Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1447 opinions found
In the Interest of I.S.
COA09
In *In the Interest of I.S.*, the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed a jury-tried termination order after concluding Father waived his appellate sufficiency complaints by failing to preserve them in the trial court. The case arose after the Department sought termination following evidence that the parties’ infant suffered multiple serious injuries, including a femur fracture and liver injury, that medical providers considered suspicious for abuse and inconsistent with the parents’ explanations. On appeal, Father challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting predicate grounds under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N), as well as best interest, but the court held that in a civil jury trial those complaints had to be preserved through recognized procedural steps such as a directed-verdict motion, charge objection, JNOV, motion to disregard, or motion for new trial. Because Father did not take the required steps, the court did not reach the merits of his sufficiency complaints. The court also rejected Mother’s issues, affirming termination, holding that the Department’s appointment as managing conservator stood once termination was affirmed, and concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for mistrial.
Litigation Takeaway
"In any Texas family case tried to a jury, even a strong appellate sufficiency argument is worthless if counsel does not preserve it. Legal-sufficiency complaints require the right trial-court vehicle, and factual-sufficiency complaints in a jury case generally require a motion for new trial. Treat jury-charge objections and post-verdict motions as essential trial work, not appellate clean-up."
In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child
COA05
In In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child, the Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a post-remand order confirming $63,508.86 in child-support arrearages against Father. Father argued Mother had not pleaded for arrearages, that a prior 2020 modification order terminating his support obligation barred any arrearage finding, and that the evidence was insufficient. The court rejected those arguments, explaining that on remand the support accounting issue was part of the live controversy because both parties presented competing support calculations, payment records, and requested relief concerning what Father should have paid from 2016 forward. The court also held the earlier modification order could not shield Father because that order had already been reversed on appeal, leaving the trial court free to recalculate support consequences consistent with the decree, the evidence, and the appellate mandate. Finally, the court found the evidence sufficient because the record included the operative divorce decree, the Attorney General payment history, Father’s records, and Mother’s arrearage summary, which supported the trial court’s arithmetic and arrearage finding.
Litigation Takeaway
"A reversed modification order does not keep protecting a client on remand. If you open the door by asking for retroactive support reductions, credits, offsets, or termination, the court can just as easily determine the opposite and confirm arrearages if the decree, mandate, and payment records support that result. In support cases, lawyers should treat historical payment calculations as a two-way street and build a precise evidentiary record around the operative order and actual payments."
Reynaldo Antonio Sanchez v. The State of Texas
COA10
In this criminal crossover opinion with clear family-law implications, the Waco Court of Appeals held that Sanchez waived his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial complaint because he never made an unambiguous speedy-trial demand and never obtained an adverse ruling. His priority-setting request, ready announcements, court appearances, and rejection of a plea offer were not enough, especially where the record also showed defense-acquiesced and defense-caused delays. The court also upheld admission of an examining physician’s testimony and report recounting a child’s statements translated from Spanish by an advocacy-center employee, concluding the trial court properly treated the translator as a language conduit after developing a reliability record under Saavedra, and any confrontation complaint failed because the child testified and was cross-examined at trial. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"If delay matters, preserve it precisely: file a clear motion for prompt trial or hearing, state the prejudice, object to resets, and get a ruling. And when child statements come through a translator, admissibility will often turn on whether the proponent builds a record showing the interpreter was neutral, qualified, and functioning only as a language conduit."
Brys v. Cobb
COA01
In Brys v. Cobb, the First Court of Appeals held that when a properly authenticated California judgment was filed in Texas under the UEFJA on July 21, 2023, it immediately became a Texas judgment. The judgment debtor waited more than a year to file a motion for new trial and later asked the Texas court to declare the foreign judgment void for lack of personal jurisdiction. The appellate court did not reach the underlying jurisdictional challenge to the California judgment because the dispositive issue was timing: under Chapter 35 and Texas Rules 306a and 329b, any attack on a domesticated foreign judgment must be brought through the same procedures and within the same deadlines that apply to Texas judgments. Because the trial court’s plenary power expired 30 days after domestication and no timely post-judgment motion was filed, the later orders granting a new trial and declaring the judgment void were themselves void. The court vacated those post-deadline orders and left the domesticated California judgment fully enforceable in Texas.
Litigation Takeaway
"Treat the UEFJA filing date like the signing date of a Texas final judgment. If you want to attack a domesticated foreign judgment, move immediately—waiting can forfeit even a personal-jurisdiction or voidness challenge. If you represent the creditor, a proper UEFJA filing can quickly become a powerful enforcement and settlement tool once the deadline passes."
Michael Solomon and Andria Roque-Solomon v. The Law Office of Keith M. Harris and Keith M. Harris
COA14
In this Texas appeal, former clients sued their prior lawyers for legal malpractice, but at trial the court excluded all causation and damages evidence under Rule 193.6 after a dispute over whether initial disclosures had actually been served. The exclusion swept too far: it barred the plaintiffs’ own testimony and a timely designated expert, then led directly to a directed verdict and take-nothing judgment. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held Rule 193.6 does not permit exclusion of a named party’s testimony and does not justify a blanket evidentiary wipeout that effectively disposes of the case. Because the order functioned as a death-penalty sanction, the trial court was required to consider lesser sanctions, such as a continuance, before imposing it. The failure to do so was an abuse of discretion, so the judgment was reversed and the case remanded.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 193.6 is a disclosure-enforcement tool, not a shortcut to end a case. If an exclusion request would knock out a party’s own testimony or otherwise leave the other side unable to present the merits, the court must treat it like a case-dispositive sanction and consider lesser remedies first."
Paul O’Brien v. Tiffanie O’Brien
COA03
In a divorce appeal, the Third Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 109.001 does not limit a trial court to only the precise temporary relief it granted within 60 days after the notice of appeal. Because the trial court had timely entered a valid temporary order pending appeal, it retained continuing jurisdiction under sections 109.001(b-3) and (b-4) to later modify that order after notice and hearing if circumstances had materially and substantially changed and the modification was equitable and necessary for the child’s safety and welfare. The court rejected the husband’s argument that any new relief requested after the 60-day window was jurisdictionally barred, distinguishing Morris v. Veilleux as a case where no timely temporary order had existed to modify. The court abated the appeal so the trial court could consider the requested modification under the correct legal standard.
Litigation Takeaway
"If you get a timely temporary order pending appeal, the trial court’s power is not frozen in place after 60 days. Lawyers should focus less on a blanket jurisdiction objection and more on building or attacking the statutory modification record: changed circumstances, equity, and a clear child-welfare connection."
In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B.
COA10
The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed a Brazos County order terminating a father’s parental rights after appointed counsel filed an Anders brief. The court independently reviewed the full record, including the father’s pro se response, and held the appeal was wholly frivolous. In addressing the required endangerment grounds under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), the court relied on severe evidence that father physically abused another child in the home, that the children at issue were exposed to that dangerous environment, that father minimized the abuse as discipline, failed to accept responsibility, failed to show meaningful therapeutic progress, and had no recommendation for reunification despite technical service completion. The court also held that appointed counsel in a termination appeal may not withdraw solely because counsel filed an Anders brief; absent additional good cause, counsel must continue representation through any petition-for-review stage.
Litigation Takeaway
"In termination and other child-safety cases, courts focus on actual danger and whether the parent truly changed—not just whether services were completed. Abuse of one child, denial or minimization, and failure to benefit from therapy can support findings that other children remain at risk. For appointed appellate counsel, an Anders brief does not automatically end the representation."
Aliza Groups, Inc. v. Roshan K. Noorani
COA02
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment declaring void a deed that purported to transfer a married couple’s community homestead because the named grantor, Karim Noorani, did not sign it and the son who signed Karim’s name had no authority to do so. The court applied Texas law that a forged deed is void, not voidable, and passes no title. Roshan Noorani’s summary-judgment evidence directly established that Karim never signed the deed and that neither spouse authorized the son to execute any deed or lien on the property. The buyer’s agency and equity arguments failed because they did not create a genuine fact issue on authorization, and its appellate authority theory was not preserved because it did not match the theory raised in the trial court. The court therefore affirmed the order quieting title in Roshan’s favor.
Litigation Takeaway
"In family-property litigation, especially homestead disputes, an unauthorized signature on a deed can be attacked as a void forgery, and vague claims that a child or other family member had “authority” will not defeat summary judgment without competent evidence of actual authorization. Lock down the record early on who signed, who authorized, and whether the property was community homestead property."
Raymond Matthew Thibault v. The State of Texas
COA01
In this criminal appeal, the First Court of Appeals affirmed a conviction for indecency with a child by contact and upheld the admission of extraneous-act evidence that the defendant sought or took breast photographs of women, including a prior incident involving another thirteen-year-old girl. The court held the evidence was admissible for noncharacter purposes under Texas Rule of Evidence 404(b), especially to show intent and to rebut any claim that the touching or photographing was accidental or mistaken. The court also concluded under Rule 403 that the evidence’s probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, particularly given the similarity of the prior conduct and the limiting instruction. The conviction was affirmed.
Litigation Takeaway
"Prior sexualized conduct may be admissible when it is tied to a specific disputed issue like intent, grooming, or absence of accident—not just bad character. In family-law cases, lawyers should frame or attack this kind of evidence with precision under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403, because those rulings can heavily affect custody, possession, and protective-order outcomes."
Jason Murray Davis and Davis & Santos, P.C. v. Graham Weston; Carowest Land Ltd.; Graham Weston as Trustee of Countyline Land Trust; and Kuehler Road, LLC f/k/a Kuehler Road, Ltd.
COA03
In this divorce-related crossover dispute, the Austin Court of Appeals held that former clients’ claims against their longtime lawyer and his firm for breach of fiduciary duty and fraud by nondisclosure could proceed despite a TCPA motion to dismiss. The plaintiffs alleged the lawyer had represented Graham Weston, related family entities, and other family interests over many years, then switched sides and represented Graham’s wife in the divorce while using trust and confidential information gained from those prior relationships. The court analyzed the case as a substantive conflict-and-loyalty dispute rather than merely an attack on protected petitioning or litigation conduct. Relying on the record, including prior disqualification findings that described the lawyer as effectively a family attorney with fiduciary duties to Graham, the court concluded the suit was not subject to TCPA dismissal on the record presented and affirmed the trial court’s denial of the motion.
Litigation Takeaway
"In entity-heavy divorces, a lawyer’s prior work for one spouse, family businesses, trusts, or the broader family enterprise can create fiduciary-duty exposure that survives early dismissal. For family-law litigators, the lesson is to build a strong record on the practical scope of prior representation and frame conflict claims as loyalty, confidentiality, and nondisclosure violations—not just complaints about litigation activity."