Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
In the Interest of M.L. and E.L., Children
COA11
In a CPS termination appeal involving repeated cocaine use and newborn/child drug exposure, the Eleventh Court of Appeals reviewed whether the evidence met the clear-and-convincing standard for multiple pleaded predicate grounds under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)—endangering conditions/surroundings (D), endangering conduct (E), prior termination based on (D)/(E) (M), and “born addicted” (Q)—and for best interest under § 161.001(b)(2). The record showed multiple positive drug tests by Mother and at least one child, removals of two children, and later relapse while pregnant; but it also showed substantial rehabilitation (counseling, medication management, completion of outpatient treatment, and sustained negative tests) and a Department-supported monitored return that later failed due to the live-in partner’s marijuana-positive test rather than Mother’s. Applying the heightened legal- and factual-sufficiency standards for termination, the court conducted a ground-by-ground audit, requiring a tight evidentiary fit between the statutory elements and the proof rather than relying on a generalized “drug case” narrative. The court therefore affirmed the termination order in part, but reversed and remanded in part because one or more of the challenged statutory grounds and/or related findings (including best-interest as tied to those grounds) were not supported by clear and convincing evidence on this record.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even in strong drug-exposure cases, appellate courts will scrutinize each termination ground separately—so build an element-by-element record. If a third party’s drug use is the trigger (e.g., during a monitored return), prove the parent’s knowledge and protective capacity (or, for the defense, document prompt removal and safety measures). And if you plead “born addicted” under § 161.001(b)(1)(Q), you must prove addiction/withdrawal with medical precision—not just exposure or suspicion."
In the Interest of A.Z., a Child
COA02
In a private SAPCR termination case, an incarcerated father failed to appear for the final hearing. The trial court had mailed him notice of the setting with instructions and a phone number to call the bailiff to appear telephonically. Father did not call in, and his mailed request asking the court to coordinate with his prison unit was file-stamped after the hearing. The trial court proceeded, found predicate grounds under Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F) (failure to support) and (L) (conviction for a listed offense, here sexual assault under Penal Code § 22.011), found termination in the child’s best interest, and terminated Father’s rights. On appeal, Father argued the court lacked personal jurisdiction (based on alleged noncitizenship), that proceeding without him violated his right of access to courts, and that the court should have granted a new trial. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held Father’s personal-jurisdiction complaint was waivable and was forfeited by his participation after answering; the trial court provided a workable means of remote participation and was not required to halt the hearing based on a late-received request; and under the post-answer default/new-trial framework (Craddock/Dolgencorp), Father failed to show his nonappearance was not due to conscious indifference and otherwise did not meet the requirements for a new trial. The termination judgment was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"When an incarcerated parent receives clear notice and a workable telephonic-appearance procedure, failure to timely follow it (or to secure prison-side coordination well in advance) is unlikely to overturn a termination on “access to courts” grounds. Preserve jurisdiction defenses early (special appearance before answering) and, after a post-answer default, support any motion for new trial with evidence meeting Craddock/Dolgencorp—conclusory complaints and late-filed requests usually won’t suffice."
Crystal Flack v. Michael Mendoza, Sr.
COA08
In this transferred appeal from a Travis County bench-tried divorce, the wife challenged a property division she claimed was impermissibly disproportionate—particularly a provision awarding the husband the first $30,000 of proceeds from the sale of the marital home. The El Paso Court of Appeals applied the highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard under Texas Family Code § 7.001 (“just and right” division) and emphasized that neither party requested findings of fact and conclusions of law, requiring the court to imply all findings necessary to support the decree. On the record presented, the implied findings could support unequal allocations based on equity considerations such as the wife’s unilateral withdrawals and trading losses that depleted community assets, removal of funds from a joint account shortly before filing, the husband’s post-separation payment of home carrying costs, and the decree’s stated rationale tying the $30,000 offset to the wife’s lack of good-faith participation in the litigation. The court also rejected the notion that a no-fault (insupportability) divorce bars a disproportionate division; fault is only one of many permissible factors. Holding that the wife failed to show the division was arbitrary, unsupported by evidence, or manifestly unfair—especially given the lack of concrete valuation proof and the presence of implied findings—the court affirmed the decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"Property-division appeals are won or lost at trial: build a valuation record and request findings of fact. Without numbers and without findings, appellate courts will imply facts supporting a “just and right” division and rarely reverse—even if the decree looks unequal (like awarding one spouse the first $30,000 of sale proceeds). Litigation conduct and dissipation/waste evidence can justify disproportionate offsets in a no-fault divorce if tied to the record."
Strong v. State
COA02
In Strong v. State, a murder defendant sought a jury-charge instruction giving him the statutory presumption that his use of deadly force in self-defense was reasonable. The trial court refused because the presumption under Texas Penal Code §§ 9.31 and 9.32 is unavailable when the actor is “engaged in criminal activity” at the time of the force. On appeal, the Second Court of Appeals held the record conclusively showed Strong was engaged in criminal activity—unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under Penal Code § 46.04—because he admitted he was a felon, knew he could not possess firearms, and used a firearm during the incident. Strong attempted to avoid the “criminal activity” bar by arguing § 46.04 was unconstitutional as applied to him under the Second Amendment, which (he claimed) would mean his possession was not “criminal activity” and the presumption instruction was required. The court rejected using an as-applied Second Amendment attack as a vehicle to obtain the presumption instruction on these facts and affirmed. Holding: the trial court did not err in denying the presumption-of-reasonableness instruction because Strong’s felon-in-possession status was contemporaneous criminal activity, and his as-applied constitutional challenge did not entitle him to the statutory presumption in the charge.
Litigation Takeaway
"When firearms are involved, a party’s prohibited-possessor status can strip away “presumptive reasonableness” / stand-your-ground framing. If the person with the gun was committing a firearms-possession offense at the time, Texas courts can treat that as contemporaneous “criminal activity” that defeats favorable self-defense presumptions—even if the party tries to reframe the issue with a constitutional challenge. In family cases, that supports protective orders, firearm surrender provisions, and best-interest arguments focused on ongoing illegality and risk."
Hendrickson v. State
COA10
In an indecency-with-a-child prosecution, the State called the child’s treating counselor, an LPC-Associate, to testify that she diagnosed the child with PTSD using the Child and Adolescent Trauma Screen (CATS) and to explain treatment goals. The defense objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 702, arguing the associate lacked the training/experience allegedly required by 22 Tex. Admin. Code § 681.43 to administer and interpret the CATS, and also objected that the testimony would improperly “bolster” the child’s testimony. The Waco Court of Appeals applied the Rule 702/Vela framework and abuse-of-discretion review, holding the record supported the trial court’s gatekeeping decision: the witness testified she learned the CATS in graduate school, received continuing training, and routinely used the tool with many patients, which was enough for the trial court to reasonably find qualification and reliability (within the “zone of reasonable disagreement”). The court also rejected the “bolstering” complaint because “bolstering” is an ambiguous objection and the trial objection did not clearly invoke a specific evidentiary rule or match the more developed arguments raised on appeal, so error was not preserved under TRAP 33.1/comportment principles.
Litigation Takeaway
"For family cases involving child-trauma/PTSD opinions, licensure level alone (e.g., LPC-Associate vs. psychologist) is not dispositive under Rule 702—what matters is a record showing tool-specific training and repeated, competent use. If you are opposing the testimony, do not rely on a generic “bolstering” objection; pin the challenge to a конкрет rule and theory (Rule 702 qualification/reliability/fit, Rule 403 unfair prejudice, or hearsay/conduit limits) and preserve it with a clear, matching objection and ruling."
In the Interest of A.B., A Child
COA05
In a divorce governed by a premarital agreement (PMA) eliminating community property and treating each spouse’s earnings as separate, the parties disputed ownership of a diamond ring purchased during marriage with Husband’s earnings and allegedly titled in his name. The trial court found the ring was initially Husband’s separate property under the PMA but that Husband later made an interspousal gift of the ring to Wife, confirming it as Wife’s separate property. On appeal, Husband challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting donative intent, delivery, and acceptance under the clear-and-convincing standard. Applying abuse-of-discretion review (with legal/factual sufficiency as factors) and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding, the Dallas Court of Appeals held the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that Husband gifted the ring based on Wife’s testimony and circumstances: Wife selected/designed the ring, the jeweler delivered it to her, she wore it as her wedding ring for years, Husband bought a matching band later, he returned it after cleanings/appraisals, and he never demanded its return at separation. The court affirmed the decree confirming the ring as Wife’s separate property.
Litigation Takeaway
"Even with a “no community property” premarital agreement, high-value personal items can still change character through an interspousal gift. At trial, build (or attack) the gift elements—donative intent, delivery, and acceptance—using the parties’ conduct over time (possession, daily use, repairs/cleanings, related purchases, and separation behavior), because on appeal a supported gift finding is difficult to overturn under abuse-of-discretion review."
In the Interest of J.D., R.D.-G., K.G., and L.G., Children
COA02
In this case, the Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate the parental rights of both Mother and Father following reports of drug use, child abandonment, and instability. The Father, who was incarcerated for deadly conduct throughout the case, challenged the trial court's finding that termination was in the children's best interest. Mother’s court-appointed attorney filed an Anders brief, signaling that her appeal lacked nonfrivolous legal issues. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals analyzed the record under the clear-and-convincing evidence standard, focusing on Father's history of incarceration, his minimization of Mother’s drug issues, and the children’s successful bonding within their foster placements. The court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the best-interest finding and affirmed the termination of both parents' rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest determinations often hinge on a parent's credibility and insight. Minimizing risks—such as ignoring a partner's drug use or failing to provide a concrete timeline for stability—can be fatal to a parent's case. For parents facing litigation, demonstrating accountability and providing a realistic, child-centered plan for the present is far more persuasive than making aspirational promises for the future."
In the Interest of T.C.C. and B.D.C., Children
COA05
After a bench trial, the judge orally rendered that Father would pay guideline child support based on minimum-wage net resources and reimburse Mother for the children’s portion of health-insurance premiums. The written final divorce decree signed shortly after trial contained lower child-support numbers and omitted any reimbursement obligation. Months later—after the trial court’s plenary power expired—Mother moved for a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct the decree to match the oral rendition. The Dallas Court of Appeals treated the dispute as a clerical “rendition-versus-entry” problem: because the reporter’s record showed the court had already rendered guideline child support on minimum-wage earnings and ordered premium reimbursement, the later written decree’s inconsistent numbers and omission were clerical mistakes in memorializing the judgment, not a new judicial decision. The court held the trial court could correct those clerical errors by nunc pro tunc at any time, and it affirmed the corrected child-support amounts and added medical-support reimbursement term. The court also dismissed Father’s challenges to unrelated provisions (protective order, conservatorship, homestead sale) for lack of jurisdiction because an appeal from a nunc pro tunc judgment reaches only the nunc pro tunc corrections, not issues that could have been appealed from the original decree.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the signed decree doesn’t match what the judge said on the record, a nunc pro tunc can fix true clerical discrepancies—even after plenary power expires—but it cannot be used to make new judicial changes. Also, appealing a nunc pro tunc order does not reopen the whole divorce; appellate review is limited to the corrections actually made, so missing the original appeal deadline can be fatal to other complaints."
In the Interest of E.D.A., Child
COA04
In a Department of Family and Protective Services termination case, Mother challenged only the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and the legal/factual sufficiency framework, applying the Holley factors and the statutory permanency and safety considerations in § 263.307. The court emphasized Mother’s admitted heroin relapse, her refusal to submit to any of eighteen requested drug tests (supporting an inference of continued use), her failure to complete key service-plan requirements (assessment/treatment, counseling, parenting class), and her pattern of missed visits as evidence of present and future danger and diminished parental ability. Against that risk evidence, the court credited proof of the child’s stability, bonding, and needs being met in an adoptive foster placement, including testimony about the child’s dysregulation after visits and the foster parents’ structured support. The court held the evidence was both legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed termination.
Litigation Takeaway
"Best-interest cases are won on a cohesive narrative: relapse plus refusal to test and failure to engage services can be powerful, forward-looking danger evidence—especially when contrasted with a child’s stability and bonding in the proposed placement. If you represent the accusing party, document test requests and noncompliance and pair it with concrete stability evidence; if you defend the parent, avoid a “refusal/disengagement” record by testing, completing treatment-focused services early, and documenting consistent visitation and objective sobriety."
In the Interest of A.I.M.H., S.R.V. Jr., and F.K.V., Children
COA04
In a Department-initiated termination suit, both parents challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination. The Fourth Court of Appeals reviewed the record under the clear-and-convincing standard and termination sufficiency frameworks (legal sufficiency: view evidence favorably to the finding and defer to credibility determinations; factual sufficiency: consider the whole record and whether disputed evidence is so significant that a firm belief could not be formed). The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support predicate grounds—especially endangerment and continued controlled-substance use coupled with refusal/failure to complete treatment—based on Mother’s admissions of frequent methamphetamine and marijuana use, physical evidence of methamphetamine, and an extensive drug-test history (33 positives out of 36 requests, including shortly before trial), along with service-plan noncompliance and untreated mental-health concerns. As to Father, the court affirmed termination and rejected his best-interest challenge, emphasizing his refusal to drug test and meaningfully engage in services, unmanaged mental-health issues (including self-medicating with street-obtained pills), unstable housing/employment, and the children’s trauma responses tied to domestic-violence risk factors. Weighing the chronic, unresolved risk factors against the children’s stability and progress in the maternal grandmother’s home and her intent to adopt, the court upheld the trial court’s best-interest finding and affirmed termination of both parents’ rights.
Litigation Takeaway
"Termination (and high-stakes custody) cases are won on patterns, not episodes: repeated positive/missed drug tests, refusal or discharge from treatment, unmanaged mental health, and ongoing domestic-violence risk factors can establish endangerment and drive the best-interest analysis. Document the services offered and the parent’s noncompliance, and contrast ongoing instability with the child’s progress and permanency in a stable placement—late, last-minute re-engagement is often too little, too late."