Opinion Library
Texas court rulings translated into actionable litigation strategy.
This Week's DigestStrategy Category
1262 opinions found
Westcott Law Group PLLC v. Paychex, Inc.
COA14
Paychex obtained a judgment titled “Final Default Judgment” against Westcott Law Group after Westcott missed its answer deadline. But Westcott had transmitted an answer and counterpetition over the weekend, which—under Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(f)(5)—was deemed filed at midnight on the next business day, making Westcott’s counterclaims (conversion, fraud, and DTPA violations) on file when the trial court signed the default judgment that Monday. On restricted appeal, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals first addressed jurisdiction and applied Texas finality law for non-conventional dispositions (including defaults): a judgment is final only if it actually disposes of all claims and parties or states with unmistakable clarity that it does so. Although the order was labeled “Final Default Judgment” and contained standard execution/enforcement language, it did not mention or dispose of Westcott’s counterclaims and did not include unequivocal all-claims/all-parties finality language. The court therefore held the judgment was interlocutory; and because Texas statutes authorize restricted appeals only from final judgments, no interlocutory restricted appeal was available. The court dismissed the restricted appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction, leaving the counterclaims (and the case) pending in the trial court.
Litigation Takeaway
"Do not rely on a “final” caption. Before appealing—or enforcing—confirm the order either expressly disposes of every pleaded claim (including counterclaims, attorney’s fees, sanctions, reimbursement, and declaratory relief) or contains unmistakably clear all-claims/all-parties finality language. If anything remains pending, the “judgment” may be interlocutory, appellate deadlines may not run, and any attempted (restricted) appeal can be dismissed for want of jurisdiction."
Holloway v. State
COA02
In an indecency-by-exposure prosecution, the defendant objected under Texas Rule of Evidence 403 to the State’s use of “context” evidence surrounding the charged incident: a non-graphic photo of the child complainant and testimony about closely timed, related encounters (an earlier exposure-like incident involving the child’s mother, a later door-checking/Ring-video incident at her home, and another school-area exposure-type event). The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied Rule 403’s pro-admission presumption and the Gigliobianco balancing factors, emphasizing that evidence is not excluded merely because it is harmful; exclusion requires that unfair prejudice substantially outweigh probative value. Because the defense made intent (intent to arouse or gratify) a contested issue, the surrounding-incident evidence had heightened probative force to show sexual intent and to provide a coherent narrative explaining recognition and the complainant’s mother’s reactions. The court also noted safeguards reducing 403 risk, including limiting instructions and the absence of undue delay or cumulativeness. It held the trial court acted within the zone of reasonable disagreement in admitting both the contextual testimony and the child’s photograph and affirmed the conviction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Rule 403 is a “substantial imbalance” rule, not a “keep it nice” rule: when intent, danger, or credibility is disputed, closely connected prior/other incidents and contextual photos can come in to “connect the dots,” especially if you (1) tie the evidence to a specific contested issue (intent/absence of mistake/fear), (2) show tight temporal and factual proximity, (3) keep the presentation non-cumulative, and (4) request/offer limiting instructions. Conversely, if you argue accident/mistake/innocent intent, expect the court to allow more context evidence and preserve your position with targeted objections and Rule 105 limits."
Claudia Lucius Williams Smith v. Kenneth Wayne Allen
COA14
In this heirship dispute, the court addressed whether a Harris County home purchased in 1972 was separate or community property. The resolution turned on whether the decedent, Lossie Mae Smith, was informally married to Tom Willie Smith at the time of purchase. The trial court found no informal marriage existed in 1972, pointing to a deed identifying Lossie as a single woman ("feme sole") and testimony from siblings that Tom was not in her life at that time. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed, emphasizing that because a key letter supporting the marriage claim was never formally admitted into evidence—only placed in the court file—it lacked probative weight. The court held the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the separate-property characterization.
Litigation Takeaway
"Evidence that is merely 'in the court file' is not the same as evidence admitted at trial. To prove an informal marriage or challenge property characterization, you must formally admit your documents into evidence and preserve all procedural objections—such as concerns about legal representation or notice—at the trial level, or you risk losing your right to appeal those issues."
In the Interest of C.H., a Child
COA02
In a SAPCR enforcement action, Mother sought reimbursement for prenatal and postnatal medical expenses that the parties’ agreed order required Father to pay 50% of after Mother “furnish[ed]” receipts/bills/EOBs by a set deadline. Father admitted nonpayment but argued enforcement failed because Mother did not prove she provided the required documentation—particularly because the underlying bills and receipts were not admitted at the hearing. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals applied the abuse-of-discretion standard, construed the agreed order under contract principles, and rejected Father’s attempt to treat the “furnish by August 22” language as a condition precedent (noting the absence of clear conditional words like “if” or “provided that”). The court held that service evidence—Mother’s attorney’s reimbursement letter to Father’s attorney with an itemized list of providers, dates, and out-of-pocket amounts, plus electronic proof of email service—constituted some evidence that Mother complied with the order’s notice/documentation requirement, and the trial court was entitled to credit that proof over Father’s denial of receipt. The court affirmed the enforcement judgment awarding Mother $30,181 (plus interest) for unreimbursed prenatal and postnatal medical expenses.
Litigation Takeaway
"In enforcement of unreimbursed medical expenses (treated as additional child support), win or lose often turns on proving the process: documented, provable service of a reimbursement demand can satisfy “furnish/notice” provisions even if every underlying bill is not admitted, and a bare “I never got it” defense is unlikely to overcome credible service records—especially where the order’s notice language is drafted as a covenant, not a true condition precedent."
Ava Washington v. Margaret Victoria
COA01
In a probate will contest arising from a late-in-life hospice will, the proponent of a 2016 will argued the decedent changed his estate plan because his daughter had financially exploited him, while the daughter contended the decedent lacked testamentary capacity due to end-stage illness and cognitive impairment. The First Court of Appeals held the evidence was legally sufficient under City of Keller/“more than a scintilla” review for a reasonable jury to find the decedent had testamentary capacity at the time of execution. However, the court reversed and remanded because the trial court allowed testimony supporting an inflammatory “she took his money” narrative to explain motive for disinheritance, yet excluded the daughter’s responsive rebuttal evidence. The court treated this one-sided evidentiary ruling as an abuse of discretion and concluded the exclusion probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment, making the error harmful and requiring a new trial.
Litigation Takeaway
"If the court lets your opponent introduce a damaging “financial exploitation/bad actor” story to sway motive and credibility, you must be allowed to rebut it. Preserve the issue with a clear offer of proof and a ruling—because even where the verdict is supported by legally sufficient evidence, an asymmetrical evidentiary ruling that leaves the jury with an unanswered accusation can be reversible harmful error."
In the Interest of J.B.S. and R.G.S., Children
COA13
In a Chapter 157 SAPCR enforcement proceeding, Mother sought contempt-style relief against Father for alleged violations of multiple prior orders. The trial court dismissed/denied the enforcement motion on threshold legal grounds (treating many alleged violations as pre-final-order and effectively barred) and signed an order denying enforcement. Mother attempted a direct appeal, arguing the denial was a final, appealable order under Texas Family Code § 109.002. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals analyzed the substance of the proceeding and reiterated that contempt/enforcement determinations under Chapter 157 are not reviewable by direct appeal; any review lies, if at all, in mandamus (and habeas if confinement is ordered). Because the order was an unappealable enforcement/contempt ruling, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Litigation Takeaway
"Don’t assume a signed order that ends a Chapter 157 enforcement hearing is appealable. If the relief sought/ruling made is contempt-type enforcement, the correct review vehicle is usually mandamus (or habeas if confinement is involved); filing a direct appeal can waste time and jeopardize your client’s only effective remedy."
In re Nicholas David Kiselov
COA05
In a Dallas County post-judgment family case, the relator sought mandamus to compel the trial court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law after a hearing on a motion for jurisdictional production and a motion to disqualify. The Fifth Court of Appeals denied relief at the threshold because the petition omitted the mandatory Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.3(k) certification that every factual statement is supported by competent evidence in the appendix or record—an omission the court treated as an independently sufficient reason to deny mandamus. The court also held, in the alternative, that even with a compliant petition the relator failed to meet the two mandamus prerequisites under In re Prudential—showing neither a clear abuse of discretion nor that appeal was an inadequate remedy—so extraordinary relief compelling findings was not warranted on the record presented.
Litigation Takeaway
"Mandamus in Texas is strict-compliance and strict-proof: include the TRAP 52.3(k) certification (and back every fact with record evidence) or your petition can be denied outright, and even then you must build a record that concretely shows both a clear abuse of discretion and why an appeal cannot fix the problem—especially for post-judgment “findings after a hearing” complaints."
In the Matter of J.D.
COA14
J.D., a juvenile serving a 25-year determinate sentence for capital murder and aggravated robbery, challenged the juvenile court’s decision under Texas Family Code § 54.11 to transfer him from the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) to the Institutional Division of TDCJ (TDCJ–ID) to complete his unserved sentence rather than release him to parole supervision. On abuse-of-discretion review, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals treated the transfer decision as discretionary and asked only whether the record contained “some evidence” tied to the § 54.11(k) factors supporting transfer. Although J.D. presented evidence of rehabilitation (good institutional behavior, educational progress, and favorable therapeutic notes), the court held the juvenile judge could credit competing evidence and weigh factors differently. The court emphasized the extreme violence and manner of the offenses, TJJD’s recommendation to transfer, J.D.’s incomplete capital/serious violent offender treatment, and testimony about victim-family and community safety concerns. Because these items provided some evidence supporting transfer, the court affirmed and held the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering transfer to TDCJ–ID rather than parole release.
Litigation Takeaway
"In § 54.11 determinate-sentence transfer hearings, “doing well” in TJJD may not overcome a safety-driven record. Expect trial courts to give heavy weight to offense severity, incomplete specialized treatment, and TJJD/prosecutor recommendations—and appellate courts will usually affirm if there is some evidence supporting transfer. For family-law cases that hinge on whether a youth returns to the home, treat the juvenile transfer record as critical evidence for risk, safety planning, and temporary orders."
In the Interest of I.S., a Child
COA10
In a termination of parental rights case, Mother timely requested a de novo hearing under Texas Family Code § 201.015 after an associate judge’s bench trial and proposed termination ruling. The referring district court began—but did not complete—the de novo hearing, then prematurely signed an order adopting the associate judge’s termination order (incorrectly reciting that no de novo demand had been made). Mother filed an accelerated notice of appeal the same day. The Tenth Court of Appeals held that, although procedurally erroneous, the adoption order was a final, appealable (voidable) judgment that triggered accelerated appellate deadlines and the running of the trial court’s plenary power. Because plenary power expired and appellate jurisdiction attached, the trial court lacked authority to later complete the de novo hearing or sign subsequent adoption/affirmance orders; those later actions were legal nullities and could not cure the § 201.015 violation. The court reversed the termination judgment and remanded for a proper de novo hearing.
Litigation Takeaway
"If a party timely requests a de novo hearing from an associate judge’s ruling, a referring court cannot sign an adoption order before completing the de novo hearing—and if it does, treat that adoption order as a final, deadline-triggering judgment immediately. File the accelerated appeal and/or plenary-power motions right away; do not assume the trial court can “fix it later,” because post-judgment de novo proceedings may be nullities once plenary power expires or an appeal is pending."
In re J.M.B. II
COA03
In a Travis County juvenile delinquency case, the State filed a Rule 162 nonsuit/motion to dismiss before any adjudication hearing. The trial court initially dismissed the petition but, the next day, signed an order vacating the dismissal and reset the case for adjudication based on policy concerns (including community safety and judicial confessions). The Third Court of Appeals held that, under Family Code § 51.17(a), the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure apply in juvenile cases absent conflict, and Rule 162 gives a plaintiff an absolute right to nonsuit before resting, leaving the trial court with a ministerial duty to dismiss unless collateral matters (pending claims for affirmative relief) remain. Because no collateral matters were shown, the trial court had no discretion to undo the nonsuit by vacating the dismissal and resetting the case. The court conditionally granted mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its order vacating the dismissal, reinstate the nonsuit-based dismissal, and enter the nonsuit in the minutes.
Litigation Takeaway
"A properly timed Rule 162 nonsuit is mandatory, not discretionary: absent collateral claims for affirmative relief (fees, sanctions, counterclaims), the court must dismiss and cannot later “revive” the case for policy or case-management reasons. If a trial court refuses to honor—or tries to vacate—a nonsuit dismissal, mandamus can be the fastest way to enforce the ministerial duty and stop a case from being pushed back to trial."