Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
946 opinions found
Charles Austin v. Extruded Aluminum Corp.
COA01
In this case, a plaintiff injured in a motor vehicle accident at a Texas worksite attempted to sue a Michigan-based manufacturer, arguing the company was subject to Texas jurisdiction because its employees had attended on-site safety training. The First Court of Appeals analyzed whether these contacts met the "nexus" requirement for specific jurisdiction—meaning the claim must arise out of or relate to the defendant's purposeful activities in the state. The court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the company, holding that repairing defective products (the company's purpose in Texas) was not the "operative fact" of a vehicle accident, and incidental safety training did not create a substantial enough connection to satisfy due process.
Litigation Takeaway
"Physical presence in Texas does not automatically equal jurisdiction; to successfully join an out-of-state entity or spouse to a lawsuit, the 'operative facts' of your specific claim must be directly tied to their purposeful activities within the state."
In re 7-Eleven, Inc.
COA13
In this case, a trial court failed to rule on a Rule 91a motion to dismiss "baseless claims" for several months following a hearing. The Relators sought mandamus relief to compel a ruling. The Court of Appeals analyzed Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, noting that while its 45-day deadline for rulings is directory rather than jurisdictional, the rule's core purpose is the "early and speedy dismissal" of meritless litigation. The court found that because the motion was properly heard and the delay was objectively unreasonable, the trial court's inaction constituted an abuse of discretion. The court conditionally granted the writ of mandamus, ordering the trial court to issue a ruling on the motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"Trial courts cannot use a 'pocket veto' to avoid ruling on Rule 91a motions to dismiss. If a judge refuses to rule on a motion to dismiss baseless claims within a reasonable time after a hearing, mandamus is an available tool to force a decision and prune frivolous 'tort-crossover' claims from family law litigation."
Sherman v. Pertee
COA05
In Sherman v. Pertee, a trial court judge dismissed a breach of contract appeal on their own motion (sua sponte), reasoning that the original claim was filed after the statute of limitations had expired and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction. The Fifth Court of Appeals analyzed whether the appeal was filed on time and whether a statute of limitations defense is truly jurisdictional. The Court found that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4, the filing deadline was extended because December 26th is a recognized state holiday. Furthermore, the Court held that a statute of limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded by a defendant; it does not deprive a court of the power to hear a case. The appellate court reversed the dismissal, holding that the trial court erred by treating a waived limitations defense as a jurisdictional bar.
Litigation Takeaway
"A statute of limitations is a 'shield' that must be affirmatively pleaded in your answer, not a 'sword' that a judge can use to dismiss a case for you. In family law enforcement or property division disputes, failing to plead limitations means you waive that defense. Additionally, remember that in Texas state courts, December 26th is a legal holiday that can provide a critical 48-hour extension for year-end filing deadlines."
In re Scott Mitchell Obeginski
COA09
In In re Scott Mitchell Obeginski, the Ninth Court of Appeals addressed a challenge to a trial court's post-judgment order sanctioning a litigant for using 'fictitious law' and filing meritless motions. The trial court ordered the litigant to pay over $10,000 in attorney's fees and required him to attend a compliance hearing. The litigant sought a writ of mandamus to vacate the order, arguing the judge improperly acted as a witness and that he had no other way to challenge the ruling. The Court of Appeals denied the request, holding that because a final judgment had been entered and the litigant failed to prove he was financially unable to post a bond (supersedeas), he had an adequate remedy through a standard appeal. The court reaffirmed that trial judges have the authority to evaluate the legal merit of filings without becoming 'fact witnesses.'
Litigation Takeaway
"Once a final judgment is signed, parties sanctioned for meritless or 'creative' legal tactics generally cannot use mandamus to bypass the trial court's order; instead, they must post a supersedeas bond and pursue a standard appeal."
Carroll v. Perla Dental
COA05
In Carroll v. Perla Dental, a plaintiff sued a dental provider in a Dallas County justice court for malpractice but failed to serve a mandatory expert report within the 120-day statutory window required by Chapter 74 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. After the justice court dismissed the case, the plaintiff appealed to a county court at law, arguing that the de novo appeal reset her filing deadlines and attempting to re-characterize her claims as a "breach of fiduciary duty" to avoid the expert report requirement. The Dallas Court of Appeals held that justice courts possess subject-matter jurisdiction over fiduciary duty and healthcare liability claims within their monetary limits. Crucially, the court ruled that a de novo appeal does not restart the expert report clock; a procedural default in the justice court remains fatal on appeal. Additionally, the court prevented the plaintiff from "label-switching," holding that claims based on professional services remain healthcare liability claims regardless of the terminology used in the pleadings.
Litigation Takeaway
"Justice courts are not "procedural-lite" forums; statutory expert report deadlines apply with full force and are not reset by a de novo appeal. If you fail to meet mandatory requirements in small claims court, an appeal will not save your case from dismissal and potential attorney's fee awards."
David Lynd v. Bailey Brewer
COA05
In David Lynd v. Bailey Brewer, the Dallas Court of Appeals addressed whether a party could challenge a trial court's venue transfer order via an interlocutory appeal. Appellant David Lynd sought to reverse an order transferring his case to Tarrant County, arguing the court could exercise jurisdiction through a standard appeal, a permissive appeal, or by treating his brief as a mandamus petition. The court analyzed Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014 and Rule of Civil Procedure 87(6), determining that venue rulings are strictly excluded from interlocutory review. Furthermore, the court found Lynd failed to obtain the necessary trial court certification for a permissive appeal and failed to meet the technical requirements for a mandamus petition under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52. Consequently, the court held it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
Litigation Takeaway
"A standard notice of appeal is a 'procedural dead end' for venue disputes; practitioners must instead file a technically perfect Petition for Writ of Mandamus or secure a specific certification for a permissive appeal to challenge a transfer order before final judgment."
MacIvor v. Zuehl Airport Flying Community Owners Association, Inc.
COA06
In a dispute over property assessments, a homeowners association sought to compel arbitration based on a 2015 resolution that purportedly amended the subdivision's covenants. The property owner challenged the existence of the agreement, arguing the amendment was never validly adopted. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order compelling arbitration, holding that the party moving for arbitration bears the initial evidentiary burden to prove the existence of a valid agreement under traditional contract principles. Because the association failed to provide evidence that the amendment was legally executed, the "presumption" favoring arbitration was never triggered, and the resulting arbitration award was declared void.
Litigation Takeaway
"The "strong policy favoring arbitration" does not excuse a party from proving that a contract actually exists. If a spouse or business partner attempts to enforce an arbitration clause in a modified agreement, trust amendment, or draft settlement, you can block the referral to arbitration by challenging the legal formation of that document. The court must confirm the agreement's existence before the arbitrator can take over."
Moore v. Stanley Spurling & Hamilton, Inc.
COA14
Moore sued an engineering firm five days before the statute of limitations expired but failed to include a certificate of merit or a 'lack-of-time' allegation in her initial petition. She filed both the certificate and the required allegation 29 days later. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 150.002(c) requires the 'lack-of-time' allegation to be made contemporaneously with the initial filing. The trial court dismissed the case, but the 14th Court of Appeals reversed. The court analyzed the statute's silence on the specific deadline for the allegation and held that, in the 14th District, a plaintiff may provide the 'lack-of-time' justification within the 30-day supplemental window rather than the first petition, provided the suit was filed within 10 days of the limitations deadline.
Litigation Takeaway
"In Houston's 14th District, there is a procedural 'safety valve' for claims against professionals: if you file suit within 10 days of a limitations deadline, you can fix a missing 'lack-of-time' allegation and file your certificate of merit within 30 days of the initial filing. However, beware of venue, as the Dallas and Beaumont courts currently hold that omitting these allegations from the initial petition is a fatal error."
Memorial Hermann Health System v. John Doe
COA14
After a patient alleged sexual assault at a Memorial Hermann facility, the health system challenged the sufficiency of the required expert report under the Texas Medical Liability Act. The plaintiff argued a 'Catch-22': they could not provide specific facts about the hospital's internal failures because statutory law stays discovery until a report is filed. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals analyzed Section 74.351(s) and held that the discovery stay does not excuse an expert from providing a non-conclusory basis for a breach. The court held that the expert must instead rely on external evidence, such as detailed interviews with the claimant, to bridge the information gap. Because the expert in this case relied on the mere occurrence of the assault as proof of a breach, the court reversed the trial court and dismissed the claims.
Litigation Takeaway
"In institutional abuse cases involving children or vulnerable adults, the lack of access to a facility’s internal records is no excuse for a vague expert report. To survive a motion to dismiss, practitioners must front-load their investigation by extracting every possible factual detail from the client about the facility's environment—such as staffing levels, lighting, and security presence—to provide the expert with a factual foundation for their opinions."
Rodriguez v. Henriquez and Gutierrez
COA01
In this case, a business owner (Rodriguez) provided the funds to purchase a property but allowed his assistant (Henriquez) to take legal title in his own name. Henriquez later sold the property to third-party buyers (the Gutierrezes) for a price below its original cost. Although Rodriguez verbally warned the buyers that Henriquez was a 'con artist' who was stealing the property, the buyers proceeded with the purchase after their agent confirmed that the official deed records listed Henriquez as the sole owner. The court analyzed whether the buyers' knowledge of Rodriguez's claims disqualified them from being 'Bona Fide Purchasers' (BFPs). The court held that while the buyers had a duty to investigate the warning, verifying the public property records constituted a 'diligent inquiry.' Consequently, the buyers' status as BFPs was upheld, and Rodriguez’s equitable claim to the property was extinguished.
Litigation Takeaway
"When property is held in a third party's name—a common scenario in 'fraud on the community' cases—verbal warnings of ownership are insufficient to protect your rights. You must immediately file a lawsuit and a 'Notice of Lis Pendens' in the county records to provide legal notice to the world; otherwise, a good-faith buyer can purchase the property and leave you with no recourse other than a lawsuit against a potentially insolvent fraudster."