presumptions, significant impairment, danger), state all applicable grounds and avoid affirmative disclaimers like “not for X.” Appellate courts will hold you to the exact theory presented to the trial judge, and a trial-level disclaimer can permanently foreclose a later appeal.”
John C. Campbell v. Medical Imaging Consultants, LLP
COA12
John Campbell, a radiologist, sued his former employer for breaching a non-disparagement clause in their separation agreement after he was passed over for a job at a different medical group. Campbell alleged that a negative comment regarding his "personality issues" from a former partner caused him to lose the position. The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed a no-evidence summary judgment against Campbell, ruling that he failed to prove causation. The court found that Campbell's theory relied on "inference stacking"—the speculative assumption that he would have successfully completed a multi-step interview process and received a unanimous hiring vote but for the alleged disparagement.
Litigation Takeaway
“To recover damages for the breach of a non-disparagement clause, it is not enough to prove a negative comment was made; you must provide direct evidence that the disparagement was the 'but-for' cause of a lost job or contract, rather than relying on a chain of speculative inferences about a third party's hiring process.”
In the Interest of K.K. and K.K., Children
COA12
In this parental termination case, the appellant (J.K.) filed a notice of appeal six days after the mandatory 20-day deadline for accelerated appeals. Although the notice was filed within the 15-day 'grace period' allowed by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3, the Twelfth Court of Appeals notified J.K. that a 'reasonable explanation' for the delay was required to maintain jurisdiction. Because the appellant failed to respond to the court’s inquiry or provide any explanation for the late filing, the court held it was powerless to grant an extension. Consequently, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, emphasizing that procedural rules apply equally to pro se litigants and licensed attorneys.
Litigation Takeaway
“Appellate deadlines in parental termination cases are extremely strict and accelerated; missing the 20-day filing window—and failing to provide a prompt, reasonable explanation for the delay—will result in the permanent loss of your right to appeal.”
In Re Constance Benavides a/k/a Constance Chamberlain
COA13
After an eviction judgment was entered following a property dispute, the Relator, Constance Benavides, attempted to stay her removal by filing a supersedeas bond. However, the trial court did not set the bond amount until over a month after the judgment, and Benavides filed the bond shortly thereafter. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Property Code § 24.007, which mandates that a bond must be filed within ten days of a judgment to stay an eviction 'under any circumstances.' The court held that the statutory deadline is absolute and contains no exceptions for judicial or administrative delays, ultimately denying mandamus relief and allowing the eviction to proceed.
Litigation Takeaway
“In property crossover evictions, the ten-day deadline to post a supersedeas bond is a 'trap' that admits no excuses; you must aggressively move to set and file the bond within 240 hours of the judgment signature or face immediate removal from the premises, regardless of a pending appeal.”
Hallas v. Hallas
COA03
In this divorce appeal, the Third Court of Appeals addressed a trial court's failure to provide mandatory Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding property division and attorney's fees. The appellant, Janice Hallas, had strictly followed procedural rules by filing both an initial request and a notice of past due findings. The appellate court analyzed the "presumed harm" doctrine, noting that missing findings force an appellant to challenge every conceivable basis for a ruling rather than narrowing the issues. Because the trial court’s silence prevented the appellant from properly presenting her case, the court held the error was harmful, abated the appeal, and remanded the case for the entry of findings.
Litigation Takeaway
“Success on appeal often depends on procedural discipline. If a trial court ignores a request for Findings of Fact, you must file a "Notice of Past Due Findings" within the strict 30-day window to preserve your rights. Without these findings, the appellate court will presume the trial judge found every fact necessary to support the original ruling, making it nearly impossible to overturn a discretionary property division.”
In the Matter of the Marriage of Brittany Lea Lannen and Clint Douglas Lannen
COA10
Years after her divorce, Brittany Lannen sought a declaratory judgment to determine if her ex-husband's 'right to purchase' specific real estate—a provision included in their 2014 divorce decree—was still valid or had been waived. The trial court dismissed her suit, agreeing with the husband's argument that the lawsuit was an impermissible 'collateral attack' on a final judgment. On appeal, the Waco Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal. The court analyzed the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) and concluded that because the decree incorporated a settlement agreement 'enforceable as a contract,' the UDJA was the proper procedural tool to interpret the parties' legal rights. The court held that seeking to construe the meaning or validity of a contract within a decree is not an attempt to overturn the judgment, but rather a request for the court to define the current legal status of those provisions.
Litigation Takeaway
“If your divorce decree incorporates a settlement agreement as an enforceable contract, you can use the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to clarify or interpret its terms years later. This allows parties to resolve disputes over property rights—like purchase options or rights of first refusal—without being barred by rules that usually prevent people from 'attacking' final judgments.”
AOC TX, LLC d/b/a Angels of Care Pediatric Home Health v. Naomi Landeros and Carlos Silva, Individually and as Next Friend of O.S., Deceased Minor
COA08
In this medical liability case involving the tragic death of a medically fragile infant, the parents sued a home health provider. The defendant challenged the qualifications of the parents' nurse and physician experts, arguing they were not 'practicing' at the time required by law. The El Paso Court of Appeals strictly interpreted Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 74.402, finding that because the nurse had not practiced since 2021 and the doctor retired in 2019—while the claim arose in 2023—they failed the mandatory temporal requirements for experts. The court held the trial court abused its discretion in accepting the reports and reversed the ruling, though it remanded the case to allow the parents an opportunity to cure the technical deficiencies.
Litigation Takeaway
“Expert experience alone is insufficient if it is not contemporaneous with the case; to survive a motion to strike, an expert must be in active clinical practice or teaching at an accredited institution at the time the claim arose or when testimony is given. In family law cases involving medically fragile children or specialized needs, practitioners must scrutinize the 'active' status of experts to ensure their testimony is not disqualified for being out-of-date.”
In The Interest of G.M.D. & V.D., Children And In The Interest of Z.J.M., A Child
COA01
In this termination of parental rights case, a mother appealed the trial court's decision to end her legal relationship with three of her children following a history of chronic substance abuse and mental health crises. The mother challenged only one of the five legal grounds (predicate acts) cited by the trial court for termination. The Court of Appeals affirmed the termination, explaining that under Texas law, an appellant must challenge every predicate ground found by the trial court; otherwise, the unchallenged grounds stand as sufficient. The court then applied the 'Holley' factors to the evidence—including the mother's history of heroin and methamphetamine use and the children's success in stable foster placements—and concluded that termination was clearly in the children's best interest.
Litigation Takeaway
“When appealing a termination of parental rights, it is a procedural necessity to challenge every single 'predicate ground' listed in the trial court's order; failure to contest even one ground can result in an automatic loss on that portion of the appeal. Additionally, historical evidence of substance abuse and mental health instability continues to be a primary driver in 'best interest' determinations by Texas courts.”
Valerie Lauren Mata v. The State of Texas
COA01
In Mata v. State, the defendant pleaded guilty to improper relationship with a student and received a five-year sentence, then attempted to appeal despite having signed a waiver of appeal. The First Court of Appeals analyzed whether it had jurisdiction in light of that waiver where sentencing was left to the trial court (i.e., not a fixed-sentence plea bargain). Applying Ex parte Broadway and Carson, the court treated the waiver as a bargained-for exchange and held it is enforceable when supported by consideration—here, the State’s waiver of its right to a jury trial—even without an agreed sentence. Because the trial court’s certification correctly reflected that Mata had no right of appeal, the appellate court was required to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“A properly documented criminal appellate waiver can make a conviction effectively “final” immediately, eliminating appellate-delay arguments in related family cases. In termination or custody litigation involving criminal conduct, obtain the clerk’s record and certification to confirm (1) a signed waiver, and (2) consideration (e.g., the State waived a jury). Then use the dismissal/waiver to oppose stays and to support termination grounds or evidentiary finality arguments.”
Moir Watershed Services, LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC and Spencer Hofmann
COA10
In Moir Watershed Servs., LLC v. Law Office of Heath Gurinsky, PLLC, a Texas-based company sued a New York law firm in a Texas court for legal malpractice and breach of contract. The New York firm challenged the lawsuit, arguing that Texas courts lacked personal jurisdiction over them since they were based in New York and the work was performed there. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the case, holding that merely entering into a contract with a Texas resident does not establish the 'purposeful availment' necessary for jurisdiction. The court concluded that because the legal services were performed outside of Texas and the defendants did not specifically target the Texas market, they lacked the minimum contacts required to be sued in a Texas forum.
Litigation Takeaway
“Hiring an out-of-state attorney or expert for your legal matter does not guarantee you can sue them in Texas if something goes wrong. If their work is performed in their home state and they haven't purposefully reached into Texas to conduct business, you may be forced to litigate any malpractice or fee disputes in their jurisdiction, significantly increasing your costs and risks.”
AHMED OLAYIWOLA, Appellant V. FITNESS INTERNATIONAL LLC D/B/A LA FITNESS; FITNESS INTERNATIONAL GP, LLC; L.A. FITNESS INTERNATIONAL TEXAS, L.P.; AND “L.A. FITNESS”
COA14
After appealing a trial court's dismissal of his claims, Ahmed Olayiwola filed a voluntary nonsuit of all underlying claims against all parties while the appeal was pending. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals examined whether the appeal could continue despite the absence of a live controversy at the trial level. Relying on the principle that appellate courts lack jurisdiction over moot disputes, the court determined that the nonsuit effectively extinguished the controversy. The court held that because there was no longer a justiciable issue for the court to resolve or a judgment that would have any practical legal effect, the appeal must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction under Rule 42.3(a).
Litigation Takeaway
“A voluntary nonsuit in the trial court acts as a 'tactical reset' that moots a pending appeal; this allows a party to effectively 'vacuum' the appellate court's jurisdiction to avoid an unfavorable precedent or a poorly developed record, provided the opposing party has not filed a counterclaim for affirmative relief.”
In the Matter of the Estate of Henry Matthew Platt
COA09
In a dispute over the validity of a holographic will, the sister of the decedent attempted to disqualify the will through expert handwriting testimony. However, the expert's comparison samples (exemplars) did not consist of the decedent's own signature, but rather signatures the decedent allegedly made on behalf of his parents. The trial court excluded the expert's testimony, and the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed. The court analyzed the case under Texas Rules of Evidence 703 and 705, concluding that because the expert lacked a 'control' sample of the decedent's actual name and signature, there was an unreliable foundation and an 'analytical gap' that rendered the opinion inadmissible.
Litigation Takeaway
“Expert testimony is only as reliable as the data supporting it; if your handwriting expert relies on representative or third-party signatures rather than authenticated personal signatures, the testimony is likely to be excluded for lack of foundation.”
VKA Investments, LLC v. Anthony Baiamonte, III
COA01
After the parties mediated a settlement while an appeal was abated, they filed an agreed joint motion asking the First Court of Appeals to reinstate the appeal solely to dismiss it, tax costs per their agreement, and—critically—issue the mandate immediately. Applying TRAP 42.1(a)(1) (dismissal by agreement), TRAP 42.1(d) (costs by agreement), and TRAP 18.1(c) (mandate may issue with the judgment by agreement), the court treated the settlement as controlling and found no reason to keep the merits alive. The court reinstated the case on its docket, dismissed the appeal without reaching the merits, ordered each side to bear its own appellate costs, and directed the clerk to issue the mandate concurrently with the opinion and judgment, eliminating the usual post-judgment waiting period and making the trial-court judgment immediately final for practical purposes.
Litigation Takeaway
“When an appeal settles—especially in divorce or custody cases where delay can be leverage—don’t just dismiss the appeal. File an agreed joint motion that (1) dismisses under TRAP 42.1 and (2) expressly requests an immediate mandate under TRAP 18.1(c). That single request can collapse the normal rehearing/petition timeline, accelerate finality, and help lock in settlement performance (QDROs, property transfers, schedule changes) before “buyer’s remorse” or appellate gamesmanship sets in.”
Yuqian Gan v. Arnoldus Mathijssen
COA03
During a divorce between Yuqian Gan and Arnoldus Mathijssen, the trial court awarded the husband a disproportionate share of the community property because the wife had unilaterally depleted joint bank accounts and paid family members post-separation. The court also lowered the husband's child support payments to account for his significant travel expenses for visitation. On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals upheld the property division, ruling that the wife's "financial self-help" constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. However, the court reversed the child support award, holding that the trial court's failure to include specific, mandatory written findings required by Texas law when deviating from support guidelines was a reversible error.
Litigation Takeaway
“Even if there is a valid reason to deviate from standard child support amounts—such as high travel costs for visitation—the court must include specific statutory 'math' and findings in the order, or the ruling will be overturned. Furthermore, using community funds for personal benefit after a separation can be legally classified as a breach of fiduciary duty, justifying an unequal division of property.”
In the Matter of M.A.R. Jr., A Child
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court's order committing a minor, M.A.R. Jr., to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD). The conflict centered on whether the State had satisfied the "reasonable efforts" requirement of the Texas Family Code before removing the child from his home environment. Despite the child's diagnoses of autism and ADHD and his father's willingness to take custody, the Court analyzed the extensive history of failed interventions—including community supervision, psychiatric services, and a residential facility placement where the minor accumulated hundreds of incident reports. The Court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the finding that local resources were exhausted and that commitment was necessary for the child's rehabilitation and public safety.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a child's removal from the home is at stake due to behavioral issues, the 'paper trail' is everything; a documented history of 'graduated sanctions' and failed local interventions is often the deciding factor in satisfying the legal 'reasonable efforts' standard.”
In Re Jose Francisco Quintero and JQ Brick Repair & Restoration Services, LLC
COA14
In a mandamus proceeding, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed whether experts who author counteraffidavits under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 18.001 are protected from deposition by the consulting expert privilege. The trial court had ordered the depositions of four experts who provided counteraffidavits but were not designated as testifying witnesses. Analyzing Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 192.3(e) and 192.7, the appellate court determined that because the experts were not designated to testify and their work was not reviewed by any testifying experts, they remained privileged consultants. The court held that serving a counteraffidavit does not constitute a waiver of the consulting expert privilege, and thus the trial court abused its discretion by compelling the depositions.
Litigation Takeaway
“Attorneys can effectively challenge the reasonableness of medical or professional expenses by using Section 18.001 counteraffidavits from consulting experts who remain immune from deposition, so long as those experts are never designated to testify and their work product is not shared with testifying experts.”
Opinion by Justice Rivas-Molloy
COA01
In a delinquent-tax foreclosure case, Wanda Joyce Smith appeared at a trial setting and testified the judge postponed the matter to conduct a title search and told her a new hearing would be set, so she left expecting further notice. The court later signed a “final” judgment without notifying her of any new setting, leading to foreclosure and sale of the property; Smith learned of the judgment months later during eviction proceedings and filed a bill of review to set aside the judgment for lack of notice/due process. The trial court granted summary judgment against the bill of review and also disposed of Smith’s newly pleaded counterclaims and third-party claims. On appeal, the court applied the traditional bill-of-review elements (meritorious defense; prevented by fraud/accident/wrongful act or official mistake; unmixed with petitioner’s negligence) and the due-process framework of Caldwell v. Barnes for lack of service/notice. The court held Smith’s affidavit testimony that the trial court represented a future hearing would be set, yet later entered judgment without further notice, raised a genuine issue of material fact on “official mistake” and lack of negligence, making summary judgment improper on the bill of review. Separately, relying on the principle that a bill of review is a narrow, independent equitable proceeding limited to vacating or denying the challenged judgment, the court held the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate new counterclaims and third-party claims before the underlying judgment was set aside; those claims were dismissed as premature.
Litigation Takeaway
“A bill of review is a two-step, narrow remedy: first you must prove the prior judgment should be vacated (often by showing lack of notice tied to “official mistake”); only after vacatur can the court reach the underlying merits or any new claims. If the petitioner offers specific testimony that the court/court staff said the case was “reset” or a new setting would be provided, that evidence can defeat summary judgment. If the bill of review pleading tries to bundle in new tort/contract/property claims or add new parties, move to dismiss them—jurisdiction is limited until the judgment is actually set aside.”
In Re Michael Wayne Lowman
COA09
After being found in contempt for failing to sign property listing documents required by a divorce decree, Michael Lowman was sentenced to 180 days in jail. He filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of his confinement. However, by the time the Ninth Court of Appeals reviewed the case, Lowman had fully served his sentence and been released. The court analyzed the case under the mootness doctrine, noting that a writ of habeas corpus is a tool used specifically to challenge an existing restraint on liberty. Because Lowman was no longer confined, the court held that there was no longer a live controversy to resolve and dismissed the petition as moot.
Litigation Takeaway
“Habeas corpus is a race against the clock: if a client is jailed for contempt, you must immediately seek an emergency stay or a personal recognizance bond. If the client serves the full sentence before the appellate court rules, the case becomes moot, and you lose the chance to vacate a potentially void contempt order.”
Owens v. Johnson
COA01
In Owens v. Johnson, a military service member sought to reduce his child support payments, claiming his income had decreased due to changes in his service status and a significant increase in insurance costs. Despite his testimony, he failed to provide official financial documentation, such as Leave and Earnings Statements (LES), to support his claims. The trial court chose to credit the mother's testimony and disbelieve the father's uncorroborated assertions, setting a higher support amount and confirming child support arrears. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, emphasizing that trial judges are the sole judges of witness credibility and that a party's self-serving testimony can be disregarded if it lacks objective corroboration.
Litigation Takeaway
“When seeking to modify child support, testimony is not a substitute for a paper trail. If you claim a decrease in income but fail to produce readily available financial records like pay stubs or tax returns, the court has the discretion to completely disregard your testimony and maintain your current support obligations.”
Opinion by Justice Rivas-Molloy
COA01
A former law-firm associate sued his prior employer for post-termination wages, arguing that because he remained “attorney of record” in a pending federal case until the court signed an order allowing withdrawal, the employment relationship (and his right to salary) necessarily continued through the withdrawal date. The Houston First Court of Appeals analyzed the claim under Texas contract principles and at-will employment, distinguishing ethical/professional duties owed to a tribunal during the withdrawal process from the private contractual terms governing compensation. The court held that an attorney’s continued “of record” status does not, as a matter of law, extend an employment contract or create an entitlement to wages after the firm has clearly terminated the employment relationship; it also rejected challenges to the trial court’s evidentiary/discovery rulings and refusal to judicially notice California law as not showing reversible error. The take-nothing judgment for the firm was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
“Being “attorney of record” after termination creates ethical obligations, not a paycheck: firms can defeat “withdrawal gap” wage claims by documenting a clear, unequivocal termination date (access shutoff, keys/credentials returned) and promptly moving to withdraw, while employment agreements should expressly state compensation ends upon termination regardless of withdrawal timing.”
Jennifer Jo Stricker v. The State of Texas
COA05
In Stricker v. State, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed a trial court's exclusion of a public spectator during jury selection due to a large venire panel filling the courtroom. The appellate court analyzed the closure under the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, applying the four-prong Waller v. Georgia test. Because the trial court failed to consider reasonable alternatives to accommodate the spectator or make specific findings on the record justifying the closure, the court held that the exclusion constituted a structural error. Consequently, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial without the need for a showing of actual harm.
Litigation Takeaway
“Limited seating or a crowded gallery is not a valid legal reason to exclude public spectators from a jury trial; doing so without specific constitutional findings creates a 'structural error' that can automatically void your entire case on appeal regardless of the evidence.”
In the Matter of Marriage of Melissa Ramirez and Silvestre Fermin Torres and In the Interest of R.S.T. and A.D.T, Children
COA13
In a family law dispute, Melissa Ramirez filed a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs. Despite this, the trial court ordered her to pay half of the mediation fees without first holding an evidentiary hearing or issuing detailed findings as required by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145(f). Ramirez challenged the order using Rule 145(g)'s expedited review process. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals dismissed the challenge for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that because the trial court failed to follow the mandatory procedural steps of Rule 145(f), the resulting order was not technically issued 'under this rule,' making the expedited appellate process unavailable.
Litigation Takeaway
“If a trial court orders an indigent party to pay costs (such as mediation or amicus attorney fees) without first holding a formal hearing or providing detailed factual findings, you cannot use the expedited motion process in Rule 145(g) to challenge the order; instead, you must file a petition for writ of mandamus to compel the court to follow proper procedure.”
Reginald Donell Rice v. Texas Department of Criminal Justice
COA13
The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's dismissal of an inmate's lawsuit, holding that Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code allows for the immediate dismissal of claims supported by false affidavits of poverty. The court analyzed the conflict between the specific requirements of Chapter 14 and the general procedural protections of Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. It concluded that because Chapter 14 is a specialized statute designed to curb frivolous inmate litigation, trial courts have the discretion to dismiss such suits without holding an evidentiary hearing or requiring service of process if the inmate's certified trust account statement contradicts their claimed income.
Litigation Takeaway
“When facing a family law filing from an incarcerated parent, immediately subpoena their certified inmate trust account statement; any discrepancy between their deposits and their affidavit of indigence allows for a dismissal under Chapter 14 without the need for a hearing or service of process.”
Ronald Adams a/k/a Ron Adams v. Gary Upshaw
COA05
The Dallas Court of Appeals reversed a trial court’s refusal to dismiss a defamation lawsuit under the Texas Citizens Participation Act (TCPA). The dispute arose after the president of a youth sports organization sent communications regarding the failure to conduct background checks on a sex offender, identifying the plaintiff as the organization's representative during the relevant period. The court analyzed the case under the TCPA framework, determining that child safety in sports is a "matter of public concern," which shifted the burden to the plaintiff to prove his case with "clear and specific evidence." Because the plaintiff failed to meet this heightened evidentiary threshold for all elements of defamation, the court held the suit must be dismissed and remanded the case for an award of attorney's fees to the defendant.
Litigation Takeaway
“In 'crossover' defamation suits involving child safety or parental fitness, the TCPA is a powerful defensive shield. Plaintiffs cannot rely on vague allegations; they must provide specific, high-quality evidence at the very start of the case or face mandatory dismissal and the obligation to pay the defendant’s legal fees.”
Cristy West v. Jimmie Ward
COA09
In West v. Ward, Cristy West filed for divorce claiming an informal (common law) marriage to professional football player Jimmie Ward. Ward denied the marriage existed, asserting they were only engaged. The court analyzed the case under Texas Family Code § 2.401(a)(2), focusing on whether there was a "present agreement" to be married. Despite social media posts where the parties used terms like 'wifey,' the court found that West's own private text messages—where she referred to herself as 'single' and discussed a 'future' wedding—contradicted the claim of a present marriage. The appellate court affirmed the jury's verdict that no marriage existed, holding that a future intent to marry is not a substitute for a current agreement to be married.
Litigation Takeaway
“Private communications often carry more weight than social media 'holding out.' Even if you represent yourselves as married on Instagram, private texts referring to each other as 'fiancé' or identifying as 'single' can be fatal to a common law marriage claim.”
In the Interest of G.M.D. & V.D., Children and In the Interest of Z.J.M., A Child
COA01
The First Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's decision to terminate a mother’s parental rights to her three children. The case centered on the mother's long history of heroin addiction and untreated mental health crises, including a suicide attempt occurring while the children were present. In its analysis, the appellate court first determined that because the mother failed to challenge every legal "predicate ground" cited by the trial court in her appeal, those unchallenged findings became binding. Furthermore, applying the 'Holley' factors, the court found that the mother's recurring drug relapses and mental instability posed a significant danger to the children, making termination necessary for their safety and best interests.
Litigation Takeaway
“When appealing a termination of parental rights, an appellant must challenge every individual predicate ground found by the trial court; failing to contest even one ground can lead to an automatic affirmance. Additionally, evidence of chronic substance abuse and untreated mental illness remains a powerful factor in establishing that termination is in a child's best interest.”
Gutmann v. Hennig
COA13
In Gutmann v. Hennig, the Thirteenth Court of Appeals addressed a situation where a trial court's 'sua sponte' severance of a partial summary judgment created a 'two-front war,' forcing parties to litigate in both trial and appellate courts simultaneously. The Appellee, who had won the summary judgment, requested that the appellate court reverse his own victory and vacate the severance to save costs and promote judicial economy. The court analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(c), which allows an appellate court to grant an appellee more favorable relief than the trial court did for 'just cause.' Finding that the parties' mutual desire for efficiency and the Appellant's lack of opposition constituted just cause, the court reversed the summary judgment without reaching the merits and vacated the severance order, effectively reconsolidating the case for a single trial.
Litigation Takeaway
“A 'win' in the form of a partial summary judgment can become a liability if a severance forces you to defend that win on appeal while simultaneously litigating the rest of the case at the trial level. If the costs of fragmented litigation outweigh the benefit of the judgment, parties can use Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.1(c) to seek a 'consensual remand'—reversing the summary judgment and vacating the severance to reconsolidate the estate's litigation into a single, more cost-effective proceeding.”
Salmeron v. Atascocita Forest Community Association
COA01
Homeowners who had sued to stop an HOA foreclosure were electronically served with the HOA’s plea to the jurisdiction and notice of submission, but they did not respond by the submission date and the trial court granted the plea and dismissed the case. On motion for new trial, the homeowners argued Hurricane Beryl caused a power/internet “system outage” that prevented timely receipt of e-service and warranted relief under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 21(f)(6), along with a three-day extension under Rule 21a(c) and relief under the Craddock framework. The First Court of Appeals held that Rule 21(f)(6) does not provide automatic tolling based on a general disaster; the movant must present specific, evidence-backed facts showing when notice was actually received or when the outage ended and why they could not act (including seeking a continuance) once access was restored. Because the homeowners offered no concrete timeline for restoration of electricity/access or diligent efforts to monitor e-service—and their participation in a later hearing undercut the claim that they were unable to engage with the court—the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying new trial and letting the dismissal stand. The court also held the three-day rule for mail service does not apply to e-service, and the motion for new trial was too conclusory to satisfy Craddock’s “no conscious indifference” requirement.
Litigation Takeaway
“E-service deadlines start immediately and aren’t automatically extended by storms or outages. If you miss a deadline and claim a “technical failure,” you must prove it with a detailed outage timeline (when access returned/when notice was actually seen), show diligent efforts to check the case, and seek prompt relief (e.g., continuance/extension) as soon as you can—otherwise the judgment/dismissal is likely to stand.”
The Great American Pool, L.L.C. d/b/a American Pools of Houston v. Mary J. Phenneger and Joedy Phenneger
COA01
In a dispute that the trial court sent to arbitration, The Great American Pool, L.L.C. attempted to appeal the trial court’s order granting Mary and Joedy Phenneger’s motion to compel arbitration. The First Court of Appeals analyzed its subject-matter jurisdiction, reiterating that Texas appellate courts generally may review only final judgments unless a statute expressly authorizes interlocutory review. Because an order compelling arbitration does not dispose of all parties and claims—it merely changes the forum and typically stays the case—and because the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides interlocutory appeal rights for orders denying arbitration (but not for orders granting arbitration), the court held the order was an unappealable interlocutory order. Lacking statutory authorization for interlocutory review, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction (granting appellant’s requested dismissal).
Litigation Takeaway
“Treat a hearing on a motion to compel arbitration as make-or-break: if the court compels arbitration, you usually cannot take an immediate interlocutory appeal. To challenge an erroneous order compelling arbitration, be prepared to pursue mandamus (and build a record), or you may be forced to arbitrate to the end before any ordinary appeal is possible.”
In The Interest of K.F.N., K.D.N., and K.N., Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s order terminating a mother's parental rights based on a history of physical abuse and unresolved substance dependency. Although the mother maintained a documented bond with her children and partially completed her court-ordered service plan, the court applied the Holley factors to determine that the children's needs for safety and stability outweighed the parental relationship. The court held that evidence of the mother’s prior criminal history involving injury to a child and her failure to remain sober during the proceedings was legally and factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding for termination.
Litigation Takeaway
“A parent-child bond does not act as a "veto" against the termination of parental rights; courts prioritize a child's need for a safe, drug-free environment over emotional ties when a parent has a history of endangerment or ongoing substance abuse.”
In Re Marisol Garza
COA13
In a contract dispute that lasted over eleven years, the defendant moved for dismissal for want of prosecution after a 46-month period of total inactivity by the plaintiff. The trial court denied the motion, but the Thirteenth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief. The appellate court analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a and the court's inherent power, determining that the burden to prosecute a case rests solely on the plaintiff. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion because the plaintiff failed to show good cause for the extensive delays, and the COVID-19 pandemic did not justify a nearly four-year lapse in activity.
Litigation Takeaway
“Don't let 'zombie' litigation linger; if an opposing party files a suit to secure temporary orders and then abandons the case for years, you can force a dismissal. The duty to move a case forward belongs entirely to the person who filed it, and even significant events like the COVID-19 pandemic do not excuse years of total inactivity.”
Adame v. The State of Texas
COA13
The defendant was convicted of animal cruelty after admitting to squeezing and stomping a pet cockatoo that died shortly thereafter. On appeal, the defendant argued the evidence was insufficient because the State failed to provide expert medical testimony or a necropsy to prove the cause of death, and claimed his admissions were unreliable due to his intoxication. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that expert testimony is unnecessary when an injury's effects are visually obvious to a layperson. The court further determined that a jury, as the sole judge of credibility, may rely on a defendant's inculpatory admissions even if they are made while intoxicated or contain factual inaccuracies.
Litigation Takeaway
“Expert veterinary testimony and formal necropsies are not required to prove animal cruelty in cases where the injury is obvious to a layperson. Family law practitioners can use this 'evidentiary shortcut' to more efficiently establish patterns of coercive control, family violence, or 'best interest' factors using only lay testimony, photos, and the opposing party's admissions.”
In re Michael David Jones
COA10
The Tenth Court of Appeals dismissed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed by Michael David Jones, who sought immediate release from jail regarding criminal charges. The court analyzed the Texas Government Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure, determining that intermediate appellate courts lack original jurisdiction over criminal habeas matters, as that power is reserved for the Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, and county courts. The court held that while it has the authority to hear original habeas petitions in civil cases—such as family law contempt proceedings—it has no legal authority to reach the merits of a habeas claim arising from criminal detention.
Litigation Takeaway
“Understand the 'why' behind a client's incarceration before filing for relief. If a client is jailed for civil contempt (like unpaid child support), the Court of Appeals has original jurisdiction to hear a writ of habeas corpus. However, if the client faces criminal charges (like custodial interference), the writ must be filed in a trial court first. Filing in the wrong forum leads to a jurisdictional dismissal and keeps your client in jail longer.”
In Re Benjamin Oshea Calhoun
COA01
Benjamin Oshea Calhoun (pro se) filed an original petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First Court of Appeals seeking a reduction of bail set in his pending Harris County criminal case. The court focused on subject-matter jurisdiction, contrasting (1) Texas Government Code § 22.221(d), which gives intermediate courts of appeals original habeas jurisdiction only when a person is restrained for violating an order, judgment, or decree in a civil case (i.e., civil-contempt-type restraints), with (2) Texas Code of Criminal Procedure art. 11.05, which vests original criminal habeas jurisdiction in the Court of Criminal Appeals, district courts, and county courts. Because Calhoun sought original habeas relief directed to a criminal bond issue—outside the narrow civil-order restraint contemplated by § 22.221(d)—the court held it had no original habeas jurisdiction to consider the request and dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction (without reaching the merits, and noting the petition’s TRAP 52 defects were not the primary basis for disposition).
Litigation Takeaway
“Forum-check habeas relief. Texas courts of appeals can entertain original habeas only for restraints tied to violation of a civil-case order (common in family-law contempt); they cannot take original habeas to reduce criminal bail. If the restraint is criminal (even if factually related to a family dispute), file original habeas in the proper trial court under Code Crim. Proc. art. 11.05 and reach the court of appeals only through appellate review.”
Ronald L. Crawford, Jr., Appellant v. Yasser Aftab Sharif, Appellee
COA01
In a post-foreclosure eviction (forcible detainer), the occupant argued the foreclosure sale was fraudulent and that the trial court therefore lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the case necessarily involved title. The First Court of Appeals rejected that argument, explaining that Texas justice courts (and county courts on de novo appeal) have jurisdiction to decide only the right to immediate possession, not title, and that a challenge to foreclosure validity does not defeat jurisdiction unless possession and title are so intertwined that possession cannot be decided without first adjudicating title. Because the purchaser presented proof of the foreclosure purchase and notice to vacate, and the occupant did not show the title issues were inseparable from possession (and provided no reporter’s record), the courts could decide possession independently. The court affirmed the judgment awarding possession (and, given the absent record, presumed the evidence supported damages and attorney’s fees as well).
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas, you usually can’t stop an eviction by attacking the underlying foreclosure or transfer: forcible detainer is about immediate possession, not who ultimately owns title. For family-law “holdover spouse” situations, use justice-court eviction when a decree/transfer document provides an independent right to possession (often via tenancy-at-sufferance language), and don’t expect a separate title/decree attack to automatically stall removal.”
ATC Indoor DAS LLC v. MM CCM 48M Leasing, LLC and MM CCM 48M, LLC
COA05
A commercial tenant sued its landlord for breaching a long-term lease after the landlord bought a distressed shopping mall and unilaterally terminated the lease to close and redevelop the property. The landlord obtained summary judgment by asserting the affirmative defense of commercial impracticability, arguing the lease’s “basic assumption” (a functioning mall with patrons) had failed. The Dallas Court of Appeals applied Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 261 as used in Texas: impracticability requires an event that makes performance objectively impracticable, the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption of the contract, and the event must be unforeseeable. The court emphasized that impracticability is not mere unprofitability and focused on foreseeability: the landlord purchased the mall as a distressed property intending redevelopment, making closure and demolition foreseeable (and effectively self-created). Because the closure was not an unforeseeable event and did not render performance objectively impossible, the defense failed. The court reversed the summary judgment, rendered judgment that the landlord breached the lease, and remanded for determination of damages and attorney’s fees.
Litigation Takeaway
““My business failed” or “the deal stopped making economic sense” is usually not a legal excuse to dodge a settlement or property-division obligation. To prove impracticability under Texas law, the obligor must show a truly unforeseeable event that makes performance objectively impossible—not merely financially painful or unprofitable—especially where the risk was known, foreseeable, or the hardship was the party’s own strategic choice.”
Lane Ivy v. Sandy Kay Butler
COA07
In a civil bench trial involving the death of Charlesetta Telford, the plaintiff introduced a recorded confession from one defendant that heavily implicated a co-defendant, Billy Glenn Ivy, Jr. Although the recording was admissible against the confessing party, Ivy's counsel only raised 'blanket' hearsay objections rather than asking the court to limit the evidence's scope. The Amarillo Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Evidence 105(b)(1), concluding that the mandatory requirement to request a limiting instruction or restriction applies even when a jury is not present. The court held that by failing to specifically request that the judge restrict the evidence to its proper purpose, the objecting party waived the right to complain about the evidence being considered against them on appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never rely on the 'presumption' that a judge in a bench trial will only consider evidence for its proper purpose. If evidence is admissible for one narrow reason but inadmissible for another, you must affirmatively request a Rule 105 restriction on the record; otherwise, a 'blanket objection' will fail to preserve your error for appeal.”
In the Interest of E.R.H., et al, Children
COA04
After a trial court terminated a father's parental rights to six children based on endangerment and failure to complete a service plan, the father appealed. His court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, stating that after a professional review of the record, there were no non-frivolous grounds for appeal. The Fourth Court of Appeals conducted an independent review of the record, evaluating whether 'clear and convincing' evidence supported the statutory termination grounds and the children's best interest. The court found the evidence of environmental endangerment and failure to comply with the service plan was sufficient to uphold the ruling, affirming the termination order.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a trial court record is thoroughly developed with clear and convincing evidence regarding child endangerment and a parent's failure to follow court-ordered service plans, the termination of parental rights is extremely difficult to overturn on appeal, even when a court-appointed attorney seeks a full review.”
Pena v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Pena v. State, the Seventh Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court could assess $1,600 in attorney’s fees and duplicate court costs against a defendant who had been determined indigent and appointed counsel. The legal issues arose from two criminal cases adjudicated in a single, consolidated proceeding. The court analyzed Texas law, which presumes that a party remains indigent throughout the proceedings unless a 'material change' in financial circumstances is proven. Additionally, the court reviewed statutory prohibitions against assessing court costs multiple times for cases heard together. The court held that the trial court erred by assessing attorney's fees without evidence of the defendant's ability to pay and by double-charging court costs, resulting in a modification of the judgments to strike the improper fees and costs.
Litigation Takeaway
“When multiple legal matters are heard in a single trial, always audit the clerk’s bill of costs to ensure you aren't being double-charged for administrative fees. Furthermore, if a party has filed a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs (Rule 145), they are generally shielded from paying attorney's fees unless the opposing party can prove a material improvement in their financial situation.”
Vallecillo v. Gonzalez
COA04
In Vallecillo v. Gonzalez, an appellant seeking to challenge a take-nothing judgment submitted only a partial reporter's record to the appellate court to save on transcript costs. However, the appellant failed to file a contemporaneous 'statement of points or issues' as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 34.6(c). The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed the case under the common-law presumption that any omitted portions of a record are presumed to support the trial court's judgment. Because the appellant's own case-in-chief was among the missing volumes and he failed to trigger the 'safe harbor' protections of Rule 34.6, the court held it was legally impossible to sustain his sufficiency challenges and affirmed the trial court's ruling.
Litigation Takeaway
“When appealing a case with a partial transcript, you must file a formal 'Statement of Points or Issues'; otherwise, the court will automatically presume that the missing testimony supports the judge's original decision, likely tanking your appeal.”
In the Interest of I.N.A.M., a Child
COA08
In this custody case, a Mother lost her right to a jury trial after failing to appear in court on her scheduled trial date. Despite having previously requested a jury, her absence allowed the trial court to dismiss the jury panel and proceed with a bench hearing. Based on the Father's testimony and the Mother's history of non-compliance with court orders, the trial court named the Father sole managing conservator and restricted the Mother to supervised visitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, ruling that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 220, failing to appear for trial constitutes a waiver of the right to a jury, and the Father's unopposed evidence was sufficient to support the court's 'best interest' determination.
Litigation Takeaway
“Your presence at trial is mandatory to protect your rights; failing to show up—even if you have a pending jury request—allows the judge to immediately rule against you based solely on the evidence provided by the other side.”
IN RE SOLARIS TRANSPORTATION, LLC, Solaris Oilfield Infrastructure, Inc., and Solaris Oilfield Site Services Operating, LLC
COA04
After Solaris Transportation filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to challenge an invasive trial court order authorizing discovery into its net worth, the opposing parties attempted to moot the proceeding by filing a unilateral stipulation withdrawing the contested requests. The Fourth Court of Appeals denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that a unilateral stipulation lacks the "enforceable assurances" required to render a case moot because it remains subject to the trial court's discretion. The court held that unless the withdrawal is backed by a binding Rule 11 agreement or a court order vacating the discovery with prejudice, the threat of recurring invasive discovery remains, and the appellate court retains jurisdiction to hear the mandamus.
Litigation Takeaway
“A party cannot escape appellate review of an invasive discovery order through a "tactical withdrawal" unless they provide a binding, enforceable guarantee—such as a Rule 11 agreement or a court order with prejudice—that the discovery dispute will not recur.”
In the Interest of O.H.R.S., a Child
COA04
In a dispute over the conservatorship of a child, O.H.R.S., a maternal aunt and her spouse challenged a jury's decision to award custody to the child's maternal sister and her husband. The aunt argued for the first time on appeal that the sister lacked 'standing'—the legal right to participate in the lawsuit—under the Texas Family Code. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed whether standing could be waived if not raised during the trial and whether the sister met the statutory requirements for intervention. The court held that standing is a jurisdictional requirement that cannot be waived and can be challenged at any stage, including after a verdict. Because the sister failed to prove she had 'substantial past contact' with the child at the time she filed her intervention, the court reversed the custody award and ruled the trial court's judgment was void for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
“In Texas family law, 'standing' is not just a technicality—it is a jurisdictional requirement that can never be waived. Even if you win a favorable jury verdict on the child's best interests, that victory can be completely overturned on appeal if you did not meet the strict statutory requirements to join the lawsuit at the very moment you filed your petition.”
IN RE E.R.F.
COA04
In this case, a San Antonio trial court ordered a child to relocate to Wisconsin with the mother, based on the erroneous legal conclusion that the father’s parental rights were 'undetermined' pending genetic testing. The father had previously signed an Acknowledgment of Paternity (AOP) and met the statutory 'holding out' presumption by living with and supporting the child for the first two years of life. The Fourth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Family Code § 160.201(b) and § 160.204, concluding that parentage established via an AOP or an unrebutted presumption is legally conclusive for all purposes. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by treating the father as a legal stranger and granted mandamus relief to vacate the relocation order.
Litigation Takeaway
“Legal parentage established through an Acknowledgment of Paternity or statutory presumption is a settled fact, not a 'pending' issue; a trial court cannot ignore these vested rights to order relocation or change custody while waiting for unnecessary genetic testing.”
Jacob Aaron Vera v. The State of Texas
COA07
In Jacob Aaron Vera v. The State of Texas, an appeal was stalled because the court reporter failed to file the appellate record and ignored subsequent status inquiries from the appellate court. The Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure (TRAP) 35.3(c), which establishes a 'joint responsibility' between trial and appellate courts to ensure the record is filed timely. The court held that the appropriate remedy for an unresponsive reporter is to abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court for a formal evidentiary inquiry, mandating the appointment of a substitute reporter if the record cannot be completed within 30 days.
Litigation Takeaway
“Do not allow a delinquent court reporter to 'pocket-veto' your appeal through silence; practitioners should proactively invoke TRAP 35.3(c) to force an abatement and remand, which compels the trial court to investigate the delay and appoint a substitute reporter if necessary to keep the case moving.”
In Re Kenneth Chambless
COA09
In this case, Kenneth Chambless sought a writ of mandamus to compel a trial court to rule on motions he filed personally (pro se) while still being represented by an attorney. The Ninth Court of Appeals denied the request, reaffirming the long-standing Texas rule against 'hybrid representation.' The court analyzed the conflict under the standards for mandamus relief, concluding that because a trial court has no legal obligation or ministerial duty to address filings made by a party who has counsel of record, the judge has absolute discretion to ignore them. The holding confirms that a litigant must choose between representing themselves or being represented by a lawyer; they cannot do both simultaneously.
Litigation Takeaway
“Texas law does not permit 'hybrid representation.' Once you are represented by an attorney, the court is entitled to ignore any motions or documents you file on your own. This ensures that the attorney remains the sole 'commander of the ship' and prevents high-conflict litigants from clogging the court system with unauthorized or conflicting filings.”
In the Interest of S.I.S.F., a Child
COA04
In this SAPCR case, the Mother—who was named Sole Managing Conservator—sought to relocate with the child to either the Dominican Republic or Florida. Despite the Mother's status as the primary custodial parent, the trial court imposed a geographic residency restriction limiting the child's primary residence to Bexar County and its contiguous counties. The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling, finding that the trial court properly applied the 'Lenz factors' and prioritized the Texas public policy of ensuring frequent and continuing contact between the child and the Father, who lived in San Antonio.
Litigation Takeaway
“Being named a Sole Managing Conservator does not grant a parent an absolute right to relocate; Texas courts prioritize the child's stability and relationship with both parents over a custodial parent's personal domicile preferences.”
In the Interest of A.N.G. and A.G.G., Children
COA07
The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's order transferring the exclusive right to designate the children's primary residence from the Mother to the Father. On appeal, the Mother admitted that a material and substantial change in circumstances had occurred but argued that the move was not in the children's best interest. The appellate court analyzed the case using the 'Holley' factors, which assess parental abilities, home stability, and the children's needs. The court ultimately held that because the trial court is in the best position to judge witness credibility and the nuances of the case, and because there was sufficient evidence that the Father could provide a stable environment, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the custody arrangement.
Litigation Takeaway
“In custody modifications, conceding that a "material and substantial change" has occurred focuses the entire legal battle on the child's "best interest." Because appellate courts give massive deference to trial judges on these issues, litigants must prioritize building a comprehensive record of stability and parental involvement at the trial level, as overcoming an "abuse of discretion" standard on appeal is a high hurdle.”
In The Matter of J.O.
COA14
A sixteen-year-old juvenile, J.O., appealed a court order transferring his case to adult criminal court following a violent probation violation involving a firearm, an assault on his girlfriend, and a SWAT standoff. J.O. argued that his previous success in structured juvenile rehabilitation programs proved he was amenable to treatment within the juvenile system. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the transfer under Texas Family Code § 54.02, weighing the seriousness of the offense and J.O.'s history of repeated violence against the same victim. The court affirmed the transfer, holding that a minor’s ability to follow rules in a controlled residential setting does not outweigh the need for public protection when they continue to commit violent acts and violate "no-contact" orders once returned to the community.
Litigation Takeaway
“A minor's "good behavior" in a structured facility is not a get-out-of-jail-free card; if they repeatedly target the same victim or violate no-contact orders in the community, Texas courts will prioritize public safety and may transfer them to the adult criminal justice system.”
In The Interest of O.T.D.H.C. and M.E.C. A/K/A M.C., III, Children
COA14
In this case, a mother appealed the termination of her parental rights following a history of substance abuse, unaddressed mental health issues, and domestic violence. Because the mother conceded that her conduct endangered the children—satisfying a "predicate ground" for termination under the Texas Family Code—the Court of Appeals focused its review entirely on whether termination was in the children’s best interest. Applying the Holley factors, the court analyzed the mother’s failure to complete intensive drug and mental health treatment and her continued involvement in criminal activity. The court ultimately affirmed the termination, holding that the mother's inability to maintain a safe, stable, and drug-free environment outweighed her partial compliance with other parts of her service plan.
Litigation Takeaway
“Simply "checking the boxes" by maintaining a job or housing is often insufficient to prevent termination if a parent fails to complete clinical requirements like substance abuse or mental health treatment. Furthermore, conceding even one legal ground for termination on appeal significantly narrows the court's review, making the trial court's decision much harder to overturn.”
In Re Ray A. Ybarra
COA14
In *In re Ybarra*, the Relator sought a writ of mandamus to compel a Harris County probate judge to rule on several pending motions. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the petition under the standards set by *Walker v. Packer*, which places the burden on the Relator to provide a record sufficient to establish an abuse of discretion. The court found that Ybarra failed to include file-stamped copies of the motions or any evidence—such as correspondence or hearing transcripts—proving the motions were affirmatively called to the trial court's attention. Because the record lacked proof that the motions were properly filed and that the judge had been asked to rule, the court denied the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“To successfully challenge a trial court's failure to rule on a motion, you must do more than just file the document; you must create a documented 'paper trail' consisting of file-stamped copies and formal requests for a ruling to prove the judge was aware of the motion and refused to act.”
In The Interest of D.K.C., Appellant
COA14
After a family law case was dismissed for want of prosecution, the appellant filed a timely motion to reinstate but failed to include a required verification. Although a verified amendment was filed later, it fell outside the thirty-day window required by law. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 165a(3) and concluded that an unverified motion is a nullity for the purpose of extending the appellate timetable. The court held that because the initial motion was defective and the subsequent amendment was untimely, the deadline to appeal remained thirty days from the dismissal order, leaving the court without jurisdiction to hear the late appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Never treat a motion to reinstate as a mere formality; it must be verified (signed under oath) and filed within thirty days of the dismissal order to protect your right to appeal. A late-filed verification cannot retroactively save your appellate timetable, meaning a simple procedural oversight can permanently bar your day in court.”
In Re Marcus Tyrone Grant
COA14
In this proceeding, Relator Marcus Tyrone Grant sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Waller County Clerk to perform specific ministerial actions. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed its own subject-matter jurisdiction under Texas Government Code § 22.221, which lists the specific judicial officers subject to the court's original jurisdiction. The court observed that county clerks are not included in this statutory list. While the court has 'ancillary' jurisdiction to issue writs necessary to protect its own appellate power, the Relator failed to demonstrate that the clerk’s inaction interfered with a pending appeal. Consequently, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“When a court clerk refuses to perform a duty, such as issuing a citation or filing a record, you generally cannot seek immediate relief from the Court of Appeals. Unless the clerk's failure to act is actively blocking an ongoing appeal, the proper route is to file a mandamus petition against the clerk in a District Court. Filing in the wrong forum results in dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, wasting both time and legal fees.”
CHI ST. LUKE’S HEALTH-THE VINTAGE HOSPITAL v. RICHARD AURISANO
COA14
In CHI St. Luke’s Health-The Vintage Hospital v. Aurisano, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals addressed the legal adequacy of expert reports under the Texas Medical Liability Act (TMLA). The hospital challenged a plaintiff's medical expert reports, arguing they were "conclusory" because they failed to explain the causal link between the hospital's alleged negligence and the patient's injuries, including a fall and bed sores. The court analyzed the reports using the "how and why" framework, which requires experts to provide a transparent analytical bridge showing how a specific breach of care was a substantial factor in causing the harm. The court held that because the expert failed to provide a factual explanation linking the hospital's conduct to the injuries—leaving the trial court to fill in the blanks with inferences—the reports were legally insufficient. The court reversed the trial court’s denial of the motion to dismiss and remanded the case.
Litigation Takeaway
“To survive a challenge, an expert report must provide an "analytical bridge" that explains the 'how and why' behind a conclusion. In family law—whether dealing with custody evaluations, capacity assessments, or business valuations—practitioners must ensure that experts do not simply state a result but instead provide a transparent, fact-based path from the breach or behavior to the specific outcome or recommendation.”
Patriot Power Group, LLC v. Fasken Oil and Ranch, Ltd.
COA08
In Patriot Power Group, LLC v. Fasken Oil and Ranch, Ltd., the parties entered into a service agreement containing an arbitration clause that incorporated the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Rules. When a dispute arose, Fasken challenged the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, citing a lack of mutuality and failure to satisfy conditions precedent. The trial court denied the motion to compel arbitration. The Eighth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the express incorporation of AAA Rules constitutes "clear and unmistakable" evidence that the parties intended to delegate threshold questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. The court reasoned that because the challenges were directed at the agreement as a whole rather than the delegation clause specifically, the arbitrator—not the trial court—must decide issues of validity and enforceability.
Litigation Takeaway
“Including "boilerplate" references to AAA or JAMS rules in a prenuptial or mediated settlement agreement effectively strips the trial court of its power to determine if the agreement is valid; instead, any challenge to the contract's enforceability will be decided by a private arbitrator rather than a judge in a public courtroom.”
In Re Dolcefino Communications, LLC d/b/a Dolcefino Media
COA14
In a divorce action between Jay Keith Sears and Debra Louise McLeod, Dolcefino Media intervened to challenge a four-year-old 'Agreed Sealing Order.' The trial court refused to unseal docket entries and reporter's records without providing a specific legal or factual basis for the continued sealing. On mandamus review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the common law right of public access, which presumes court records are open unless a court balances competing interests and articulates specific reasons for closure on the record. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to perform this balancing test or 'show its work,' and it conditionally granted mandamus relief requiring the trial court to vacate its order and perform the necessary analysis.
Litigation Takeaway
“Agreed sealing orders are not bulletproof; to protect sensitive divorce records from media intervention, counsel must ensure the trial court record includes specific evidence of harm and a clear balancing of interests to justify continued privacy.”
In The Interest of O.T.D.H.C. and M.E.C. A/K/A M.C., III, Children
COA14
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court's order terminating a mother’s parental rights following an investigation that began when she removed her injured child from a hospital against medical advice. The investigation revealed a history of domestic violence, substance abuse (testing positive for cocaine and methamphetamines), and untreated mental health conditions. On appeal, the mother conceded to the predicate finding of endangering conduct, leading the court to focus on the children's best interest. The court held that while the mother had secured housing and employment, her failure to successfully complete drug treatment or address her bipolar disorder and PTSD provided legally and factually sufficient evidence to support termination under the Holley factors.
Litigation Takeaway
“In termination cases, "checking the boxes" by securing a job and a home is often insufficient if a parent fails to complete the "psychological" components of their service plan. Courts prioritize a parent's behavioral stability and the resolution of substance abuse or mental health issues over material gains when determining the best interest of the child.”
Mengistu Taye v. 3000 Sage Apartments
COA14
In Taye v. 3000 Sage Apartments, the appellant challenged a trial court's denial of a motion to 'seal or redact' sensitive data within court records. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the distinction between Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a, which governs the sealing of entire court records, and Rule 21c, which governs the redaction of specific sensitive data points like Social Security numbers and bank accounts. The court found that while Rule 76a specifically authorizes an immediate interlocutory appeal, Rule 21c does not. Applying a substance-over-form analysis, the court determined the appellant was seeking redaction rather than sealing. Consequently, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal because the order was neither a final judgment nor a statutorily authorized interlocutory appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
“Labeling a motion as a 'Motion to Seal' will not grant you an automatic right to an interlocutory appeal if the substance of your request is merely the redaction of sensitive data under Rule 21c. To preserve the right to an immediate appeal regarding privacy, practitioners must strictly comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 76a; otherwise, the only path for immediate appellate relief is the significantly higher burden of a Petition for Writ of Mandamus.”
In The Matter of J.O.
COA14
In this case, a sixteen-year-old minor (J.O.) challenged a juvenile court's decision to waive jurisdiction and transfer his case to adult criminal court following a violent assault involving a firearm and a SWAT standoff. The conflict centered on whether J.O. was still 'amenable to rehabilitation' within the juvenile system, given that he committed the offense while already on probation for a nearly identical act of family violence. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the factors under Texas Family Code Section 54.02, specifically weighing the 'welfare of the community' and the minor's history of recidivism against his alleged progress in structured environments. The court held that the transfer was appropriate, finding that the escalating nature of the violence and the failure of previous rehabilitative efforts justified treating the minor as an adult for criminal proceedings.
Litigation Takeaway
“The rehabilitative focus of the juvenile justice system has limits; repeated acts of family violence and the use of weapons can lead a court to transfer a minor to adult criminal court, especially when prior interventions have failed to prevent recidivism.”
In re Guardianship of Evelyn Ramirez, an Incapacitated Person
COA08
In a contested guardianship “crossover,” the mother (acting pro se) repeatedly filed motions to modify the guardianship and remove the father as guardian. The father moved under Texas Estates Code § 1053.052 for security for costs/fees to deter what he characterized as harassing, repetitive litigation. The probate court did not grant or deny the request; instead it entered a temporary, conditional order abating the security motion for two months and providing that if the mother violated specified conduct restrictions, the abatement would end and she would have to post a $25,000 cash bond. On appeal and in an original mandamus proceeding, the El Paso Court of Appeals applied the probate/guardianship “discrete phase” finality test (Crowson; Matter of Guardianship of Jones) and held the conditional abatement order was interlocutory because it left the security-for-costs issue pending and did not dispose of a discrete phase of the guardianship. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court also denied mandamus relief as moot because the order expired by its own terms (the two-month abatement period had already run), leaving no live controversy for which the court could grant effective relief.
Litigation Takeaway
“Cost-bond motions under Estates Code § 1053.052 can be an effective way to deter vexatious filings in guardianship/family-law crossovers, but orders that merely abate or conditionally defer a bond request are typically not immediately appealable. If you need appellate review of a short-lived, conduct-conditioned order, seek emergency relief (stay/expedited consideration) immediately—otherwise the order may expire and moot mandamus or other challenges.”
In Re Mitchell William Blakeley
COA09
In a divorce and custody dispute, the husband (Relator) sought a writ of mandamus to overturn two trial court orders: one granting the wife interim attorney's fees and another denying his request to designate an expert witness after the deadline. The Ninth Court of Appeals analyzed the case under the strict mandamus standard, which requires showing both a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy through a standard appeal. The court found that the trial court acted within its broad discretion regarding interim fees under the Texas Family Code and that the Relator failed to meet the burden for late expert designation under Rule 193.6. Ultimately, the court held that the Relator failed to demonstrate entitlement to extraordinary relief, denying the petition.
Litigation Takeaway
“Trial courts have vast discretion over temporary orders and discovery schedules; challenging these rulings mid-case via mandamus is extremely difficult unless you can prove the trial court's decision was completely arbitrary or effectively ends your case.”
Alvarez v. State
COA06
In Alvarez v. State, the Sixth Court of Appeals addressed whether a defendant's seven-year confinement of a child in a van, which resulted in severe physical stunting and profound developmental delays, supported a conviction for injury to a child. The court analyzed the 'cumulative force' of the evidence, including the child’s lack of education, social isolation, and extreme malnutrition. The court held that such environmental deprivation constitutes both 'serious bodily injury' and 'serious mental deficiency' under the Texas Penal Code, affirming the defendant's first-degree felony conviction because the injuries were a direct result of intentional acts and the omission of necessary care.
Litigation Takeaway
“Severe neglect, educational deprivation, and social isolation can be legally classified as 'serious mental deficiency' and 'serious bodily injury.' This provides a powerful evidentiary framework for family law practitioners to seek the termination of parental rights or secure protective orders by framing 'off-the-grid' isolation not as a lifestyle choice, but as intentional harm.”
In the Interest of P.J.G., A Child
COA13
In this family law case, a father representing himself appealed a court order for child support and custody (SAPCR), claiming he did not consent to the Title IV-D child support system and alleging that federal funding creates a judicial conflict of interest. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the appeal under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i), which requires a party to provide clear legal arguments supported by relevant authority. The court found that the father's arguments relied on 'sovereign citizen' rhetoric and federal cases that did not support his claims. Because he failed to provide a substantive legal analysis of how the trial court actually erred, the appellate court held that he waived his right to challenge the order and affirmed the lower court's decision.
Litigation Takeaway
“Pro se litigants are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys; failing to provide a clear, legally-supported roadmap of trial court errors in an appellate brief will result in a waiver of those claims, regardless of their perceived constitutional importance.”
Espinoza v. FGMS Holdings, LLC
COA13
Alberto Espinoza filed a petition to challenge a tax sale of his homestead and submitted a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of Court Costs under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 145. Despite this, the trial court ordered him to deposit $60,237.44 into the court registry or face the dismissal of his claims with prejudice. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Rule 145, which protects indigent parties from "pay-to-play" orders unless the court follows strict procedural safeguards, including conducting an evidentiary hearing and making specific findings regarding the party's actual ability to pay. The court held that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to comply with these mandatory procedures and conditionally granted mandamus relief to vacate the order.
Litigation Takeaway
“A trial court cannot force an indigent litigant who has filed a Rule 145 Statement to pay a deposit into the court registry—whether for expert fees, amicus attorneys, or receivers—without first holding a hearing and making specific findings that the party actually has the financial means to pay. If an order lacks these findings or the required notice of the right to challenge, it is a clear abuse of discretion reviewable by mandamus.”